Telecommunications Regulation Research Articles

Determining spectrum caps and service efficiency: A case study of mobile operators in Thailand

Mobile spectrum is a crucial natural resource, which is essential in a nation's economic growth and a mobile operator's business operations and sustainability. Moreover, spectrum auctions have become a common method for spectrum allocation by telecom regulators in recent decades. In Thailand, the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) over the past years has used a spectrum cap setting mechanism to encourage more competition in both the auctions and in the market after the auctions. This mechanism also allows regulators to determine the number of mobile operators in the market. However, regulatory mandated spectrum caps can potentially harm a large mobile operator's performance since spectrum caps can preclude large carriers from getting more necessary spectrum to support their customers' demand. Therefore, the purpose of this research was to demonstrate the effect of spectrum caps' determination using frequency allocation in Thailand as a case study. This paper employs data from Q3 2012 - Q1 2020 for the three major mobile operators in Thailand (AIS, TRUE, and DTAC) and analyzes the mean difference of six operating parameters by 1 MHz spectrum and the industry average. Results revealed that AIS was the largest carrier with the most spectrum amount, the greatest number of users, with revenue exceeding the industry average. AIS also had a statistically significant operational efficiency in all six of the evaluated dimensions. However, TRUE which is second in the total number of users in Thailand was determined to have no statistically significant operating efficiencies. Furthermore, the study determined that operators need additional spectrum so that they can increase market share through improved service quality. Finally, the empirical evidence suggests that spectrum caps when set in conjunction with each auction did not create any significant operator's efficiency problem.

Regulation of Telecommunications: The Choice Between Market and Regulatory Failures

Abstract
 The paper examines the main regulatory frameworks of the telecommunications industry through the concept of market failure and analyses how and why the policy often leads to undesirable outcomes that might be considered as regulatory failure. The research uses the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications as a base for the analysis of the main policy objectives through the prism of the market failure theory with an eye to the interests of the main market players in the telecommunications markets. About any aspect of regulation allows to find ways to create opportunities for some groups of the industry and stifle activity of others. Despite the theory of market failure provides reasonable justifications for regulation of telecommunications markets, it is possible to argue that many of these problems are mainly the consequence of the policy and could be better solved by market mechanisms. The results of the research allow to look at the problems of telecommunications development and issues of the high level of concentration of the telecommunications markets as regulatory formed problems rather than consequences of the inherited industry’s characteristics.

Preponderant agent, what is that?

Preponderant agent is a new instrument for preventing and reverting adverse impact in competition due to highly concentrated markets. Therefore, this paper's objective is to present and analyze the preponderant agent concept in Mexico with emphasis on the broadcast sector, the telecommunication regulator decisions and the courts' interpretation. The objectives were achieved by researching and analyzing the main legal documents, the Congress reports and debates, the regulator's decisions and other relevant regulator's documents, as well as final decisions by the courts in connection with broadcast sector. Among the findings are that certain topics were not duly addressed by the Mexican regulator, or by the Congress, whereas the courts were more willing to hold decisions in favor of public interest based on constitutional intent and deference to the regulator's decision. This paper will be valuable for persons interested in telecommunications, broadcast and antitrust. Although the preponderant agent concept created in Mexico is not necessarily a “best practice”, it does provide an alternative. instrument in antitrust. Moreover, the courts decisions also provide criteria regarding regulatory deference for the regulator.

Study of Telecom Industry Ombudsman and its Regulatory Relevance for Customer Satisfaction

Purpose: To study, analyse and compare telecom ombudsman functioning in Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA), in context of proposed telecom ombudsman in India. Methods: The study is both explanatory and analytical. Here, Qualitative Analysis is used for analysing primary and secondary data from last four years till 2019-20. Findings: There are rooted norms for how an Ombudsman’s functioning runs and how it fits the regulatory/judicial framework. This research study highlights the functioning of an ombudsman in different countries. It also analyses primary data collected through an online questionnaire from Australia, the USA, and India. Also, it examines that the customer satisfaction is higher in markets where there is telecom ombudsman/alternate dispute resolution mechanism. Primary data analysis stresses that countries with telecom ombudsmen prove to be particularly useful in customer experience; however, India, despite being the second-largest telecom market, lacks customer satisfaction in telecom, and highlights the need to revisit some regulatory changes. Only around 8% of telecom consumers who made a complaint were satisfied with the overall experience. Scope of the Study: This study will be useful for regulators and policymakers of different countries, telecom consumers, public policymakers and think tanks. Novelty: This study proves importance of telecom ombudsman for having transparent grievance handling systems and higher customer satisfaction. Keywords Grievance Redressal, telecom regulations, telecom ombudsman, telecom policies, dispute resolution, ADR

Network modeling approaches for calculating wholesale NGA prices: A full comparison based on the Greek fixed broadband market

According to the European Commission Recommendation for setting copper and fiber wholesale prices where cost orientation is imposed as a remedy, National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) should adopt a Bottom-UP Long-Run Incremental Cost Plus (BU LRIC+) costing methodology that estimates the current cost that a hypothetical efficient operator would incur to build a modern efficient Next Generation Access (NGA) network. The starting point of modeling an efficient operator investing in NGA networks is the network modeling approach. In this paper, we compare the most widely adopted network modeling approaches in terms of wholesale fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) prices. In particular, the modified scorched node approach is compared to the extreme cases of the scorched node and the scorched earth approaches. The comparison between the aforementioned scenarios sheds light on the impact of each approach on the wholesale FTTH prices. The main finding of this paper is that the scorched earth approach leads to a maximum of 10% reduction in the short-term access prices compared to the most inefficient scorched node approach, whereas further extending its optimizations by optimizing the number of central offices, both the short-term and long-term wholesale price reductions are quite significant (more than 20%) regardless of service speeds. Consequently, NRAs should consider a geographically differentiated modeling approach when regulating the wholesale market by adjusting the level of scorching in each area and network segment according to the investment plans of telecom operators. An appropriate variation of the modeled network operator's efficiency is expected to more accurately represent the costs of a reasonably efficient operator based on the real market conditions and a forward-looking perspective. These findings provide valuable information to both network operators and telecom regulators.

Interactions through Soft Law in the EU Multi-level Space – the Cases of Competition Enforcement and Telecommunications Regulation

The evolution of EU administrative law generates peculiar governance processes in the entire EU policy space, EU Economic Law being a prime example. By comparatively examining the interactions of the key national and supranational institutions enforcing EU competition law and telecommunications regulation, this paper argues that the Commission is making strategic use of particular governance tools (soft law instruments and good governance principles) to obtain enforcement outcomes that further its own vision for steering EU Economic Regulation. Furthermore, the success of this approach seems to be related to the institutional design of the policy field, which the Commission wants to dominate. In particular, a field where the Commission has exclusive regulatory competence (competition) lends itself to steering through soft law. Conversely, steering through soft means in domains where the Commission is weaker by design (telecommunications) seem to fail. In the latter case, to achieve a position of power, the Commission is likely to exert pressure on the Council to adopt hard law at EU level – a development we currently observe with the December 2020 Commission proposal for a Digital Markets Act. Overall, the Commission, as the umpire of internal market integration, strategically uses soft law to secure a position of dominance in the domain of EU Economic Regulation.

Need for Competition and Regulatory Reform in Developing Countries: Case of Indian Competition Law Enforcement

There is no doubt that a robust competition policy and its proper enforcement through transparent competition law contributes to the growth and economic development by way of offering choices to the stakeholders, reduced prices due to reduced costs of production or otherwise (say innovation). Despite the aforesaid principle, we find that the Governments lack in promoting sustainable economic growth through competition reforms; this is more so true for the developing countries which have many more other things on the agenda (like tackling the challenges of malnutrition, poverty, unemployment, health and others) than competition. On this aspect, it is important to note that the developing countries did not realize the role an effective competition policy may play in a strong economy. While developed countries like Australia and UK have been able to map the inter-relationship between the competition law enforcement and economic / social benefits to the stakeholders, for developing countries this exercise has not been easy to carry out. There are several reasons for that, some of them include capacity building issues, institutional reforms, roles to be played by various stakeholders. India is watched by all developing countries and especially on the competition law and policy front. The Hon’ble Finance Minister in one of the ICN conferences highlighted the need for a clear competition and regulatory reform. Citing an example of telecom sector, it was pointed out “If two telecom majors are to amalgamate, will there be common turf areas between the telecom regulator and market regulator CCI. Therefore, how do you built the jurisdiction of the two. Obviously jurisdiction in this area is emerging.” While competition and regulatory reform have been on the agenda of the Government which is evident from the reports like National Competition Policy 2011 and Financial Sector Reforms Commission (FSLRC) Report, the action on these have not been yet prioritized. There is indeed a need to convince the Government both at the central and the state level towards the importance of competition and regulatory reforms in public policy discourses and also the need for competition impact assessment. The present paper focuses upon the aforesaid issues and challenges.

Much ado about nothing? The controversy about the International Telecommunication Regulations and Internet Governance

Much ado about nothing? The controversy about the International Telecommunication Regulations and Internet Governance

Are telecommunications regulators correct in their beliefs that network size affects origination/termination?

Some telecommunications regulators in calling-party pays (CPP) regimes have asserted that network operator size itself affects the ratio of (off-net originating minutes)/(off-net terminating minutes) (abbreviated in future references as “O/T”). This implies that being a large operator itself causes the operator to be a net terminator of traffic and to be a net receiver of call termination payments. For convenience, we will describe this notion as the “regulators' proposition.” This notion could have been a motivation for regulators: to establish asymmetric mobile call termination rates (MTRs) (higher termination rates for smaller operators); or to reduce symmetrical MTRs. We begin with a simple mathematical description of calling between networks that indicates that size does not affect O/T. We also use a unique panel data set from eight mobile operators in Colombia that includes a measure of operator size, a off-net price variable, and two proxies for the proportion of low-income subscribers (one for originating minutes and one for terminating minutes). We do not find empirical support for the regulators' proposition. Operator size is statistically insignificant (and has the incorrect sign – to support the regulator's proposition - in some specifications to). Off-net price and income (rather than network size) variables are significant in explaining O/T. The off-net price variable has the expected negative sign and is significant at the 5% level or better. The income variables have the expected signs and are generally significant at the 5% level. Belief in the regulators' proposition could also, unwittingly, accentuate the urban-rural divide and reduce service to low-income customers, particularly in less-developed countries.

IEEE 802.15.22.3 Spectrum Characterization and Occupancy Sensing Application Testbed

Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) is becoming a key enabler for wireless communication technologies. Many DSA concepts—such as the Citizens Broadband Radio Service and TV White Space—rely on spectrum databases to identify available radio channels. However, propagation models and other assumptions used by these databases are usually poor for the given scenario, typically leading to over-conservative calculations in terms of permitted secondary spectrum access, geographical bounds or transmit powers in order to mitigate perceived interference risk. Spectrum sensing allows better understanding of the actual propagation and actual channel impulse response, allowing spectrum databases to tune their propagation models to increase the availability of spectrum for secondary access as assessed by such spectrum databases, or to increase the availability of local access licenses as assessed by the telecommunications regulator. A critical limitation on the uptake of ubiquitous sensing is that measurement systems are either proprietary or do not have commercial use-cases; hence little economy of scale exists to drive deployment. For this reason, the IEEE 802.15.22.3 Task Group was formed to standardize a Spectrum Characterization and Occupancy Sensing (SCOS) system capable of addressing a wide range of sensing tasks and be easily and flexibly deployed across a variety of hardware options. This paper provides a high-level description of this system and a first testbed implementing the standard in a laboratory-controlled environment. Preliminary performance assessments are also reported, where it is shown that the system is able to detect users with a power level down to −80 dBm with a probability of detection equal to 1 and controlled false alarm rates.

Critical Analysis of Telecommunications Regulatory Governance in Malawi

This paper presents a critical analysis of power dynamics for telecommunications governance in the context of a developing country. The study used regulatory governance and critical discourse analysis as theoretical underpinnings. The case of telecommunications sector of Malawi was analysed using secondary data comprise policy documents and media reports. The results showed that power relations affected the autonomy of the telecommunications regulator in performing its functions. The effects of power dynamics created practices and conduct of stakeholders that contributed towards the barriers in market entry of mobile network operators in the telecommunications sector. Consequently, there was limited market competition and the cost of ICT services remained high. Power relations were also productive in enabling stakeholders to raise sector problems to the regulator. The study provides an understanding of power relations in the regulation of telecommunications in the context of an African country.

Why are smart cities proving to be so hard to deliver?

Why are smart cities proving to be so hard to deliver?

Technological and geographic heterogeneity in broadband markets: The challenge for regulation

When the telecommunications industry was liberalised in Europe and North America in the 1980s and 1990s, it inherited a legacy of monopoly providers whose footprint was national or multi-regional in its character. The regulatory framework, particularly that adopted in EU member states, reflected this pattern of relatively homogeneous deployment achieved, in part, by decades of cross-subsidised pricing and universal service goals. Perhaps because of this legacy, telecommunications regulators have often adopted the presumption that relevant markets are national in character, unless proven otherwise Although geographically-variegated regulatory remedies have been permitted (even in the face of allegedly national relevant markets) and adopted in many member states, many regulators have never done so, and overly cautious thresholds for permitting geographically based forbearance suggest a continued bias towards presuming national markets and remedies. We find that this presumption of uniformity and the tendency to aggregate geographic markets together is not supported by first principles of antitrust analysis, although there may have been strong practical reasons to apply this presumption in the past circumstances of the telecommunications and broadband industries.On the ground, however, there has arguably never been as much heterogeneity across geographies and across technological solutions that provide effective ultra-fast broadband speeds. Both technological (i.e., product market) and geographic heterogeneity are likely to increase with the advent of mobile 5G networks. With their deployment, a cautious regulatory stance towards geographic variation and a cautious regulatory stance towards inter-technology or inter-modal competition may result in regulation that could exceed what is required to ensure effective competition and could instead distort the incentives to enter of facilities-based actors. This may also result in higher-cost and inefficient investment. A more geographically varied and technologically agnostic regulatory framework may satisfy the principle of proportionate and focused regulation—with the possibility that the locus of regulation shifts from the access network to bottleneck facilities such as fibre, ducts and poles.This discussion is especially germane when one considers the highly speculative nature of forecasts and projections about future demand, and the competing claims of proponents of 5G and fibre. While there is some scepticism about the performance of mobile networks, we note that pure mobile and fixed 5G services may have synergies in deployment, and that the idea of competing with residential broadband services is a core strategy of very influential large-scale industry actors. In terms of a future research agenda, regulatory decisions could benefit from much more research into the relationship between domestic and global bandwidth constraints and their influence on development of software and application, as well as much more quantitative research by academics on the drivers of bandwidth demand. The risks associated with promoting investment that results in large-scale wasted resources should also be central to the regulatory agenda.

Digital Economy

The digital economy is growing rapidly across the world, albeit at an uneven pace that transcends different countries. In most countries, however, the digital economy is constantly evolving. This article seeks to explore the possible role of the telecoms regulator within the context of a digital economy in Nigeria. The article starts by providing an overview of digital economy by defining this concept as well as its components. Furthermore, the article provides some examples of emerging technologies, which appears to propel the digital economy and some inherent challenges. The article then discusses the readiness of the Nigerian economy in adopting digital economy which involves broadband coverage, data protection, and interoperability of digital platforms. Finally, the implications for the regulator within the context of having a digital economy is considered and practical recommendations provided.

Titularidad de los servicios de telecomunicaciones y regulación tarifaria. Límites a las facultades normativas de la administración

The vertiginous technological advance and the new telecommunications services defy the normative principles of legal source underpinning the regulation of telecommunications and encourage the administration to regulate its contents, threatening to subtract Force to the principle of legal reserve which extends by constitutional mandate. So, the regime of granting concessions and permissions and the tariff regulation of services have kept the law as exclusive source of its regulation, however the exclusivity could be diminished to the increasing regulatory capacity you are recognized to the administration. The treatment that the law makes respect to both subjects is analyzed, its historical evolution, the role that infra-legal regulation has played in these matters and the constitutional safeguards that are presented as limits to the regulatory capacity of the administration.

Opportunity cost of spectrum for mobile communications: Evaluation of spectrum prices in Bangladesh

The purpose of this study is to focus attention on the choice of the reserve price made by the telecom regulator to explain the under-performance of spectrum auctions in Bangladesh. The overestimation of the reserve prices for several auctions in Bangladesh including the auction of the 3G – 2100 MHz band in 2013, the 2G - 1800 MHz band in 2015, and the 4G – 1800 and 2100 MHz bands in 2018 is established by comparing the reserve prices to the economic value of spectrum, determined by using the engineering valuation and production function approaches. Possible reasons for the inflation of the reserve price are discussed.

Symmetric Telecom Regulation, Competition and Investment

Symmetric telecoms regulation, where it is not only the operators with significant market power (SMP) at national or large geographical scales which are subject to special access obligations, has been on the agenda for long. However, emphasis has hitherto been on asymmetric regulation, but during the past few years, symmetric regulation has gradually gained weight in different EU countries, and the new European Electronic Communications Code also aims at putting more emphasis on symmetric regulation. The paper identifies the reasons behind symmetric access regulation possibly coming to play a more prominent role in EU telecoms regulation, the scope of symmetric regulation and how it is being articulated, and what the possible implications of symmetric regulation could be on the level of investment. The contribution of the paper is to discuss these different elements of understanding the potential role of symmetric regulation.

Judicial review of regulatory decisions: Decoding the contents of appeals against agencies in Spain and the United Kingdom

AbstractDespite the important role that courts play to supervise the legality of regulatory agencies' actions, only few comparative studies analyze the contents of judicial appeals against regulatory decisions within European countries. This paper builds on the comparative administrative law scholarship and administrative capacities literature to analyze the content of 2,040 rulings against decisions issued by competition and telecommunications regulators in Spain and the United Kingdom. To understand the substance of the appeals, the study classifies cases according to the alleged administrative principles under breach and the regulatory capacities under challenge. Findings show a clear country‐sector variation regarding the information contained in judicial disputes for both dimensions of analysis, which can be explained as a result of existing differences between the institutional settings of courts. These results offer a more in depth understanding of the political role of judicial oversight over regulatory agencies embedded in different institutional arrangements and policy sectors.

Churn and loyalty behavior of Turkish digital natives: Empirical insights and managerial implications

A generation of consumers have now grown up in the digital age, intimately connected to a host of digital tools. This generation, which we call Digital Natives, has become a prime target for mobile operators due to their size, spending power, and use intensity. In addition, they tend to be influential trend setters when it comes to the adoption of new digital solutions. In the dynamic emerging economy of Turkey, they are of even greater interest to mobile operators as they surpass their peers in many advanced economies in terms of use intensity. Despite its importance, our knowledge of the loyalty and churn behavior of this customer segment is very limited. We respond to this research gap by drawing insights from a comprehensive survey of digital natives in the Turkish context. The empirical data originates from a survey of 2000 Turkish university students. We employ Binomial Logistic Regression analysis which provides interesting managerial and public policy insights. Our findings demonstrate that such customer service factors as call quality, billing and brand image affect both the loyalty and churn intentions of Turkish Digital Natives. Surprisingly, youth loyalty club programs, duration of subscription, and prior churn experience are found to be not significant. These results lead to practical implications for mobile providers and telecom regulators operating in Turkey and elsewhere.

The impact of telecommunications regulation on less well-off Mexican households

Access to mobile communications in Mexico is heavily skewed in favour of those with higher incomes. In 2014, 80% of the highest 10 percent (decile) in the income distribution had access to mobile communications, while only 30% of the lowest decile did. The same figures for 2016 are 84% and 40%. This report sets out to review some of these numbers and places them within the narrative of asymmetric regulation and other reforms which Mexico adopted in 2013/14.Among our observations is that buyers of mobile communications services in the lowest decile in 2014 spent 6% of their income on that service while those in the highest decile spent only 2%. Over the next 2 years, mobile communications prices fell by 36%; this fall in the prices of mobile communications followed regulatory reforms in the sector which were introduced in 2013/4. An interesting component of these reforms was the imposition on the preponderant operator of asymmetric access charges, which reduced its mobile termination rates to zero. This means that a policy that, in principle, was not even aimed at, designed, or considered for the poor had a real strong impact on this group of the population.