MISCELLANEA SCOTUS' TEACHINGS ACCORDING TO OCKHAM I. ON THE UNIVOCITY OF BEING The study of the thought of Scotus presents distinctive and proper difficulties. These are due partly to the actual condition of the texts handed down to us in various editions, partly to the language used by the Subtle Doctor. The first obstacle will be removed by the future edition of the works of Duns Scotus, which, at present, is being prepared in Rome. The second obstacle, however, will remain or, at least, will not be substantially altered. For the language used by Duns Scotus is exceedingly technical. The entire Scholastic period, since the beginning at the early thirteenth century, has gradually developed the armor of Aristotelean terminology to a high degree of precision and has constantly added new notions which will lead the modern reader astray unless he accept them in their exact meaning. Many misinterpretations of Scotistic texts, as well as of later Scholastics, are usually due to a lack of the understanding of Scholastic terminology. Scotus can not be simply read, he must be thoroughly studied. He will be understood only if the reader has Scotus' entire arsenal of technical terms at his ready disposition. Every serious student of Scotism will remember his personal, sad experiences. For these reasons the direction of the Franciscan Studies deemed it advisable to publish texts which could be of help in reaching an exact interpretation of Scotus' teachings. Convinced that the medieval Scholastics understood each other much easier than we moderns understand them, we are offering in the following numbers of the Franciscan Studies summaries of the opinions of Duns Scotus made by William Ockham. This outstanding Franciscan Doctor, who had a great admiration for Duns Scotus in spite of his deep differences, usually presents Scotus' opinions in Scotus' own words. He sometimes even expressly notes that he is quoting Scotus literally. Since Ockham wrote his Commentary in the second decade of the fourteenth century, he can be considered a reliable witness; he must even be considered as such, because he knew very well that he had to face the opposition of a considerable number of outstanding pupils of Duns Scotus; therefore, it is obvious that he had to watch his step. Though he directed his criticism against a man who had been dead about ten years, Ockham, nevertheless, was well aware that he was criticizing a living thought, and hence that he himself had to expect opposition and criticism. ¦ It is interesting to note that Ockham, when discussing Scotus' opinions, easily glides from the singular form into the plural, for instance from dicit into dicunt. Now this fact, too, makes it very probable that the texts and summaries offered by Ockham are reliable, at least to a high degree. Our editions of the following texts will be taken from Ockham's Commentary on the Sentences. For the text-reconstruction we followed the general rules laid down in our study: "The text tradition of Ockham's Ordinatio " in The New Scholasticism, XVI (1942) 203-223. There the reader will find the key to the sigla and other details. The footnotes refer mostly 100 MISCELLANEA101 to the respective texts of Scotus in the Vives edition, quoted as ed. VNot many variants are noted, but only some of importance. A comparison with the Vives edition will show that in several instances Ockham's text is certainly preferable. Since the criticisms of Ockham give valuable evidence for a correct interpretation of Scotus' thought, the second part of it is also published here, but mainly, because it contains further quotations from Scotus. Now, we shall present the main result which can be obtained from these texts. In the first place, Ockham agrees with Scotus on the main point, viz. that the concept of being is univocal to God and creatures. Like Scotus he sees in this doctrine the only safeguard of our natural knowledge of God, and for that reason, he defends it. Ockham, however, disagrees with Scotus: (a) on the proofs of this doctrine. However, his criticism is concerned more with logical subtleties. Ockham gives preference to the third proof. He disagrees likewise (b) on the extent of the univocity of being. Scotus...
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Mar 1, 1967
A Combaz 
