Religious Disbelief Research Articles

The Nones of Mombasa: Religious Disbelief and Disaffiliation on the East African Coast

Abstract Religious disbelief (RDb) and religious disaffiliation (RDa), which describe the intellectual, cultural, and social lives of contemporary citizens referred to as “Nones” (i.e., “none of the above” as a respondent’s choice among religious options), are emerging as sociological categories of increasing interest to religious studies scholars. Much of the research done thus far focuses on Western nations and religions. This study and the observations herein apply some of these same interests and methods to the African nonreligious scene. As a field site, the cosmopolitan city of Mombasa (pop. 1.2 million) on the Kenyan coast has for many recent generations been home to a variety of African, Arab, Indian-Asian, and European races, cultures, and religions. African Traditional Religions (ATRs), Islam(s), Indian religions, and Christianities all have a presence in this religiously pluralistic milieu. In this cosmopolitan context, we should expect to find among urban Africans some representation of trends found across the world, one of which is a potentially growing, if silent and low-profile, population called “Nones.”

Is There a Dark Side to Humility? Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Evidence for Existential Costs of Humility

ABSTRACT Previous research has highlighted the benefits of holding one’s views with humility. However, might intellectual humility surrounding existential beliefs also incur some psychological costs? To advance research on intellectual humility about existential concerns (IH-E), we conducted four studies (N = 1,700) to examine potential costs of humility. Study 1 (N = 203) revealed that IH-E was associated with greater death-related anxiety. Study 2 (N = 1,151) replicated this association in a larger sample. In Study 3 (N = 77), a longitudinal study of first-year college students revealed that IH-E predicted negative changes in religious well-being three and six weeks later. In Study 4 (N = 269), a year-long longitudinal study of religious “ex-vangelicals” revealed that IH-E predicted religious disbelief and lower well-being one year later. We discuss implications for the nature and structure of security-providing worldviews. Despite the benefits of humility, holding existential beliefs humbly might come with intrapsychic costs.

Rethinking History, Science, and Religion: An Exploration of Conflict and the Complexity Principle

Rethinking History, Science, and Religion: An Exploration of Conflict and the Complexity Principle

Analytic atheism: Valuing epistemic rationality strengthens the association between analytic thinking and religious disbelief

Analytic thinking has been put forth as one of the processes through which people may become atheists. According to this view, people who are more (vs. less) analytically inclined should be more likely to reject the existence of deities because they rely less on the various intuitive cognitive processes that support supernatural beliefs. Consistent with this “analytic atheism” hypothesis, studies have found a negative association between analytic thinking and religious belief. In the present article we expand on this literature and argue that analytic thinking should be more strongly associated with religious disbelief when coupled with motivation to be epistemically rational. Consistent with this hypothesis, we show that the association between analytic thinking and weaker religious faith (Study 1), as well as between analytic thinking and disbelief (vs. belief) in God, and related supernatural phenomena (Study 2–3) is stronger among people who ascribe more (vs. less) value to epistemic rationality.

The Origins of Religious Disbelief: A Dual Inheritance Approach

Widespread religious disbelief represents a key testing ground for theories of religion. We evaluated the predictions of three prominent theoretical approaches—secularization, cognitive byproduct, and dual inheritance—in a nationally representative (United States, N = 1,417) data set with preregistered analyses and found considerable support for the dual inheritance perspective. Of key predictors of religious disbelief, witnessing fewer credible cultural cues of religious commitment was the most potent, β = .28, followed distantly by reflective cognitive style, β = .13, and less advanced mentalizing, β = .05. Low cultural exposure predicted about 90% higher odds of atheism than did peak cognitive reflection, and cognitive reflection only predicted disbelief among those relatively low in cultural exposure to religion. This highlights the utility of considering both evolved intuitions and transmitted culture and emphasizes the dual roles of content- and context-biased social learning in the cultural transmission of disbelief (preprint https://psyarxiv.com/e29rt/).

The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality.

There is a widespread cross-cultural stereotype suggesting that atheists are untrustworthy and lack a moral compass. Is there any truth to this notion? Building on theory about the cultural, (de)motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, the present research investigated whether there are reliable similarities as well as differences between believers and disbelievers in the moral values and principles they endorse. Four studies examined how religious disbelief (vs. belief) relates to endorsement of various moral values and principles in a predominately religious (vs. irreligious) country (the U.S. vs. Sweden). Two U.S. M-Turk studies (Studies 1A and 1B, N = 429) and two large cross-national studies (Studies 2–3, N = 4,193), consistently show that disbelievers (vs. believers) are less inclined to endorse moral values that serve group cohesion (the binding moral foundations). By contrast, only minor differences between believers and disbelievers were found in endorsement of other moral values (individualizing moral foundations, epistemic rationality). It is also demonstrated that presumed cultural and demotivational antecedents of disbelief (limited exposure to credibility-enhancing displays, low existential threat) are associated with disbelief. Furthermore, these factors are associated with weaker endorsement of the binding moral foundations in both countries (Study 2). Most of these findings were replicated in Study 3, and results also show that disbelievers (vs. believers) have a more consequentialist view of morality in both countries. A consequentialist view of morality was also associated with another presumed antecedent of disbelief—analytic cognitive style.

Bertrand Russell: ateísmo, agnosticismo e filosofia analítica no século XX

Este trabalho apresenta o surgimento e o significado do “ateísmo público” e do “agnosticismo filosófico” do inglês Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) a partir dos textos que ele produziu particularmente na década de 1890 e de 1920. Para realizar esse objetivo, optei por destacar no artigo: 1) o debate historiográfico sobre a identificação do autor como ateu e agnóstico; 2) as origens de sua descrença religiosa no cenário filosófico inglês da década de 1890 e as críticas que direcionou às doutrinas e instituições religiosas nos anos 1920; 3) avaliações sobre o ateísmo e o agnosticismo do pensador britânico. Com base nestes pontos, espero evidenciar a contribuição desse filósofo para a história das ideias sobre ateísmo e agnosticismo.

Reflection increases belief in God through self-questioning among non-believers

AbstractThe dual-process model of the mind predicts that religious belief will be stronger for intuitive decisions, whereas reflective thinking will lead to religious disbelief (i.e.,the intuitive religious belief hypothesis). While early research found intuition to promote and reflection to weaken belief in God, more recent attempts found no evidence for the intuitive religious belief hypothesis. Many of the previous studies are underpowered to detect small effects, and it is not clear whether the cognitive process manipulations used in these failed attempts worked as intended. We investigated the influence of intuitive and reflective thought on belief in God in two large-scale preregistered experiments (N= 1,602), using well-established cognitive manipulations (i.e., time-pressure with incentives for compliance) and alternative elicitation methods (between and within-subject designs). Against our initial hypothesis based on the literature, the experiments provide first suggestive then confirmatory evidence forthe reflective religious belief hypothesis. Exploratory examination of the data suggests that reflection increases doubts about beliefs held regarding God’s existence. Reflective doubt exists primarily among non-believers, resulting in an overall increase in belief in God when deciding reflectively.

A travessia atlântica como um trajeto iniciático nos romances de formação Un océan, deux mers, trois continents, de Wilfrid n'Sondé, e A rainha Ginga, de José Eduardo Agualusa

O objetivo deste artigo é refletir sobre a travessia atlântica no eixo Sul-Sul e o seu caráter iniciático nos romances de formação (Bildungsroman) Un océan, deux mers, trois continents, de Wilfried N’Sondé e A Rainha Ginga de José Eduardo Agualusa. Na leitura comparatista proposta, salientaremos a complementaridade dos romances estudados que narram um contexto histórico específico: o comércio transatlântico de escravos durante os séc. XVI e XVII. Debruçar-nos-emos mais especificamente sobre a questão da travessia atlântica e todos os aspetos inerentes à viagem: separação da terra natal, solidão, questionamento e reflexão pessoais. Elementos que ao longo de ambas as obras conduzirão os protagonistas a uma morte iniciática e a uma posterior ressurreição simbólica, culminando num processo de construção identitária, consciência humanista e descrença religiosa.

Becoming Religious Disbelievers: Retrospective Viewpoints

Religious disbelief has been increasing in the United States. Many studies have examined this phenomenon. This study examined the factors surrounding the transition to disbelief within a sample of 25 adults in the United States based on a conversion model proposed by Lewis Rambo. Using Q-sorting methodology, it was found that the experiences of these individuals, as viewed by the individuals themselves, fell into five groups. These groups reflected subjective beliefs about their experiences with the following different emphases on the processes and results of their deconversions: a new identity, a change in lifestyle and social groups, being in despair and wanting life to mean more, media questing, and mentored change. These results suggest that the experience of becoming a disbeliever is viewed by those having experienced it in various ways, though each of the five viewpoints reflect aspects of Rambo’s model.

Cognitive flexibility and religious disbelief

Cognitive flexibility is operationalized in the neuropsychological literature as the ability to shift between modes of thinking and adapt to novel or changing environments. Religious belief systems consist of strict rules and rituals that offer adherents certainty, consistency, and stability. Consequently, we hypothesized that religious adherence and practice of repetitive religious rituals may be related to the persistence versus flexibility of one’s cognition. The present study investigated the extent to which tendencies towards cognitive flexibility versus persistence are related to three facets of religious life: religious affiliation, religious practice, and religious upbringing. In a large sample (N = 744), we found that religious disbelief was related to cognitive flexibility across three independent behavioural measures: the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Remote Associates Test, and Alternative Uses Test. Furthermore, lower frequency of religious service attendance was related to cognitive flexibility. When analysing participants’ religious upbringing in relation to their current religious affiliation, it was manifest that current affiliation was more influential than religious upbringing in all the measured facets of cognitive flexibility. The findings indicate that religious affiliation and engagement may shape and be shaped by cognitive control styles towards flexibility versus persistence, highlighting the tight links between flexibility of thought and religious ideologies.

Analytic atheism: A cross-culturally weak and fickle phenomenon?

AbstractReligious belief is a topic of longstanding interest to psychological science, but the psychology of religious disbelief is a relative newcomer. One prominently discussed model isanalytic atheism, wherein cognitive reflection, as measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test, overrides religious intuitions and instruction. Consistent with this model, performance-based measures of cognitive reflection predict religious disbelief in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic) samples. However, the generality of analytic atheism remains unknown. Drawing on a large global sample (N= 3461) from 13 religiously, demographically, and culturally diverse societies, we find that analytic atheism as usually assessed is in fact quite fickle cross-culturally, appearing robustly only in aggregate analyses and in three individual countries. The results provide additional evidence for culture’s effects on core beliefs.

Atheists

AbstractAtheists represent an inconspicuous minority, identifiable only by their disbelief in God(s). Despite being highly stigmatized and disliked, until recent scientific endeavors, little has been known about this group including why they don't believe, how many people are atheists, and why they trigger intense reactions. Thus, this paper aims to synthesize what is known about atheists (so far) and to help explain the widespread negative attitudes and prejudice towards atheists; the possible cognitive, motivational, and cultural origins of disbelief; and the unique challenges facing the study of religious disbelievers. To do so, we will explore current findings in psychological research on atheism by considering the complex interactions of cultural learning, motivations, and core cognitive processes. Although significant scientific progress has been made in understanding the factors underlying atheism, there remains much to be explored in the domain of religious disbelief.

Believing God: an account of faith as personal trust

AbstractThe affective view of faith, as opposed to the doxastic or cognitive view, giving more importance to goodwill than to belief content, has received much support in recent philosophy of religion, including from Richard Swinburne. Swinburne's concept of faith is no less rational than his concept of religious belief, but its rationality is that of an action or of a practically oriented attitude, aiming at the goals of religion, compatible with religious disbelief (belief that the religious content one has faith in is probably false) and even with atheism. I argue that this paradoxical stance, which hardly squares with the Christian tradition, can be avoided, while keeping to an affective view of faith, if we give more weight to the idea that faith is first an answer given to a telling, on the basis of personal trust of the hearer in the authority of the teller – a personal account as opposed to a propositional account of faith.

How Many Atheists Are There?

One crucible for theories of religion is their ability to predict and explain the patterns of belief and disbelief. Yet, religious nonbelief is often heavily stigmatized, potentially leading many atheists to refrain from outing themselves even in anonymous polls. We used the unmatched count technique and Bayesian estimation to indirectly estimate atheist prevalence in two nationally representative samples of 2,000 U.S. adults apiece. Widely cited telephone polls (e.g., Gallup, Pew) suggest U.S. atheist prevalence of only 3–11%. In contrast, our most credible indirect estimate is 26% (albeit with considerable estimate and method uncertainty). Our data and model predict that atheist prevalence exceeds 11% with greater than .99 probability and exceeds 20% with roughly .8 probability. Prevalence estimates of 11% were even less credible than estimates of 40%, and all intermediate estimates were more credible. Some popular theoretical approaches to religious cognition may require heavy revision to accommodate actual levels of religious disbelief.

Atheists and Agnostics Are More Reflective than Religious Believers: Four Empirical Studies and a Meta-Analysis.

Individual differences in the mere willingness to think analytically has been shown to predict religious disbelief. Recently, however, it has been argued that analytic thinkers are not actually less religious; rather, the putative association may be a result of religiosity typically being measured after analytic thinking (an order effect). In light of this possibility, we report four studies in which a negative correlation between religious belief and performance on analytic thinking measures is found when religious belief is measured in a separate session. We also performed a meta-analysis on all previously published studies on the topic along with our four new studies (N = 15,078, k = 31), focusing specifically on the association between performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test (the most widely used individual difference measure of analytic thinking) and religious belief. This meta-analysis revealed an overall negative correlation (r) of -.18, 95% CI [-.21, -.16]. Although this correlation is modest, self-identified atheists (N = 133) scored 18.7% higher than religiously affiliated individuals (N = 597) on a composite measure of analytic thinking administered across our four new studies (d = .72). Our results indicate that the association between analytic thinking and religious disbelief is not caused by a simple order effect. There is good evidence that atheists and agnostics are more reflective than religious believers.

Analytic Thinking, Religion, and Prejudice: An Experimental Test of the Dual-Process Model of Mind

ABSTRACTDual-process models of the mind, as well as the relation between analytic thinking and religious belief, have aroused interest in recent years. However, few studies have examined this relation experimentally. We predicted that religious belief might be one of the causes of prejudice, while analytic thinking reduces both. The first experiment replicated, in a mostly Muslim sample, past research showing that analytic thinking promotes religious disbelief. The second experiment investigated the effect of Muslim religious priming and analytic priming on prejudice and showed that, although the former significantly increased the total prejudice score, the latter had an effect only on antigay prejudice. Thus, the findings partially support our proposed pattern of relationships in that analytic thinking might be one of the cognitive factors that prevents prejudice, whereas religious belief might be the one that increases it.

SENSATIONAL SERMONIZING: ELLEN WOOD,GOOD WORDS, AND THE CONVERSION OF THE POPULAR

In the nineteenth century Britainunderwent a period of immense religious doubt and spiritual instability, prompted in part by German biblical criticism, the development of advanced geological and evolutionary ideas forwarded by men such as Charles Lyell and Charles Darwin, and the crisis in faith demonstrated by many high profile Church members, particularly John Henry Newman's conversion to Catholicism in 1845. In tracing the development of this religious disbelief, historian Owen Chadwick comments that “mid-Victorian England asked itself the question, for the first time in popular understanding, is Christian faith true?” (Victorian Church: Part I1). Noting the impact of the 1859 publication of Darwin'sOrigin of Speciesand the multi-authored collectionEssays and Reviewsin 1860, Chadwick further posits that “part of the traditional teaching of the Christian churches was being proved, little by little, to be untrue” (Victorian Church: Part I88). As the theological debate over the truth of the Bible intensified so did the question of how to reach, preach, and convert the urbanized and empowered working and middle classes. Indicative of this debate was the immense popularity of the Baptist preacher Charles Spurgeon, who was commonly referred to as the “Prince of Preachers.” Spurgeon exploded onto the religious scene in the mid-1850s and his theatrical and expressive form of oratory polarized mid-Victorian society as to the proper, most effective mode of preaching. In print culture, the emergence of the religious periodicalGood Words, with its unique fusion of spiritual and secular material contributed by authors from an array of denominations, demonstrated a concurrent re-evaluation within the religious press of the evolving methods of disseminating religious discourse. The 1864 serialization of Ellen Wood'sOswald CrayinGood Wordsemphasizes the magazine's interest in combining and synthesizing religious and popular material as a means of revitalizing interest in religious sentiment. In 1860 Wood's novelEast Lynnewas critically categorized as one of the first sensation novels of the 1860s, a decade in which “sensational” became the modifier of the age. Wood, alongside Wilkie Collins and Mary Elizabeth Braddon, was subsequently referred to as one of the original creators of sensation fiction, a genre frequently denigrated as scandalous and immoral.Oswald Cray, however, sits snugly among the sermons, parables, and social mission essays that fill the pages ofGood Words.

Country Religiosity Declines as Material Security Increases

According to the uncertainty hypothesis, religion declines as the quality of life improves. Replicating an earlier study with religious disbelief as the DV, it was predicted that religiosity would decline in developed countries due to greater existential security, including income security (income equality and redistribution via welfare states) and improved health. This study used a uniform data source, improving on the heterogeneous surveys tapped in the earlier work. Predictions were tested by correlation and regression analysis of 114 countries that controlled for Communism and Islamic religion. Religiosity declined with economic and social development (measured by lower agricultural employment and third-level enrollment). income security (low Gini coefficient, high personal taxation tapping the welfare state), and health security (low pathogen prevalence, marginally significant in the regression analysis). Results show that religiosity declines as material security increases, consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis, replicating the earlier study.

Analytic Thinking Promotes Religious Disbelief

Scientific interest in the cognitive underpinnings of religious belief has grown in recent years. However, to date, little experimental research has focused on the cognitive processes that may promote religious disbelief. The present studies apply a dual-process model of cognitive processing to this problem, testing the hypothesis that analytic processing promotes religious disbelief. Individual differences in the tendency to analytically override initially flawed intuitions in reasoning were associated with increased religious disbelief. Four additional experiments provided evidence of causation, as subtle manipulations known to trigger analytic processing also encouraged religious disbelief. Combined, these studies indicate that analytic processing is one factor (presumably among several) that promotes religious disbelief. Although these findings do not speak directly to conversations about the inherent rationality, value, or truth of religious beliefs, they illuminate one cognitive factor that may influence such discussions.