Animal Cognition Research Research Articles

Pain pathophysiology and pharmacology of cattle: how improved understanding can enhance pain prevention, mitigation, and welfare.

Globally, humans rely on cattle for food production; however, there is rising societal concern surrounding the welfare of farm animals. From a young age, cattle raised for dairy and beef production experience pain caused by routine management procedures and common disease conditions. The fundamental mechanisms, nociceptive pathways, and central nervous system structures required for pain perception are highly conserved among mammalian species. However, there are limitations to a comparative approach to pain assessment due to interspecies differences in the expression of pain. The stoicism of prey species may impede pain identification and lead to the assumption that cattle lack pain sensitivity. This highlights the importance of establishing validated bovine-specific indicators of pain-a prerequisite for evidence-based pain assessment and mitigation. Our first objective is to provide an overview of pain pathophysiology to illustrate the importance of targeted analgesia in livestock medicine and the negative welfare outcomes associated with unmitigated pain. This is followed by a review of available analgesics, the regulations governing their use, and barriers to implementation of on-farm pain management. We then investigate the current research undertaken to evaluate the pain response in cattle-a critical aspect of the drug approval process. With an emphasis on emerging research in animal cognition and pain pathology, we conclude by discussing the significant influence that pain has on cattle welfare and areas where further research and modified practices are indicated.

Morgan's Quaker gun and the species of belief

AbstractIn this article, I explore how researchers’ metaphysical commitments can be conducive—or unconducive—to progress in animal cognition research. The methodological dictum known as Morgan's Canon exhorts comparative psychologists to countenance the least mentalistic fair interpretation of animal actions. This exhortation has frequently been misread as a blanket condemnation of mentalistic interpretations of animal behaviors that could be interpreted behavioristically. But Morgan meant to demand only that researchers refrain from accepting default interpretations of (apparent) actions until other fair interpretations have been duly considered. The Canon backfired largely because of Morgan's background metaphysical commitment to a univocal, hierarchical, and anthropocentric account of cognitive architecture. I make the case that, going forward, comparative psychologists would do well to pair judicious use of Morgan's Canon with an openness to the existence of non‐humanlike animal minds comprising phenomena belonging to distinct cognitive and folk psychological ontologies. And I argue that this case gives us pragmatic reason to reconcile deep—e.g., psychofunctionalist—and superficial—e.g., dispositionalist—approaches to the metaphysics of belief.

Reporting and interpreting non-significant results in animal cognition research.

How statistically non-significant results are reported and interpreted following null hypothesis significance testing is often criticized. This issue is important for animal cognition research because studies in the field are often underpowered to detect theoretically meaningful effect sizes, i.e., often produce non-significant p-values even when the null hypothesis is incorrect. Thus, we manually extracted and classified how researchers report and interpret non-significant p-values and examined the p-value distribution of these non-significant results across published articles in animal cognition and related fields. We found a large amount of heterogeneity in how researchers report statistically non-significant p-values in the result sections of articles, and how they interpret them in the titles and abstracts. Reporting of the non-significant results as "No Effect" was common in the titles (84%), abstracts (64%), and results sections (41%) of papers, whereas reporting of the results as "Non-Significant" was less common in the titles (0%) and abstracts (26%), but was present in the results (52%). Discussions of effect sizes were rare (<5% of articles). A p-value distribution analysis was consistent with research being performed with low power of statistical tests to detect effect sizes of interest. These findings suggest that researchers in animal cognition should pay close attention to the evidence used to support claims of absence of effects in the literature, and-in their own work-report statistically non-significant results clearly and formally correct, as well as use more formal methods of assessing evidence against theoretical predictions.

Anthropomorphism, anthropocentrism, and reductionism as obstacles to 21st-century animal cognition research

El objetivo de este artículo es argumentar la falta de validez del enfoque reduccionista para el estudio de la cognición animal y proponer su estudio desde un enfoque holista que tenga en cuenta toda la realidad de la cognición animal además de analizar el antropomorfismo y antropocentrismo relacionado con este tema. La metodología usada para esta investigación, fue una revisión de la literatura actual sobre el problema en cuestión y las conclusiones fueron que no se puede entender la mente de los sujetos no humanos sin un enfoque holista. Existen numerosos sesgos en la investigación científica, sea del observador, del sujeto experimental o respecto a los instrumentos de observación y medida. Entre todos los sesgos más conocidos, el muy conocido antropomorfismo, se ha visto como un sesgo inconsciente en donde el hombre se refleja en los elementos de su realidad exterior. La hipótesis de esta investigación es que el reduccionismo no toma en cuenta toda la riqueza y la verdadera realidad de la cognición animal no humana y ésta debe estudiarse mejor, desde un enfoque holista que tiene en cuenta la realidad entera de este fenómeno.

Congratulations to Animal Cognition on its 50th birthday! Some thoughts on the last 50 years of animal cognition research.

In this article, the author reflects on some of the key issues that have arisen in comparative cognition and the role and impact of the journal Animal Cognition through its first 25years by pretending to look back at this period from the year 2047. Successes within comparative cognition are described and the role that Animal Cognition has played in the growth of comparative cognition are discussed. Concerns are presented about issues that affect the opportunities that researchers have to work with nonhuman species and to produce good comparative cognitive science. Prescriptions for what the author hopes will happen next also are offered all in the lens of a prospectively imagined retrospective on this field.

Intelligence in light of perspectivalism and AI responsibilization

What does the I in the composite “AI” stand for? The answer to this guiding question appears to be straightforward, namely intelligence; however, at secunda facie, one might wonder what intelligence really is. Even though definitions of intelligence have been provided in psychology, neuroscience, and animal cognition research, among others, these crude approaches turn out to be overly systematic, rigid and reductive (Hoffmann, 2022b). At the same time, novel types of Artificial Intelligence (AI), from social robots to cognitive assistants, are provoking the demand for new answers for meaningful comparison with other kinds of intelligence. In this paper, we devote ourselves to addressing this need by proposing an open malleable and loose framework for making sense of intelligence in humans, other animals and AI, which is ultimately based on causal learning as the central theme of intelligence. The goal is to showcase the instrumental value of this framework for AI responsibilization.

Great Tits Chosen for Greatness Makes Them Representative: A commentary on Farrar et al.'s "Replications, Comparisons, Sampling and the Problem of Representativeness in Animal Cognition Research"

Studies of animal cognition struggle frequently with the question of how representative results from small samples are for a species. A recent article by Farrar et al. (2021), in this journal, highlights some of the major problems and suggests some solutions to these with cautionary examples drawn from the animal cognition literature. One such example comes from a study of inhibitory control in the great tit, Parus major, by the authors of this commentary. Although we recognize, and agree, that there are issues regarding representativeness in studies of animal cognition, we disagree with the use of our inhibitory control study as a cautionary example. Here, we explain why we think that our study is representative of Great tit inhibitory control. In fact, some of our arguments as to why our study is representative are in agreement with suggestions by Farrar et al (2021), e.g., comparing individuals with different levels of previous experiences in the cognitive paradigm under investigation. Moreover, we also add to Farrar et al.’s (2021) conclusion on how to approach studies with ambiguous representativeness by highlighting the importance of recognizing and discussing methodological differences in studies of cognitive ability. In summary, we do not argue against the valid points laid out by Farrar et al (2021), but discuss important nuances of the representativeness issue to also consider and, most importantly, add an additional point of scrutiny to account for in comparative animal cognition research.

Nietzschean Perspectives on Intelligence: In Need of More Plurality for Making Sense of Intelligence

Philosophers as well as scientists in psychology, neuroscience, animal cognition research etc. have not found satisfying answers to what intelligence is with their crude, overly systematic and reductive approaches. At the same time, both recent findings about the capabilities of smart animals such as corvids (Nieder et al., 2020) or octopi (Godfrey-Smith, 2018) and novel types of Artificial Intelligence (AI), from social robots to cognitive assistants, are provoking the demand for new answers for meaningful comparison with other kinds of intelligence. In this paper, we devote ourselves to addressing this need by proposing an open malleable and loose framework for making sense of intelligence in humans, other animals and AI, which is ultimately based on causal learning as the central theme of intelligence. The goal is not just to describe, but mainly to explain queries like why one kind of intelligence is more intelligent than another, whatsoever the intelligence.

Increasing animal cognition research in zoos

Animal cognition covers various mental processes including perception, learning, decision-making and memory, and animal behavior is often used as a proxy for measuring cognition. Animal cognition/behavior research has multiple benefits; it provides fundamental knowledge of animal biology and evolution but can also have applied conservation and welfare applications. Zoos provide an excellent yet relatively untapped resource for animal cognition research, because they house a wide variety of species-many of which are under threat-and allow close observation and relatively high experimental control compared to the wild. Multi-zoo collaboration leads to increased sample size and species representation, which in turn leads to more robust science. However, there are salient challenges associated with zoo-based cognitive research, which are animal-based (e.g., small sample sizes at single zoos, untrained/unhabituated subjects, side effects) and human-based (e.g., time restrictions, safety concerns, and perceptions of animals interacting with unnatural technology or apparatus). We aim to increase the understanding and subsequent uptake of animal cognition research in zoos, by transparently outlining the main benefits and challenges. Importantly, we use our own research (1) a study on novelty responses in hornbills, and (2) a multi-site collaboration called the "ManyBirds" Project to demonstrate how challenges may be overcome. These potential options include using "drop and go" apparatuses that require no training, close human contact or animal separation. This study is aimed at zoo animal care and research staff, as well as external researchers interested in zoo-based studies.

No evidence for future planning in Canada jays (Perisoreus canadensis).

In the past 20 years, research in animal cognition has challenged the belief that complex cognitive processes are uniquely human. At the forefront of these challenges has been research on mental time travel and future planning in jays. We tested whether Canada jays (Perisoreus canadensis) demonstrated future planning, using a procedure that has produced evidence of future planning in California scrub-jays. Future planning in this procedure is caching in locations where the bird will predictably experience a lack of food in the future. Canada jays showed no evidence of future planning in this sense and instead cached in the location where food was usually available, opposite to the behaviour described for California scrub-jays. We provide potential explanations for these differing results adding to the recent debates about the role of complex cognition in corvid caching strategies.

Does Exposure to Animal Cognition Research Influence the Zoo Visitor Experience?

Zoos average about 183 million visitors per year, which makes them a major source for educating the public due to the diverse and wide-ranging demographic that visit. Zoos are increasingly a source of scientific research in a variety of subfields, including animal cognition, although much of this research takes place behind the scenes. Bringing this research to the public perspective has the potential to increase engagement of zoo visitors. However, it is not always possible to show live research, but videos have been found to be an effective educational approach in other domains. Here, we presented a brief video illustrating cognitive research involving sun bears at Zoo Atlanta to determine the potential effect on visitors. We measured several aspects of visitor behavior (stay time and actual behaviors in the exhibit), attitudes (towards both animal research and educational technology), and knowledge gained at the exhibit. We also presented a control video that focused on sun bear enrichment to tease out whether potential effects on visitors were related to the research focus of the video, or merely an effect of a video playing in the exhibit space. Visitor behavior, attitudes, and knowledge were determined by observing a randomly selected visitor’s behavior throughout their time in the exhibit space, and then requesting completion of a survey when they exited the exhibit (N = 148). We compared various aspects of behavior, attitudes, and knowledge across the Scientific Video, Enrichment Video, and No Video conditions. There were no differences between the Scientific Video and the Enrichment Video conditions; however, some differences were found between visitors who experienced a video during their visit (scientific or enrichment video) versus those who did not. Attitudes towards technology in the exhibit space were generally positive. There was also a significant correlation between visitor stay time (overall time spent in the exhibit space) and knowledge gained. Visitors learning about research in zoos remains important, but it is unclear if a video is a sufficient means to share that information.

The hidden side of animal cognition research: Scientists' attitudes toward bias, replicability and scientific practice.

Animal cognition research aims to understand animal minds by using a diverse range of methods across an equally diverse range of species. Throughout its history, the field has sought to mitigate various biases that occur when studying animal minds, from experimenter effects to anthropomorphism. Recently, there has also been a focus on how common scientific practices might affect the reliability and validity of published research. Usually, these issues are discussed in the literature by a small group of scholars with a specific interest in the topics. This study aimed to survey a wider range of animal cognition researchers to ask about their attitudes towards classic and contemporary issues facing the field. Two-hundred and ten active animal cognition researchers completed our survey, and provided answers on questions relating to bias, replicability, statistics, publication, and belief in animal cognition. Collectively, researchers were wary of bias in the research field, but less so in their own work. Over 70% of researchers endorsed Morgan's canon as a useful principle but many caveated this in their free-text responses. Researchers self-reported that most of their studies had been published, however they often reported that studies went unpublished because they had negative or inconclusive results, or results that questioned "preferred" theories. Researchers rarely reported having performed questionable research practices themselves-however they thought that other researchers sometimes (52.7% of responses) or often (27.9% of responses) perform them. Researchers near unanimously agreed that replication studies are important but too infrequently performed in animal cognition research, 73.0% of respondents suggested areas of animal cognition research could experience a 'replication crisis' if replication studies were performed. Consistently, participants' free-text responses provided a nuanced picture of the challenges animal cognition research faces, which are available as part of an open dataset. However, many researchers appeared concerned with how to interpret negative results, publication bias, theoretical bias and reliability in areas of animal cognition research. Collectively, these data provide a candid overview of barriers to progress in animal cognition and can inform debates on how individual researchers, as well as organizations and journals, can facilitate robust scientific research in animal cognition.

Replications, Comparisons, Sampling and the Problem of Representativeness in Animal Cognition Research.

Animal cognition research often involves small and idiosyncratic samples. This can constrain the generalizability and replicability of a study’s results and prevent meaningful comparisons between samples. However, there is little consensus about what makes a strong replication or comparison in animal research. We apply a resampling definition of replication to answer these questions in Part 1 of this article, and, in Part 2, we focus on the problem of representativeness in animal research. Through a case study and a simulation study, we highlight how and when representativeness may be an issue in animal behavior and cognition research and show how the representativeness problems can be viewed through the lenses of, i) replicability, ii) generalizability and external validity, iii) pseudoreplication and, iv) theory testing. Next, we discuss when and how researchers can improve their ability to learn from small sample research through, i) increasing heterogeneity in experimental design, ii) increasing homogeneity in experimental design, and, iii) statistically modeling variation. Finally, we describe how the strongest solutions will vary depending on the goals and resources of individual research programs and discuss some barriers towards implementing them.

First description of nest-decoration behaviour in a wild sub-Antarctic shorebird

A wide range of animal species accumulate objects in, on, and/or around structures they build. Sometimes, these accumulations serve specific functions (e.g. structural or isolating features) or are purely incidental, while in other cases the materials are deliberately displayed to serve signalling purposes (extended phenotype signals). In this pilot study, we employed systematic in situ observations and camera trapping to describe for the first time that both partners of a territorial shorebird, the black-faced sheathbill (Chionis minor ssp minor) collect, carry, and arrange colourful marine shells and dry twigs within and around their nest cavity. Our observations expand the taxonomic breadth of avian extended phenotype signals, by showing that at least one species within a largely understudied group i.e., Charadriiformes, exhibits nest-decoration behaviour. Multiple manipulative experiments are needed to explore further the signalling function of these decorations, which opens new exciting avenues for animal communication and cognition research.

The lack of validity hinders research in animal cognition.

Comparability of specific behavioral skills in diverse animal species is of central importance in animal cognition. Yet, as the present analysis of "rescuing behavior" shows, the lack of validity analysis may lead to contradictory results.

Task Aspects Triggering Observational Learning in Jackdaws (Corvus monedula)

Complex novel tasks are often used in animal cognition research to allow discrimination between various learning mechanisms. Successful performance relies on the capacity to identify informational cues from features in the environment. Additionally, observational learning is often considered more beneficial for survival than individual learning. Despite the importance of controlling task complexity, it can often be challenging to operationalize. This study investigated whether jackdaws, a highly social corvid species, can learn to drop stones inside a tube to release a reward after observing a trained conspecific. Additionally, it aimed to identify the underlying learning mechanisms and to detect the informational cues triggering learning. A research design was developed to highlight different aspects of the required action sequence. Experimental conditions included a conspecific model demonstrating the full sequence, parts of the sequence, consuming the reward without solving the task, and consuming the reward after the solution was demonstrated without a visible model. None of the 12 naïve jackdaws solved the task in pretests. Two subjects started solving in test sessions and they developed modified versions of the demonstrated action. Observing the full action sequence performed by a conspecific seemed to trigger learning. The majority of the subjects exhibited changes in their stone-oriented behavior, most likely due to stimulus and/or local enhancement. As predicted, jackdaws were influenced by conspecific model demonstrations when manipulating a complex novel foraging task. Factors contributing to the apparent task difficulty and directions for future studies are discussed within a tri-dimensional framework including the task, setup, and individuals.

Personality, cognition and behavior in chimpanzees: a new approach based on Eysenck’s model

Personality has been linked to individual variation in interest and performance in cognitive tasks. Nevertheless, this relationship is still poorly understood and has rarely been considered in animal cognition research. Here, we investigated the association between personality and interest, motivation and task performance in 13 sanctuary chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) housed at Fundació Mona (Spain). Personality was assessed with a 12-item questionnaire based on Eysenck’s Psychoticism-Extraversion-Neuroticism model completed by familiar keepers and researchers. Additionally, personality ratings were compared to behavioral observations conducted over an 11-year period. Experimental tasks consisted in several puzzle boxes that needed to be manipulated in order to obtain a food reward. Dependent variables included participation (as an indicator of interest), success and latency (as measures of performance), and losing contact with the task (as an indicator of motivation). As predicted, we obtained significant correlations between Eysenck’s personality traits and observed behaviors, although some expected associations were absent. We then analyzed data using Generalized Linear Mixed Models, running a model for each dependent variable. In both sexes, lower Extraversion and lower Dominance were linked to a higher probability of success, but this effect was stronger in females. Furthermore, higher Neuropsychoticism predicted higher probability of success in females, but not in males. The probability of losing contact with the task was higher in young chimpanzees, and in those rated lower on Extraversion and higher on Dominance. Additionally, chimpanzees rated higher on Neuropsychoticism were also more likely to stop interacting with the task, but again this was more evident in females. Participation and latency were not linked to any personality trait. Our findings show that the PEN may be a good model to describe chimpanzee personality, and stress the importance of considering personality when interpreting the results of cognitive research in non-human primates.

Trialling Meta-Research in Comparative Cognition: Claims and Statistical Inference in Animal Physical Cognition.

Scientific disciplines face concerns about replicability and statistical inference, and these concerns are also relevant in animal cognition research. This paper presents a first attempt to assess how researchers make and publish claims about animal physical cognition, and the statistical inferences they use to support them. We surveyed 116 published experiments from 63 papers on physical cognition, covering 43 different species. The most common tasks in our sample were trap-tube tasks (14 papers), other tool use tasks (13 papers), means-end understanding and string-pulling tasks (11 papers), object choice and object permanence tasks (9 papers) and access tasks (5 papers). This sample is not representative of the full scope of physical cognition research; however, it does provide data on the types of statistical design and publication decisions researchers have adopted. Across the 116 experiments, the median sample size was 7. Depending on the definitions we used, we estimated that between 44% and 59% of our sample of papers made positive claims about animals' physical cognitive abilities, between 24% and 46% made inconclusive claims, and between 10% and 17% made negative claims. Several failures of animals to pass physical cognition tasks were reported. Although our measures had low inter-observer reliability, these findings show that negative results can and have been published in the field. However, publication bias is still present, and consistent with this, we observed a drop in the frequency of p-values above .05. This suggests that some non-significant results have not been published. More promisingly, we found that researchers are likely making many correct statistical inferences at the individual-level. The strength of evidence of statistical effects at the group-level was weaker, and its p-value distribution was consistent with some effect sizes being overestimated. Studies such as ours can form part of a wider investigation into statistical reliability in comparative cognition. However, future work should focus on developing the validity and reliability of the measurements they use, and we offer some starting points.

Investigation of cognitive mechanisms and strategy on solving multiple string-pulling problems in Azure-winged magpie (Cyanopica cyanus).

String-pulling tasks are a widely used paradigm in animal cognition research. The present study tested whether ten azure-winged magpies (Cyanopica cyanus) could solve a series of multiple-strings problems with the aim of systematically investigating which rules this species uses to solve different-patterned string tasks, i.e., tasks in which subjects have to choose between two strings only one of which is connected to bait. When the subjects faced the parallel strings task (T1), five birds (C3, C5, C8, C9, and C10) were able to solve the task and acted in a goal-directed manner. Three birds (C5, C8, and C9) successfully solved the oblique parallel strings task (T3). The azure-winged magpies exhibited proximity selection in the oblique parallel strings task (C1 and C4 in T2), and the task with one string folded at a right angle (C3, C6 and C8 in T5). Several subjects also performed simple strategies in other unresolved tasks, e.g., random selection, trial-and-error learning, and side bias strategies (i.e., a certain degree of "left-handed" tendency). These results demonstrated that the azure-winged magpie possesses the potential to solve simple multiple-string tasks, although when faced with more difficult problems they could not solve them.

Old and New Approaches to Animal Cognition: There Is Not "One Cognition".

Using the comparative approach, researchers draw inferences about the evolution of cognition. Psychologists have postulated several hypotheses to explain why certain species are cognitively more flexible than others, and these hypotheses assume that certain cognitive skills are linked together to create a generally “smart” species. However, empirical findings suggest that several animal species are highly specialized, showing exceptional skills in single cognitive domains while performing poorly in others. Although some cognitive skills may indeed overlap, we cannot a priori assume that they do across species. We argue that the term “cognition” has often been used by applying an anthropocentric viewpoint rather than a biocentric one. As a result, researchers tend to overrate cognitive skills that are human-like and assume that certain skills cluster together in other animals as they do in our own species. In this paper, we emphasize that specific physical and social environments create selection pressures that lead to the evolution of certain cognitive adaptations. Skills such as following the pointing gesture, tool-use, perspective-taking, or the ability to cooperate evolve independently from each other as a concrete result of specific selection pressures, and thus have appeared in distantly related species. Thus, there is not “one cognition”. Our argument is founded upon traditional Darwinian thinking, which—although always at the forefront of biology—has sometimes been neglected in animal cognition research. In accordance with the biocentric approach, we advocate a broader empirical perspective as we are convinced that to better understand animal minds, comparative researchers should focus much more on questions and experiments that are ecologically valid. We should investigate nonhuman cognition for its own sake, not only in comparison to the human model.