In this paper, we address conflicting objectives in a two-echelon retailer-manufacturer green retailing channel (GRC) with two types of substitutable green and non-green products. In the investigated model, the government pays (charges) the manufacturer a certain amount of subsidies (penalties) for producing green (non-green) products. The retailer can implement a green sales effort program to encourage customers to purchase green items instead of non-green products. In so doing, the retailer can transfer an uncertain amount of non-green demand to the green demand, while the total demand over both products remains constant. However, while producing green products is advantageous for the manufacturer due to governmental interventions, this is not the case for the retailer. To mitigate this conflict, we develop a game-theoretical model and a coordination mechanism that reconciles both members' interests. By applying the novel revenue-cost sharing along with a buyback (RCS&B) contract as an incentive mechanism, we mitigate conflicts and coordinate ordering and sales effort decisions throughout the channel. Our results show that the RCS&B contract may be quite effective in managing conflicting objectives toward aligning both GRC members’ interests. The proposed contract creates an economically viable, ambidextrous GRC by devising Pareto-improving solutions.
Read full abstract