Military conflicts inevitably lead to the detention and interrogation of adversaries (or perceived adversaries), and American military action in Afghanistan and Iraq has resulted in the protracted and scrutinized detention and interrogation of varied personnel. Detention and interrogation, in turn, inevitably lead to moral and legal questions, and these questions have been especially poignant during and following the aforementioned campaigns. Controversially, the Bush administration did not afford Geneva Convention protections to so-called enemy combatants; these protections would have increased the standard of care (e.g., legally, medically) afforded to detainees and would have limited the interrogation options available to military personnel. Also controversially, reports have alleged that military interrogators have practiced “stress and duress” tactics that include “sleep management” (i.e., sleep deprivation), “dietary manipulation” (i.e., food withholding), “environmental manipulation” (e.g., exposure to extreme temperatures, presence of dogs), forced maintenance of uncomfortable positions for extended periods of time, isolation (sometimes for longer than 30 days), hooding, and so forth.1 Whether these tactics are tantamount to torture is debatable. They are certainly unpleasant but, in my view, fall short of archetypical instances of torture. Although the invocation of “torture” might seem merely semantic, it has substantial rhetorical force that has been often been carelessly and uncritically employed. For this reason, I propose to label interrogations that incorporate these tactics as hostile (which they clearly are) as opposed to torturous (which they arguably are not).2 To be sure, many of the arguments of this paper are as applicable to torture as they are to hostile interrogations. However, it is important to preserve the distinction so as to reflect current allegations. Before turning to a moral evaluation of physician involvement in hostile interrogations, it might be useful to briefly consider the morality of the interrogations themselves. If the interrogations are immoral, then physician contributions to their efficacy are presumably immoral a fortiori.3 So, if someone wanted to defend the morality of physician involvement in these interro-