Goethe Yearbook 429 Thus Pugh's claim throughout his book that he knows what was on Schiller's mind fails to convince. The author's main point with regard to the "Theosophie" is that it transmits a philosophy of love that further shapes the poetry and philosophy written during the first decade of Schiller's career. While this is certainly an important point, it is ironic that, given his thesis that Schiller was not a proponent of the Enlightenment, he would feel compelled to come to terms with the influences of several of Schiller's contemporaries while, to be sure, reaching back to Ficino and Renaissance Platonism. Ironically, when considering Schiller's "Theosophie des Julius" and openly discussing the themes of the immortality of the soul, love and gravity, love and friendship, and even self-sacrifice, Pugh fails to consult Plato's Phaedrus. Finally, the love of God and Julius's understanding of self-love is not simply "egoistic," as Pugh contends (179), since Julius attributes Creation to God and states explicitly that beings like himself are not equal to the Creator. Perhaps Schiller also had Goethe's Werther in mind when he wrote: "Egoismus errichtet seinen Mittelpunkt in sich selber; Liebe pflanzt ihn außerhalb ihrer in die Achse des ewigen Ganzen. Liebe zielt nach Einheit; Egoismus ist Einsamkeit. Liebe ist die mitherrschende Bürgerin eines blühenden Freistaats, Egoismus ein Despot in einer verwüsteten Schöpfung." In any case, the political analogies of the last comparison are well -worth noting. In sum, Pugh insists that Schiller was a Platonist (see also his article of 1991 on this very topic in Colloquia Germanica), even in the absence of explicit statements, which he admits time and again, and to the exclusion of other pressing considerations, such as the main current of Schiller scholarship today. Because the author exhibits an admirable command of the Platonic tradition, the Schiller expert will wish to come to terms with this book. University of Arizona Steven D. Martinson Novalis, Philosophical Writings. Translated and edited by Margaret Mahony Stoljar. Albany: SUNY Press, 1997. 194 pp. Theory as Practice: A Critical Anthology of Early German Romantic Writings. Edited and translated by Jochen Schulte-Sasse et al. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. 479 pp. In recent years several major English-language studies have underscored the importance of early German Romanticism and its for- 430 Book Reviews mative influence on modern literary theory. While a fair number of these early Romantic texts have been published in English translation in various fora, these two new translations make a wide selection of seminal Romantic writings available in a convenient, accessible form, and would make a welcome addition to any library . Stoljar's masterful translation, which provides the first extensive selection of Novalis's philosophical writings available in English, is exemplary in its precision, accuracy, and readability. Focusing on those manuscripts written between 1797 and 1799, Stoljar presents lucid, engaging translations of the Miscellaneous Observations [Blüthenstaub], Monologue, Faith and Love, and Christendom or Europe in their entirety, and extensive selections from the Logological Fragments, the Teplitz Fragments, the essay on Goethe as scientist, the General Draft [Das Allgemeine Brouillon], and the Last Fragments .Where she does not include complete translations of the original texts, Stoljar's choice of fragments is judicious . Her introduction and notes to the translation are clearly and intelligently written, succinctly outlining and analyzing major issues raised in Novalis's writings. The resultant volume provides a reasonably comprehensive picture of Novalis's wide-ranging interests and contributions to the critical discourse of his era. Throughout her flowing translation Stoljar remains faithful to the original German, and her English is a pleasure to read. To be sure, on occasion dimensions of the original text are lost in the English rendition, as is inevitably the case in any translation. For example, the first fragment of Blüthenstaub, "Wir suchen überall das Unbedingte, und finden immer nur Dinge" (emphasis mine), becomes "We seek the absolute everywhere, and only ever find things" (23), eliding the word play between das Unbedingte and Dinge that informs the original German. While the translation itself is otherwise impeccable, two shortcomings are evident...