Revolutionary Party Research Articles

Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the Post-PRI Transition

President Fox has made the improvement of public safety and reduction in corruption priorities of his government. Backed by an educated urban middle-class electorate, he faces fundamental challenges to the achievement of his goals. These include a legacy of institutionalized PRI (Institutionalized Revolutionary Party) corruption, limited respect for the rule of law, and the penetration of drug trafficking groups into the state structure. Mexico's long border with the United States has contributed to the rapid rise in organized crime and the use of Mexican territory by foreign crime groups. Mexico's past may preclude the transition to a more democratic and open society despite the best of presidential intentions and the desires of much of the Mexican population.

Assessing the Consequences of Electoral Democracy: Subnational Legislative Change in Mexico

Recent research has taught much about the dynamics of democratic transition and consolidation.1 Yet important questions about regime change remain unanswered. Most notably, what are the consequences of political democratization? As democracy has taken root across Latin America, many scholars and citizens of the newly democratic countries have expressed disappointment with the substantive results of the political transitions.2 National democratic governance has not successfully addressed problems of pervasive inequality and poverty. As international financial institutions increasingly prescribe decentralization to solve the region's intractable problems, many have begun to look toward subnational governments for solutions. Yet in many cases regional disparities continue to grow, and subnational authoritarian enclaves remain resistant to change.3 One of the most significant obstacles to the development of greater equality and more meaningful citizenship in new democracies is the lack of effective democratic representation.4 Popular assemblies have generally performed the function of democratic representation in established democracies. In Latin America, however, legislatures have been weak and often largely irrelevant to politics.5 Mexico is no exception to this regional pattern. Mexico's hyperpresidentialism traditionally has relegated the legislative branch to a mere symbolic position in the political system.6 Yet, as electoral competition has increased across Mexico, the national legislature and some state legislatures have achieved new influence over the policymaking process. In the 1997 mid term elections the ruling party lost its absolute majority in the lower house of the national legislature for the first time in seventy years. Since then the legislature, led by a coalition of opposition leaders, has demanded a much greater policy role. The emerging influence of the national legislature has created an entirely new set of rules for public policymaking and legislative behavior in Mexico.7 Similarly, as opposition parties have gained strength in subnational elections, new sets of rules governing state legislative-executive relations have emerged. The transformation of the Mexican political system raises important questions about democratization and political representation. How does the process of democratization play out at the subnational level? What are the consequences of increasing political contestation for state legislative behavior? Are legislative institutions changing in response to growing electoral competition and challenges to the longruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)? The vast majority of studies of

Toward a Contemporary Understanding of the United States-Mexico Border: A Preface

VOL. 60, NO. 2, SUMMER 2001 The following essays focus on the United States-Mexico border at a time when the geopolitical frontier between these countries is becoming increasingly important. Mexico’s recent presidential election upset the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which had ruled for 71 years. The new president, Vicente Fox Quesada, brings a strikingly different posture to the office and reinforces an ideology that is already challenging current policy with the United States. Over the last few years Mexico’s economy has begun to stabilize, the country’s role as a major exporter in world trade has increased, and the split between Mexico’s rich, located in the prosperous northern border region, and poor, found in the south, exacerbates the urgency of changing relations with the United States. It should be no surprise, therefore, that President Fox is placing new emphasis on the U.S.-Mexico border. Of specific importance is Fox’s uncompromising attention on the North American Free Trade Agreement. NAFTA continues to be debated in Mexico, as neoliberals and liberals argue about how to negotiate change in the agreement. But Fox’s advocacy for NAFTA is couched in strikingly new—and nationalistic—initiatives. One such proposition is a common market, which would open the U.S.-Mexico border and allow free movement of migrants along the entire frontera, as well as along Canada’s border with the U.S. (Borden 2000a; Economist 2000). This was met with polite skepticism in Canada and silence in the United States, but it signaled a new Mexican stance toward the powers of the north. Since his election Fox has been outspoken about his support for Mexicans in the U.S. and along the border. Unlike other presidents, he is courting Mexican Americans: he invited U.S. migrants and Mexican American leaders to Mexico, where he emphasized the need for migrant and worker rights in the United States (Borden 2000b). Fox’s emphasis on NAFTA and immigration strategically isolates the most important policy factors between the two nations: trade and Mexican labor migration to the U.S. President Fox recently dramatized these issues in symbolic visits to major border cities, such as Laredo, Nogales, Tijuana, and Ciudad Juarez, where he welcomed Mexicans returning home for holiday visits, calling them the real heroes of the nation, and emphasized their labor value for U.S. business (Rotstein 2000). Toward a Contemporary Understanding of the United States-Mexico Border: A Preface

The Making of a Revolutionary Icon: Vera Nikolaevna Figner and the People’s Will in the Wake of the Assassination of Tsar Aleksandr II

A few minutes after two o'clock in the afternoon on 1 March 1881 (O.S.), the carriage of Tsar Aleksandr II traveled briskly along the Ekaterinskii canal in St. Petersburg. As the Imperial procession made its way along the snow-covered streets of the capital, the Emperor was in unusually high spirits.1 Just the day before he had learned that gendarmes had arrested the major revolutionary conspirator, Andrei Zheliabov.2 In August of 1879, Zheliabov and his narodovol'tsy comrades in the People's Will had formally condemned the Tsar to death in the hopes that Aleksandr II's assassination would precipitate a political and social revolution.3 Over the subsequent year and a half, the members of this revolutionary party repeatedly attempted to impose this sentence. Though each endeavor ended in failure, the members of this radical group came dangerously close on a number of occasions. In the weeks preceding 1 March, Aleksandr II and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Count Mikhail Loris-- Melikov, had been particularly concerned about an imminent danger to the Tsar.4 Consequently, the news of Zheliabov's arrest was especially welcome and quieted the pronounced fears of the Tsar's inner circle.5 With the terrorist leader in custody, the Tsar felt comfortable continuing his regular Sunday review of the troops at the Mikhailovskii Riding School. Thus, Aleksandr II set off as usual from the Winter Palace on this gray, frosty, Sunday afternoon. His decision to do so proved a fatal mistake. Frustrated by recent arrests and potential setbacks, the Executive Committee of the People's Will resolved that 1 March 1881 would be the day that Aleksandr II's death sentence was finally imposed. Unbeknownst to the Tsar and his ministers, the capture of Zheliabov actually heightened the danger to the Sovereign. Afraid that the decimation of their group was imminent, the leaders of the People's Will resolved to assassinate Aleksandr II without delay, regardless of the cost. For weeks, the revolutionaries' plans to murder the Emperor centered on Malaia Sadovaia Street, a thoroughfare which the Tsar regularly traveled en route to the Mikhailovskii Riding School. With two of their members posing as married merchants, the People's Will leadership let a cheese shop on Malaia Sadovaia Street, tunneled underground and prepared to lay a mine beneath the pavement. When Zheliabov, the driving force behind this plan was arrested on 27 February, the mine was not yet in place. Knowing that Aleksandr II was likely to pass the cheese shop on the morning of I March, the narodovol'tsy hurriedly readied their violent preparations. Throughout the night of 28 February/1 March, while one set of terrorists laid the mine under Malaia Sadovaia Street, several others6 gathered in the apartment of narodovol'tsy leader Vera Nikolaevna Figner and carefully prepared bombs which could be thrown by hand in case the underground mine failed. These contingency arrangements proved decisive. On the afternoon of 1 March, Aleksandr II eschewed the bustling, public route to the Riding School via Nevskii Prospect and Malaia Sadovaia Street, and opted to travel the more open Ekaterinskii Canal and Italianskaia Street where a would-be assassin would have less cover.7 This route variation rendered the narodovol'tsy's underground mine useless, but it did not foil the terrorists. For months they had shadowed the Tsar and noted his routines. The revolutionaries knew that Aleksandr II might follow the Ekaterinskii Canal en route to review the troops at the Riding School.8 Consequently, four revolutionaries equipped with the recently constructed hand-held bombs manned the Ekaterinskii Canal.9 After the review of the troops and a short visit with his cousin, the Grand Duchess Ekaterina Mikhailovna,10 Aleksandr II's cavalcade turned back onto the Ekaterinskii Canal just after two o'clock. Seeing that the Emperor was returning to the Winter Palace via the same course he had taken earlier in the day, Executive Committee member Sofia Perovskaia gave a pre-determined signal to the bomb-throwers to get ready to act. …

El impacto del nuevo sistema de partidos en el desempeño de los poderes de la Unión

El sistema de partidos mexicano modificó su perfil una vez más luego de que la ciudadanía expresó el 2 de julio pasado su voluntad de sustituir al Partido Revolucionario Institucional en el gobierno federal. Su decisión incluyó también la ausencia de una mayoría absoluta en ambas cámaras del Congreso de la Unión y, por consiguiente, la obligación del nuevo Presidente de la República de compartir con otras fuerzas la responsabilidad en la elaboración de las decisiones públicas. Este escrito explora cual puede ser el curso de la nueva relación entre los Poderes Ejecutivo y Legislativo. Analiza los diversos aspectos formales e informales que pueden intervenir en la aprobación de las piezas de legislación requeridas para apoyar el proceso de gobierno. Más adelante, reflexiona sobre la debilidad institucional del sistema de partidos y su impacto sobre la consolidación de la democracia mexicana. En especial, se detiene en los distintos factores que pueden condicionar en la LVIII Legislatura la cohesión y la disciplina demandadas entre los partidos para el establecimiento de acuerdos con la administración del presidente Fox.

The End of Mexico's One-Party Regime

Vicente Fox's unexpected victory in Mexico's July 2, 2000 presidential elections put a definitive end to Mexico's one-party regime. Until now the longest ruling party in the world, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) failed to turn out those who have traditionally voted for PRI in numbers adequate to match the millions of Mexicans who voted for change by supporting Fox. The Fox win means that Mexico has accomplished the rare feat of ending an authoritarian regime by voting it out of office, an event that comes at the end of a process of building an electoral opposition to the former ruling party that stretches back nearly a quarter century. However, while Fox defeated his PRI rival, Francisco Labastida, by a healthy six-point margin—42.5 to 36.1% of votes cast—he failed to sweep in a majority of legislators from his Alliance for Change (a coalition of Fox's National Action Party [PAN] and the Mexican Green Party [PVEM]). Thus, Fox faces a congress in which he will need constantly to build majorities to support his legislative program and in which the threat of a deadlock will loom continually.

LAOS IN 2000 The Economics of Political Immobilism

Research Article| February 01 2001 LAOS IN 2000 The Economics of Political Immobilism Yves Bourdet Yves Bourdet Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (2001) 41 (1): 164–170. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2001.41.1.164 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Yves Bourdet; LAOS IN 2000 The Economics of Political Immobilism. Asian Survey 1 February 2001; 41 (1): 164–170. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2001.41.1.164 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. © Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

MONGOLIA IN 2000 The Pendulum Swings Again

Mongolia in 2000 saw a political sandstorm befitting the Gobi Desert. When the dust settled toward the year’s end, the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP), formerly the Communist Party, had wrested four years of political power away from the Democratic Coalition by winning both the national parliamentary elections in July and the countrywide local legislative elections in October. The elections were free and open, the transfer of power was peaceful, and Mongolians and foreign observers were left waiting to see what the new government will do. During the winter of 1999–2000, the country also suffered a terrible natural calamity in the form of a cold freeze called the dzud during which 2.6 million head of livestock died, affecting the lives of thousands of herders who depend on animals for their livelihood. Concerns about corruption, poverty, unemployment, crime, alcoholism, domestic violence, street children, health and education, and other issues continue. The new government plans to focus heavily on such social and economic concerns. The major foreign policy event of the year was the visit of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. Still unresolved at the end of 2000 is the two-year-old assassination in 1998 of S. Zorig, one of the founders of Mongolia’s democracy movenment and one of the country’s chief architects and leaders after that.

'We're for the Muzhiks' Party!' Peasant Support for the Socialist Revolutionary Party During 1917

(2001). 'We're for the Muzhiks' Party!' Peasant Support for the Socialist Revolutionary Party During 1917. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 133-149.

‘MAKING REFORM THE INSTRUMENT OF REVOLUTION’: BRITISH SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, 1881–1911

The Social Democratic Federation (SDF) was the major representative of Second International socialism on British soil. As a socialist organization it is usually viewed through the distorting prism of the Russian Revolution and its aftermath. This article sets out to analyse the organization's strategy in its proper context – that of the struggle to transform Victorian and Edwardian Britain into the co-operative commonwealth. SDF views on the nature of revolution and what members called ‘palliative’ reforms are considered, as are their views on the character of the British state, the nature of democracy, the role of parliament, and the potential for violence at times of change. For them, the transition to socialism would be effected by well-fed, organized workers with a degree of education and culture, and their social reforms were designed to bring this revolutionary class into being. Campaigns against unemployment, work on school boards, boards of guardians, and local councils are found to have been conducted both as ends in themselves, and as a part of a grander strategy for the attainment of socialism. The SDF was a ‘parliamentary revolutionary party’ which sought to use reforms constructively in order to bring about the transformation of British society.

Unrest in Laos

Mysterious bombings in the capital Vientiane and other cities, increased attacks by ethnic hill-tribe insurgents in the north and factionalism in the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) have turned Laos into the region’s latest potential trouble spot. Both Vietnam and Thailand have publicly expressed concern. Behind the unrest are a shaky economy and increasingly bitter factional disputes among LPRP leaders. International donors are pressuring Laos to carry out reforms, but Vientiane is compounding its problems by refusing to change its rigid political system.

Evolution without democracy: Toward a unified framework for understanding the success and failure of Chinese Communism

This paper establishes an evolutionary framework for studying the dynamics of the power struggle within the Chinese Communist Party in relation to the wider power struggle in the nation. It posits four essential conditions for the applicability of the framework and a prediction of consequences. If a political party meets all the key conditions, then the model predicts that the ultimate winner of the internal power struggle is one who has identified the optimal strategy for the party to win the national power struggle and who has demonstrated the ability of putting it to practical use. The theoretical framework is briefly applied to several periods of the modern Chinese history. One of the evolutionary conditions is that the norm of promotion based on merits, which I argue the CCP inherited from the traditional Confucian culture, figures as the basic rule of game in deciding the intra-party power struggle. Thus, “evolution without democracy” is essentially a continuation of the traditional political culture in the new social context. My basic observation is that the CCP before 1949 met most of the evolutionary conditions, with Mao Zedong emerging as the ultimate winner of the internal power struggle at the same time as the CCP won its national victory. After 1949, however, the CCP has gradually changed from a revolutionary party to a status quo party, with Mao himself the biggest status quo winner, and some of the evolutionary assumptions began to be violated. I suggest that, in the post-Mao (and especially the post-Deng) era, these conditions might begin to be satisfied again. These preliminary observations are to be tested further by extensive case studies.

Blind spots in democratization: Sub‐national politics as a constraint on Mexico's transition

This article argues that Mexico, after nearly seven decades of highly centralized, presidentialist rule, is moving toward a political system in which power is contested actively and continuously between centre and periphery. State governors and other sub‐national political actors have become more assertive in national politics, and they have greater financial resources under their control, due to fiscal decentralization. Now operating in an increasingly competitive electoral environment, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) has switched to a primary system for selecting its presidential candidate that inevitably rewards the state and local PRI machines that deliver the vote for the winning candidate. Under these circumstances, the very different sub‐national political regimes that coexist inside Mexico may function more as obstacles to the completion of the democratic transition than as breeding grounds for further democratizing advances, as the ‘periphery’ is often viewed in the contemporary Mexican politics literature. Drawing on evidence from five types of centre‐periphery confrontations during the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo, it is argued that the re‐emergence in the 1990s of strong, sub‐national political regimes that are resistant to control by the President and other central political actors is likely to prolong Mexico's democratic transition and increase its unevenness.

Entangled in terror: the Azef affair and the Russian Revolution

Anna Geifman. Entangled in Terror: The Azef Affair and Russian Revolution. Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2000. x, 247 pp. Bibliography. Index. $60, cloth; $19.95, paper. In May 1908 Vladimir Burtsev, a Russian journalist and sometime socialist with unusual sources of information within tsarist police, accused Evno Azef of being an agent working for both Russian police and Socialist Revolutionary Party (PSR). This charge sent shock waves through Russian revolutionary movement and contributed to temporary collapse of PSR. Azef had been a trusted revolutionary for fifteen years; he was a member of PSR's Central Committee; and for last six years had been a leading figure in their Combat Organization (Boevaia organizatsiia) which in turn had been responsible for a number of sensational political assassinations, most notably that of Interior Minister V.K. von Plehve in 1904 and Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich in 1905. If Azef were a provocateur, then this meant that he had been responsible for arrest of numerous revolutionaries, failure of other plots against regime, revealing of Socialist Revolutionaries' innermost secrets, and discrediting of terror as a political weapon. The party's first response was to defend their longtime colleague. Burtsev was accused of slander and brought before a court of honour. In his defence, he revealed that he obtained confirmation for his suspicions from A.A. Lopukhin, a former Director of Police Department. After verifying this information with Lopukhin, incredulous revolutionaries confronted Azef in Paris in January 1909. Realizing that his denials were unconvincing and fearing for his own safety, he promptly fled to Germany where he lived incognito until his death in 1918. The basic outline of Azef is well known. Burtsev, to enhance his reputation as the Sherlock Holmes of Russian Revolution, published numerous versions of his unmasking of provocateur. The PSR, to salvage something from fiasco, sought to embarrass tsarist government by publicizing terrorist acts Azef allegedly had been involved in at behest of police. The Russian authorities themselves gave credence and publicity to affair by arresting and exiling Lopukhin for assisting revolutionary cause. And Boris Nicolaevsky incorporated much of this evidence and made it accessible to a wider audience in his 1934 biography Azeff Spy: Russian Terrorist and Police Stool. Since then, almost all scholarly accounts of period have followed Burtsev and Nicolaevsky in seeing Azef as classic example of an agent or agent without bothering to explore either his motives or appropriateness of these terms. Anna Geifman, an Associate Professor at Boston University, touched on Azef affair in her Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917 (Princeton, 1993). Now, with aid of material found in State Archives of Russian Federation (GARF), she has provided a much-needed new biography and in doing so has effectively challenged conventional picture of Russia's master spy. To Geifinan Azef was neither a provocateur nor a double agent. …

A Re-examination of the Establishment of the Mongolian People’s Party, Centring on Dogsom’s Memoir

AbstractD. Dogsom’s memoir which was published in Source Materials Related to the History of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (Ulaanbaatar, 1928) should be considered the most comprehensive account of the establishment of the Mongolian People’s Party. This memoir records extremely important facts which were later deliberately excluded from the description of modern Mongolian history, such as the Mongolian nationalists’ approach to the White Russian regime and their religious and ritualistic observance. The comparison of three main source materials, that is, Dogsom’s memoir, Sorokovikov’s accounts and the 1934 edition of the history of the Mongolian revolution, reveals that the hitherto accepted theory of the establishment of the Mongolian People’s Party contains fundamental errors, including the date of the establishment of the party. Additionally ‘the myth of Sükhbaatar’ strongly influenced the 1934 edition of the history of the Mongolian revolution. This edition has been treated as the most reliable source material for the study of the 1921 revolution. It is difficult to agree with the accepted theory that on 25 June 1920 two groups gathered at Danzan’s, adopted the party’s manifesto and united into the Mongolian People’s Party. This paper is intended to show it is very improbable that the meeting and decision took place on 25 June. The meeting at Dogsom’s which was held in the second month of spring using the lunar calendar in 1920 should be regarded as the real turning point for the Mongolian revolutionaries in the development of the Mongolian People’s Party.

Gacetilla: a keyword for a revisionist approach to the political economy of Mexico's print news media

Based on the perspective of political economy, this work traces the history of the gacetilla, advertising disguised as news, also known as `reading notice', a key feature in the finances of contemporary Mexican print news media. The work contends that gacetillas have been the key ingredient in a system of governmental press subsidy, essential in explaining the way in which the Mexican press has served as a propaganda tool for both the Mexican government and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) throughout most of the 20th century. The work also characterizes how the gacetilla system works and how it affects press content and journalistic routines. Finally, the work speculates about the current transition in the political economy of the Mexican press and the implication of this process for future media studies.

A New Model of Urban Land Regularisation in Mexico? The Role of Opposition Government

Tenure legalisation is often depicted as the key to upgrading illegal settlements. To date, however, the processes of upgrading and legalisation have mostly operated independently in Mexico. Regularisation has instead served to tie the urban poor into a political system dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party. To decry the political uses of illegality is not, however, to argue that legalisation is undesirable. This article discusses recent attempts to construct an alternative, more democratic, model of regularisation in the city of Guadalajara. These are the work of municipal and state governments won in 1995 by the National Action Party. The article assesses the new strategy, showing how it differs from the existing model of regularisation. I attribute the emergence of the new model to the rise of opposition government. The article therefore contributes to the growing literature on opposition government in Mexico's cities.

Democracy and state bias in Latin America: Some lessons from Mexico, Peru and Venezuela

This discussion considers why democracy has not so far led to the creation of impartial, honest and effective state institutions in Mexico, Venezuela and Peru. The explanation offered is essentially historical‐institutional. Non‐impartial (that is, biased) types of governance have a tendency to reproduce themselves over time due to the advantages that they offer to the powerful. However this observation, while true, does not explain why democracy has not done more to bring about the rule of law. The research focuses on Mexico, Peru and Venezuela because these are all cases in which democracy has failed spectacularly to discipline political competition within a framework of law. The Mexico's ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party maintains significant popular support despite conclusive evidence of previous ballot rigging, and continuing evidence of large‐scale corruption. Peru's Fujimori was re‐elected as president in 1995 despite previously using force to close the national Congress. Venezuela's Chavez convincingly won presidential elections in 1998, only six years after leading a coup attempt against an elected government.

Left At the Polls: The Changing Far-Left Vote

Part of the steady erosion of traditional voting patterns in recent years has been the emergence of a small but significant far-left vote. In the past, socialist grouplcts have stood in elections with a cheerful disregard for the number of votes secured by their candidates. Such was the case with the illfated Workers' Revolutionary Party, polling 0 .1% at Dumbartonshire in February 1974, and the International Marxist Group who polled an earththudding 0 .3% at Queens Park in the same general election. These candidatures have usually had a limited function. As long as a handful of individuals could be recruited through the hard work, tears and downright humiliation of polling less than the self-confessed novelty candidates, then all was well with the world. The bandwagon could keep, if not exactly 'rolling on', then at least stumbling sideways from time to time.

Mexico: between democracy and anarchy

The Mexican presidential elections scheduled for July 2000 could lead to a political revolution with the defeat of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which has ruled the country for 70 years. The party is divided into different factions, and its prestige has suffered as a result of economic crisis in the 1990s. The southern state of Chiapas remains largely under the control of Zapatista rebels, who draw their support from the oppressed and disadvantaged Indian population. Moreover, the increasingly wealthy drugs cartels have extended their influence over the political establishment, and army.