Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. ‘Human good is heterogeneous because the aims of the self are heterogeneous’ (Rawls 1971 Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. 1999, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], p. 554). Compare: ‘Human beings are thoroughly diverse’ (Sen 1992 Sen, A. 1992. Inequality Reexamined, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. [Google Scholar], p. 1). 2. Here, Sen parts ways with Rawls who in A Theory of Justice, Sen notes, supposes ‘there will be a unanimous choice of a unique set of “two principles of justice” in a hypothetical situation of primordial equality (he calls it “the original position”), where people's vested interests are not known to the people themselves. This presumes that there is basically only one kind of impartial argument satisfying the demands of fairness, shorn of vested interests. This, I would argue, may be a mistake’ (10). 3. See, for example, Peter on the idea of deliberative democracy (2009 Peter, F. 2009. Democratic Legitimacy, London: Routledge. [Google Scholar]). 4. To develop this conception, I have argued that having a personal identity (indeed a changing one) which one needs to manage is a central human functioning and a capability that people may be more or less successful in developing in the process of developing their many other capabilities (Davis 2009 Davis, J. 2009. The Capabilities Conception of the Individual. Review of Social Economy, 67(December): 413–429. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar], 2011 Davis, J. 2011. The Individual and Identity in Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar]). 5. As reflected in related doubts about Sen's earlier concept of commitment, see e.g. Hausman (2007 Hausman, D. 2007. “Sympathy, Commitment, and Preference”. In Rationality and Commitment, Edited by: Schmid, B. and Peters, F. 49–69. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]) and Pettit (2007 Pettit, P. 2007. “Construing Sen on Commitment”. In Rationality and Commitment, Edited by: Schmid, B. and Peters, F. 28–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]), as well as Sen's reply (2007 Sen, A. 2007. “Rational Choice: Discipline, Brand Name, and Substance”. In Rationality and Commitment, Edited by: Schmid, B. and Peters, F. 339–361. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], pp. 349–354).