ABSTRACT Given the sensitive nature of cybersecurity in authoritarian regimes, the existence of semi-autonomous patriotic hackers raises questions about their function because no security-adjacent actor can survive without at least tacit regime approval. Reflecting the attention that the phenomenon has received from scholars of defence and cybersecurity, the hackers’ presence has to date been viewed as a pragmatic strategy that either compensates for autocrats’ own lack of technological capacity, or that deflects blowback from high-stakes cyber operations. But less is known about how the hackers’ presence relates to authoritarian stabilization and survival agendas. This prompts this article to ask: How does the devolution of cybersecurity functions to patriotic hackers influence regime stabilization and survival agendas? Observing patriotic hacking in Syria through work on authoritarian devolution, space and cybersecurity, the article argues that while there is much precedent for authoritarian power devolution, digital devolution has novel mechanisms and effects. This is because the internet enables regimes to consciously and instrumentally manipulate the process, thereby creating a sense of constantly shifting space between themselves and the hackers that facilitates new opportunities for authoritarian stabilization and survival.