Removal Of Judges Research Articles

The Court’s Jurisdiction under the Somali Judiciary System

The Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia establishes the legal framework for the Somalian judicial system. It specifies that the national court system will be divided into three levels: the Constitutional Court, Federal Government level courts, and Federal Member State level courts. Any federal-level member of the court may be appointed by the future nine-member Judicial Service Commission. The Law on the Organization of the Judiciary (Judiciary Act) establishes a more precise framework for the selection and removal of judges and prosecutors, as well as the duties of the AGO, courts, and the creation of the Attorney General's Office. Clarification of court levels and jurisdiction is provided in this article.

Under the Sword of Damocles: The Supreme Court and Judicial Politics in Paraguay, 1992–2020

With a case study of the Paraguayan Supreme Court from the transition to democracy until today (1992-2020), I evaluate the endurance and change of informal institutions and their relationship with formal ones in court-elected branches relations. I show that the formal institutions that are considered as paramount for judicial independence – those that regulate the appointment, tenure, and removal of judges – are intertwined with the informal institution of judicial co-optation, which guarantees the subordination of judges to political interests (Basabe-Serrano 2015). These formal rules function as control mechanisms to ensure this subordination. With a historical institutionalist approach, I identify the key events and actors within this development. My analysis indicates that regime legacies partly explain the subordination of the court to political interest, but also stresses the role of agency. Further, I show that the independence of courts is especially challenged within early transition years.

SPECIFIC RELEASE OF JUDGES REMOVAL: GENERAL THEORETICAL CHARACTERISTICS

In the article the specifics of the removal of judges from office are clarified. The essence of this legal category is revealed. The general theoretical description of removal of judges from office is given.
 The author points out that the notion of "removal" is more focused on the science of labor law (on dismissal) or criminal procedural law (on preventive measures such as removal from office and temporary removal of a judge from the administration of justice). The current legislation does not operate on the separate concept of “removal of judges”. Today, it is used in the context of such a measure of legal influence as "temporarily removing a judge from the administration of justice." For the term "justice", its definition is also not provided at the level of law, and in theory there is no common understanding.
 In addition, at the level of the Basic Law, the terms "legal dispute" and "criminal prosecution" are considered as two different categories that are not covered by each other, which is logical in terms of the substantive load of these concepts.
 It is worth noting that the term "removal of a judge from the administration of justice" is used in the law with the adverb "temporary", despite the fact that the very concept of "removal" already sees its temporary character - this phenomenon exists before certain conditions arise, after the onset of which it exhausts itself.

Appointment and removal of judges and assignment of files at Civil Courts in Ghana – current issues.

Appointment and removal of judges and assignment of files at Civil Courts in Ghana – current issues.

Appointment and removal of judges and the assignments of files at Criminal Courts in Tanzania

Appointment and removal of judges and the assignments of files at Criminal Courts in Tanzania

Appointment and removal of judges and assignment of files at Civil Courts in Kenya – current issues

KAS African Law Study Library , Seite 312 - 322

The appointment and removal of judges in Hungary – efforts, reforms and constitutional controversies

The appointment and removal of judges in Hungary – efforts, reforms and constitutional controversies

Appointment, Discipline and Removal of Judges: A Comparison of the Swiss and New Zealand Judiciaries

This article gives an overview of the legal system of Switzerland and then compares the judiciaries of Switzerland and New Zealand. As far as Switzerland is concerned, it covers both the system of the Swiss Federation and the systems in the cantons. After analysing the powers enjoyed by the judiciary via the legislature, the article examines the appointment of judges in detail. The author explains how, in Switzerland, openly political and other considerations are weighed in the course of electing judges and how the appointment of lay judges is balanced with an active role of law clerks. In contrast, New Zealand has a proud tradition of apolitical judicial appointments that are made solely based on merit. The author criticises that Swiss judges are elected for a term of office, whereas New Zealand judges enjoy the security of tenure and thus, a greater judicial independence. Lastly, the article covers the removal and discipline of judges, where the author, while he commends the recent reform in New Zealand, he advocates for a system where the ultimate decision is given to an independent judicial body rather than a parliament.

Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter?

AbstractThe relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence is much debated in the literature on judicial politics. Some studies find no relationship between the formal rules governing the structure of the judiciary and de facto judicial independence, while others find a tight correlation. This article sets out to reassess the relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence using a new theory and an expanded data set. De jure institutional protections, we argue, do not work in isolation but work conjunctively, so that particular combinations of protections are more likely to be effective than others. We find that rules governing the selection and removal of judges are the only de jure protections that actually enhance judicial independence in practice and that they work conjunctively. This effect is strongest in authoritarian regimes and in contexts with checks on executive authority.

Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter?: A Reevaluation of Explanations for Judicial Independence

The relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence is much debated in the literature on judicial politics. Some studies find no relationship between the formal rules governing the structure of the judiciary and de facto judicial independence, while others find a tight correlation. This article sets out to reassess the relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence using a new theory and an expanded data set. De jure institutional protections, we argue, do not work in isolation but work conjunctively, so that particular combinations of protections are more likely to be effective than others. We find that rules governing the selection and removal of judges are the only de jure protections that actually enhance judicial independence in practice and that they work conjunctively. This effect is strongest in authoritarian regimes and in contexts with checks on executive authority.

The Appointment and Removal Process for Judges in Argentina: The Role of Judicial Councils and Impeachment Juries in Promoting Judicial Independence

AbstractThis article explores the conditions that allow judicial councils and impeachment juries to promote judicial autonomy. In theory, these bodies intervene in the appointment and removal of judges in order to reduce executive control over court composition, thereby promoting judicial independence. Using the case of Argentina at the federal and the subnational levels, this study demonstrates that competitive politics enhances the capacity of judicial councils and impeachment juries to bolster judicial autonomy. Interparty competition provides incentives for the executive to develop a meaningful system of checks and balances, which includes an independent judiciary that can check executive power. In contrast, monolithic party control—defined as a prolonged period of unified government under a highly disciplined party—permits the executive to maintain a monopoly on power and thereby control judicial appointments and removals.

The Appointment and Removal Process for Judges in Argentina: The Role of Judicial Councils and Impeachment Juries in Promoting Judicial Independence

This article explores the conditions that allow judicial councils and impeachment juries to promote judicial autonomy. In theory, these bodies intervene in the appointment and removal of judges in order to reduce executive control over court composition, thereby promoting judicial independence. Using the case of Argentina at the federal and the subnational levels, this study demonstrates that competitive politics enhances the capacity of judicial councils and impeachment juries to bolster judicial autonomy. Interparty competition provides incentives for the executive to develop a meaningful system of checks and balances, which includes an independent judiciary that can check executive power. In contrast, monolithic party control—defined as a prolonged period of unified government under a highly disciplined party—permits the executive to maintain a monopoly on power and thereby control judicial appointments and removals.

Controlling Precident: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decisionmaking

Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen has recently urged enactment of a congressional statute that would limit the judicial use of precedent in constitutional cases. Although I share Professor Paulsen's general views on precedent, his proposed statute is unconstitutional. Congress does not have power to regulate by statute the decisionmaking processes of federal courts, even when those decisionmaking processes are themselves unconstitutional. Congress' sole remedy is impeachment and removal of judges who improperly decide cases. This assessment of congressional power calls into question many familiar practices, such as statutes regulating scope of review, statutes prescribing rules of evidence for courts, and statutes regulating judicial remedies.

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Regarding the Appointment and Removal of Judges in the United Arab Emirates

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Regarding the Appointment and Removal of Judges in the United Arab Emirates

The Appointment and Removal of Judges

This is the third series in the annual Menzies Lecture series. The lectures were delivered at the University of Virginia and at William and Mary College Williamsburg on 8 and 12 October 1987.

A Symposium on the Appointment, Discipline and Removal of Judges

Members of panel at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Bar Association, 1971, suggest and analyze possible methods of improving the present process of selection and appointment as well as the disciplining and removal of judges. The Chairman, Mr. D. C. McDonald, outlines proposal for system of judicial appointments as suggested by Professor E. A. Tollefson in recent article. From Professor Tollefson's proposal Mr. McDonald extracts several "possibilities" including an intensive training course for judges upon their appointment, periodic refresher courses for all judges and the extension and upgrading of the "research staffs" available to the courts. The Chairman goes on to compare and contrast the disciplinary provisions that are applicable to Supreme, District and Provincial Court judges. Panel member G. M. Stirling, Q.C., who has served on the National Committee on the Judiciary of the Cana dian Bar Association, describes its function and method of operation and concludes that it is only first step in the process towards an improved method of selecting the most competent and highly qualified judges. Mr. Stirling suggests that modified form of the "Missouri plan" could be followed in Canada. The plan would involve the setting up in every province of standing independent commission "which would screen all qualified and available lawyers in the province and submit limited number of names to the Minister of Justice" from which the Minister would make his selection. Panel member, W. H. Hurlburt, Q.C., also endorses an "appropriate adapta tion" of the Missouri plan and goes on to suggest how the nominating commission might be constituted. With regard to the removal and disciplining of judges, Mr. Hurlburt approves of the concept of Judicial Council as set up by an amendment to the Judges Act (S.C. 1970-71-72 c. 55) but suggests that if the Council is to operate efficiently it must have an office and admin istrative staff. Panel member F. C. Muldoon, Q.C., submits that al

Carinthia (Removal of Judges) Case.

Military Occupation — Article 43 of the Hague Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land — Administrative Measures Taken by the Occupant — Removal of a Judge — Yugoslav Occupation of Carinthia.

The Removal of Judges by Legislative Address in Massachusetts

While there are many noteworthy and liberal provisions in the constitution of Massachusetts, there is one of particular interest, especially at the present time, because of the wide discussion accorded the subject with which it deals. This is a provision relating to the removal of judges, and declares that a judge of any court in Massachusetts may be removed by the governor and council on an address of the legislature. When Colonel Roosevelt said in his famous speech before the Ohio Constitutional Convention at Columbus, in speaking of the recall of judges, that he favored such a drastic method of removal as was embodied in the Massachusetts constitution, many people opened their eyes in amazement. Few, of course, had ever heard of removal by address, and fewer still, if they had heard of it, understood what was meant. Their surprise was entirely natural inasmuch as no case of removal by address has taken place in Massachusetts for more than a generation.

Discussion of the Selection and Removal of Judges

Discussion of the Selection and Removal of Judges

Removal of Judges by the Legislature

Removal of Judges by the Legislature