One of the questions that has been raised concerning the events in Spanish Morocco in July 1936 is how a group of army and token civilian conspirators subjugated a geographically disjointed area with such rapidity and with so little resistance? In response, General Franco's apologists have pointed to the conspirators' decisiveness and organization, the cowardice of the Protectorate's Republican authorities, and the support of the Zone's indigenous population.' On the other hand, critics of this viewpoint have argued that the Protectorate's subjugation resulted from the Republic's exaggerated fear of indigenous discontent which kept it from both declawing the Army of Africa and monitoring the conspiratorial activities of its anti-Republican officers. It has also been stated that the Republic's supporters in Melilla, Ceuta, Tetuan and Larache were never really given a chance by local authorities to arm themselves. As for indigenous support, these critics note that with the exception of the 'feudal leadership' in Tetuan, the Protectorate's Moroccan population greeted the Alzamiento Nacional either with indifference or muted resistance. 2 Looking at the question with hindsight, and perhaps more dispassion, one could possibly answer it with an amalgam of these two viewpoints. Specifically, the success of the rebellion in the Protectorate on 17-18 July 1936, can be ascribed to five factors: first, the Army of Africa's importance to the Second Republic as a guarantor of peace and order in the Zone and the Republican authorities' early acceptance of this 'fact of life'; second, as a consequence of this, the Army of Africa's high state of combat preparedness, particularly its indigenous units and the Foreign