Regional Development Banks Research Articles

Power Relations in an Embedded Institution: The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is unique among the set of regional development banks in that non-regional members have substantial influence in decision making. Moreover, two other European institutions have direct influence on decision making in the EBRD's Board of Directors. This paper analyses the relative influence of members of the Board of Directors by applying three measures of a priori voting power - the Banzhaf, Johnston, and Shapley-Shubik power indices. Weighted voting schemes, such as the one used by the EBRD, have very distinct properties that allow for the calculation of indicators of voting power using simple, cooperative games in order to determine how voting weight translates into the ability to affect outcomes. Voting power analysis reveals that the United States and Japan have significant influence over electoral outcomes. Influence is concentrated in a subset of members in large part because of the presence of 'dictators' in the EBRD's voting groups. The results demonstrate that relative voting power often diverges from intended influence due to the way decision rules are structured and because of the use of weighted voting.

The Determinants of Aid Allocation by Regional Multilateral Development Banks and United Nations Agencies

This paper examines which factors can explain the allocation of aid by four regional development banks as well as three United Nations agencies. The results suggest the following: most donors examined also exhibit a bias apparent in bilateral aid allocation in favor of less populous countries. Some of them also share another bias of bilateral donors who give more aid to their former colonies. However, the three United Nations agencies contravene a third bias of bilateral aid allocation and provide more aid to countries geographically more distant from the centers of the Western world. While the regional development banks with the possible exception of the Inter-American one focus exclusively on economic need as measured by per capita income, the three United Nations agencies also take into account human development need in their aid allocation as measured by the Physical Quality of Life Index. Some tentative evidence is found that respect for political freedom is rewarded with higher aid receipts at the aggregate multilateral level and by the Inter-American Development Bank as well as perhaps, in a few estimations, two of the three United Nations agencies. Neither respect for personal integrity rights nor low levels of perceived corruption play any role in the allocation of aid by the donors looked at. In general, higher military expenditures and arms imports are not associated with higher aid receipts, with a few notable exceptions.

What the United States Needs to Learn from UNESCO

The United States of America will soon rejoin the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. There is no question that the United States has much to contribute to UNESCO ‐ the quality of social science investigation, the technologies of educational evaluation, research in the learning sciences, educational technologies, education for the handicapped, comparative education and much research and development in educational policy, higher education, educational leadership and administration. The United States (hereafter US) already learns a great deal from its on-going relationships in the field of education with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Asian-Pacific Economic Council (APEC), the World Bank and the regional development banks. But what can it learn from UNESCO and why is membership of UNESCO useful to the United States? There are four reasons why the US needs UNESCO. The first has to do with the demand within the US for innovations in education policy reform and the regular monitoring of educational trends among trading partners who are not already members of the OECD. American school systems are in desperate need of innovation and benchmarking of international trends, and these can only be partly fulfilled through its co-operation with OECD member states. The US has important trading partners outside the OECD membership with whom it needs to

Economic Transition in Latin American and Post-Communist Countries: A Comparison of Multilateral Development Banks

This article examines regional development banks and their relationship with the World Bank. Specifically, the article analyzes the roles of the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the factors that have influenced the creation of these international financial institutions. Most of the literature examines regional development banking practices and development strategies as if all regional banks were the same. However, the missions of the IDB and the EBRD are quite distinct. While the IDB primarily provides social sector loans to nation-states, the EBRD primarily provides private sector loans for finance and business development. Given that Latin America and the former Soviet Union share many of the same economic, political and social problems, it is surprising that these institutions are so different. What accounts for the different missions of these regional banks? We find that the influence of borrowing and non-borrowing member states in the creation of these banks can help explain some of the differences between the IDB and the EBRD.

The imposition of a global development architecture: the example of microcredit

Poverty reduction is now a prime concern of global policymakers. Renewed global efforts for poverty reduction are presented as the post-Washington Consensus. In this context, I identify an emerging ‘global development architecture’ that entails new patterns of interlinkages between the WTO, IMF, World Bank, Regional Development Banks and Bilateral and Multilateral Development Agencies. Through the example of microcredit and poverty reduction I address the political economic implications of the emerging global development architecture. I argue that microcredit (1) facilitates financial sector liberalisation and the global trade in financial services; (2) functions as a political safety-net, containing or dampening resistance at the community level to liberalisation policies and economic austerity measures. The article critically probes the emerging global development architecture and argues that it is incorporated into the reconfiguration of global political economy as a strategy of ‘crisis management’. Normative discourses underpinning the post-Washington Consensus are argued to be instrumental to efforts to legitimate the consolidation, ‘constitutionally’, of what continues to be the Washington Consensus.

Transparency Mechanisms at the Multilateral Development Banks

The multilateral development banks (MDBs) adopted information disclosure policies in the 1990s, and four created mechanisms providing recourse for citizens affected by their activities. This paper proposes a set of four characteristics by which information disclosure policies may be compared and assessed, emphasizing the fullness and timeliness of disclosure, accessibility of information to citizens, and existence of recourse. The transparency and disclosure policies of the World Bank and regional development banks are found to vary in important details. Their policies have advanced the status of transparency in development discourse and practice, and contributed to redefining the relationships among MDBs, states and citizens. At the same time they set limits that constrain information disclosure's significance in practice.

Liberalism since the Cold War: an enemy to itself?

Many expected that after the Cold War, there would be peace, order, increasing prosperity in expanding markets and the extension and eventual consolidation of civil and political rights. There would be a new world order, and it would in these ways be liberal. In international politics, the United States would be supreme. It would through security treaties command the peace in western Europe and east Asia; through its economic power command it in eastern Europe and Russia; through clients and its own domination command it in the Middle East; through tacit understanding command it in Latin America; and, in so far as any state could, command it in Africa also. It could choose whether to cooperate in the United Nations, and if it did not wish to do so, be confident that it would not be disablingly opposed by illiberal states. In the international markets, it would be able to maintain holdings of its bonds. In the international financial institutions, it would continue to be decisive in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; it would be an important influence in the regional development banks; and it would be powerful in what it was to insist in 1994 should be called the World (rather than Multinational) Trade Organisation. Other transactions in the markets, it is true, would be beyond the control of any state. But they would not be likely to conflict with the interests of the United States (and western Europe) in finance, investment and trade, and would discipline other governments.

Good Governance in International Organizations

ood governance moved onto the agenda of many international or ganizations at the end of the Cold War when calls for democracy ^*??^ and better government became louder and as expectations were heightened as to what international organizations might do to further this aim. Many multilateral agencies?from the UN to multilateral develop ment banks?took up the summons. They are now part of a chorus of voices urging governments across the world to heed higher standards of democratic representation, accountability, and transparency. Much more slowly, multilateral organizations have begun to question what good governance means for the way in which they themselves are structured and in which they make and implement decisions. They have been very slow to set down a standard for themselves?and there is little precedent in the international system for doing so. To quote former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali: Democracy has not featured in the history of the international system of states. Sovereignty, rather than democracy, has been its guiding principle. . . . [Today,] the democratization of the international system can be seen as both necessary and possible.1 Yet if international organizations are going to become more partici patory, accountable, and transparent, what standards are relevant to them? In this article, I set out to provide one part of an answer to this question, primarily probing what good governance means for relations among states in multilateral organizations. The first section of the article explores the concept of good governance, how it has emerged, and what its core prin ciples mean. I draw a distinction between applying principles of good gov ernance to relations among states within international organizations (in ternational governance) and applying the principles more broadly to links between individuals, peoples, groups, and international organizations (global governance). My emphasis in the following sections is on interna tional governance. I have chosen several institutions to illustrate the ten sions and trade-offs. These include the regional development banks, the UN Security Council, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the Global Environment Facility of the UN De velopment Programme/World Bank, and the European Union.2 By looking 39

Banking on the Regions

New EconomyVolume 2, Issue 4 p. 257-261 Banking on the Regions Do we need regional development banks and what would they do? GAVIN KELLY ANDREW, GAVIN KELLY ANDREW Political Economy Research Centre, University of SheffieldSearch for more papers by this authorRANDALL GERMAIN, RANDALL GERMAIN Political Economy Research Centre, University of SheffieldSearch for more papers by this author GAVIN KELLY ANDREW, GAVIN KELLY ANDREW Political Economy Research Centre, University of SheffieldSearch for more papers by this authorRANDALL GERMAIN, RANDALL GERMAIN Political Economy Research Centre, University of SheffieldSearch for more papers by this author First published: December 1995 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0041.1995.tb00096.xCitations: 2AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume2, Issue4December 1995Pages 257-261 RelatedInformation

Reform of the international financial institutions

The recent Mexican peso crisis illustrates both the importance and the limits of the IMF as it now exists. This article identifies two weaknesses in particular which must be addressed if the Fund is to continue role at the centre of international financial coordination. First, the IMF needs adequate resources ‐ and a “quick‐disbursing facility” ‐ with which to help countries that are threatened by sudden shifts in the flow of international capital. Second, enhanced IMF surveillance should focus primarily, but not exclusively, on currency alignments and the policies of all states which are of systemic significance. The article also considers the prospects of improving the World Bank and regional development banks by concentrating on raising the income of the world's “absolute poor.”

Regional development banks: Exploiting their specificity

(1994). Regional development banks: Exploiting their specificity. Third World Quarterly: Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 459-482.

The question of cross-conditionality

All member countries of the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) have an interest in close cooperation between the two institutions as well as in consistency and complementarity between their programs. Such cooperation has grown steadily, especially in recent years, as the degree of overlap in the operations of the two institutions has increased. Cooperation between the Bretton Woods institutions is being stepped up still further under the Fund’s new Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), since although loans to SAF-eligible countries will continue to be negotiated and administered separately by the IMF and World Bank, they will have to be consistent with a “policy framework” previously agreed upon between the two institutions and the country concerned. There has also been a strengthening of cooperation between the Bank and Fund and other external sources of capital, particularly the regional development banks, the bilateral donors and the commercial banks. Inevitably, the drawing together of these various agencies and the growing interdependence of their decisionmaking processes have greatly increased the complexity of the negotiating process for potential borrowers, and this consideration alone has caused delay in the approval and disbursement of loans. The costs of such delays to the borrowers are considerable even where there are no disagreements between lenders and borrowers, or among the lenders themselves. The consequences of delays in the granting of loans by the development finance institutions have been especially severe in cases where disputes over the policies of member countries have been protracted. Damage to a country’s economy may result not merely from the holding up of a single project, but from the consequential suspension of preparatory work on new projects, so that the project pipeline becomes depleted. Any subsequent resumption of lending, even after full agreement on policies has been attained. therefore becomes subject to aggravated delay. While calling for closer cooperation between the Bank and Fund, the Interim and Development Committees have made it clear that crossconditionality is to be avoided, without, however, defining that term. Although it is difficult for an outsider to obtain all the evidence needed for a thorough evaluation of the issues arising in connection with cross-conditionality. it does seem that there have been cases in which the above-mentioned injunction of the two Committees has not been observed. It appears. however, that there have been relatively few. if any, cases in which formal cross-conditionality has occurred in the sense of a veto by one of the Bretton Woods institutions of a loan by the other. Rarely, if ever, does a case of crossconditionality reach the Executive Board of either institution. On the other hand there appear to have been many cases of informal cross-conditionality whereby each of the Bretton Woods institutions has withheld loans to a member country. or has suspended a borrower’s access to an existing loan. because the country concerned was in disagreement with the other institution on policies or performance. Ever since the adoption of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and multiyear stand-by arrangements by the IMF. designed to promote structural adjustment, the Fund has relied on the World Bank for the evaluation of investment priorities and other factors affecting the efficiency of the use of resources in member countries. The counterpart of this is that Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) by the World Bank have been made only to countries having stand-by arrangements with the IMF or to

A new round of rescheduling?

The danger that the foreign indebtedness of developing countries will again come to a head has by no means been banished. Prof. Gutowski outlines proposals for concerted action by commercial banks, the World Bank and regional development banks which could help to prevent the outbreak of a new crisis.

Recent Tax Changes in ASEAN and their Implications

major tax reform programme in the areas of income tax, sales tax, and tax administration. Both external and internal factors have contributed to varying degrees to the need for changes in the fiscal systems of the ASEAN countries. Given the outward-orientation and the dependence of the ASEAN economies on international economic relations, developments in the world economy are likely to require adjustments in the economic policies and the fiscal systems of these countries. Among the major developments in the world economy over the past few years have been the persistence of slow economic growth in the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries to which grouping almost all the major industrial countries of the world belong.2 While the recent rapid growth rates of the U.S. economy have temporarily reduced some what the importance of this development, relatively low growth rates of the OECD countries have affected both the investment and trade flows and prospects of the ASEAN countries. The second major development has been the severity of the external debt crisis. This has been considerably exacerbated by the nationalistic economic policies followed by the United States in recent years. Two major mani festations of these policies have been persistently high real interest rates, the significance of which is now considerably greater as a result of the variable interest rates charged to the borrowers, and the increased importance attached to ideo logical, political, and security considerations of the United States, and to the narrow financial criteria to determine both the conditions and the levels of resource flows to the developing countries from the international economic insti tutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and even the regional development banks in which the United States and its allies have predominant leverage.3 An additional external factor has been the decline in the price of oil as

Book reviews

Book reviews

Power structures and regional development banks

This paper examines the experience of developing countries in the three major regional financial institutions, the Inter-American, Asian, and African Development Banks. In the Inter-American Development Bank, members from developing countries have secured both influence and resources; in the Asian Development Bank they have secured resources but little influence; in the African Development Bank they have influence but limited resources. This variation can be explained by the different issue area power structures within which the banks function. The Inter-American Development Bank has functioned within a hegemonic structure. The dominant power, the United States, pursued long-term political objectives and accepted considerable autonomy for developing countries within the Bank. The Asian Development Bank has functioned within a bipolar structure with Japan playing an increasingly important role. As a normal power, Japan has pursued tangible economic interests and has constrained the behavior of the Asian Development Bank. Until the late 1970s the African Development Bank functioned in a multipolar structure that largely excluded nonregional countries. This exclusion made it impossible to generate substantial resources. Experience in the regional development banks suggests that a hegemonic structure can offer weaker states both resources and influence provided that the milieu goals of the dominant power are not violated.

External assistance for food and agricultural development in the Third World

Trends in the flow of investment in and external development assistance to food and agriculture in developing countries are the subject of this paper. These are discussed in the context of targets regarding agricultural production increases set both by the FAO and by the World Food Conference (1974). The paper deals specifically with external assistance commitments offered by such donors as the DAC, IBRD, OPEC, Regional Development Banks, etc., with a special emphasis on ‘concessional assistance’.

Regional Development Banks.

Regional Development Banks.

Book Reviews

Development and ChangeVolume 3, Issue 2 p. 77-89 Book Reviews First published: May 1972 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.1972.tb00619.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Abstract Book reviewed in this article: Juliet Clifford and Gavin Osmond, World Development Handbook Charles Knight & Co. John White, Regional Development Banks. A Study of Institutional Style Overseas Development Institute Keith Griffin (ed), Financing Development in Latin America Milton C. Taylor (ed), Taxation for African Economic Development Hutchinson Educational Ramgopal Agarwala, An Econometric Model of India 1948–1961 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd Earl M. Kulp, Rural Development Planning - Systems Analysis and Working Method Alessandro Pizzorno (ed), Political Sociology Penguin Modern Sociology Readings Volume3, Issue2May 1972Pages 77-89 RelatedInformation

Regional Development Financing

Regional development banks can serve as focal points for regional and subregional cooperation, thus promoting economic integration. They are institutions whose objectives are neither national nor global and whose leadership and staffs have a regional outlook.The first and immediate challenge confronting these regional development banks is the financing of regional projects which are beyond the reach of national development banks. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) has devoted only limited resources to such project, with a few spectacular exceptions, especially the Indus River project. A purely national approach to planning and financing development does not make sense in most of Latin America and Africa because many nations on these continents are “minicountries,” too small to form economic units of development. Many national borders have been determined by political and diplomatic history rather than by economic factors; frequently, they cut across natural development units such as river basins or mineral deposits. Moreover, except in Europe, the very dearth of strong national institutions makes regional development banks important; they provide additional financial intermediaries to be interposed between the developing regions and the world financial centers, as well as between various national financial institutions of the member countries of the regions concerned.