Right-wing Parties In Europe Research Articles

THE REPUBLICAN TRUMP VOTER

With its emphasis on anti‐immigration rhetoric and actions, protectionism, as well as populism, Donald Trump has transformed the Republican Party into a party that closely resembles populist radical right‐wing parties in Europe. In this article, we first illustrate how the Republican Party has transformed into a radical right‐wing party. Second, we examine the degree to which the Trump voter has the same or similar characteristics as the prototypical radical right‐wing voter. To do so, we compare some key features of voters for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Trump voters. Through original survey research, we find that the two voter types are alike. Both AfD and Trump voters espouse anti‐immigrant sentiment, reject globalization, and position themselves on the right on a left‐right ideological scale. This implies that, both from a supply and demand side perspective, the Trump Republican Party has become a prototypical radical right‐wing party.

The representation of migrants in Spanish judicial decisions: using corpus data to refute hate speech

The phenomenon of immigration and its depiction in media texts have been examined profusely within the field of corpus-based discourse analysis ( Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008 ; Baker et al., 2013 ; and Blinder and Allen, 2016 ). This research seeks to present it as reflected in a corpus of 600 judicial decisions issued by Spanish courts in the years 2016 and 2017. This analysis was motivated by the rise of extreme right-wing parties in Europe in recent years. Such parties dehumanise immigrants and portray them as a threat to the welfare state. On first examination, the results appear to dissociate immigration and crime since a considerable percentage of the keywords obtained (about 20 percent) revolves around three major topoi (namely, ‘family’, ‘territory/access’ and ‘legal punishment’) and there is no evidence of any major offences or crimes amongst the top-ranking lexicon. The study of the collocate networks of the keywords within the category ‘legal punishment’ confirms our initial perception; in fact, out of twenty-one collocates, only the word delito (‘crime’) itself collocates with terms referring to typified crimes such as violencia (‘violence’). In parallel, the data were triangulated using the text-classification software UMUTextStats ( García-Díaz et al., 2018 ). The results of this second analysis also confirm our initial observations.

The Characteristics of the Nordic right-wing populism

The last two decades have seen the rise of right-wing parties in Europe, spurred among other things by a series of crises, the latest of which being the ongoing COVID-19 global pandemic. Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark did not find themselves isolated from the political and socio-economic shocks and aftershocks of such events, and right-wing populist parties and movements belonging to the Nordic region have also gained strength, sometimes even being a part of governments. However, these parties have certain characteristics that distinguish them from their counterparts in the rest of the Europe, given the specific social, political, economic and historical context of the region. Such traits can be listed as welfare chauvinism, right-wing egalitarianism, authoritarian positions on sociocultural issues, and populist, anti-establishment drive. At the same time, these parties have demonstrated their high pragmatism and ability for adaptation to the current political situation in their countries. In this work a quick overview is presented of the principles of four major right-wing parties in the Nordic region (The Finns Party, Sweden Democrats, Norwegian Progress Party, and Danish People’s Party), and the differences and similarities in their motivations are discussed.

Explaining the emergence of the radical right in Spain and Portugal: salience, stigma and supply

Spain and Portugal have long been considered exceptions when it comes to the electoral success of radical right-wing parties in Europe. This scenario changed for both countries in 2019, with the extraordinary rise of Vox in Spain and the comparatively more modest election of one representative of Chega in Portugal. Their emergence – and the stark difference in the extents of their success – provides researchers with an ideal ‘edge-case’ and can be explained via a theoretical model that builds on and fuses previous explanatory models for radical right success. The Iberian cases demonstrate that radical right parties succeed when they (i) avoid the stigma of extremism, (ii) benefit from a gap in political supply on the right and (iii) cater to an unsatiated demand of voters on a salient sociocultural issue. While both countries had long been home to marginal far-right political forces, the stigma of extremism prevented them from being considered credible political alternatives. The appearance of new parties that emerged as a result of splits from the mainstream centre-right, in both cases reflecting a beleaguered political supply, gave the radical right an opportunity to avoid stigma, as we demonstrate through a news content analysis. However, whereas in Spain Vox could profit from both the Catalan independence challenge and the uptick in salience of immigration, which had previously been anomalously low in Iberia, Chega has not (yet) benefited from a similarly ripe political opportunity structure in Portugal.

Many losers – One winner? An examination of vote switching to the AfD in the 2017 German federal election using VAA data

The German federal election of 2017 saw significant losses for the two German mainstream parties (Volksparteien) and governing coalition partners, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD). The major beneficiary was the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a right-populist party, which almost tripled its amount of votes received from the 2013 federal election. Making use of data from a Voting Advice Application, this article seeks to explore the AfD’s extraordinary electoral success with particular attention to the party’s capacity to attract voters from the two mainstream and traditionally powerful parties. Drawing on the literature on radical right-wing parties in Europe and tracking the route of AfD from a single-issue Eurosceptic party to a radical party with broader programmatic appeal, this work tests hypotheses regarding demographic, political and attitudinal determinants of voting for AfD, in general, and switching one’s vote to AfD from CDU/CSU or SPD more specifically. In line with previous literature, individual-level analyses show that voting for the AfD seems to be more tangentially related to demographic variables, such as sex, age and education and more strongly connected to political concerns, e.g. “conservative” self-placement and attitudes toward specific policies, immigration and Euroscepticism in particular.

Теоретические аспекты и дискурсивная практика праворадикальной идеологии в политических процессах современной Европы

Introduction. The article discusses the main approaches to the concept “right radicalism” in modern Russian and foreign political science. In addition, the author shows how actors in political processes use ideology in the framework of political struggle as exemplified by the ideological discourse of the far-right British National Party. The aim of the study is to trace the specifics of constructing the nationalist discourse of the rightwing political forces in modern Europe (using the example of the British National Party) and formulate the author’s definition of the term “right-wing radicalism”. Methods. The author uses comparative and historical-retrospective methods to comprehensively consider the phenomenon of the right-wing radicalism, as well as discourse analysis of a political party’s text, which contributes to a better understanding of the features constructing the discourse of these actors in political processes. Scientific novelty of the study. The work provides comprehensive analysis of the concept “right radicalism” in the context of political processes of modern Europe, the author suggests his own definition of the phenomenon considered. Results. From the vast scientific heritage devoted to issues of the right-wing radicalism, ideology, and functioning of right-wing political parties, the author choses several approaches presented in both domestic and foreign political science, which makes it possible to disclose essential ideas of the “right-wing radicalism”. In addition, as a result of the discourse analysis of the British National Party program document, the author identifies the main points that are key to the nationalist discourse of the modern European right-wing radical party. Conclusions. As a result of the study, we can conclude that the concept “right radicalism” is one of the most debatable in modern political science and the relevance of its study is not in doubt. The analysis of the program document of one of the oldest extreme right-wing parties in Europe shows that ideological discourse is formed from various components and, using various methods, the researcher can analyze its structure in detail, understanding how political forces form this discourse within the framework of the political struggle.

Introduction

Introduction

An analysis of the European Enlargement Policy through years: the case of Western Balkans

No matter its peculiarities, enlargement policy through its conditionality policy instrument is viewed as the most successful EU foreign policy. It is argued that enlargement has strengthened and stabilized democracy in Europe. This review article discusses the enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans since the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit and the Union’s efforts and mechanisms to maintain enlargement at the forefront. These mechanisms include forums and summits of discussion between EU and Western Balkan key actors, various strategies on enlargement, and financial dedications to fostering reform implementation like IPA. The 2003 Summit is considered a critical point in regards to refocusing attention and efforts to enlargement and reaffirming a European future for the Balkan region; therefore, it is important to consider all alternations from that point in time. Thus, the aim is to look at enlargement policy through years and provide an insightful view to the enlargement credibility that allows us to critically review it. To achieve the set goal, this article employees the content analysis methodology. The results show that although the Commission has shown its commitment to enlargement from time to time, the enlargement policy has been at stake at different times from 2003. The raise of the populism right wing parties in Europe, the growth of eurospectis and spread of terrorism are few of the contributing factors to the enlargement fatigue.

Europe’s Anti-immigrant Parties: False Start or Second Wind?

The article makes focus on the rise of Western Europe’s far-right parties which act with anti-immigrant agenda amid 2010s European migrant crisis. Massive influxes of refugees and migrants have accumulated huge political significance and triggered off a wide range of conflicts (both on international and national levels). The migrant crisis has indicated many social-political challenges for European countries. The crisis has been synchronous with a rise of popularity of right populist political movements (old ones as well as new ones), which promote restrictions of immigration etc. At the same time it cannot be ignored that West European right-wing populist political movements achieved some success in previous decades, well ahead of the current migrant crisis. Immigration issue has been a centerpiece of political discourses of West European right-wing parties (National Front in France, for instance) since late 1970s – early 1980s. But it is quite obvious that the 2010s migrant crisis became a trigger for revitalization of the far-right movements which are outspoken critics of the European Union as “a supra- national body” dictating its conditions to the member countries. Besides, the crisis gave a boost to a rise of new populist movements (for example, “Alternative for Germany”). In 2017 the populist right-wing parties in Europe won the largest support over the three past decades. Recently the right populist forces appeared in elections in a number of European countries (Germany, Austria, France etc.) as tough competitor of traditional mainstream political parties and won parliamentary representation and/or representation in the government coalitions. Furthermore, these movements demonstrate attempts to change their image to shift to political mainstream. However, in the foreseeable future, any cardinal breakthrough and far-right anti- immigrant parties’ coming to the power in Western Europe’s coutrnies is hardly possible.

Frames of nostalgia and belonging: the resurgence of ethno-nationalism in Sweden

ABSTRACT This article explores the ethno-nationalist rhetoric promoted by radical right-wing parties in Europe; its perceived threats against national identity translated into a nostalgia for the past based on ethnic homogeneity. Five anti-immigrant frames have been especially instrumental in attracting voters, merging with other central components to construct a potent master frame and structuring much of the mobilizing activities of these parties. This development motivates a closer look into the ways in which the ethno-nationalist message is framed and constructed, taking Sweden as our case in point. The Sweden Democrats entered the Swedish parliament in 2010, an election that has come to mark the end of Swedish ‘exceptionalism’ and pointing towards the resurgence of ethno-nationalism in Sweden too. The Swedish case is analyzed with a focus on the Sweden Democrats particular ethno-nationalist message; the rhetoric of decline of golden ages and solutions posed to combat these alleged processes of decay. We depart from framing theory that allow us to better understand the centrality of the ethno-nationalist message, which demonstrates considerable continuity over time, despite the modernization of party rhetoric. Thus, the exclusive conceptualization of nationality as constituted by an ‘inherited essence’, proposes that Swedish identity is more than culturally assigned. The empirical material consists of Sweden Democrat party manifestos and position papers since 1989 and selected articles from the party newsletter (SD Kuriren).

Rechtspopulismus als Klassenkampf? Soziale Deklassierung und politische Mobilisierung

From a perspective of theoretical inequality, the causes of the rise of populist right-wing parties in Europe are attributed either primarily to socio-economic divisions or primarily to cultural divisions. Theoretically as well as empirically an integrated perspective appears more substantial, which understands the conflicts about truth and sovereignty of interpretation that arise in right-wing populism as expression of symbolic struggles which attack the entire regime at the present time. Following Pierre Bourdieu’s theory, the author explains how the political narratives of right-wing populism tie in with pre-political class specific attitudes and habitual patterns. The specificity of these habitual patterns results from transformations in response to the declassification experiences made since 1989, which also affect milieus in the upper and middle classes. The article illuminates the motives of mobilisation in three milieus: the conservative upper class, the traditional middle class and the precarious lower class.

Radical right-wing parties in Europe

AbstractIn this paper I discuss, critically, the literature on populism and the extent to which it applies to the contemporary radical right-wing parties in Europe. These parties are often – and increasingly – referred to as populist parties. I argue that it is misleading to label these parties ‘populist parties’, since populism is not the most pertinent feature of this party family. These parties are mainly defined by ethnic nationalism, and not a populist ideology. In their discourse they are primarily preoccupied with questions pertaining to national identity and national security – and their ‘negative’ doubles immigration, multiculturalism, Islamist threat – and they consistently pit ‘the people’ mainly against elites that they view as responsible for a cultural and political threat against their idealized image of their nation state. The ethnic nationalism of European radical right-wing parties is more important for their discourse and tends to influence the populist elements.

From Political Fringe to Political Mainstream: The Front National and the 2014 Municipal and European Elections in France

The succession of Jean-Marie Le Pen by his daughter Marine Le Pen as president of the Front National (FN) in January 2011 heralded a significant strategic shift in the party’s development. In terms of its overarching political objective, the FN has moved from playing its historical spoiler role as an anti-system protest party to recasting itself as a mainstream political formation interested in exercising political power. In order to secure this objective, the FN under Marine Le Pen has adopted a two-pronged discursive and organizational approach. At a discursive level, the FN has toned down the racialized anti-immigrant and anti-Semitic rhetoric that characterized it in the past and instead chosen to couch its rejection of immigration in a broader, more conceptually neutral opposition to neoliberal globalization. The central element underpinning this discursive aggiornamento has been the rejection of the European Union, which is presented as an institutional stalking horse for the latter, conjoined with an avowedly Gaullist reaffirmation of France’s economic and political sovereignty. While the ‘UMPS’ (an acronym combining the initials of the principal center-right and -left parties in France) is busy facilitating Europe’s neo-liberal economic integration, so this new line goes, the FN erects itself as the sole authentic partisan opponent of this project and defender of its sectoral victims. At an organizational level, the FN has attempted to balance its top-heavy party structure built around a charismatic leader in favor of establishing a grassroots structure geared to responding to local concerns. Specifically, it is attempting to develop — much like the French Communist Party in the 1950’s and 1960’s — a clientelistic network to anchor its municipal electoral implantation. In turn, this Frontisme municipal is designed to strengthen the FN’s parliamentary representation at the mainstream parties’ expense. Thus, through both its discursive aggiornamento and new emphasis on local organizing, the party hopes to translate its status as the third political force in the country following the 2012 presidential elections into concrete electoral gains. This would allow it to more directly shape national policy and ultimately aspire to exercising power in its own right. The municipal and European parliamentary elections respectively scheduled for March and May 2014 stand to provide a sterling empirical test of the electoral effectiveness of the FN’s strategic reorientation under Marine Le Pen. The former will gauge the FN’s organizational gambit to wrest local political control from the mainstream parties, while the latter will measure the electoral resonance of its anti-European discourse. On a backdrop of generalized socioeconomic crisis, this paper shall analyze the FN’s performance in the 2014 municipal and European parliamentary elections from the standpoint of discourse and organization as essential factors of political supply. First, it will assess what the electoral results bode for the FN’s positioning and status within the French party system, chiefly whether they signal the party’s ‘breakout’ from the political fringe to the political mainstream. In turn, it will consider the broader lessons and implications this case holds for other radical right-wing parties in Europe.

Extreme Rechte in der Krise – Kämpfe ums Subjekt

The success of right wing parties in Europe is closely linked to the lack of representation that went along with the neoliberal shift of the social democrats. Feelings of injustice going along with altering the trans-national mode of production, concepts of the welfare state and labour politics were taken into account by rightwing “critics” that fight globalization in fighting immigrants. The crisis and bail-out-politics enforced feelings of injustice but at the same time brought the state – and the unions – ‘back in’ e.g. in creating a ‘clash-for-clunkers’ project. That seems to have weakened right-wing parties in Germany and France presenting themselves as an authoritarian fordistic option, but at the same time strengthened racist campaigns in other countries.

(Small) Enterpreneurs first!

A large body of research on political parties is devoted to the family of extreme right parties. Yet, systematic analyses of extreme right parties discourse remain scarce. The present study addresses this gap in the literature by providing a discourse analysis of the Vlaams Belang, one of the most successful extreme right-wing parties in Europe. Moreover, by focusing on this partys economic discourse, the study also sheds new light on the ongoing debate about the economic viewpoints of the new extreme right parties. We conclude that the Vlaams Belangs economic rhetoric is in line with its ethno-linguistic, nationalist standpoints and pleas for a Flemish economic policy. The partys economic programme is built on liberal points of view and seems particularly aimed at attracting (dissatisfied) liberal voters. Importantly, as economic issues remain subordinated to the partys ideological core, it appears that the Vlaams Belang has largely instrumentalised its programme to expand its electorate.

Fertile grounds for extreme right-wing parties: Explaining the Vlaams Blok's electoral success

The Vlaams Blok is one of the most successful extreme right-wing parties in Europe. We empirically identify contextual determinants that contribute to its political success in the municipal elections of October 8th, 2000 in Flanders. The use of the Tobit II estimator allows disentangling the party's decision to participate in an election and its (latent) political success. We find that the Vlaams Blok is particularly successful in municipalities with a small network of social organisations. The presence of Turkish or Maghrebian citizens and a high average income also foster extreme right success. Economic deprivation reduces the probability of Vlaams Blok participating in elections, while a high crime rate positively affects the party's decision to participate in the elections. The findings on municipal elections are confirmed by an empirical analysis of the Vlaams Blok's success in the federal elections of 1999.

The adaptation of the extreme right''s discourse

The Vlaams Blok is one of the most successful of the extreme right-wing parties in Europe. The growth of the party was partly due to its populist rhetoric on race and security, and its anti-establishment rhetoric. Indeed, over the years, the party has prioritized the immigration issue, which has yielded electoral rewards, and sidelined the Flemish question. Further, the Vlaams Blok has filtered, softened and rewritten strongly-worded ideological texts in order to broaden its electoral appeal, and consolidate its gains. The recent transformation of the Vlaams Blok into Vlaams Belang may be seen as a further step in the party’s attempt to become a right-conservative people’s party. It is another indication of an attempt to get away from the party’s image as being on the extreme of the right wing and the historical legacy of collaboration, and radical Flemish nationalism. However, the moderation of the Vlaams Blok’s language over the years is not only the result of electoral strategy. While enjoying steady growing electoral support, the party has remained isolated on the Belgian political scene. The traditional parties reacted to the extreme right’s success with a total exclusion of the party. This situation led far-right leaders to modify their strategies, positions and rhetoric, and to try to demonstrate that the Vlaams Blok is capable of assuming power responsibly. Similar trends in the moderation and adaptation of the party’s rhetoric can be seen in other successful extreme right-wing parties. In France, the Front National (FN) has of late presented itself as a party of good governance. In Austria, the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (FPO) significantly moderated its program and, as a consequence, dovetailed with the mainstream of Austrian politics in 1999. Ascension to government forced the party to review further its themes, tone and style. And in Italy, the Alleanza Nazionale (AN) developed a program in line with those of moderate European right-wing parties after it entered Berlusconi’s 1994 government.

The Institutionalization of Extreme Right-wing Charismatic Parties: a Paradox?

In this article, we explain the puzzling continuous success of the far right-wing parties in Europe by using micro-organizational factors such as charismatic leadership and cohesive party organization, contributing to the process of party institutionalization and demonstrating the success of the extreme right-wing parties. We attempt to solve what appears to be a paradox of the institutionalization of far right charismatic parties on the basis of theories of party leadership and party institutionalization. In this endeavour we first define the concept of charismatic parties, and then outline our argument regarding the paradox of charismatic institutionalization and present criteria for measuring institutionalization of charismatic parties. Finally, we outline a proposed theory of `hard charismatic parties' institutionalization. The French FN (Front National) and the Austrian FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) serve as case studies to test our proposed model.