record of Japan's diplomacy in the Six-Party Talks (SPT) , the sole multilateral mechanism currently in place to directly address North Korea's unflagging nuclear ambitions, is largely inconspicuous. In general discourse on the SPT, Tokyo's position in the process has tended to be marginalized, often viewed as Washington's henchman in a delicate internal dynamic among the participants. Japanese insistence on including the abduction issue in the talks' agenda at times aroused open criticism by other participants (save the United States) as unproductive and harmful to the SPT process,2 leaving Tokyo in a somewhat isolated position. Given that, among the participants, Japan faces, arguably, the most direct and serious threat to its security in the event of the SPT's failure, as it would likely lead to Pyongyang becoming a full-fledged nuclear power, such a subordinate or seemingly obstructionist position appears hardly an optimal option in strategic terms. Japan's rather unpronounced record in SPT diplomacy presents an interesting contrast to that of China. It is widely pointed out that China has played an indispensable role in, first, initiating the SPT scheme in 2003 and, subsequently, maintaining this stumbling and cumbersome process over the past three years. Beijing garners credit for having played the role of honest