Rent-seeking Society Research Articles

Ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent-seeking society

The paper develops a model of rent-seeking in a democratic political context where voting, as well as rent-seeking, matters. In this context, the paper demonstrates that voter ideology is a constraint on the rent-seeking game as well as a possible avenue of rent-seeking. In a setting where there are both rent-seeking and ideological interest groups, rent-seekers can free ride on the efforts of ideologues, which tends to reduce rent-seeking effort. In a setting where complementary economic and ideological interest groups coordinate their efforts, both rent- seeking and ideological conflict tend to increase.

Politique Migratoire et Sociétés De Rente

AbstractApproximately 90 percent of the half million Haitians who work and live in the Dominican Republic do not have any legal status. This article proposes to evaluate the conditions for the application of a neo-liberal policy to regulate the problem presented by the presence of Haitians in the Dominican Republic. This policy proposes the repatriation of all Haitians not born in the country. After a brief description of the characteristics of a rent-seeking society, the neo-liberal thesis will be explained, then criticized. In order to more deeply explore the limits of this thesis, it will be considered along with the thesis of the “formalization” of economic relations, formulated by those favoring the explicit elaboration of a migratory policy. This will allow the author to suggest, at the end of the article, the definition of stages in view of the legalization of Haitians living in the Dominican Republic.

Constitutional design for a rent-seeking society: Voting rule choice

If rent-seeking costs are considered in addition to, and separate from, external costs and decision costs in Buchanan and Tullock's economic theory of constitutions, total interdependence costs may have multiple local minima close to the decision-making extremes. As a result, the global minimum, which gives the optimal decision rule, may be much closer to “unanimity rule” or “individual rule” than to “simple majority rule”. Further, the comparison of the minimum total interdependence costs for the public sector with those for the private sector would only justify a smaller scope and size for the public sector than would be the case if rent-seeking costs were ignored. Finally, systematic variation in rent-seeking cost could account for dramatic regime shifts between dictatorship and democracy.

Privatization in rent-seeking societies

Four Latin American countries have devoted particular attention, though not equal action, to privatization policies, the implementation of which has shed considerable light on the dynamics of rent-seeking societies. The fact that democratization, in some form, is also underway in each of the four has intensified the interplay of forces that shape the implementation of privatization programs. The experiences of Mexico and Chile, in particular, demonstrate how important it may be to “privatize” the private sector by reforming macroeconomic policies and opening the economy to external competition before, or at least concurrently with, tackling the privatization of the public sector. The obstructive force of rent-seeking behavior is shown most clearly in the Argentine case, while the Brazilian experience is useful, along with that of Mexico, as a reminder that rent-seeking dynamics are not necessarily incompatible with structural transformation and high rates of growth.

Earmarking as a deterrent to rent-seeking

Statistical analysis tends to support the view that quid-pro-quo fiscal arrangements reduce rent-seeking opportunities and thereby limit campaign spending in gubernatorial races. This investigation has, however, not examined other possible avenues of rent-seeking, nor has it tested the hypothesis that earmarking forces a global reduction in rent-seeking activity. One possibility, already discussed, is that higher taxes may reduce participation in gubernatorial elections but increase the demand for tax advisers. Nor have we considered rent-seeking at different levels within government — within the legislature or the highway bureaucracy, for example. Finally, we have not examined rent-seeking at those critical quasi-constitutional moments when earmarking rules are being established. Because rent-seeking can occur on many different levels, these issues deserve further investigation. Of some interest is the statistical insignificance of several variables commonly thought to contribute to campaign activity, including the income of citizens, and the candidate's political PARTY and TERM of office. Our findings downplay the importance of those variables once the distinction is made between quid-pro-quo and unilateral government transactions. Buchanan's view that rent-seeking tends to increase in direct proportion to government spending gains support here, after controlling for earmarking and other conditions that influence campaign spending. Accordingly, a 1% increase in non-QPQ spending stimulates a 1% increase in campaign activity. The positive coefficient on GOVernment spending and the negative coefficient on TAXes imply that campaign contributions and SPENDing grow in conjunction with larger public deficits — an ominous sign in an age of contribution-maximizing candidates. More optimistically, our empirical results also suggest that earmarking and other quid-pro-quo fiscal arrangements may be among the institutional reforms most effective at limiting growth of the rent-seeking society.

Democracy, creeping socialism, and ideological socialism in rent-seeking societies

Rent-seeking societies suffer from a serious distortion of incentives. Incentives to engage in distributional struggles, to seek contrived transfers are strong, but incentives to engage in productive work are too weak. Stagnation and some unemployment should be expected. Long lasting democracies within unchanged borders create a permissive environment for rent-seeking. The provision of rents very much depends on government. The stronger the governmental involvement in the economy, the higher social security spending, the more rents the government is likely to generate. Therefore, creeping socialism understood as increased government control of the economy should reinforce the rent-seeking society and the corresponding negative effects on growth and employment. Whether such creeping socialism is backed by ideological socialism or not should make little difference for growth or employment. These ideas have been tested and partially supported by a 19 nation sample of industrial democracies, using data from the sixties and seventies. By and large, the rent-seeking approach is fairly successful in explaining national differences in economic growth rates, but receives ambiguous support or less for unemployment. Olson's (1982, 1983) proposition about the negative impact of long lasting democracy within unchanged borders on economic growth is much better supported than the growth-retarding effects of government revenues or social security spending are.

Mercantilism as a rent-seeking society: economic regulation in historical perspective

<i>Mercantilism as a rent-seeking society: economic regulation in historical perspective</i>

Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society: Economic Regulation in Historical Perspective

Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society: Economic Regulation in Historical Perspective

Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society: Economic Regulation in Historical Perspective

Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society: Economic Regulation in Historical Perspective

Economic Thought and Doctrine - Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society: Economic Regulations in Historical Perspective. By Robert B. EkelundJr., and Robert D. Tollison. College Station, Texas: Texas A &amp; M University Press, 1981. Pp. xiii, 169. $17.50 cloth.

Economic Thought and Doctrine - Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society: Economic Regulations in Historical Perspective. By Robert B. EkelundJr., and Robert D. Tollison. College Station, Texas: Texas A &amp; M University Press, 1981. Pp. xiii, 169. $17.50 cloth. - Volume 42 Issue 4

The political economy of the rent-seeking society: The case of public employees and their unions

Evidence is accumulating which suggests that public employee pay levels may contain substantial rent components. The purpose of this study is twofold: to relate the theories of public choice and competitive rent seeking to this evidence and to improve upon existing estimates of rent levels by incorporating the effects of fringe benefits and stability of employment. This study concludes that once nonwage forms of compensation are included, economic rents are contained in pay levels at all three levels of government for both sexes.

ECONOMIC REGULATION IN MERCANTILE EENGLAND: HECKSCHER REVISITED

The gradual evolution to free enterprise in England, which became quite pronounced about the time of Adam Smith, is explained in this paper in terms of institutional changes in the rent-seeking society of mercantile England. In this explanation the role of ideas and influential writers is seen as subsidiary to the role of real economic and institutional forces in producing historical outcomes. Moreover, a major feature of our rent-seeking interpretation is that the poor design and competition for control of the mercantile regulatory process unintentionally helped bring about the institutional changes which made rent seeking and economic regulation by the central government less feasible. “a part of that force which always intends evil 4und always creates good”— Goethe, Faust.

RENT‐SEEKING AND HONG KONG'S TEXTILE QUOTA SYSTEM

The Developing EconomiesVolume 17, Issue 1 p. 110-118 Free Access RENT-SEEKING AND HONG KONG'S TEXTILE QUOTA SYSTEM Morris E. MORKRE, Morris E. MORKRESearch for more papers by this author Morris E. MORKRE, Morris E. MORKRESearch for more papers by this author First published: March 1979 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-1049.1979.tb00610.xCitations: 9AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL REFERENCES 1 Bardan, B. The Cotton Textile Agreement, 1962–1972,” Journal of World Trade Law, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January-February 1973). 2 Dam, K. W. The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1970). 3 Fairbank, J. K. The United States and China ( Cambridge , Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1971). 4 Hong Kong, Census and Statistics Department. 1973 Census of Industrial Production ( Hong Kong : Government Printer, 1977). 5 Hong Kong, Department of Commerc. and Industry. Textile Export Control System: Hong Kong , mimeographed (1975). 6 Hong Kong, Department of Commerce and Industry. “ The Modified Textiles Export Control System,” mimeographed (1976). 7 Krueger, A. O. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review, Vol. 64, No. 3 (June 1974). 8 Meade, J. E. The Balance of Payments, Vol. 1, The Theory of International Economic Policy London : Oxford University Press, 1951). 9 Murray, T., and Walter, I. Quantitative Restrictions, Developing Countries, and GATT,” Journal of World Trade Law, Vol. 11, No. 5 (September-October 1977). 10 Textile Asia, April 1976. 11 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Secretariat. International Trade in Cotton Textiles and the Developing Countries: Problems and Prospects New York : United Nations, 1974). Citing Literature Volume17, Issue1March 1979Pages 110-118 ReferencesRelatedInformation

How British Is the British Sickness?

Previous articleNext article No AccessHow British Is the British Sickness?Samuel BrittanSamuel Brittan Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 21, Number 2Oct., 1978 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/466920 Views: 4Total views on this site Citations: 17Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1978 The University of Chicago Law SchoolPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Jim Tomlinson Deindustrialisation and ‘Thatcherism’: moral economy and unintended consequences, Contemporary British History 35, no.44 (Aug 2021): 620–642.https://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2021.1972416Rami Kaplan, Daniel Kinderman The Business-Led Globalization of CSR: Channels of Diffusion From the United States Into Venezuela and Britain, 1962-1981, Business & Society 59, no.33 (Jul 2017): 439–488.https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650317717958Christopher Kirkland The Trade Union Crisis of 1976–1979, (Jul 2017): 53–103.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59238-1_2ROGER MIDDLETON BRITTAN ON BRITAIN: ‘THE ECONOMIC CONTRADICTIONS OF DEMOCRACY’ REDUX, The Historical Journal 54, no.44 (Nov 2011): 1141–1168.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X11000422Kenneth W. Dam Legal Institutions, Legal Origins, and Governance, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2006).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.932694Roger Middleton Britain's Economic Problem: Too Small a Public Sector?, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 1997).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2943254Zaidi Sattar Public expenditure and economic performance: A comparison of developed and low-income developing economies, Journal of International Development 5, no.11 (Jan 1993): 27–49.https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3380050103MANFRED E. STREIT The Mirage of Neo-Corporatism, Kyklos 41, no.44 (Nov 1988): 603–624.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1988.tb02732.xManfred E. Streit Economic Order and Public Policy - Market, Constitution and the Welfare State, (Jan 1987): 1–21.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-73064-1_1 Leonard Dudley Implicit Labor Contracts and Public Choice: A General Equilibrium Approach, The Journal of Law and Economics 29, no.11 (Oct 2015): 61–82.https://doi.org/10.1086/467109Erich Weede Selbstgefährdungstendenzen von freiheitlichen Demokratien, (Jan 1986): 83–96.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-86109-2_10Colin Thain The Treasury and Britain's Decline, Political Studies 32, no.44 (Jun 2016): 581–595.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1984.tb01547.xMichael James Big government, efficiency and equity: A reply to Peter Wilenski, Politics 19, no.11 (Sep 2007): 66–72.https://doi.org/10.1080/00323268408401909Neil M. Kay Innovation, Markets and Hierarchies, Journal of Economic Studies 11, no.22 (Feb 1984): 44–60.https://doi.org/10.1108/eb002576Erich Weede Democracy, creeping socialism, and ideological socialism in rent-seeking societies, Public Choice 44, no.22 (Jan 1984): 349–366.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118768Marc Bendick, Larry C. Ledebur NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND ECONOMICALLY DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES, Policy Studies Journal 10, no.22 (Dec 1981): 220–235.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1981.tb00998.x WORK-SHARING AND INSURANCE POLICY: A CURE FOR STAGFLATION, Kyklos 34, no.33 (Aug 1981): 432–447.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1981.tb01198.x

Campaign Expenditures and Political Competition

THE theory of public choice emphasizes the role of economic assumptions in the mechanisms which generate political choices.1 In a recent contribution to this literature, Stigler has suggested that the "all-or-nothing" characterization of political competition is both unappealing and unrealistic. He is sympathetic to a basic similarity between political and economic competition, where, like the latter, the products of a political process (public policy) can be construed as ranging continuously from failure to success.2 Stigler notes that there has been a tendency to label (incorrectly) the winning of 51 per cent of legislative seats a victory and 49 per cent a defeat and argues that the success of a political party is "more or less," not all-or-none. Thus, the importance of a continuous characterization of political outcomes is that it reduces the apparent fundamental differences which have exacerbated the extent of the analogy between economic and political competition.3

A Theory of Price Control

PRICE or rent control is but one of many forms of legislative action which interfere with private contracting in the market place. To delimit the scope of my analysis, I shall use the term "price control" to refer only to any set of regulations which satisfies the following three conditions. First, the control must fix the price (or income)' terms of private contracts; this categorically excludes any laws which regulate the distribution of income among the contracting parties on a share or percentage basis.2 Second, the control must involve no appropriation of proceeds to or from the government; taxation and subsidization are thus excluded. Finally, the fixing of price must not be associated with direct government sales, purchases, or manipulation of resources so as to maintain the regulated price;3 by this stipulation, price "support" is also excluded. Even on such terms, legal regulations to control price are still many and varied. To evaluate our understanding of the class of phenomena which we seek to explain it is essential that we discover implications refutable by facts. By this criterion the available body of economic theory pertaining to price control is deficient indeed: the massive literature on the subject offers few such implications.4 An alternative approach to analyzing the observable effects of price control is presented here.

What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity

What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity