Rethinking Corporate Governance Research Articles

Rethinking corporate governance in the digital economy: The role of stewardship

Digital technologies are increasingly changing the nature of competition and generating externalities that impact society. On the one hand, digitalization allows organizations to create substantial economic value in shorter periods of time through improved economies of scale, scope, and learning, resulting is increasing returns on capital and competitive concentration. On the other hand, ensuing societal concerns with inequities, regulatory lapses, and lack of transparency and truthfulness represent significant challenges for effective corporate governance. This article addresses the consequences to stakeholders that emerge from the digital economy, discussing how traditional governance mechanisms are ill-equipped to subvert negative externalities. We offer a stewardship-based model of corporate governance as a solution to the pressing problems plaguing consumers, employees, and other salient stakeholders of digital business excesses, with an emphasis on truthful disclosures, enhanced transparency, improvements in equitable allocation of organizational resources, and heightened trust relationships. The focus is on the positive role that organizational leaders can play as exemplars of virtuous stewardship in a highly networked society. The article redefines a modern view of stewardship in a digital economy and applies its principles to the four Ts of virtuous stewardship, a practical corporate governance model that encompasses truthfulness, transparency, trust, and technological equity.

Rethinking corporate governance approaches

Rethinking corporate governance approaches

발표논문 : 기업지배구조법제 형성에 관한 소고(小考) -최근의 의원발의 법률안을 소재로 검토-

발표논문 : 기업지배구조법제 형성에 관한 소고(小考) -최근의 의원발의 법률안을 소재로 검토-

Book reviews edited by Chris Taylor

Book reviews edited by Chris Taylor

Remuneration and Riots: Rethinking Corporate-Governance Reform in the Age of Entitlement

The question this paper addresses is whether the corporate-governance reforms of the past 30 years have actually made our elite-remuneration problems worse. This article posits that, over time, corporate-governance initiatives have created a regulatory edifice that has neutered executives and distanced shareholders from important internal governance matters, such as remuneration, while at the same time considering disclosure of elite salaries a legitimising tool in itself. In the public sector, the mimicking of private-sector agency-cost-reducing norms and transparency initiatives has had a similar accelerating effect on the salaries of the elite. The price of this edifice in all sectors has been high elite pay, as neutered executives and public servants have sought out remuneration as a proxy for power, prestige and service. In turn, there has been a steady increase in public awareness of and unhappiness about elite remuneration. The paper concludes that the answer lies in giving executives and public servants back their discretionary power to manage, by removing many agency-cost-reducing initiatives. Real solutions are likely to be found by: ending quarterly financial disclosure; exempting public-sector salaries from Freedom of Information (FOI) requests; ceasing to use performance-related targets; reducing the influence of Non-Executive Directors (NED); increasing the cost of exit for shareholders; allowing boards to use their powers to defend takeovers; utilising average-pay ratios and employee say-on-pay rights; and removing remuneration-disclosure requirements.

Remuneration and Riots: Rethinking Corporate Governance Reform in the Age of Entitlement

Corporate governance reforms of the past 30 years have made our elite remuneration problems worse. Corporate governance initiatives during this period have created a regulatory edifice that has neutered executives and distanced shareholders from important internal governance matters, such as remuneration, while treating the disclosure of elite salaries as a legitimizing tool. In the public sector, the mimicking of private sector agency cost-reducing norms and transparency initiatives has had a similar accelerating effect on the salaries of the elite. The result in all sectors has been high elite pay, as neutered executives and public servants have sought remuneration as a proxy for power, prestige, and service. In turn, there has been a steady increase in public awareness of, and unhappiness about, elite remuneration. This article argues that the answer to remuneration problems lie in returning discretionary managerial power to executives and public servants, by removing agency cost-reducing initiatives. Real solutions are likely to be found by: ending quarterly financial disclosure; exempting public sector salaries from Freedom of Information requests; ceasing to use performance-related targets; reducing the influence of Non-Executive Directors; increasing the cost of exit for shareholders; allowing boards to use their powers to defend takeovers; utilizing average pay ratios and employee say-on-pay rights; and removing remuneration disclosure requirements.

Rethinking corporate governance in Nigeria

Corporate governance is generally seen as a critical determinant of corporation’s growth and development, most especially for low income countries. Corporate governance laws have evolved in developed economies often in response to corporate failures or systemic crises. The recent focus on corporate governance has accentuated due to corporate failure in different parts of the world. Most countries developed corporate governance codes that address their institutional specifics. However, corporate laws in Nigeria draw extensive inspiration from British laws maybe, because of the colonial legacy. This study documents extensive evidence to show that existing laws in the country are grossly inadequate to promote good corporate governance. The author advocates for total overhaul of company laws in Nigeria. Such policy prescription must recognize the peculiar challenges of the Nigerian corporate environment, and also establish proactive mechanism for enforcement and compliance.

Rethinking Corporate Governance in Ethiopia

This paper deals with the corporate governance thematic area of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Its contribution to the literature is twofold: (1) It provides additional evidence that a microeconomic perspective of studying governance leads to a better understanding of key reform issues in many Sub Sahara African (SSA) economies; and (2) With regard to Ethiopia, the paper surmises that the overall standard of corporate governance is disappointing. More specifically, the legal and constitutional instruments do not provide adequate legislative; key international conventions and standards are not ratified; political parties own substantial number of business enterprises and operate in key sectors of the economy; ownership concentration through pyramid structure introduces particular problems of agency and creates crony capitalism; investor and creditor protection laws are inadequate; the absence of organized equity market is a serious void, and finally with regard to professional education, the increase in the number of tertiary institutions granting degrees and diplomas is not matched by sound quality standards. The reform debate will have to find solutions to these problems.

Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century

Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century

Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century; Managers VS. Owners: The Struggle for Corporate Control in American Democracy

(1996). Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century; Managers VS. Owners: The Struggle for Corporate Control in American Democracy. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 1193-1195.

Book Reviews

Parkinson, J.E. (1993) Corporate Power and Responsibility – issues in the theory of law. The Director at Risk – accountability in the boardroom; Henry Bosch. American Anti‐munagement Theories of Organization, Donaldson, Lex. Ownership and Control: Rethinking corporate Rethinking corporate governance for the twenty‐first century, Blair Margaret M.

Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century By Margaret M. Blair

(1996). Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century By Margaret M. Blair. Challenge: Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 62-64.

Ownership and control: rethinking corporate governance for the twenty-first century

Ownership and control: rethinking corporate governance for the twenty-first century