Representationalist Approach Research Articles

Discourse studies and the material turn: From representation (facts) to participation (concerns)

Discourse studies has shown how language use matters in various political and societal settings. With the »material turn«, the focus on language has meant that discourse studies have been deemed as a symbolic and representationalist approach. In contrast, this paper shows how discourse studies have been concerned about material issues, language included, in local achievements of sense. »Nexus analysis« is introduced as an ethnographic framework to study »assemblages« and affects as entangled material-discursive practices, where close analysis of embodied practices is crucial. Nexus analysis encourages participatory research, providing a framework for agential research on matters of concern.

Philosophy, realism and psychology’s disciplinary fragmentation

ABSTRACT Most mainstream psychologists consider philosophy irrelevant to their work, but see themselves as realists. Various opposition movements embrace philosophy but reject realism, either completely or partially, despite upholding ideas consistent with a realist philosophy. Many on both sides see the Tower of Babel that constitutes psychology as a sign of healthy diversity, not fragmentation. We argue that relations among the three factors – philosophy, realism and fragmentation – deserve closer scrutiny. With philosophy’s core method of conceptual analysis deprioritized, both mainstream psychology and the opposition fracture into an array of “partial realisms”, falling away from a realism that is thoroughly consistent. These are the source of psychology’s fragmentation. The conceptual neglect and resulting confusions can be seen in psychology’s recent replicability crisis, and in the widespread adoption of a representationalist approach to the mind/brain. We argue that the metatheoretical coherence and methodological maturity required for genuine scientific progress involves a consistent adherence to realism. We spell out what that involves and consider several reasons why this has been so difficult for psychology.

Inferentialist conceptual engineering

ABSTRACT On a representationalist view, conceptual engineering is the practice of changing the extensions and intensions of the devices we use to speak and think. But if this view holds true, conceptual engineering has a bad rationale. Extensions and intensions are not the sorts of things that are better or worse as such. A representationalist account of conceptual engineering thus falls prey to the objection that the practice has a bad rationale. To account for the assumption that conceptual engineering is worthwhile, we propose to view what is being engineered as inferential devices, as opposed to representational devices. The objective is not to establish that being or having an inferential role is all there is to meaning or conceptual content. Rather, our agenda is to recommend a shift of focus from the representational features of content to the inferential features of content for the purposes of doing and thinking about conceptual engineering. Inferentialism about conceptual engineering makes better sense of the practice than a representationalist approach: In addition to accounting for the rationality of engaging in conceptual engineering, inferentialism provides a sound interpretation of what is at stake in concrete examples of conceptual engineering.

What are we doing when we perceive numbers?

Clarke and Beck rightly contend that the number sense allows us to directly perceive number. However, they unnecessarily assume a representationalist approach and incur a heavy theoretical cost by invoking "modes of presentation." We suggest that the relevant evidence is better explained by adopting a radical enactivist approach that avoids characterizing the approximate number system (ANS) as a system for representing number.

Naturalizing Self-Consciousness: The representationalist approach of F. Dretske

The article discusses the problem of self-consciousness, which was first articulated by G. Fichte, and which refers to explaining a conscious self-reference without falling into an infinite regression when self-consciousness is implied but not explained. Analyzing S. Shoemaker’s linguistic approach to self-consciousness, the author asserts that the key feature of self-consciousness is a conscious self-reference. However, after considering Shoemaker’s arguments, the author claims impossibility of solving the problem of self-consciousness solely by means of a linguistic analysis.Therefore, the author refers to two bottom-up proposals aiming to solve this issue: the approach of non-conceptual forms of self-consciousness developed by J. Bermúdez and the conception of self-consciousness pre-reflective form coined by D. Zahavi. The article states inadequacies in both approaches and asserts the need to identify self-consciousness in non-intentional (in terms of phenomenology), non-semantic, and non-mental concepts - that is, in a naturalistic way that meets the requirements to naturalism put forward by L. Baker. For this, the author suggests referring to representationalism, in particular to, the works of F. Dretske, and trying to ground the theory of self-consciousness in his statement that representations do not require «self», a principle that spontaneously organizes mental activity and carries out all intentional acts.The author concludes that the approach of Dretske avoids an endless regression or circular way of explanation. However, the very project of naturalization of self-consciousness, based on a non-linguistic, naturalized form of representation of a cognitive system that does not contain «self», can not exist without taking into account the first-person perspective. One of the possible solutions to this problem is the assumption of a metaphysical relation everyone has to himself. However, the author stresses the need for further clarification and agreement with the theses of strong representationalism.

Explaining the felt location of bodily sensations through body representations.

Why are bodily sensations felt on specific body parts? This paper discusses the view according to which we need body representations to account for the felt location of bodily sensations. My aim will be to consider whether or not some claims linked with that view are substantiated (namely, that all of our grasp of the spatiality of our bodies must come from bodily sensations, that the representation of the body can determine bodily sensations surmounting sensory input, that the content of body representations cannot be action-oriented). To do this, I first introduce and assess Brian O'Shaughnessy's seminal version of the representationalist approach to bodily sensations. Next, I will inquire into a purported objection to any version of the approach, showing its inadequacy. Finally, I will concentrate on Frédérique de Vignemont's variant of the representationalist view, trying to pin down a few of her assertions. My conclusion will be that the scope and strength of the representationalist position in regard to the aforementioned claims is different from what it is usually thought to be.

Inferentialism and knowledge: Brandom\u2019s arguments against reliabilism

I take issue with Robert Brandom’s claim that on an analysis of knowledge based on objective probabilities it is not possible to provide a stable answer to the question whether a belief has the status of knowledge. I argue that the version of the problem of generality developed by Brandom doesn’t undermine a truth-tracking account of noninferential knowledge that construes truth-tacking in terms of conditional probabilities. I then consider Sherrilyn Roush’s claim that an account of knowledge based on probabilistic tracking faces a version of the problem of generality. I argue that the problems she raises are specific to her account, and do not affect the version of the view that I have advanced. I then consider Brandom’s argument that the cases that motivate reliabilist epistemologies are in principle exceptional. I argue that he has failed to make a cogent case for this claim. I close with the suggestion that the representationalist approach to knowledge that I endorse and Brandom rejects is in principle compatible with the kind of pragmatist approach to belief and truth that both Brandom and I endorse.

Phenomenology and the experience of the historical

Twentieth Century philosophical accounts of history have been dominated by two paradigms: our relation to history either takes the form of a representation of the past, or the historical past is conceived as a sociological phenomenon of collective memory. Whereas the defenders of the representationalist approach are primarily interested in history as a story that can be known and fixed through the elaboration of a narrative discourse (e.g., Hayden White, Arthur Danto, W.B. Gallie, Louis Mink), advocates of the memory-oriented approach (e.g., Maurice Halbwachs, Pierre Nora, Paul Ricoeur) are more typically interested in discerning and analysing the psychological effects of our collective relation to our past. Beyond their unmistakable differences, these two tendencies have a common dominator, which provides David Carr with the starting point of his reflections on history: ‘‘On both of these accounts, then, history is divided by a gap from what it seeks to find or wants to know, and its activity is seen by philosophers as that of bridging this or these gaps. This constitutes the problem to which the philosophy of history addresses

Lady Gaga as (dis)simulacrum of monstrosity

Lady Gaga’s celebrity DNA revolves around the notion of monstrosity, an extensively researched concept in postmodern cultural studies. The analysis that is offered in this paper is largely informed by Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of monstrosity, as well as by their approach to the study of sign-systems that was deployed in A Thousand Plateaus. By drawing on biographical and archival visual data, with a focus on the relatively underexplored live show, an elucidation is afforded of what is really monstrous about Lady Gaga. The main argument put forward is that monstrosity as sign seeks to appropriate the horizon of unlimited semiosis as radical alterity and openness to signifying possibilities. In this context it is held that Gaga effectively delimits her unique semioscape; however, any claims to monstrosity are undercut by the inherent limits of a representationalist approach in sufficiently engulfing this concept. Gaga is monstrous for her community insofar as she demands of her fans to project their semiosic horizon onto her as a simulacrum of infinite semiosis. However, this simulacrum may only be evinced in a feigned manner as a (dis)simulacrum. The analysis of imagery from seminal live shows during 2011–2012 shows that Gaga’s presumed monstrosity is more akin to hyperdifferentiation as simultaneous employment of heterogeneous and potentially dissonant inter pares cultural representations. The article concludes with a problematisation of audience effects in the light of Gaga’s adoption of a schematic and post-representationalist strategy in the event of her strategy’s emulation by competitive artists.

Lady Gaga as (Dis)Simulacrum of Deleuzian Monstrosity

Lady Gaga’s celebrity DNA revolves around the notion of monstrosity, an extensively researched concept in post-modern cultural studies. The analysis that is offered in this paper is largely informed by Deleuze & Guattari’s notion of monstrosity, as well as by their approach to the study of sign-systems that was deployed in Thousand Plateaus (1987). By drawing on biographical and archival visual data, with a focus on the relatively underexplored live-show, an elucidation is afforded of what is really monstrous about Lady Gaga. The main argument that is put forward is that monstrosity as sign seeks to appropriate the horizon of unlimited semiosis as radical alterity and openness to signifying possibilities. In this context it is held that Gaga effectively delimits her unique semioscape, however any claims to monstrosity are undercut by the inherent limits of a representationalist approach in sufficiently engulfing this concept. Gaga is monstrous for her community insofar as she demands of her fans to project their semiosic horizon onto her as simulacrum of infinite semiosis. However, this simulacrum may only be evinced in a feigned manner as (dis)simulacrum. The analysis of imagery from seminal live shows during 2011-2012 shows that Gaga’s presumed monstrosity is more akin to hyperdifferentiation as simultaneous employment of heterogeneous and potentially dissonant inter pares cultural representations. The article concludes with a problematization of audience effects in the light of Gaga’s adoption of a schematic and post-representationalist strategy in the event of her strategy’s emulation by competitive artists.

Epistemological Misgivings of Karen Barad’s ‘Posthumanism’

Karen Barad develops a view she calls ‘posthumanism,’ or ‘agential realism,’ where the human is reconfigured away from the central place of explanation, interpretation, intelligibility, and objectivity to make room for the epistemic importance of other material agents. Barad is not alone in this kind of endeavor, but her posthumanism offers a unique epistemological position. Her aim is to take a performative rather than a representationalist approach to analyzing ‘socialnatural’ practices and challenge methodological assumptions that may go unnoticed in some disciplinary fields. Yet for all the good of the challenge, Barad must support it with sound epistemological theorizing, theorizing that would apply to any methodology, whether that be sociological, historical, anthropological, or philosophical. Thus, where one might critique Barad on her assessments of sociological, historical, or anthropological incorporations of humans and the nonhuman, I critique Barad’s epistemology on its sense of objectivity and dismissal of the centrality of the human. I argue that Barad’s epistemology must retain a particular form of humanism, a humanism that stakes human subjectivity as the locus of rationality and objectivity, without which it creates intractable problems. To recuperate Barad’s challenge to contest assumptive distinctions while avoiding her epistemological problems, I offer some parting reflections.

General and specific consciousness: a first-order representationalist approach

It is widely acknowledged that a complete theory of consciousness should explain general consciousness (what makes a state conscious at all) and specific consciousness (what gives a conscious state its particular phenomenal quality). We defend first-order representationalism, which argues that consciousness consists of sensory representations directly available to the subject for action selection, belief formation, planning, etc. We provide a neuroscientific framework for this primarily philosophical theory, according to which neural correlates of general consciousness include prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, and non-specific thalamic nuclei, while neural correlates of specific consciousness include sensory cortex and specific thalamic nuclei. We suggest that recent data support first-order representationalism over biological theory, higher-order representationalism, recurrent processing theory, information integration theory, and global workspace theory.

Intentions and potential intentions revisited

The importance of potential intentions has been demonstrated both in the construction of agent systems and in the formalisation of teamwork behaviour. However, there still lacks an adequate semantics for the notion of potential intentions as introduced by Grosz and Kraus in their SharedPlans framework. In this paper, we give a formal semantics to intentions and potential intentions, drawing upon both the representationalist approach and the accessibility-based approach. The model captures the dynamic relationship among intentions and potential intentions by providing semantic rules and conditions. Also, the model treats norms as a special class of intentional context, and it is shown that norms play a critical role in the dynamics of intentions in multiagent systems. The formal semantics allows us to validate some properties that are widely-accepted for intention attitudes.

Environmental Representation of the Body

Much recent cognitive neuroscientific work on body knowledge is representationalist: “body schema” and “body images”, for example, are cerebral representations of the body (de Vignemont 2009). A framework assumption is that representation of the body plays an important role in cognition. The question is whether this representationalist assumption is compatible with the variety of broadly situated or embodied approaches recently popular in the cognitive neurosciences: approaches in which cognition is taken to have a ‘direct’ relation to the body and to the environment. A “direct” relation is one where the boundaries between the body and the head, or between the environment and the animal are not theoretically important in the understanding of cognition. These boundaries do not play a theoretically privileged role in cognitive explanations of behavior. But representationalism appears to put a representational veil between the locus of cognition and that which is represented, making cognitive relations to the body and to the environment be indirect, with a high associated computational load. For this reason, direct approaches have tried to minimize the use of internal representations (Suchman 1987; Barwise 1987; Agre and Chapman 1987; Brooks 1992; Thelen and Smith 1994; van Gelder 1995; Port and van Gelder 1995; Clark 1997, 1999; Rupert 2009, p. 180). Does a cognitive neuroscience committed to direct relations rule out a representationalist approach to body knowledge? Or is direct representationalism possible?

A Representationalist Approach to Generality

by John Dilworth Philo 6 no. 1 (2003), pp. 216-234. Abstract: There are no unicorns, but there are representations of them, hence motivating an explanation of discourse about the property 'unicorn' in terms of discourse about representations of unicorns. I show how to extend this strategy to apply to any kind or property terms. References to property instances may be explained as references to comprehensive representations of them, which represent all of the (supposed) properties of such an instance--unlike 'ordinary' representations, which are distinctive in that they represent only some limited subset of such properties, through use only of some proper subset of their own (supposed) properties. This representationalist approach results in a very economical naturalist ontology, which has no need for properties.

Shoemaker's The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays

This excellent collection of essays by Sydney Shoemaker covers his work over the last ten years in the philosophy of mind. Shoemaker's overarching concern in the collection is to provide an account of the mind that does justice to the first-person perspective. The two main topics are the nature of self-knowledge and the nature of sensory experience. The essays are insightful, careful, and thought-provoking. On the issue of self-knowledge, Shoemaker opposes an inner sense model of introspection and he argues for the view that our knowledge of our own mental states is self-intimating. I find much of what Shoemaker says here, both positively and negatively, persuasive. On the issue of sensory experience and, in particular, perceptual experience, Shoemaker develops a complex position that, although undeniably interesting and original, seems to me less convincing. For the remainder of this review, I shall focus upon this topic. Shoemaker believes that the qualities in terms of which we phenomenally individuate our perceptual experiences are not intrinsic qualities of the experiences themselves. The individuating qualities are qualities of the objects of the experiences (if they are qualities of anything at all). These qualities, in Shoemaker's view, are ones that the experiences represent; for there seems no other way of explaining the fact that the qualities that individuate our experiences phenomenally are always experienced as qualities of something or other, whether or not the qualities have bearers that actually exist. In the case of the experience of red, for example, the distinctive phenomenal quality is always experienced as belonging to some red thing, typically a physical surface, even if there is nothing red in the vicinity. So far, Shoemaker is in agreement with other representationalists about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. However, Shoemaker maintains that without certain qualifications, the representationalist approach

Reduction and Realism

In his recent book Foundations of Space-Time Theories Michael Friedman argues for a realism about theoretical structure based on specific methodological practices concerning theory unification. Theoretical structures that are essential to the unifying process are to be given a literal realistic interpretation while the remaining ones can be considered as having merely representational status. Friedman’s account of unification involves the notion of a literal reduction or identification of observational properties of entities or objects with their theoretical counterparts. The relationship between these two levels of theory can be construed as that of submodel to model. Once the appropriate reductions are achieved we are then free to conjoin certain theoretical structures with others thereby enabling us, over time, to produce a unified theory encompassing a variety of domains.The alternative to this view Friedman describes as the representationalist approach. Instead of characterizing the relationship between observational and theoretical structures as that of submodel to model the observational properties are simply correlated by way of an embedding (as opposed to an identity) map with their appropriate theoretical counterparts.