Representation In Mind Research Articles

The Role of Language in Thought Formation and Personality

Language is a communication tool that plays an important role in social life as a representation of minds and individual and group identity. Language consists of a series of sounds systemized in the form of symbols, and has free, significant, conventional, universal, productive, diverse, dynamic, and humane characteristics. As a communication tool, language allows individuals to interact in social groups, convey messages, and identify themselves in society. In addition, language reflects mental representation, where the form and structure of language follow or mimic minds and ideas. Language is also considered a personality trait that reflects an individual’s beliefs and values. This research aimed to increase understanding of the role of language as a communication tool, mind representation, and identity. The research method involved an in-depth literature review, analysis of linguistic data, and observation of social phenomena in everyday language use. The analysis used a descriptive and interpretive approach to understand the relationship between language, mind, and identity. The results showed that language not only functions as a tool to convey messages but also as a medium that reflects mindset, cultural values, and social identity. The choice of language code was closely related to language ethics, influenced by a community’s social and cultural rules. This research concluded that language was a reflection of human complexity in thinking, communicating, and building identity. Using language in accordance with language ethics contributed to forming a positive image of individuals in society.

Makna Gaya Penulisan Jurnalistik Berita Feature Human Interest Di Detikjabar

The writing style in features is more flexible and can be more creative and tends to be longer than other news, the human interest feature has the ability to produce the reader’s emotional reaction. Research objectives want to know aspects of clarity of writing style such as language, narrative, sentence structure, or typical elements in writing detikjabar. The research method uses the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce, with a qualitative approach. Data collection techniques carried out through interviews, observation, and documentation. The results showed that the sign used by detikjabar was only a slightly transparent white watermark in the lower right corner of the picture. Objects can be a representation in mind and can be in the form of something real. The interpretant in the form of the meaning of the sign, namely January is never ashamed even though it is dressed not fashionable. In detik, certain news writing is always warning or warning in each of the first paragraphs, to remind the reader that this news contains traumatic elements. The language used is classified as formal but still maintains emotional elements of humanity in its delivery.

Poorer representation of minds underpins less accurate mental state inference for out-groups

Societies are becoming more polarised, driven in part by misconceptions about out-groups’ beliefs. To understand these effects, one must examine the cognitive processes underlying how people think about others. Here, we investigate whether people are less prone to theorise about the minds of out-groups, or less able to do so. Participants (Study 1: n = 128; Study 2: n = 128) made inferences about social and political beliefs held by real in-group and out-group members, and could choose to receive further information to improve these inferences. Results show: (1) participants sought equivalent or greater information about out-groups relative to in-groups; but despite this, (2) made significantly less accurate inferences for out-groups; and (3) were significantly less aware of their reduced ability. This shows that poorer mental state inference is not underpinned by a reduced propensity to consider out-group minds, but instead by a worse representation of the minds of out-groups.

Demonstratives as attention tools: Evidence of mentalistic representations within language

Linguistic communication is an intrinsically social activity that enables us to share thoughts across minds. Many complex social uses of language can be captured by domain-general representations of other minds (i.e., mentalistic representations) that externally modulate linguistic meaning through Gricean reasoning. However, here we show that representations of others' attention are embedded within language itself. Across ten languages, we show that demonstratives-basic grammatical words (e.g., "this"/"that") which are evolutionarily ancient, learned early in life, and documented in all known languages-are intrinsic attention tools. Beyond their spatial meanings, demonstratives encode both joint attention and the direction in which the listener must turn to establish it. Crucially, the frequency of the spatial and attentional uses of demonstratives varies across languages, suggesting that both spatial and mentalistic representations are part of their conventional meaning. Using computational modeling, we show that mentalistic representations of others' attention are internally encoded in demonstratives, with their effect further boosted by Gricean reasoning. Yet, speakers are largely unaware of this, incorrectly reporting that they primarily capture spatial representations. Our findings show that representations of other people's cognitive states (namely, their attention) are embedded in language and suggest that the most basic building blocks of the linguistic system crucially rely on social cognition.

Theory of collective mind.

Theory of mind research has traditionally focused on the ascription of mental states to a single individual. Here, we introduce a theory of collective mind: the ascription of a unified mental state to a group of agents with convergent experiences. Rather than differentiation between one's personal perspective and that of another agent, a theory of collective mind requires perspectival unification across agents. We review recent scholarship across the cognitive sciences concerning the conceptual foundations of collective mind representations and their empirical induction through the synchronous arrival of shared information. Research suggests that representations of a collective mind cause psychological amplification of co-attended stimuli, create relational bonds, and increase cooperation, among co-attendees.

Group Minds in Ancient Narrative

Abstract The present article adopts a cognitive approach to examine the representation of group minds in ancient narrative and show the specific purposes to which they are put. Herodian’s History of the Roman Empire, a work that illustrates the social and collective dimension of mental functioning, is chosen as a case study. After a brief exposition of the state of research on collective minds in narratology and literature, the present study first discusses the formation of group minds and their stability or mutability over the course of Herodian’s narrative. The next section explores the internal dynamics of group minds, focusing especially on instances of splitting which helpfully illuminate the problematic nature of the Roman principate after Marcus’ death. The final section draws on contemporary theories of philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences and examines the way and extent that Herodian’s groups can be considered as ‘intentional agents’. In this regard, it is proposed that Herodian represents an approach to group agency that prefigures modern theory of ‘interpretivism’. Overall, the article suggests a novel way of studying ancient narrative, one that reconciles narratological and cognitive analysis with historical and political considerations by revealing the constitutive role of group minds in various aspects of the ancient social world.

Decoding semantic representations in mind and brain.

A key goal for cognitive neuroscience is to understand the neurocognitive systems that support semantic memory. Recent multivariate analyses of neuroimaging data have contributed greatly to this effort, but the rapid development of these novel approaches has made it difficult to track the diversity of findings and to understand how and why they sometimes lead to contradictory conclusions. We address this challenge by reviewing cognitive theories of semantic representation and their neural instantiation. We then consider contemporary approaches to neural decoding and assess which types of representation each can possibly detect. The analysis suggests why the results are heterogeneous and identifies crucial links between cognitive theory, data collection, and analysis that can help to better connect neuroimaging to mechanistic theories of semantic cognition.

Spinoza’s Ethics

Spinoza’s Ethics

Novel theory of mind task demonstrates representation of minds in mental state inference

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to represent the mental states of oneself and others, is argued to be central to human social experience, and impairments in this ability are thought to underlie several psychiatric and developmental conditions. To examine the accuracy of mental state inferences, a novel ToM task was developed, requiring inferences to be made about the mental states of ‘Targets’, prior participants who took part in a videoed mock interview. Participants also made estimates of the Targets’ personality traits. These inferences were compared to ground-truth data, provided by the Targets, of their true traits and mental states. Results from 55 adult participants demonstrated that trait inferences were used to derive mental state inferences, and that the accuracy of trait estimates predicted the accuracy of mental state inferences. Moreover, the size and direction of the association between trait accuracy and mental state accuracy varied according to the trait—mental state combination. The accuracy of trait inferences was predicted by the accuracy of participants’ understanding of trait covariation at the population level. Findings are in accordance with the Mind-space theory, that representation of the Target mind is used in the inference of their mental states.

Electrophysiological evidence for a subject-first strategy in visually situated auditory sentence processing in Korean

This study investigated a subject-first strategy in prediction mechanism in visually situated sentence processing in Korean, using event-related potentials (ERPs). According to the subject-first strategy, parsers tend to generate sentences conforming to canonical sentence word order (i.e., SOV in Korean), subject-first sentence, mapping conceptually more prominent referent such as agent of the event on the subject position of the sentence. Therefore, in the predictive mechanism of language comprehension, the subject is pre-activated and anticipated for the first NP of the sentence at the initial phase of bottom-up language processing. This study tested this subject-first strategy in Korean by examining brain responses to object-initial sentences (OV) compared with subject-initial sentences (SV) under the context of clear thematic role relations set by a visual image. The results of an ERP experiment with 30 native Korean speakers identified neural effects for object-initial sentences compared with subject-initial sentences at the NP and Verb, reflecting a conflict between the pre-activated representation in the parser's mind and the encountered bottom-up input. An N400 effect was elicited at the NP, as early as at the noun, not at the following object case marker. Late frontal positivity (LFP) was also found in the sentence-final verb, proving the processing difficulty of non-canonical object-initial sentences compared with canonical subject-initial sentences. These results indicate that Korean native speakers build linguistic representation conforming to a canonical sentence in SOV language in the predictive mechanism supporting subject-first strategy but revise the predicted event structure rapidly upon newly encountering input.

Character’s mental functioning during a ‘neuro-transition’: Pragmatic failures in Flowers for Algernon

The representation of fictional minds that work in idiosyncratic ways has received significant attention in the past few decades, particularly regarding characters with some form of developmental delay or pathological disorder. The present paper attempts to investigate the mental functioning of the central character in Daniel Keyes’s widely acclaimed short-story Flowers for Algernon, which presents two versions of the same character: after being introduced as cognitively delayed and with a very low IQ, a futuristic treatment turns him into a neurotypical individual first, and into a genius later. With the unfolding of the plot, however, it soon becomes clear that the character’s mental gains are doomed to deteriorate by the end of the story, when he finds himself as cognitively delayed as he was at the beginning. By building on previous research, this paper is concerned with the effects of drastic changes in mind style in the course of the same story. More particularly, the final aim of this article is to study whether an abrupt shift in mind style may bear consequences on the character’s ability to interact with the other characters. Mental schemata and adherence/flouting of Grice’s maxims are closely investigated in the two versions of the characters, together with analyses of deictical patterns carried out by means of corpus techniques.

Visual perspective taking without visual perspective taking.

What happens when an observer takes an agent's visual perspective of a scene? We conducted a series of experiments designed to measure what proportion of adults take a stimulus-centered rather than agent-centered approach to a visual perspective taking task. Adults were presented with images of an agent looking at a number (69). From the perspective of the viewer, the number appeared upside down. We then asked participants what number the agent saw. An agent-centered approach, that is, one that takes into account the other's visual experience, should produce the correct answer "69". Even an egocentric error (i.e., the participant's own perspective) would provide the same correct response. We were interested in what proportion of participants would give the incorrect answer "96", which is best explained by a stimulus-centered rather than agent-centered strategy, namely "flipping" each digit one at a time from left to right. Crucially, such a strategy ignores the alternative visual perspective. We found that, on average, 12-21% of participants made this error. We discuss this finding in the context of the key questions around representation, content, and Theory of Mind in visual perspective taking. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Color Toponyms in French and Azerbaijani Onomastics

The article states that using colour adjectives as a part of toponyms is a common phenomenon in the onomastic vocabulary of the French and Azerbaijani languages. The object of the analysis of the study is colour toponyms (colour hydronyms, -oikonyms and -oronyms) of the French and Azerbaijani onomastics. It is noted that the differences between the colour toponyms of the compared languages are, on the one hand, their belonging to different language families and, on the other hand, the location of the studied countries in various political and geographical zones. The commonalities discovered in studying the colour-toponymic units of these languages are explained by the universality of some concepts in nature and the primary colour representations in mind.

PELATIHAN CARA MENGGUNAKAN ALAT TRANSKRIPSI ELAN

Human voice can be preserved and analysed through realised sound waves with the help of ELAN software. This ELAN software supports language or language analysis segment sound into tangibles and saves them in a file in the ELAN feature itself. The method used in this training is triangulation, with the umbrella being descriptive qualitative. Observation technique to find out what the participants’ desire. The interview technique used by the servant to determine the representation of the respondent's mind after attending this training. Finally, the documentation used to document the movement that has been carried out is by taking photos along with the activity. The results and discussion obtained from the observation are that respondents, especially students and language activists, are enthusiastic about learning more deeply about the operation of this ELAN device. Meanwhile, based on the results of interviews, it is known that the ELAN software is a new thing and can be integrated into matters relating to language documentation in the Balongsari area itself. Documentation of this training is photos during the training event. After this training, the devotee observed that the respondents were interested in learning language transcription technologies such as ELAN.

Explainable Contrastive Multiview Graph Representation of Brain, Mind, and Behavior.

Understanding the intrinsic patterns of human brain is important to make inferences about the mind and brain-behavior association. Electrophysiological methods (i.e. MEG/EEG) provide direct measures of neural activity without the effect of vascular confounds. The blood oxygenated level-dependent (BOLD) signal of functional MRI (fMRI) reveals the spatial and temporal brain activity across different brain regions. However, it is unclear how to associate the high temporal resolution Electrophysiological measures with high spatial resolution fMRI signals. Here, we present a novel interpretable model for coupling the structure and function activity of brain based on heterogeneous contrastive graph representation. The proposed method is able to link manifest variables of the brain (i.e. MEG, MRI, fMRI and behavior performance) and quantify the intrinsic coupling strength of different modal signals. The proposed method learns the heterogeneous node and graph representations by contrasting the structural and temporal views through the mind to multimodal brain data. The first experiment with 1200 subjects from Human connectome Project (HCP) shows that the proposed method outperforms the existing approaches in predicting individual gender and enabling the location of the importance of brain regions with sex difference. The second experiment associates the structure and temporal views between the low-level sensory regions and high-level cognitive ones. The experimental results demonstrate that the dependence of structural and temporal views varied spatially through different modal variants. The proposed method enables the heterogeneous biomarkers explanation for different brain measurements.

Three Ways of Looking at a Tiger: Animal Minds in Yann Martel’s Life of Pi

Engagement with animals is a central theme in Yann Martel’s novel Life of Pi, reflected and shaped by the character-narrator Pi’s reading of animal minds. The article examines attributions of minds to animals in three types of encounters with them: observation, interaction, and narration. While in childhood Pi tends to project human temperaments and emotions onto animals, he is forced to recognize animals’ species-specific experiences as the shipwreck foregrounds his embodiment. As such, the novel introduces the logic of nonhuman psychology into narrative development, formulating an intersubjective and interspecies relationship. Furthermore, at the end of the novel, it alerts us to intellectual and therapeutic functions of animals as narrative elements through comparison between representations of human and animal minds. The text not only identifies different presences of animals in the human world, but generates insights into how narrative in general conveys and responds to complex human-animal entanglements in our reality.

Minds, bodies, spirits, and gods: Does widespread belief in disembodied beings imply that we are inherent dualists?

Belief in beings without physical bodies is prevalent in present and past religions, from all-powerful gods to demonic spirits to guardian angels to immortal souls. Many scholars have explained this prevalence by a quirk in how we conceptualize persons, intuitively representing their minds as separable from their bodies. Infants have both a folk psychology (for representing the mental states of intentional agents) and a folk physics (for representing the properties of objects) but are said to apply only folk psychology to persons. The two modes of construal become integrated with development, but their functional specialization and initial independence purportedly make it natural for people of all ages to entertain beliefs in disembodied minds. We critically evaluate this thesis. We integrate studies of both children and adults on representations of intentional agents, both natural and supernatural, beliefs about the afterlife and souls, mind transfer, body duplication, and body transplantation. We show that representations of minds and bodies are integrated from the start, that conceptions of religious beings as disembodied are not evident in early ages but develop slowly, and that early-acquired conceptions of religious beings as embodied are not revised by theological conceptions of such beings as disembodied. We argue that belief in disembodied beings requires cultural learning-a learned dualism. We conclude by suggesting that disembodied beings may be prevalent not because we are developmentally predisposed to entertain them but because they are counterintuitive and thus have a social transmission advantage. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

“Food Doesn’t Have Power Over Me Anymore!” Self-Efficacy as a Driver for Dietary Adherence Among African American Adults Participating in Plant-Based and Meat-Reduced Dietary Interventions: A Qualitative Study

BackgroundAfrican American (AA) adults are disproportionately affected by cardiovascular disease risk factors. Many nutrition interventions aim to promote healthier eating to reduce cardiovascular disease incidences among participants. However, little is known about what influences individuals’ nutrition self-efficacy while participating in these interventions. ObjectiveThe objective of this study is to explore the drivers and barriers of nutrition self-efficacy among Nutritious Eating With Soul (NEW Soul) participants. The NEW Soul study was funded from the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute. DesignA purposive-current study sampling was used to conduct 4 audio-recorded focus groups for this qualitative study. Bandura’s self-efficacy theory of behavior change guided the framework. This theory asserts that individual self-efficacy is influenced by 4 factors: (1) mastery experiences, (2) vicarious experiences, (3) social persuasion, and (4) somatic and emotional states. Participants/settingInclusion criteria for the NEW Soul program included being an AA, being between 18 and 65 years old, and having a body mass index between 25 and 49.9. Participants in cohort 2 (n = 84) of the NEW Soul program were asked to participate in focus groups. In total, 28 individuals (16 vegan, 12 omnivorous participants) took part in 4 in-person focus groups, which contained 3 to 13 participants. Focus groups took place in the southeastern United States. Main outcome measurePerception of drivers and barriers of following the diet. Statistical analysisResponses were analyzed qualitatively using principles of content analysis. ResultsNine themes influenced participants’ confidence in their ability to follow their diet: food preference, planning and preparation, identity and tradition, mindfulness, representation, social support, social influence, accountability, and state of mind. ConclusionIn this study, self-efficacy played a prominent role in participants’ motivations toward following the diet. Mastery experiences, vicarious experiences, social persuasion, and positive psychological arousal were all common themes in participant-reported sources of motivation. Nutrition interventions are likely to elicit positive behavioral outcomes if these 4 factors that enhance self-efficacy are incorporated into program development.

The paradox of colour constancy: Plotting the lower borders of perception

AbstractThis paper resolves a paradox concerning colour constancy. On the one hand, our intuitive, pre‐theoretical concept holds that colour constancy involves invariance in the perceived colours of surfaces under changes in illumination. On the other, there is a robust scientific consensus that colour constancy can persist in cerebral achromatopsia, a profound impairment in the ability to perceive colours. The first stage of the solution advocates pluralism about our colour constancy capacities. The second details the close relationship between colour constancy and contrast. The third argues that achromatopsics retain a basic type of colour constancy associated with invariants in contrast processing. The fourth suggests that one person‐level, conscious upshot of such processing is the visual awareness of chromatic contrasts ‘at’ the edges of surfaces, implicating the ‘colour for form’ perceptual function. This primitive type of constancy sheds new light on our most basic perceptual capacities, which mark the lower borders of representational mind.

Phrenology and Autodiegetic Narration in Jane Eyre

This paper examines how Charlotte Brontë's belief in phrenology influences the narration of her novel Jane Eyre. Phrenology was a nineteenth-century belief that the shape of the skull could give information about a person's temperament. Phrenologists speculated that the brain was split into separate parts, or faculties, that defined the individual's ability to feel a particular emotion. A bump on the skull implied that the faculty underneath that part of the skull was bigger, so the individual was more inclined to feel that emotion. By placing Jane Eyre within the historical context of the rise of phrenology, I explore the ways in which Brontë's phrenological representation of Jane's mind informs and parallels the autodiegetic narration of Jane Eyre. My analysis focuses on moments when Jane draws attention to the fact that she is a first-person narrator telling the story of her own past experiences. I argue that these moments are comparable to those when Jane’s experiencing-self is fractured into phrenological faculties. Concomitantly, I seek to trace how Jane's narration changes as she moves between the locations of Thornfield, the Moor House, and Ferndean. I suggest that the shifts in narration draw attention to these locations as metaphors for varying degrees of restriction on Jane's faculties. Through an application of nineteenth-century psychological studies, I conclude that Brontë uses her narration style to criticize phrenologists who promote an unnaturally restrictive control of the faculties.