Reductionist Theories Research Articles

Affordances and Phenomenal Character in Spatial Perception

Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is wholly determined by, or even reducible to, its representational content. This essay puts forward a version of intentionalism that allows (though does not require) the reduction of phenomenal character to representational content. Unlike other reductionist theories, however, it does not require the acceptance of phenomenal externalism (the view that phenomenal character does not supervene on the internal state of the subject). According to the view offered here, phenomenal characters essentially represent subject-environment relations that are relevant to the possibilities for causal interaction between the subject and the environment; relations of the kind that J. J. Gibson dubbed affordances. The essay argues for this view chiefly through an examination of spatial perception, though other cases are also considered. The view assumes that a phenomenal character has an essential functional role; though it need not be assumed that a functional role is sufficient for a phenomenal character.

Spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is impossible

Even if spectrum inversion of various sorts is possible, spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is not. So spectrum inversion does not pose a challenge for the intentionalist thesis that, necessarily, within a given sense modality, if two experiences are alike with respect to content, they are also alike with respect to their phenomenal character. On the contrary, reflection on variants of standard cases of spectrum inversion provides a strong argument for intentionalism. Depending on one’s views about the possibility of spectrum inversion, the impossibility of spectrum inversion without a difference in representation can also be used as an argument against a variety of reductive theories of mental representation.

Interactions Between Connected Half-Sarcomeres Produce Emergent Mechanical Behavior in a Mathematical Model of Muscle

Most reductionist theories of muscle attribute a fiber's mechanical properties to the scaled behavior of a single half-sarcomere. Mathematical models of this type can explain many of the known mechanical properties of muscle but have to incorporate a passive mechanical component that becomes ∼300% stiffer in activating conditions to reproduce the force response elicited by stretching a fast mammalian muscle fiber. The available experimental data suggests that titin filaments, which are the mostly likely source of the passive component, become at most ∼30% stiffer in saturating Ca2+ solutions. The work described in this manuscript used computer modeling to test an alternative systems theory that attributes the stretch response of a mammalian fiber to the composite behavior of a collection of half-sarcomeres. The principal finding was that the stretch response of a chemically permeabilized rabbit psoas fiber could be reproduced with a framework consisting of 300 half-sarcomeres arranged in 6 parallel myofibrils without requiring titin filaments to stiffen in activating solutions. Ablation of inter-myofibrillar links in the computer simulations lowered isometric force values and lowered energy absorption during a stretch. This computed behavior mimics effects previously observed in experiments using muscles from desmin-deficient mice in which the connections between Z-disks in adjacent myofibrils are presumably compromised. The current simulations suggest that muscle fibers exhibit emergent properties that reflect interactions between half-sarcomeres and are not properties of a single half-sarcomere in isolation. It is therefore likely that full quantitative understanding of a fiber's mechanical properties requires detailed analysis of a complete fiber system and cannot be achieved by focusing solely on the properties of a single half-sarcomere.

Possible Worlds II: Non‐reductive Theories of Possible Worlds

AbstractIt is difficult to wander far in contemporary metaphysics without bumping into talk of possible worlds. And, reference to possible worlds is not confined to metaphysics. It can be found in contemporary epistemology and ethics, and has even made its way into linguistics and decision theory. What are those possible worlds, the entities to which theorists in these disciplines all appeal? Some have hoped that a theory of possible worlds can be used to reduce modality to non‐modal terms. This paper sets reductive theories aside, and articulates and applies a framework for evaluating non‐reductive theories of possible worlds. I argue that, if we abjure reduction, we should aim for a theory of possible worlds that is user‐friendly. I then outline four leading contemporary theories and consider objections to each. My conclusions are negative: every theory we discuss fails to be user‐friendly in some significant respect.

Interactions between Connected Half-Sarcomeres Produce Emergent Mechanical Behavior in a Mathematical Model of Muscle

Most reductionist theories of muscle attribute a fiber's mechanical properties to the scaled behavior of a single half-sarcomere. Mathematical models of this type can explain many of the known mechanical properties of muscle but have to incorporate a passive mechanical component that becomes ∼300% stiffer in activating conditions to reproduce the force response elicited by stretching a fast mammalian muscle fiber. The available experimental data suggests that titin filaments, which are the mostly likely source of the passive component, become at most ∼30% stiffer in saturating Ca2+ solutions. The work described in this manuscript used computer modeling to test an alternative systems theory that attributes the stretch response of a mammalian fiber to the composite behavior of a collection of half-sarcomeres. The principal finding was that the stretch response of a chemically permeabilized rabbit psoas fiber could be reproduced with a framework consisting of 300 half-sarcomeres arranged in 6 parallel myofibrils without requiring titin filaments to stiffen in activating solutions. Ablation of inter-myofibrillar links in the computer simulations lowered isometric force values and lowered energy absorption during a stretch. This computed behavior mimics effects previously observed in experiments using muscles from desmin-deficient mice in which the connections between Z-disks in adjacent myofibrils are presumably compromised. The current simulations suggest that muscle fibers exhibit emergent properties that reflect interactions between half-sarcomeres and are not properties of a single half-sarcomere in isolation. It is therefore likely that full quantitative understanding of a fiber's mechanical properties requires detailed analysis of a complete fiber system and cannot be achieved by focusing solely on the properties of a single half-sarcomere.

Beyond the Answer: Making Sense of Neuroprudence

Through an analysis of legal theory, jurisprudence, economics, philosophy and evidence drawn from reductionist theories of neurobiology and the emerging field of neuroeconomics, this paper calls for a restructuring of fundamental questions in jurisprudence. It is neither a mere challenge to Dworkinian interpretivism, nor is it simple fodder for the legal positivist. When confronted by new disciplines, old questions call for new answers. Trust as the neural currency, not trust as the abstract virtue, lays the bedrock for our systems of law. At the neural systems level, law is a cognitive process and trust is its ultimate rule. A rule may be binding before it is accepted with no debate between the mind and molecule as to whether or not it is valid. Law is not posited through decision. We live in and by the law, but not as subjects of law’s empire. With what ruler must jurisprudence draw the line between the validity of law and the trouble of being human? This is a question Hercules can only begin to ask if he moves beyond his answer and makes sense of neuroprudence.

Party Matters

This article addresses the relationship between political decentralization and the organization of political parties in Great Britain and Spain, focusing on the Labour Party and the Socialist Party, respectively. It assesses two rival accounts of this relationship: Caramani's `nationalization of politics' thesis and Chhibber and Kollman's rational choice institutionalist account in their book The Formation of National Party Systems. It argues that both accounts are seriously incomplete, and on occasion misleading, because of their unwillingness to consider the autonomous role of political parties as advocates of institutional change and as organizational entities. The article develops this argument by studying the role of the British Labour Party and the Spanish Socialists in proposing devolution reforms, and their organizational and strategic responses to them. It concludes that the reductive theories cited above fail to capture the real picture, because parties cannot only mitigate the effects of institutional change, they are also the architects of these changes and shape institutions to suit their strategic ends.

Teaching critical thinking in psychiatric training: a role for the social sciences.

In 1969, a psychiatric resident admitted a young woman who confessed to her doctor that, “twenty-percent of the time I see reality, and the rest of the time I am in my dream world.” Six months later, near the end of her treatment with antipsychotic medications and psychotherapy, her resident summarized how he understood her illness: There is no question that the psychosis continues…Yet, within the overall personality there is… an ego-adaptive, coping, observing, trying to judge—albeit from a weak, uncertain and tenuous position…[often] overwhelmed in the face of inner chaos and psychosis. But there are islands of strength within the psychotic seas, and when the seas diminish, seemingly of their own accord, one can see these islands more clearly than ever before…One can only wonder if all these islands are not somehow connected beneath the sea, and if so, how does one continue to raise the land mass, that is, capacity to cope and adapt above the level of the waters of the raging impulses of her psychosis. Compare this record to one written nearly 40 years later at the same institution. Here, a psychiatric resident describes the hospital course of a man with the identical diagnosis as the woman: This is a 25 yo Hispanic male with a past psych hx of schizophrenia who brought himself to the ER with the chief complaint of command AH telling him to hurt himself and hurt his brother. ….Pt also endorsed depressed mood, decreased appetite, and insomnia. He did not have any other active SI or HI. Pt admitted that he had been off his psychotropic medications for the past 30 days.…Pt was restarted on his previous medications. On day 2, pt reported feeling improved after treatment. He denied having suicidal thoughts or homicidal thoughts. His AH frequency decreased. On day 3, pt reported improved mood, denied suicidal or homicidal thoughts. Case manager contacted the patient's brother, who stated that pt didn't get along with his family members and family members would not be willing to provide housing. The patient agreed to be discharged to a shelter. The two patients experienced nearly identical troubles, including failure to live independently, a paucity of social relationships, and persistent psychosis. In the first case, the resident took little interest in the patient's symptoms (despite the fact that antipsychotic medications had been in widespread use for over 15 years) and spent many hours learning about her life outside of the hospital and her inner psychological world. The second resident dearly cared about the patient's symptoms and viewed them as unrelated to the scarcity and loneliness that characterized his social life. These divergent representations of the patient with schizophrenia reflect dramatic changes in the social, cultural, and scientific contexts in which psychiatry is practiced. Much of what we do as clinicians is not a consequence of the natural world but, instead, results from our contingent social and cultural context and, as such, deserves critical scrutiny. Historical and anthropological approaches provide tools with which psychiatrists-in-training can reckon with the clinical challenges raised by a complex world. For the last three years, the authors have conducted a course on the social sciences and psychiatry for second-year psychiatric residents with these aims in mind. Through lectures, readings, and homework, the course engages residents in discussions about the psychiatric task. Social science is taught not as a set of abstract theories, but as a set of tools with which to be thoughtful about the responsibilities, complexities, and uncertainties of clinical work. The aim is to teach residents to critically engage the knowledge they use as psychiatrists and to make an intellectual investment in the future of their profession. This article describes the conceptual foundation of the course, its structure, and impact.

Exploring the Work of Victor Turner

Victor Turner broke anthropology free from cultural determinism when it was anchored in the reductionist theories of Durkheim. Like Tolstoy in his recognition of the origin of violence in government, Turner recognized the origin of the denaturing of cultures in culture’s own penchant for the building of social structures in order to perpetuate itself. He saw in the cracks between structures, and in the liminal gaps necessary for changes in structure, the revival of the lost immediacy of social relationships and the communitas that is its mark. Nowadays one may include signs of spirituality in those gaps, although that spirituality has been a topic previously tabooed in anthropological circles or hidden under structural analysis. Turner saw the inconvenient truth that if structuralism as a value and philosophy (plus what we now see as the violence inseparable from the political state, along with neoconservatism and neoliberalism—business doctrines multiplied by themselves ad infinitem) were to continue as the world’s philosophy, we would continue with wars and the smothering of the natural flexibility of social intercourse (see Robert Putnam 2000, who shows in stark figures how sociality in general is losing ground in our era).
 Keywords: Victor Turner, social process, rites of passage, liminality, communitas, anthropologyof experience, brain studies

THE OTHER CONFESSIONAL HISTORY: ON SECULAR BIAS IN THE STUDY OF RELIGION

ABSTRACTThe rejection of confessional commitments in the study of religion in favor of social‐scientific or humanistic theories of religion has produced not unbiased accounts, but reductionist explanations of religious belief and practice with embedded secular biases that preclude the understanding of religious believer‐practitioners. These biases derive from assumptions of undemonstrable, dogmatic, metaphysical naturalism or its functional equivalent, an epistemological skepticism about all truth claims of revealed religions. Because such assumptions are so widespread among scholars today, they are not often explicitly articulated. They were overtly asserted by Emile Durkheim in his Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912), however, and are implicit in the claims of two other thinkers influential in the study of early modern Christianity in recent years, namely Clifford Geertz and Michel Foucault. The use of such theories in the history of religion yields secular confessional history, parallel to traditional religious confessional history only with different embedded metaphysical beliefs. If scholars want to understand religious persons such that the latter would recognize themselves in what is said about them, rather than impose their own metaphysical convictions on them, then they should reject metaphysically biased reductionist theories of religion no less than confessional religious assumptions in the practice of their scholarship. Instead, a study of religion guided not by theories but by the question, “What did it mean to them?” and which is particularized in metaphysically neutral ways offers a third alternative that avoids confessional history, whether religious or secular. When carried out consistently for multiple traditions, such an approach can reconstruct disagreements that point beyond description to historical explanation of change over time.

Making It Totally Explicit

This paper begins by isolating the reductive component of Brandom's inferentialism. In order to assess to what extent that reductive component is supported by the considerations Brandom marshals in its defense, I assess the comparative degree of support those considerations provide a non-reductive counterpart of Brandom's original, reductive theory. One of the central claims here is that once the reductive and non-reductive theories are placed side-by-side, it is clear that, save one, all of the considerations Brandom marshals in defense of inferentialism equally well support its non-reductive counterpart. This shows that those considerations offer no support for the reductions at inferentialism's heart. What the considerations raised here ultimately show is that Brandom's defense of the reductive core of his theory ultimately rests on the simple fact that it has a certain feature, namely, that it is reductive in the sense reserved here. I close with a brief discussion of some advantages that some reductive theories have over non-reductive ones, but show how none of these advantages are had by Brandom's theory in particular.

Religion and spirituality: A discussion paper about negativity, reductionism and differentiation in nursing texts

Background The last 30 years have seen a proliferation of literature about spirituality in the nursing press. A dominant theme has been the need to differentiate spirituality from religion and this has provoked a number of authors to attempt to define and describe religion. As nursing advocates respect for the person's religious beliefs the way in which it is portrayed is very relevant. Aims This work explores how religion is defined and discussed in the nursing literature about spirituality to consider whether the way religion is portrayed could be said to demonstrate ‘respect’ for religious beliefs. Methods Texts about religion were examined in relation to theories of religion from anthropology, sociology and religious studies. These disciplines have produced substantive or irreducible accounts in contrast to functional and reductive theories about religion. Results The result of this analysis is that there appears to be a tendency to talk about religion without using sources which itself suggests a lack of respect as well as an inclination to view it only in reductive and functional terms. This is proved by the similarity of ideas in the nursing literature to the functionalist and reductionist theories of Frazer, Tylor, Marx, Durkheim and Freud. This approach is criticised with reference to the work of Otto, Bellah, Berger and Pals who suggest that religion should be seen as irreducibly to do with the sacred. It is proposed that this is a more appropriate outlook to take for an occupation which professes to respect the religious beliefs of all individuals. However, viewing religion in this more meaningful way, acknowledging their spirituality has implications for attempts to differentiate religion and spirituality. Conclusion Reductive accounts of religion imply, probably inadvertently but nevertheless negative, attitudes towards religious belief. A more serious and deeper exploration of the meaning of religion from the standpoint of irreducibility might be more respectful and tolerant of religious belief. This is particularly salient in a society where religious practice is increasing both in the indigenous population and as a result of immigration.

Complexities: beyond nature & nurture

Recent years have seen a growing impetus to explain social life almost exclusively in biological and mechanistic terms, and to dismiss cultural meaning and difference. Daily we read assertions that everything from disease to morality - not to mention the presumed characteristics of race, gender, and sexuality - can be explained by reference primarily to genetics and our evolutionary past. Complexities mobilizes experts from several fields of anthropology - cultural, archaeological, linguistic, and biological - to offer a compelling challenge to the resurgence of reductive theories of human biological and social life. This book presents evidence to contest such theories and to provide a multifaceted account of the complexity and variability of the human condition. Charting a course that moves beyond any simple opposition between nature and nurture, Complexities argues that a nonreductive perspective has important implications for how we understand and develop human potential.

SELF-CONCEPTION AND PERSONAL IDENTITY: REVISITING PARFIT AND LEWIS WITH AN EYE ON THE GRIP OF THE UNITY REACTION

Derek Parfit's “reductionist” account of personal identity (including the rejection of anything like a soul) is coupled with the rejection of a commonsensical intuition of essential self-unity, as in his defense of the counter-intuitive claim that “identity does not matter.” His argument for this claim is based on reflection on the possibility of personal fission. To the contrary, Simon Blackburn claims that the “unity reaction” to fission has an absolute grip on practical reasoning. Now David Lewis denied Parfit's claim that reductionism contravenes common sense, so I revisit the debate between Parfit and Lewis, showing why Parfit wins it. Is reductionism about persons then inherently at odds with the unity reaction? Not necessarily; David Velleman presents a reductionist theory according to which fission does not conflict with the unity reaction. Nonetheless, relying on the distinction between person level descriptions of first-person states and the first-person perspective itself, I argue that Velleman's theory does not eliminate fission-based conflict with the unity reaction.

Paradigm Lost? Reassessing Theory of International Politics

Constructivists attack the social theory of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (TIP), arguing its positions on change, agent-structure interaction and culture are irrevocably flawed. We argue that many of these criticisms are mispecified, as they overlook the structural-functionalist assumptions of Waltz’s theory. Seen in this light, structural realism specifies mechanisms of change, provides a plausible account of agent-structure interaction; and is less ‘materialist’ and ‘rationalist’ than its critics suppose. Most fundamentally, recognizing Waltz’s sociological commitments reinforces his insight that reductionist theories cannot account for international order. An appreciation of TIP’s structural-functionalist sensibilities also helps us to understand the flaws of the theory, and provides constructivists with a clearer departure point for a reformulated systems theory of international politics.

Is That an Action Man in There? Masculinity as an Imaginative Act of Self-creation

The concept of masculinity has been critiqued either as an ideological effect of patriarchy or as a play of discourse. This occurs at a time when there is renewed interest in biologically reductive theories of gender, and in the context (in the UK) of public disquiet about boys' academic performance. This paper argues that while masculinity cannot be regarded as a foundational subject, the reality of the category 'masculinity' in the daily lives of students and teachers means that we have to take account of how it structures both the social and pedagogic life of the classroom. The paper demonstrates how an imagined sense of masculinity--the masculine social imaginary--appears as a reality in the boys' narratives of self. The paper also argues that while this masculine social imaginary provides the semantic logic of gender, it is in the moment-to-moment interactions that boys have to assert and seek recognition of themselves as male. 'Masculinity' continues to be a useful sociological concept.

Making it Implicit: Brandom on Rule Following

In Making it Explicit, Brandom aims to articulate an account of conceptual content that accommodates its normativity—a requirement on theories of content that Brandom traces to Wittgenstein's rule following considerations. It is widely held that the normativity requirement cannot be met, or at least not with ease, because theories of content face an intractable dilemma. Brandom proposes to evade the dilemma by adopting a middle road—one that uses normative vocabulary, but treats norms as implicit in practices. I argue that this proposal fails to evade the dilemma, as Brandom himself understands it. Despite his use of normative vocabulary, Brandom's theory fares no better than the reductionist theories he criticises. I consider some responses that Brandom might make to my charges, and finally conclude that his proposal founders on his own criteria.

Scientific representation: against similarity and isomorphism

I argue against theories that attempt to reduce scientific representation to similarity or isomorphism. These reductive theories aim to radically naturalize the notion of representation, since they treat scientist's purposes and intentions as non-essential to representation. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that similarity and isomorphism are common but not universal means of representation. I then present four other arguments to show that similarity and isomorphism are not the constituents of scientific representation. I finish by looking at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon the aim to radically naturalize scientific representation are likely to be successful.

Consciousness-Dependence and the Explanatory Gap

Contrary to certain rumours, the mind-body problem is alive and well. So argues Joseph Levine in Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness . The main argument is simple enough. Considerations of causal efficacy require us to accept that subjective experiential, or 'phenomenal', properties are realized in basic non-mental, probably physical properties. But no amount of knowledge of those physical properties will allow us conclusively to deduce facts about the existence and nature of phenomenal properties. This failure of deducibility constitutes an explanatory problem - an explanatory gap - but does not imply the existence of immaterial mental properties. Levine introduced this notion of the explanatory gap almost two decades ago. Purple Haze allows Levine to situate the explanatory gap in a broader philosophical context. He engages with those who hold that the explanatory gap is best understood as implying anti-materialist metaphysical conclusions. But he also seeks to distance himself from contemporary naturalistic philosophical theorizing about consciousness by arguing that reductive and eliminative theories of consciousness all fail. Levine's work is best seen as an attempt to firmly establish a definite status for the mind-body problem, i.e. that the mind-body problem is a real, substantive epistemological problem but emphatically not a metaphysical one. Because Levine's work is tightly focused upon contemporary Anglophone analytic philosophy of mind, there is little discussion of the broader conceptual background to the mind-body problem. My aim here is to place Levine's work in a broader conceptual context. In particular, I focus on the relationship between consciousness and intentionality in the belief that doing so will allow us better to understand and evaluate Levine's arguments and their place in contemporary theorizing about mentality and consciousness.

Crucial Choices, Crucial Changes: The Resurrection of Psychotherapy

Back to table of contents Previous article Next article Book ReviewsFull AccessCrucial Choices, Crucial Changes: The Resurrection of PsychotherapyWilliam H. Sledge, M.D.William H. SledgeSearch for more papers by this author, M.D.Published Online:1 Apr 2002https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ps.53.4.489-aAboutSectionsView EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InEmail I approached Crucial Choices, Crucial Changes with a great deal of hope and expectation. The tone of the initial material is promising—the idea, hopeful and illuminating, that there are critical choices ahead and changes to be made. Disaffection with the state of psychodynamic psychotherapy would prompt basic changes in order to protect and maintain the substantial benefits of this perspective in the sea of troubles facing psychotherapy in general. The idea of a presentation of "entirely different approaches to psychotherapeutic theory and practice" is appealing. The historical and literary quotations sprinkled throughout the text give it a humanistic flair—again, an appealing quality. Indeed, the introduction seems to be headed in the right direction by identifying as problems psychoanalytic training and basic conceptual issues in psychoanalysis and psychodynamic theory. However, the author begins to demonstrate a different quality of choices as he moves into the middle portion of the book.Dr. de Schill's attack on what he considers major problems and shortcomings of psychoanalytic psychotherapy practitioners takes on a shrill edge. This section of the book is disappointing and confusing, for de Schill seems to embody just what he complains about in his repetitive, diffuse attacks on the work of others. There seems to be a consistent strategy of setting up straw men and then knocking them down—repeatedly. De Schill's attacks on the authors whose scholarship I know best misrepresents their work, which does not leave me with a great deal of confidence in his own scholarship.The book is organized essentially into three major components. The first, an introductory section, includes a foreword by Monroe Spero; a preparatory essay by de Schill, noting the difficulties in the field; and essays by John Gedo and Robert Stoller, addressing contemporary psychoanalysis and the use of conceptual language, respectively. The next section, part 1, is entitled "The Resurrection of Psychotherapy." This section, written by de Schill, is an effort to deal with some deficits in psychotherapy, namely, the failure to deal effectively with dreams and feelings, the poor conceptualization of psychotherapy, and the malignant narcissism of many of the prominent writers in the field. Part 2, the final section, also written by de Schill, is an account of using intensive psychoanalytic group psychotherapy as well as a continuation of the author's litany of complaints.On one hand, the book soars toward a passionate humanism, seeking improvements in the training of psychotherapists and a rational critique of the conceptual soundness of the field; on the other hand, it plummets into a rambling, verbose, loosely argued railing against the world of academic psychotherapy. In short, Crucial Choices, Crucial Changes is a difficult work, showing promise and fire but mostly failing to deliver a consistent, well-articulated vision. The author hardly mentions the great forces that are at work in our culture to devalue the examined life; the strong move in medicine toward reductionist theories to explain complex phenomena that have social and psychological dimensions; or the commercialism that has invaded the practice of medicine.Crucial Choices, Crucial Changes will not be a blueprint for change in the field. It is a great book for someone seeking ways to talk about some of what is wrong in the realm of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, but the solutions are weak and the remedies pale. The author does not make the crucial choices that can lead to change. There will be no resurrection this way.Dr. Sledge is professor of psychiatry at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut.by Stefan de Schill; Amherst, New York, Prometheus Books, 2000, 548 pages, $56 FiguresReferencesCited byDetailsCited ByNone Volume 53Issue 4 April 2002Pages 489-a-490 Metrics History Published online 1 April 2002 Published in print 1 April 2002