Richard Swinburne Research Articles

Varieties of Dualism

Thomas Aquinas argues that matter is informed by a rational soul to compose a human person. But a person may survive her body's death since a rational soul is able to exist and function without matter. This leads to the typical characterization of Aquinas as a dualist. Thomistic dualism, however, is distinct from both Platonic dualism and various accounts of substance dualism offered by philosophers such as Richard Swinburne. For both Plato and Swinburne, a person is identical to an immaterial soul that is contingently related to a human body. For Aquinas, a human person is composed of her soul and the matter it informs, but is not identical to either metaphysical component. I explicate Thomistic dualism while critically analyzing Swinburne's account. I conclude that Aquinas's account has the resources to address a central issue that arises for substance dualism.

Were There Two Consciousnesses in Christ?

AbstractA major problem with the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation is that Jesus is meant to be both God and man. Richard Swinburne attempts to overcome the problem by having it that in him the...

Was Jesus God? by Richard Swinburne, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 192, £9.99 hbk

Was Jesus God? by Richard Swinburne, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 192, £9.99 hbk

Richard Swinburne's argument to the simplicity of God via the infinite

AbstractIn The Coherence of Theism Richard Swinburne writes that a person cannot be omniscient and perfectly free. In The Existence of God Swinburne writes that God is a person who is omniscient and perfectly free. There is a straightforward reason why the two passages are not in tension, but recognition of this reason raises a problem for Swinburne's argument in The Existence of God (the conclusion of which is that God likely exists). In this paper I present the problem for Swinburne's argument. I then consider two potential responses and suggest that neither succeeds.

Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, and Principle P

Swinburne relies on principle P in The Existence of God to argue that God is simple and thus likely to exist. In this paper, I argue that Swinburne does not support P. In particular, his arguments from mathematical simplicity and scientists’ preferences both fail. Given the central role P plays in Swinburne’s overall argument in The Existence of God, I conclude that Swinburne should further support P if his argument that God likely exists is to be persuasive.

Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, and Exact Numerical Values

Richard Swinburne’s argument in The Existence of God discusses many probabilities, ultimately concluding that God probably exists. Swinburne gives exact values to almost none of these probabilities. I attempted to assign values to the probabilities that met that weak condition that they could be correct. In this paper, I first present a brief outline of Swinburne’s argument in The Existence of God. I then present the problems I encountered in Swinburne’s argument, specifically problems that interfered with my attempt to arrive at values for the probabilities discussed by Swinburne. Finally, I suggest that Swinburne’s argument would be more persuasive if he assigned exact values to his probabilities.

The Problem of Natural Evil I: General Theistic Replies

AbstractI examine different strategies involved in stating anti‐theistic arguments from natural evil, and consider some theistic replies. There are, traditionally, two main types of arguments from natural evil: those that purport to deduce a contradiction between the existence of natural evil and the existence of God, and those that claim that the existence of certain types or quantities of natural evil significantly lowers the probability that theism is true. After considering peripheral replies, I state four prominent theistic rebutting strategies: skeptical theism; Richard Swinburne's view that moral knowledge entails natural evil; the soul‐making theodicy; and the natural law theodicy.

Two Models of Radical Revelation in Austrian Philosophy

In this paper I highlight two opposing models of the notion of divine revelation: the propositional and the radical. The propositional understanding of revelation was central to theology and philosophy until the 19th century. Since then, a number of other models of revelation have emerged. I define as radical the understanding of revelation which emphasizes two features of revelation: 1) God’s existence is *per se* revelatory; 2) God’s revelation is *per se* self-revelation. I propose too an assessment of the notion of propositional revelation as presented by Richard Swinburne. And I offer detailed analyses of two representatives of the early understanding of divine revelation as self-revelation: the views of Bernard Bolzano and Anton Günther. Bolzano, the renowned mathematician, was also a philosopher of religion; and Günther, one of the most ingenious writers in Austrian philosophy, was not only a theologian but also a philosopher comparable to the important figures of 19th century German thought.

Animals and the Problem of Evil in Recent Theodicies

This essay critically evaluates the theodicies of John Hick, Richard Swinburne and process theism regarding animal suffering and evils. Their positions on animals are found to be flawed and/or inadequate because they cannot explain the mass suffering and unnecessary deaths to animals throughout time. I also offer a positive contribution. That is, God’s putative love for all humans and animals does not entail that he loves every single human and animal. It is very possible that God treats humans and animals similarly in regard to evils. This theory partly explains human tragedies such as the Holocaust and much unnecessary animal and human suffering.

Avoiding the Afterlife in Theodicy.

Contemporary proponents of theodical generally believe that a theodical reply to the evidential argument from evil must involve some appeal to the afterlife. In Richard Swinburne's writings on theodical, however, we find two arguments that may be offered in opposition to this prevailing view. In this paper, these two arguments—the argument from usefulness and the argument from assumed consent—are explained and evaluated. It is suggested that both of these arguments are rendered ineffective by their failure to distinguish between the different ways in which persons may be of-use in the attainment of some good state of affairs.

How to speak with intellectual and theological decency on the resurrection of Christ?: A comparison of Swinburne and Wright

AbstractIn recent scholarship the spiritual reading of the New Testament resurrection stories has come under pressure from new studies of the relevant data. In this article, two of the most conspicuous of these studies are compared and evaluated. First, Richard Swinburne's monograph opens our eyes to the fact that, in interpreting the resurrection stories, much more is at stake than is usually recognised in so-called ‘undogmatic’ exegesis. However, the rather crude way in which Swinburne deals with these stories, suggesting that they represent Jesus' resurrection as a bare fact not qualitatively different from other historical facts, neglects their peculiarity and displays insufficient hermeneutical sensitivity for their unique theological meaning. Second, Tom Wright's monumental volume is sometimes criticised for a similar single-minded focus on historical questions and a concomitant lack of attention to the eschatological character of Jesus' resurrection. As a result, George Hunsinger has argued, it becomes unclear why the resurrection reports embody life-transforming good news now. Close scrutiny of Wright's book, however, does not vindicate this criticism. Wright neither isolates the question of the resurrection's historicity from its theological meanings nor overlooks the fact that a plausible historical case for the resurrection does not in itself elicit faith. Still, he rightly argues that what people believe about what actually has happened often plays a vital role in their personal transformation. Moreover, the eschatological nature of the resurrection does not rule out the fact that it can be seen and discussed with integrity as a historical issue.

Religious Belief in the age of Science: An Epistemological Tragedy Godsgeloof in het tijdperk van wetenschap: Een epistemologisch drama

In this article it is argued that all religious beliefs to the effect that a specific god exists are prima facie implausible for two reasons: traditional sources of religious knowledge, or methods of religious investigation, such as revelations, prayer, and the interpretation of ‘signs’, have turned out to be unreliable, and religious beliefs are implausible given the background knowledge provided by modern science and scholarship. Four contemporary apologetic strategies for the religious believer, developed in detail by analytic philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga or Richard Swinburne, are discussed and criticized. It is further argued that the 18 objections against my argument for universal strong disjunctive atheism in ‘Atheïstisch manifest. De onredelijkheid van religie’ (Amsterdam, 1995, 2004), put forward by René van Woudenberg and Rik Peels (NTT 62/1:24-44), are inconclusive.

Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy. Second edition. By RICHARD SWINBURNE.

Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy. Second edition. By RICHARD SWINBURNE.

SWINBURNE ON RELIGION AND ETHICS

Simon Blackburn responds to the preceding article by Richard Swinburne.

GOD AND MORALITY

The first six articles in this issue of THINK have the theme “Good without God”. Here, Richard Swinburne argues that the existence of God is not a precondition of there being moral truths, but his existence does impact on what moral truths there are.

Is Simplicity Evidence of Truth?

In a short 1997 book entitled Simplicity as Evidence of Truth, the Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne has put forward the following thesis summarily: ‘… for theories (of equal scope) rendering equally probable our observational data (which, for brevity I shall call equally good at “predicting”), fitting equally well with background knowledge, the simplest is most probably true’.

Is Simplicity Evidence of Truth?

In a short 1997 book entitled Simplicity as Evidence of Truth, the Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne has put forward the following thesis summarily: ‘… for theories (of equal scope) rendering equally probable our observational data (which, for brevity I shall call equally good at “predicting”), fitting equally well with background knowledge, the simplest is most probably true’.

The Eternity of God. Comparative Study of Bernard Lonergan SJ and Richard Swinburne.

The Eternity of God. Comparative Study of Bernard Lonergan SJ and Richard Swinburne.

CORNEA AND CLOSURE

Could our observations of apparently pointless evil ever justify the conclusion that God does not exist? Not according to Stephen Wykstra, who several years ago announced the “Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access,” or “CORNEA,” a principle that has sustained critiques of atheistic arguments from evil ever since. Despite numerous criticisms aimed at CORNEA in recent years, the principle continues to be invoked and defended. We raise a new objection: CORNEA is false because it entails intolerable violations of closure. Could our observations of apparently pointless evil ever justify the conclusion that God does not exist? Not according to Stephen Wykstra, who several years ago announced the “Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access,” or “CORNEA,” a principle that has sustained critiques of atheistic arguments from evil ever since. 1 Despite numerous criticisms aimed at CORNEA in recent years, the principle continues to be invoked and defended. 2 We raise a new objection: CORNEA is false because it entails intolerable violations of closure. Wykstra offers CORNEA as a necessary condition for one’s being entitled to assert claims of the form “It appears that p .” He seeks to retain the virtues of Richard Swinburne’s account of “the ‘seems so, is so’ presumption” while rejecting what he regards as Swinburne’s arbitrary distinction between “positive” and “negative” seemings, a distinction he derides as “Swinburne’s Slip”: “Since the distinction between positive and negative seemings depends so much upon formulation, it is hard to see how it can have the epistemic bite Swinburne gives it.” 3 His alternative, CORNEA, runs as follows: On the basis of cognized situation s , human H is entitled to claim “It appears that p ” only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be different than it is in some way discernible by her. 4

Can Religious Experience Provide Justification for the Belief in God? The Debate in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy

AbstractIn recent analytic philosophy of religion, one hotly debated topic is the veridicality of religious experience. In this paper, I briefly trace how the argument from religious experience comes into prominence in the twentieth century. This is due to the able defense of this argument by Richard Swinburne, William Alston, and Jerome Gellman among others. I explain the argument's intuitive force and why the stock objections to religious experience are not entirely convincing. I expound Swinburne's approach and his application of the Principle of Credulity to religious experience. Then I critically examine four major objections to Swinburne. I conclude that the argument from religious experiences is not likely to be conclusive but it should not be dismissed either.