The approach taken by the authors of all the papers in this special issue has been deliberately and unashamedly instrumental. The question asked in all cases was - could new rules for stimulating private initiatives with property rights be used as an instrument for better achieving (some of the) existing goals of land use planning? Would that as an instrument be more effective and/or more efficient that the 'customary' way of pursuing land use planning? In this epilogue we want to broaden the discussion about property rights, private initiatives and land use planning. We want to broaden it by placing it within the wider topic of ordering and structuring markets. Most land use change takes place 'through the market' even when there is strong and active land use planning. Customary land use planning can, therefore, be seen as an Ordering' of that market. However, scholars of planning very rarely do that, although there is a wealth of practical experience and academic literature about ordering markets in other sectors. Admittedly, the market within which decisions about land use are taken has some special properties which make it different from those other markets. In particular, decisions about land use refer to a particular location and all locations are special if not unique because of the immobility of land. Also, there are sometimes aesthetic and emotional consequences to land use decisions which can be regarded as unquantifiable and locationally specific external effects. Nevertheless, discussion about land use planning could benefit from discussion about market ordering in other sectors, as the paper by Segeren et al. in this issue shows. Another direction in which we want to broaden the discussion about deliberately changing property rights by relating it to the topic of institutional change. Property rights are rules and therefore according to the usual definition, institutions. Changing property rights deliberately so as to achieve certain effects is, therefore, purposeful institutional change. There is a growing literature on this related to land (Needham and Louw, 2006; Buitelaar et al., 2007). Property rights change slowly, especially when they concern fundamental and sensitive rights such as the ownership of land. Nevertheless, there are many cases where the state has deliberately modified property rights in response to social and political pressure. See, for example, The Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 introduced for England and Wales in order to regulate co-ownership better. The other point we wish to emphasise is that institutional change, especially in property rights, is usually path dependent - changes are fairly marginal. It can be no accident that North (1990, 97-99) when discussing the concept of path dependency, illustrated this with the land laws adopted for many states in North America, which were based on the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. It must be noted that the political and the social context are essential for whether or not, and in which direction, institutions change. For instance, Houston (Texas) is the only big city in the USA that still has not adopted a zoning ordinance, since the majority of the people (or at least the majority of the ones that turned up at the ballot box in 1948, 1962 and 1993) is against it. The connotation and symbolic value attached to zoning and property rights have prevented zoning from being installed (Buitelaar, forthcoming). In more general terms, institutions embody certain values instead of just serving them instrumentally. Closely related to the previous topic (institutional change) is the necessity of institutional fit. By this we mean that any change in the rules governing the use of property rights has to fit in with existing formal rules and informal practices related to property rights. Some of the institutions have been determined at the level of the European Union (EU), for example, the European Convention on Human Rights. …
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