Myanmar Relations Research Articles

China–Asean Relations January 2017 to March 2017: Chronology of Events

China–Asean Relations January 2017 to March 2017:Chronology of Events Ping Xiaojuan (bio) As a research institute based in Singapore, the EAI monitors developments in relations and interactions between China and the individual countries of Southeast Asia as well as the ASEAN grouping as a whole. This material is presented in the form of (i) a chronology of events and (ii) important documents. —the Editors JANUARY 2017 1st Chinese President Xi Jinping sends a message of condolences to Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte over the typhoon Nock-ten that hit the Philippines, and caused heavy casualties and property damage. Xi emphasises that China and the Philippines are friendly neighbours. China expresses deep concern about the Philippine people who become homeless and affected by the disaster, and also readiness to provide emergency assistance to the typhoon-hit area. 3rd Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin meets with Cambodian Minister of Commerce Pan Sorasak. Liu reiterates that China is willing to intensify cooperation with Cambodia, comprehensively implement outcomes of Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit and deepen practical cooperation in various fields, so as to bring more tangible benefits to the two peoples. Pan Sorasak states that the two countries have enjoyed a long-standing traditional friendship, and that Cambodia is ready to collaborate with the Chinese side to advance bilateral relations, especially economic and trade cooperation for greater development. 10th Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin meets the delegation led by the Director-General of the Department of Treaties and Law of the [End Page 208] Laotian Foreign Ministry Phoukhong Sisoulath at the Chinese foreign ministry for their first official consultation meeting to exchange in-depth views on the working mechanism and capacity-building of treaties and laws, legislation and contracting issues concerning foreign affairs, issues of human rights treaties, legal affairs relating to the domestic implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions, relevant settlement of disputes pertaining to the China–Laos Investment Agreement and other issues. Both sides unanimously agreed that the establishment and continuation of such a consultation mechanism between the two counterpart departments is conducive to enriching and deepening the China–Laos comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. FEBRUARY 2017 7th The China–Myanmar "2+2" High-level Consultations led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence are held in Kunming, China. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission Shao Yuanming, Myanmar's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs U Kyaw Tin and Myanmar's Chief of the No.1 Special Operations Bureau of the Tatmadaw, or Myanmar Armed Forces, Tun Tun Naung co-chair the consultations. Speaking positively about the sound development of China–Myanmar relations, both sides agree that proper and careful resolution of the northern Myanmar issue and the maintenance of peace and stability at the China–Myanmar border area are of great significance to promoting bilateral comprehensive strategic cooperation in the new era. China expects the relevant parties in Myanmar to practise restraint and achieve a ceasefire in the northern Myanmar area soon to ensure stability at the China–Myanmar border area. Myanmar claims that it will take practical measures to stabilise the situation in northern Myanmar and advance the domestic peace process. Myanmar also welcomes China to play its due role in the process in a constructive way. At a joint press conference that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi holds with Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop after the fourth round of the China–Australia Diplomatic and Strategic Dialogue, Wang highlights that the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership and any other regional arrangement are all pathways leading to a larger goal of achieving a free trade area in the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). Wang says that China stays positive and open to all regional arrangements conducive to promoting regional economic integration and safeguarding the global free trade system. Wang says China is ready to work with Australia to advance the RCEP initiative, [End Page 209] which is led by ASEAN in the 10 Plus Six Initiative, i.e. 10 ASEAN members and six dialogue partners, towards an early agreement and with the early conclusion of the RCEP. China can...

Nationalism and anti-ethno-politics: why ‘Chinese Development’ failed at Myanmar’s Myitsone Dam

In 2011, the Burmese military-backed government stunned global audiences by unilaterally suspending the construction of the Myitsone Dam, the cornerstone of China’s largest hydropower project abroad. This prominent failure of China’s “Going Out” investment strategy reverberated globally. Both Western and Chinese accounts frame the event as a pivotal moment in Myanmar’s celebrated reform process, the cooling of China–Myanmar relations, and US–China geopolitical rivalry in the Asia-Pacific. However, my ethnographic field and media research from 2010 to 2015 reveals that the mega-project’s failure does not originally stem from inter-state geopolitics or contested economics and ecology. Through chronological narration, I show how the Myitsone Dam is primarily the casualty of a distinctly ethno-political causality, whereby three nationalisms clashed and the replication of China’s “anti-ethno-political” model of development failed. Though no monolithic Chinese state directs “Chinese Development” overseas, individual Chinese entrepreneurs nonetheless draw from the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) anti-political and state-centric paradigm when facing foreign social worlds. In the particular case of Myitsone, Chinese proponents drew from PRC’s state-nationalist heuristics of “national minorities and state-led development” and “Western anti-China conspiracy,” when facing Myanmar’s ethnic Kachin and Burman nationalisms. State ideological subjectivities of these developers seemed to blind them to the weakness in their own anti-ethno-political strategies, even when those collapsed publicly. I conclude that the Myitsone Dam’s construction will likely not be restarted, despite the hydropower company’s efforts. The Myitsone case also exemplifies how China’s previous historical entanglements in its neighboring regions uniquely disrupt the progress of “Going-Out” in Asia.

Language, Education and the Peace Process in Myanmar

This article analyses the relationship between the politics of education and language, and armed conflict and ongoing peace process in Myanmar. It discusses the state education system, which since the military coup of 1962 has promoted the idea of the country based on the language and culture of the Bamar (Burman) majority community, and the school systems developed by ethnic armed groups which oppose the military government. Ethnic opposition education regimes have developed mother tongue-based school systems. In some cases, the Mon for example, these broadly follow the government curriculum, while being locally owned and delivered in ethnic languages; in others, such as the Karen, the local education system diverges significantly from the Myanmar government curriculum, making it difficult for students to transition between the two systems. This article explores the consequences of these developments, and how reforms in Myanmar since 2011 — including the peace process, which remains incomplete and contested — have opened the space for educational reform, and the possible “convergence” of state and non-state education regimes. Ethnic nationality communities remain determined to conserve and reproduce their own languages and cultures, adopting positions in relation to language and education which reflect broader state-society relations in Myanmar, and in particular ethnic politicians’ demands for a federal political settlement to decades of armed conflict. The article concludes that sustainable resolution to Myanmar’s protracted state-society conflict is unlikely to be achieved until elites can negotiate agreement on ethnic language and teaching policies.

Book Review: Rajiv Bhatia, India–Myanmar Relations: Changing Contours

Book Review: Rajiv Bhatia, <i>India–Myanmar Relations: Changing Contours</i>

Book Review: Rajiv Bhatia, India–Myanmar Relations: Changing Contours

Book Review: Rajiv Bhatia, <i>India–Myanmar Relations: Changing Contours</i>

Myanmar's China Policy since 2011: Determinants and Directions

This paper argues that a key factor in Myanmar's new approach towards China since 2011 has been the Myanmar government's foreign policy goal to reintegrate itself into the international community. The success of this approach is dependent on Myanmar's rapprochement with the United States, which requires both domestic political reforms and a foreign policy realignment – a need to reduce Myanmar's dependence on China, particularly in the context of US–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region. In the context of China–Myanmar relations, the factors that have influenced Myanmar's China policy since 2011 are growing anti-China sentiment in Myanmar, growing concern over China's interference in Myanmar affairs, and the rapprochement with the United States. Myanmar's China policy shift, in terms of direction, is by no means to seek to be independent of China, but rather for there to be an increased interdependence between the two countries.

Myanmar and the United States, Closing and Opening Doors: An Idiosyncratic Analysis

An Idiosyncratic Analysis United State and Myanmar relations have profoundly altered for the better during President Obama’s tenure in office. They have helped Myanmar move along a trajectory of progress with a speed that few could have predicted. But the credit for these changes must go to first to those elements of the Myanmar leadership within the tatmadaw, outside of it, and in the opposition who fostered such changes. The external elements are but supporting actors in this drama. U.S.-Myanmar relations are at their apex since Independence in 1948. There are still many hurdles to overcome, any definition of “success’ is likely to engender dispute, and there is always the possibility of negative repercussions to internal chaos that could alter the best laid plans. Progress is sometimes tempered by stasis, progress by setbacks. Yet, in spite of the Cassandra cries of some both internal and external, modest optimism is the most appropriate prediction.

Balance of relationship: the essence of Myanmar's China policy

Although many observers in the field of Southeast Asian international relations (IRs) predict that Myanmar's relations with China have faced a grand challenge since the 2010 presidential election, this article provides a different perspective and proposes that Myanmar's China policy remain consistent. In addition, theorists in IRs tend to apply the concepts of balance of power (BoP) and bandwagoning as the analytical base and fail to explain the Southeast Asian states’ responses to the rising China. This article argues that Myanmar's China policy is better understood and depicted by the theory of balance of relationship (BoR). This article further provides an analysis from the angles of historical factor, domestic political tradition, and external environment to investigate Myanmar's manipulation of BoR. The conclusion of this article aims at predicting the future development of the Sino-Burmese relations.

Differentiating the Politics of Dependency: Confucius Institutes in Cambodia and Myanmar

Cambodia and Myanmar are both identified as ＂pro-China＂ Indochinese countries with regimes that rely on political support and economic investment from Beijing. Cambodia and Myanmar, therefore, have become testing grounds for China 50 new soft power initiative of ＂spreading cultural understanding＂ by means of the establishment of Confucius Institutes. China 50 relations with both Cambodia and Myanmar are improving, but local responses to the Confucius Institute initiative differ in the two countries. Phnom Penh has one Confucius Institute and three Confucius Classrooms equipped with thirteen Chinese language teaching stations. including those installed in the Roy al Cambodian Armed Forces Academy and the Office of the Prime Minister: The initiative is enthusiastically championed by government and political leaders. In the case of Myanmar, three Confucius Classrooms, rather than Confucius Institutes, have been established by ethnic Chinese associations in Yangon and Mandalay. Lacking governmental endorsement, these Confucius Classrooms need to keep a low profile. The aim of this article is to differentiate between the politics of dependency in China-Cambodia and China Myanmar relations by exploring local contexts and responses to Beijing's soft power initiatives.

A Politician, Not an Icon: Aung San Suu Kyi's Silence on Myanmar's Muslim Rohingya

In Myanmar (also known as Burma), the Rohingya are a persecuted Muslim minority living mainly in northern Rakhine State. Aung San Suu Kyi, the iconic leader of Myanmar's opposition party the National League for Democracy (NLD), is championed as the voice of the people. However, on the matter of the Rohingya's persecution she has been notably silent. This article examines the possible reasons for Suu Kyi's silence and argues that Buddhist–Muslim political relations in Myanmar are central to understanding the reasons behind Suu Kyi's position on the Rohingya. It is suggested that various factors, including the history of the Rohingya in Myanmar, the NLD's attitude towards the Rohingya, Suu Kyi's sense of obligation to her father's political legacy, and Suu Kyi's views on ethnicity, are creating a political environment in which Suu Kyi is presented with pragmatic political reasons for staying silent. Given Suu Kyi has the potential to become a future national leader, an understanding of her behaviours towards a sizeable persecuted Muslim minority is important. This is particularly the case when consideration is given to the contemporary pressures on Muslims to embrace radical politics and the implications this could have for Myanmar and the region.

Diaspora as a Factor in India–Myanmar Relations

The paper studies the presence of Indian Diaspora in Myanmar in transforming the India–Myanmar bilateral relations. At present, both these countries treat Indian Diaspora as a liability. However, i...

Post-Myitsone Relations Between China and Myanmar – More Continuity than Change?

While the world's media has centred on the opening up of Myanmar and the removal of sanctions by the West, less attention has been focused on Myanmar's relations with China. Can this relationship be ignored within the context of the Sino-American rivalry in the Asia-Pacific? This policy article focuses on the recent evolution of China-Myanmar relations and Chinese interests in and perceptions of Myanmar in transition.

The Crisis of the Rohingya as a Muslim Minority in Myanmar and Bilateral Relations with Bangladesh

The Muslim Rohingya crisis has been disrupting the bilateral relations between Myanmar and Bangladesh since the late 1970s. This paper explores the crisis of Rohingya as a Muslim minority in Myanmar and their forced migration to Bangladesh where they took refuge causing disputes between Bangladesh and Myanmar in this regard. The Rohingya problem is seen as composed of various clusters of past and present human rights violations in Myanmar which has caused their forced migration to neighboring countries like Bangladesh contributing to non-traditional security crisis in the bilateral relations between Myanmar and Bangladesh. This study analyzes the local and international responses to manage and resolve the Rohingya problems as well. For understanding the nature of this problem, the forced migration of the Rohingya to Bangladesh and its internationalization process are also singled out. In addition, the approach proposed seeks to integrate developmental and humanitarian factors into the total picture of the Rohingya refugee problems within the framework of non-traditional security crisis. Bilateral negotiations between Bangladesh and Myanmar as well as democratization in Myanmar accelerated by the concerted efforts of the local and international communities can eventually bring about a durable solution to the Rohingya problems in Bangladesh–Myanmar relations.

Emerging Trends in India–Myanmar Relations

Myanmar is an important neighbour of India as it shares extensive land borders with India's north-eastern states and maritime borders in the Bay of Bengal. The long spell of Myanmar's military rule forced India to follow a policy of disengagement with the Burmese authorities. It was only after India initiated its “Look East” policy in the 1990s New Delhi started its engagement with the military junta. Moreover, the recent democratisation of Myanmar has the potential to take India–Myanmar relations to a new height.

China–Myanmar Relations: The Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence Georgetown University, November 4, 2011

Georgetown University’s Asian Studies program hosted a conference on November 4, 2011 entitled “China–Myanmar Relations: The Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence.” The conference included panel discussions by scholars and government officials from China, Myanmar, Thailand, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, and the United States. With an attendance of over 150 people, it proved that discussions regarding the Sino–Myanmar relationship are able to attract interest in Washington.

Myanmar/Burma: Inside Challenges, Outside Interests

Part One: The Moment 1. Outside Interests, Inside Challenges 2. The New Policy of Pragmatic Engagement Part Two: Strategic Pressures 3. The Policies of China and India toward Myanmar 4. India-Myanmar Relations: A Strategic Perspective 5. Myanmar's Relations with North Korea 6. Misfit on the Margin of Southeast Asia Part Three: Myanmar in the ASEAN Community 7. ASEAN's Policy of Enhanced Interactions 8. The Last Bus to Nay Pyi Taw Part Four: National Reconciliation 9. Problems with the Process of Reconciliation 10. A Personal View of Reconciliation Part Five: Economic Outlook 11. Boom on the Route from Ruili to Mandalay 12. Recapitalizing the Rural Economy

Ethnicity and Democratization in Myanmar

Myanmar is embarking on political reforms that could prove to be the first stage of a gradual transition to democracy. However, critical problems of ethnic discord remain to be resolved. This article draws on the literature on multiculturalism to examine ways forward. First it considers how other democratic states have sought to manage ethnic relations, and constructs a matrix of four ideal types: multiculturalism; ethnic enclaves; assimilation; and marginalization. Next it demonstrates just how difficult matters of ethnicity and identity were in the development of modern Burma. Then it surveys possibilities for ethnic relations in contemporary Myanmar. Finally it sketches future pathways. A brief conclusion reinforces the core argument. Ethnic enclaves and assimilation are the major contenders for ethnic policy in Myanmar. Their relative merits will need to be debated as openly as possible during any future democratization process.

China and Myanmar

Three decades of economic reform have led to a comprehensive recasting of China’s geostrategic priorities in its immediate periphery. China’s relations with Myanmar are an instance of a bilateral relationship that has gone from strength to strength in the past two decades following internal political upheavals in the late 1980s that motivated the two countries to reach out to each other following international opprobrium. This article will explain the strategic nature of relations between Myanmar and China in the last decade and attempt to posit this equation in a South Asian context. The structure of the article includes includes four sections—the first section is a brief introduction that captures five decades of relations between Myanmar and China from 1950 to 2000; the second section examines the comprehensive nature of their bilateral relations; the third section analyses mutual perceptions; and the concluding section focuses on the impact China–Myanmar relations has on the South Asian region. There are two central arguments in this research article—the first revolves around the hypothesis that Myanmar–China relations are motivated by geo-strategic and geo-economic considerations. The second argument rests on the premise that there is no ‘client dependency’ in this bilateral relationship and China–Myanmar relations while ‘close’ and ‘friendly’ do have their share of concerns.

The United States and Myanmar: a ‘boutique issue’?

Myanmar has been one of a number of countries that the new American Executive branch selected for policy reconsideration. The Obama administration's review of relations with Myanmar, characterized as a ‘boutique issue’ during the presidential campaign, has received considerable attention in 2009, and in part was prompted by quiet signals sent by both sides that improved relations were desirable. Begun as an intense policy review by various agencies, it has been supplemented by the first visits in 15 years to the country by senior US officials. The policy conclusion, that sanctions must remain in place but will be supplemented by dialogue, is a politically realistic compromise given the strong congressional and public antipathy to the military regime and the admiration for Aung San Suu Kyi, whose purported views have shaped US policies. US claims of the importance of Myanmar as a security and foreign policy concern have also been a product of internal US considerations as well as regional realities. US—Burmese relations since independence have been strongly influenced by the Cold War and China, whose strategic interests in Myanmar have been ignored in the public dialogue on policy until recently, with US policy focused on political and human rights concerns. Attention is now concentrated on parliamentary and local elections to be held in 2010, after which the new constitution will come into effect and provide the military with a taut reign on critical national policies while allowing opposition voices. Future relations will be strongly influenced by the transparency and freedom both of the campaigning and vote counting, and the role—if any—of the opposition National League for Democracy. Strong scepticism exists in the US on prospects unless the Burmese institute extensive reforms. The Burmese military, presently controlling all avenues of social mobility, will have a major role in society for decades. The article initially evaluates US policies towards Myanmar prior to 1988, when a military coup marked a negative shift in US—Myanmar relations, from cooperation to a US sanctions regime. It looks at the influence China's involvement in Myanmar and the role Aung San Suu Kyi have had on the formulation of US policy towards the country and assesses the prospects for the US-Myanmar relationship under the Obama administration.

Re-interpreting China's Non-intervention Policy towards Myanmar: leverage, interest and intervention

China's non-intervention policy has long been criticized for prolonging the rule of many authoritarian regimes. Myanmar has become one of the classic examples. As China is expected to become a responsible great power, her behavioral patterns have aroused many concerns. This paper aims to re-interpret China's non-intervention policy. While explaining various constraints on China's capability to intervene in the Myanmar government, it shows how China is making efforts to seek a new intervention policy in dealing with countries like Myanmar. It argues that China's insistence on a non-intervention policy does not mean that China does not want to influence other countries such as Myanmar. To assess Chinese leverage and its non-intervention policy toward Myanmar as well as to supplement the current limited academic discussion on Sino–Myanmar relations, in this paper we first examine Chinese leverage in Myanmar through Burmese local politics, such as the power struggle between the central government and local rebel governments. Second, we disaggregate the Chinese interests in Myanmar into different levels (regional, geo-strategic and international) and discuss how these interests affect China's non-intervention policy. Third, we argue that China has indeed tried to intervene in Myanmar politics, but in a softer manner that contrasts with the traditional Western hard interventions, such as economic sanctions and military interference.