Republican Voters Research Articles

The Mortality of Politics: An American Paradox

Introduction: The USA has the poorest health statistics of any high-income country. Political polarization has risen dramatically; newer safety net programs (the Affordable Care Act [ACA]) are unevenly provided because many Republican-leaning states refused expanded Federal coverage. Democratic programs have reduced physician leadership of medicine. Both have been deleterious. Here, we investigated associations among four key health measures two of which directly impact pregnancy outcomes and two that affect all patients by percentage of each state that voted for the Republican versus Democratic candidate in the 2020 presidential election. Methods: For each state, we used public, non-partisan databases to assess the incidence of COVID, maternal, and infant mortality per 100,000 population and average life expectancy. Correlations among these four outcome variables and percentage Republican vote were calculated (r), contextualized by measuring associations with related variables including COVID vaccination rates, access to medical care, and incidences of heart disease, obesity, diabetes, gunshot deaths, and automotive fatalities. Results: COVID mortality, maternal and infant mortality, and life expectancy were highly correlated with percentage Republican (“red”) vote per state. If “red” states had vaccination rates equivalent to Democratic-leaning (“blue”) states, 72,000 deaths could have been avoided. Overall, “red” states have lower health metrics, reduced access to care, and higher comorbidities. Conclusion: The percent Republican vote was strongly associated, but not the whole answer, with worse health outcomes for multiple key measures of public health including mortality, access to care, and various comorbidities. Overall, the ACA has improved patient access to care but has also led to “maternity care deserts” disproportionately in rural areas in “red” states. Translating insurance coverage into improved care and outcomes requires further analysis and will require multi-pronged approaches including expanding coverage and incentivizing quality care.

Assessing potential for policy feedback from renewable energy incentive programs

Climate advocates look optimistically to policy feedback as a mechanism for locking-in a decarbonization policy trajectory, but little research has examined whether and how climate legislation creates constituencies that could provide future political support. This article focuses on incentive programs supporting investment in solar PV and the potential for policy feedback through participating households. We first develop a framework of feedback potential that considers the volume and partisanship of incentive program beneficiaries and their distribution across electoral districts. We then apply the framework to New York State’s solar PV incentive program, which enabled over 140,000 households to install solar PV. We find that the number of solar PV incentive beneficiaries is positively associated with Republican vote share, suggesting potential for a strong pro-solar constituency in the pivotal, Republican-led districts. Within electoral districts, however, beneficiaries skew Democratic, raising questions about the direction of policy feedback. The results carry implications for the kind of politics that incentives in the Inflation Reduction Act may set in motion in the coming years.

The Costs of Voting and Voter Confidence

We revisit the effect of ballot access laws on voter confidence in the outcome of elections. Previous research found weak or no relationship between voter confidence and election laws regulating ballot access. We argue this non-finding is conditioned by partisanship. Democrats and Republicans view election laws through a partisan lens, which is especially triggered when coalitions lose. Republican voters see ballot restrictions as a means of securing the vote against fraud; Democratic voters see ballot restrictions as voter suppression. We maintain that the conditional partisan effect that election laws have on voter confidence is triggered or attenuated when partisans’ candidates lose elections. We find that in states where ballot access is costly, voter confidence among partisans and supporters of the losing Presidential candidate is significantly higher for Republicans and significantly lower for Democrats than their counterparts in states with less costly ballot access laws. These effects are greater for Republican than Democrats. We discuss the implications of our findings on election ecosystems and voter confidence.

Understanding community hate crimes as an incorrigible proposition: Local political attitudes, path dependence, and the ceremonious reporting of hate crime statistics

AbstractThe Hate Crime Statistics Act (HCSA) of 1990 requires the federal government to publicly release official hate crime statistics annually; the HCSA does not, however, mandate that local agencies submit hate crime reports to the government in the first place. Although research has evaluated the reporting of hate crime statistics in a dichotomous fashion (compliance vs. noncompliance), the current study suggests that the consistent and invariable reporting of zero hate crimes in a particular jurisdiction over time is unlikely and thus better conceptualized as a third response strategy: ceremonious compliance. We examine this strategy as a potentially unique institutional behavior, structured by local political and historical contexts, including discursive differences in the identification of hate crime as an important social problem, and localized histories of racial oppression. This research then uses multilevel multinomial logistic regression models to estimate variation in the likelihood of differential compliance strategies (i.e., true compliance, ceremonious compliance, noncompliance), according to several political and historical factors, including Republican vote share, location in the Confederate South, and historical lynchings. Findings reveal that political and historical contexts are important predictors of agency responses to hate crime, with a particular tendency toward ceremonious compliance in Republican‐leaning locales.

Voter Support for Policies Associated With Child Health as National Campaign Priorities

Policies that are associated with child health are rarely included in platforms of candidates for national political office. Candidates may underrecognize voter support for such priorities or perceive that such policy issues are not sufficiently divisive to appeal to partisan voters. Key policy questions associated with child health may be considered by the next Congress, including the consistency of Medicaid coverage across states and restoring the recently lapsed refundable child tax credit. To examine voter support for candidates regarding policies that are associated with child health. This nationally representative survey of registered US voters 18 years or older was conducted from March to April 2024 and included a survey-based randomized experiment to evaluate the association of message framing with voter support. Messages conveying distinct rationales for Medicaid reform and refundable child tax credit. Likely or definite support for candidates. In this sample (unweighted N = 2014; 1015 women [51.0%]), most respondents indicated they would likely or definitely vote for candidates who expressed strong support for all tested policies: extreme risk protection order (79.5%), school threat assessment (73.1%), expanded childcare (69.6%), refundable child tax credit (66.6%), federalization of Medicaid (66.0%), paid parental leave (65.5%), free school meals (65.6%), safe firearm storage and enforcement (62.9%), preventing Medicaid disenrollment for children younger than 6 years (61.9%), universal free preschool (61.6%), and summer nutrition programs (57.9%). More women than men expressed support for all tested policies. Strong majorities of Democrat and Independent voters would support candidates who endorsed child-focused policies; fewer than 50% of Republican voters expressed such support, except for the extreme risk protection order and school threat assessment. Variations in framing language regarding consistent Medicaid coverage across states were not associated with amplified or diminished voter support. Framing the refundable child tax credit as benefiting "hard-working" vs "low-income" families garnered significantly more support among men (67.0% vs 59.0%), privately insured individuals (72.0% vs 64.4%), and Republicans (54.6% vs 43.0%; all P < .05). The study results suggest that most voters favor candidates who strongly support policies that are associated with child health. Voter support differs substantively by gender and political party affiliation and may be associated with language choices in messaging about policy change.

Hiding the Hate—Contextual Effects on Hate Crime Reports

This study examines the influence of local norm shifts driven by white supremacist ideology on hate crime reporting by US law enforcement agencies. Results show a substantial association, indicating a threefold increase in expected hate crimes reports in counties experiencing a spike in local hate group activity. Specifically, Republican vote share acts as a moderator, reducing reported hate crimes by 23% in counties with strong Republican support and right-wing hate group presence. Adjacent Republican counties also show a 13% reduction in expected reports, suggesting a spillover effect. Beyond local politics, a regional impact is evident; Northeastern counties with higher right-wing hate group presence show a 23% lower incidence rate. Using longitudinal data from the FBI UCR, SPLC, MIT Election Lab, and the US Census (2010–2020), through negative binomial regressions, this study highlights how right-wing hate groups can affect law enforcement’s enforcement of general civil rights depending on the local context.

Racialized environments and syringe services program implementation: County-level factors

ObjectiveRacialized health inequities in substance use-related harms might emerge from differential access to syringe service programs (SSPs). To explore this, we examined the association between county-level racialized environments, other factors, and (1) SSP presence, and (2) per capita syringe and (3) naloxone distribution. Methods2021 US National Survey of SSP data (n=295/412;72 % response rate) was used to identify SSP presence and the sum of syringes and naloxone doses distributed in 2020 by county. Study measures included racial residential segregation (RRS; i.e., divergence and dissimilarity indexes for Black:Non-Hispanic White & Hispanic:Non-Hispanic White) and covariates (i.e., demographic proportions, urban/suburban/rural classifications, 2020 US presidential Republican vote share, and overdose mortality from 2019). We used logit Generalized Estimating Equations to determine factors associated with county-level SSP presence, and zero inflated negative binomial regression models to determine factors associated with per capita syringe and naloxone distribution. ResultsSSPs were reported in 9 % (283/3106) of US counties. SSP presence was associated with higher divergence and dissimilarity indexes, urban and suburban counties, higher opioid overdose mortality, and lower 2020 Republican presidential vote share. Per capita syringes distributed was associated with lower RRS (divergence and Hispanic:White dissimilarity), lower racially minoritized population proportions and rural counties, while per capita naloxone distribution was associated with lower Hispanic and “other” population proportions, and rural counties. ConclusionsRacialized environments are associated with SSP presence but not the scope of those programs. Preventing HIV and HCV outbreaks, and overdose deaths requires addressing community level factors that influence SSP implementation and accessibility.

A rural-urban political divide among whom? Race, ethnicity, and political behavior across place

ABSTRACT Over the past 30 years, the United States has developed a rural-urban political divide, as rural voters have become increasingly reliable Republican voters while long-term patterns of Democratic voting in the largest cities have also consolidated in many smaller cities and suburbs as well. Yet, although 1 in 4 rural dwellers now identify as people of color, research on the rural-urban divide has either mostly centered on the behavior and attitudes of non-Hispanic whites, or assumed that nonwhites have exhibited similar behavior to whites. Does this political cleavage exist among people of color? We find that the growing rural-urban divide is driven primarily by white Americans, while rural people of color differ much less, if at all, from their urban counterparts in voting behavior. In addition to highlighting the need for more research on the politics of rural people of color, our findings raise concerns about the political representation of rural Black Americans and Latinos.

The N400 effect captures nuances in implicit political preferences

We conducted a study in San Antonio, Texas, in the weeks preceding the 2022 state Governor election to determine if implicit or explicit measures of political preference could predict voter behavior. We adapted an established event-related potential (ERP) paradigm showing political statements to participants one word at the time where the last word made the statement pro-Republican or pro-Democratic. Our sample of college students included decided and undecided voters, and was reflective of the demographic make-up of south-central Texas. Our implicit measures were an established authoritarianism scale and the N400 effect to the sentence-final word. The N400 is an ERP to any stimulus that engages semantic memory and has been shown to measure implicit disagreement with political statements. Explicit measures of political preference and authoritarianism were predictive of vote choice. The expected N400 effect was found for Democratic voters, with larger amplitude to pro-Republican than pro-Democratic statements. Surprisingly, decided Republican voters showed no difference in N400 responses to pro-Republican and pro-Democratic statements and there was no group difference in the N400 effect. In turn, the N400 was not predictive of voter behavior. We argue that the N400 effect reflected individual political preferences, but that ultimately voter behavior aligned with partisan identity.

Estimating Disenfranchisement in US Elections, 1870–1970

While it is commonly understood that the poll tax and literacy tests, among other measures, were used effectively in the South to disenfranchise Black voters from the late nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century, what is not well known is how much those disenfranchising laws mattered. Specifically, how much did the enactment of poll taxes or literacy tests affect turnout in federal and state elections? And how much did those disenfranchising provisions dampen vote totals for Republican candidates in the South? Using the staggered implementation and removal of several disenfranchising policies over a 101-year period, we answer these questions and provide some precision to our collective knowledge of the “disenfranchising era” in American electoral politics. Overall, we find that the poll tax was the main driver of disenfranchisement in Southern elections, with literacy tests and the Australian ballot providing some secondary effects. We also find that ex-felon disenfranchisement laws were considerably more important—both in reducing turnout as well as Republican vote share in Southern elections—than has been traditionally understood. Finally, we unpack the “South” and unsurprisingly find that racial politics drove these results: the disenfranchising institutions were more impactful in states with a larger Black population share. Our results show the powerful effects of disenfranchising policies on electorates and electoral outcomes. We discuss these results in both their historical context as well as with a mind to the continuing use of disenfranchising provisions in law today.

From apprentice to president? Entertainment TV and US elections

This article studies the importance of entertainment TV for the selection of political leaders in the context of an important case study: Donald Trump's win in the 2016 presidential election and his previous role as host of the popular TV show “The Apprentice.” We find a positive correlation between TV ratings of The Apprentice and the county-level Republican vote share in 2016, but this correlation vanishes once we control for pre-existing voting and NBC viewership patterns. This null result is robust to different model specifications, measures of exposure to The Apprentice, and an extensive investigation of heterogeneous effects. Viewership of The Apprentice is also unrelated to Congressional election results, as well as support for Trump in survey data and the Republican primaries. These findings highlight the context-dependent importance of television for political leadership.

The Big Peach Divided: Demographic-Electoral Transitions and Geographic Polarization in Atlanta Metropolitan Area Counties

Like much of the Southern United States, Georgia was once overwhelmingly Democratic. Towards the end of the 20th century, however, it became a stronghold for the Republican party. By the late 2010s, the Peach State was transformed into an electoral battleground, delivering crucial victories to both parties in federal and statewide elections. In 2020, Joe Biden became the first Democratic presidential candidate to win the state in 28 years. The Atlanta Metropolitan area has been at the center of these political shifts due to rapid and ongoing demographic changes that reflect and amplify the urban-rural divide. Voters in the region are geographically concentrated in a Democratic-dominated core and a Republican-dominated exurban periphery. Caught in between these zones are suburban areas, which are growing and diversifying at a rate much faster than the national average. As they do so, they are joining the Democratic core, while Republican voters are increasingly concentrated in smaller, outlying counties. These patterns are re-defining the state’s politics and provide an accelerated example of what we will likely see in other metropolitan areas of the United States in the future.

Reports of COVID-19 Vaccine Adverse Events in Predominantly Republican vs Democratic States

Antivaccine sentiment is increasingly associated with conservative political positions. Republican-inclined states exhibit lower COVID-19 vaccination rates, but the association between political inclination and reported vaccine adverse events (AEs) is unexplored. To assess whether there is an association between state political inclination and the reporting rates of COVID-19 vaccine AEs. This cross-sectional study used the AE reports after COVID-19 vaccination from the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) database from 2020 to 2022, with reports after influenza vaccines from 2019 to 2022 used as a reference. These reports were examined against state-level percentage of Republican votes in the 2020 US presidential election. State-level percentage of Republican votes in the 2020 US presidential election. Rates of any AE among COVID-19 vaccine recipients, rates of any severe AE among vaccine recipients, and the proportion of AEs reported as severe. A total of 620 456 AE reports (mean [SD] age of vaccine recipients, 51.8 [17.6] years; 435 797 reports from women [70.2%]; a vaccine recipient could potentially file more than 1 report, so reports are not necessarily from unique individuals) for COVID-19 vaccination were identified from the VAERS database. Significant associations between state political inclination and state AE reporting were observed for all 3 outcomes: a 10% increase in Republican voting was associated with increased odds of AE reports (odds ratio [OR], 1.05; 95% CI, 1.05-1.05; P < .001), severe AE reports (OR, 1.25; 95% CI, 1.24-1.26; P < .001), and the proportion of AEs reported as severe (OR, 1.21; 95% CI, 1.20-1.22; P < .001). These associations were seen across all age strata in stratified analyses and were more pronounced among older subpopulations. This cross-sectional study found that the more states were inclined to vote Republican, the more likely their vaccine recipients or their clinicians reported COVID-19 vaccine AEs. These results suggest that either the perception of vaccine AEs or the motivation to report them was associated with political inclination.

Sentiments and spending intentions: Evidence from Florida

AbstractConsumer sentiment is considered an important indicator of changes in household spending. However, the evidence of the causal relationship between sentiment and consumption is mixed and scarce. We address this gap using data from the monthly Florida Consumer Attitude Survey, which captures party affiliation, consumer sentiment, and spending intentions since 1991. We employ political partisanship as an instrument for sentiment and find a significant effect of sentiment on spending intentions. Finally, we provide evidence that spending intentions relate to actual spending and show that spending increased among counties with a larger share of Republican voters following the 2016 presidential election.

Uncommon and nonpartisan: Antidemocratic attitudes in the American public

Democratic regimes flourish only when there is broad acceptance of an extensive set of norms and values. In the United States, fundamental democratic norms have recently come under threat from prominent Republican officials. We investigate whether this antidemocratic posture has spread from the elite level to rank-and-file partisans. Exploiting data from a massive repeated cross-sectional and panel survey ([Formula: see text] = 45,095 and 5,231 respectively), we find that overwhelming majorities of the public oppose violations of democratic norms, and virtually nobody supports partisan violence. This bipartisan consensus remains unchanged over time despite high levels of affective polarization and exposure to divisive elite rhetoric during the 2022 political campaign. Additionally, we find no evidence that elected officials' practice of election denialism encourages their constituents to express antidemocratic attitudes. Overall, these results suggest that the clear and present threat to American democracy comes from unilateral actions by political elites that stand in contrast to the views of their constituents. In closing, we consider the implications of the stark disconnect between the behavior of Republican elites and the attitudes of Republican voters.

The Effect of the 2020 Black Lives Matter Protests on Police Budgets: How “Defund the Police” Sparked Political Backlash

Abstract This article investigates whether a core political demand of the 2020 Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests was realized: “defund the police.” Original hand-compiled data containing budget information on 264 major cities in the United States and comprehensive protest data enable us to assess the effect of protests on changes in city police budgets. We find no evidence that BLM protests led to police defunding. In cities with large Republican vote shares, protest is associated with significant increases in police budgets. We demonstrate that electoral incentives cannot explain this policy backlash. Instead, we provide tentative evidence that backlash in Republican cities might stem from policymakers’ own conservatism and entrenched right-wing influences within city politics. The analysis offers novel evidence on the consequences of the largest protest movement in U.S. history and reveals the importance of backlash in explaining policy outcomes of social movements.

Party affiliation and the legacy of HOLC redlining maps

The Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) redlining maps were formalized in the 1930s to assess lending risks in certain neighborhoods based on their racial or ethnic composition and systematically denied services such as mortgage loans and insurance. Despite the abolishment in the 1960s, many consequences of redlining persist in many American cities today. In this paper, we combine historical HOLC redlining maps and modern-day voter registration data to examine the relationships between redlining and party affiliation in Miami-Dade County, Florida. We use probit regressions to estimate the likelihood of residents’ affiliation with different parties in relation to redlining, controlling for resident characteristics and census block group factors. We find that, after accounting for socio-demographics, residents in historically redlined neighborhoods are more likely to be Democratic voters and less likely to be Republican voters. Additionally, we show that certain resident characteristics contribute to their party affiliation. Specifically, female residents are more likely to be Democratic voters but less likely to be Republican voters. There is also a clear pattern in racial disparities regarding party affiliation. Black residents are more likely to be Democratic voters but less likely to be Republican voters when compared to White residents. Our results highlight future urban planning efforts to prioritize the integration of redlined and non-redlined neighborhoods to avoid political polarization and isolation induced by historical urban policies such as redlining.

The complexity of pluralistic ignorance in Republican climate change policy support in the United States

Most Americans fail to recognize widespread public support for climate change action. Here we investigate how this phenomenon differs for Republican supporters versus opponents of several climate change policies. Surveying a representative sample of Republican voters (N = 1000), we find that misperception of in-group support for climate action is primarily restricted to Republicans already opposed to action. Specifically, those in the minority (i.e., Republicans opposed to climate action) were more likely to erroneously perceive other Republicans as holding views on climate change policy similar to their own. While Republican supporters recognize that most Republicans support climate change policy, they may be discouraged from expressing their support due to an information environment disproportionately portraying Republicans as opposed to climate change action.

Challenges to correcting pluralistic ignorance: false consensus effects, competing information environments, and anticipated social conflict

Abstract For many policy issues, people holding the majority opinion often do not act in accordance with their beliefs. While underestimating public opinion appears as a likely cause, correcting this misperception often fails to motivate those in the majority to act. Investigating further, we surveyed a nationally representative sample (N = 1,000) of Republican voters about vaccination. Despite a majority supporting vaccines, Republicans on average underestimated other Republicans’ support. However, this misperception occurred primarily among anti-vaccine Republicans—a group that reported a greater willingness to share their vaccine views. We show how an information environment overrepresented with minority views may discourage majority view holders from speaking out even when they are aware of their majority status. That is, instead of experiencing pluralistic ignorance, those in the majority may be discouraged from expressing their views due to anticipated social conflict from engaging in an information environment disproportionately made up of minority views.

Selecting for Masculinity: Women’s Under-Representation in the Republican Party

The gap between women’s representation in the Democratic and Republican parties has grown significantly in the last three decades. We argue existing explanations undervalue voters’ contributions to this trend by focusing on voter responses to candidate sex rather than candidate gender. We theorize that Republican voters (especially the most conservative) prefer masculine candidates in intraparty and entry-level elections. Because sex and gender are correlated, this limits the number of Republican women who advance through the political pipeline. Experimental vignettes from two rounds of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (N = 2,000) and two large surveys of Republicans (N &gt; 10,000) show that Republican (but not Democratic) voters penalize candidates with “feminine” self-presentation regardless of the candidate’s sex. Original data on the self-presentation of Republican candidates for entry-level office (N = 459) confirm Republican candidates often present themselves in gender-stereotypical ways. In short, voters play an underappreciated role in the partisan gap in women’s representation.