Reliable Belief Research Articles

A valid and reliable belief elicitation method for Bayesian priors

Objective Bayesian inference has the advantage of formally incorporating prior beliefs about the effect of an intervention into analyses of treatment effect through the use of prior probability distributions or “priors.” Multiple methods to elicit beliefs from experts for inclusion in a Bayesian study have been used; however, the measurement properties of these methods have been infrequently evaluated. The objectives of this study were to evaluate the feasibility, validity, and reliability of a belief elicitation method for Bayesian priors. Study Design and Setting A single-center, cross-sectional study using a sample of academic specialists who treat pulmonary hypertension patients was conducted to test the feasibility, face and construct validity, and reliability of a belief elicitation method. Using this method, participants expressed the probability of 3-year survival with and without warfarin. Applying adhesive dots or “chips,” each representing 5% probability, in “bins” on a line, participants expressed their uncertainty and weight of belief about the effect of warfarin on 3-year survival. Results Of the 12 participants, 11 (92%) reported that the belief elicitation method had face validity, 10 (83%) found the questions clear, and 11 (92%) found the response option easy to use. The median time to completion was 10 minutes (5–15 minutes). Internal validity testing found moderate agreement (weighted kappa = 0.54–0.57). The intraclass correlation coefficient for test–retest reliability was 0.93. Conclusion This method of belief elicitation for Bayesian priors is feasible, valid, and reliable. It can be considered for application in Bayesian clinical studies.

Trustworthiness

I argue that trustworthiness is an epistemic desideratum. It does not reduce to justified or reliable true belief, but figures in the reason why justified or reliable true beliefs are often valuable. Such beliefs can be precarious. If a belief's being justified requires that the evidence be just as we take it to be, then if we are off even by a little, the belief is unwarranted. Similarly for reliability. Although it satisfies the definition of knowledge, such a belief is not trustworthy. We ought not use it as a basis for inference or action and ought not give others to believe it. The trustworthiness of a belief, I urge, depends on its being backed by reasons—considerations that other members of the appropriate epistemic community cannot reasonably reject. Trustworthiness is intersubjective. It both depends on and contributes to the evolving cognitive values of an epistemic community.

Head Start teachers’ beliefs about language and literacy instruction

Abstract This study investigated the nature of Head Start teachers’ beliefs about early literacy and the teacher background factors that relate to these beliefs. Twenty-eight Head Start teachers were given the Preschool Teacher Literacy Beliefs Questionnaire (TBQ) and a background questionnaire. Reliable belief subscales reflecting code, oral language, book reading, and writing aspects of early literacy, as well as a reliable total literacy beliefs score, emerged from the TBQ. In general, teachers agreed with research-based practices related to oral language and book reading, but more variability was apparent around code-related and writing beliefs. Teacher experience was positively linked to agreement with evidence-based beliefs about oral language. The multidimensional nature of these beliefs, possible reasons for the absence of strong relations to background factors, and directions for future research on preschool teachers’ beliefs are discussed.

In defence of a realist interpretation of theology

AbstractIn this essay, I defend theology against a recent argument made by Peter Byrne. According to Byrne, any discipline of thought that can be interpreted realistically shows the accumulation of reliable or widespread belief about the reality it investigates. I challenge this claim, first, by showing how theology, so construed as an exercise of ‘faith seeking understanding’, can and should be interpreted realistically, even if it does not show the accumulation of reliable or widespread belief about divine reality. Second, I give a plausible account of why theology is beset by internal disagreement and division, even if the goal of theological enquiry is to overcome such disagreement and division.

WHEN IS IT SELECTIVELY ADVANTAGEOUS TO HAVE TRUE BELIEFS? SANDWICHING THE BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY ARGUMENT

Several philosophers have argued that natural selection will favor reliable belief formation; others have been more skeptical. These traditional approaches to the evolution of rationality have been either too sketchy or else have assumed that phenotypic plasticity can be equated with having a mind. Here I develop a new model to explore the functional utility of belief and desire formation mechanisms, and defend the claim that natural selection favors reliable inference methods in a broad, but not universal, range of circumstances.

Can Reliabilists Believe in Subjective Probability?

According to reliabilist conceptions of knowledge, knowledge implies reliable true belief. Since reliability is an irreducibly probabilistic notion, one's view of knowledge also depends on one's view of probability. If one believes that all probability is subjective probability, knowledge becomes a relativized concept: knowledge is relative to a given body of beliefs of a given person at a given time. Since such a relativized conception of knowledge is extremely implausible and since reliabilism seems to capture at least part of the truth, one should rather give up a purely subjective view of probability.

Justification and reliable belief

Justification and reliable belief