Recycling Channels Research Articles

Multiple benefits of new-energy vehicle power battery recycling strategies based on the theory of planned behavior and stimulus organism response

With the yearly increasing market penetration of new-energy vehicles in China, the retirement of power batteries has gradually become a scale, and most of the waste batteries have entered informal recycling channels, which has induced a series of environmental problems. Considering this issue, we introduced the system dynamics (SD), stimulus organism response (SOR), and the theory of planned behavior (TPB) in behavioral economics to establish the environmental economic benefit evaluation model of power battery recycling strategies, and we performed a dynamic simulation analysis on the effect of government subsidy policy, policy advocacy, and other recycling strategies. The results show that: (1) the recovery subsidy policy can improve the formal recycling quantity and economic benefits of recovery, but the effect on the degree of environmental pollution is limited. (2) The combination of environmental awareness promotion strategy and subsidy policy can overcome the shortcomings of subsidy policy and has significant environmental and economic performance. (3) Compared with the benchmark scenario, the formal recycling quantity, the CO2 emission reduction, and the economic benefits of recovery in scenario 4 (high subsidy-high policy propaganda strategy) increased by approximately 112 %, 208 %, and 223 %, respectively, and the degree of environmental pollution decreased by approximately 65 %.

Expand or not? Trade-offs of the remanufacturer on recycling channels

The integration of online trading has emerged as a crucial driver of operational efficiency in the reverse supply chain. This study expands the recycling model to include three distinct scenarios: basic-offline recycling (BR), single-platform recycling (SR), and dual-platform recycling (DR). The research delves into the implications of varying platform numbers, profit-sharing contracts, consumer recycling preferences, and recycling price adjustment speeds on supply chain stability within a multi-period decision-making framework. Findings reveal that the SR model is not always yield higher profits for remanufacturers through lower revenue allocation proportions to platforms, in stark contrast to the DR model. Furthermore, rapid decision adjustments do not consistently enhance the stability of the recycling system across multiple decision cycles. Remanufacturers' expansion strategies are significantly impacted by the costs associated with acquiring e-waste from individual recyclers. Importantly, an excess of platforms does not always result in favorable outcomes. Conversely, the SR model proves superior to the DR model in practical contexts that may arise. These insights offer valuable guidance to remanufacturers seeking to develop viable expansion strategies that foster mutually beneficial relationships among individual recyclers, remanufacturers, and platforms.

Recycling decision and corporate social responsibility implement for closed‐loop supply chain considering green design under EPR policy

AbstractThe extended producer responsibility (EPR) policy requires producers to focus on the green design of front‐end products and the recycling of end‐of‐life waste products at the same time and fulfill dual environmental responsibilities. Under this background, we study the recycling decision and corporate social responsibility (CSR) implementation for closed‐loop supply chains (CLSC) considering green design under EPR policy. We build game models of CLSC under six situations, and analyze the interaction between the manufacturer's green design behavior and the retailer's CSR behavior, along with their influence on recycling decisions and the operational performance of CLSC. We show that both the manufacturer's green design behavior and the retailer's CSR behavior are beneficial to improving social welfare and the other party's profits, but a higher level of green design is uneconomical for the manufacturer. Similarly, a higher CSR awareness is not conducive to retailer's profitability. We also find that under the influence of the government's “Tax‐Reduction‐Subsidy” policy, the selection of the optimal recycling channel is influenced by factors such as the difficulty of recycling waste products, government subsidies, and the profit of unit reprocesses from the perspective of maximizing supply chain member's profits.

Cooperate or not? Strategic analysis of formal and informal recyclers under different retired power battery recycling market structures

The huge economic value of retired power battery recycling market has attracted participations of informal recyclers with recycling channel advantage and formal recyclers with environmental responsibility. Meanwhile, consumers’ preferences for recycling prices and channels have resulted in different recycling market structures. However, considering the possibility of their complementary advantages, research on the cooperation strategies between them under different market structures currently lacks. To address this gap, this paper constructs a Hotelling model consisting of a formal and an informal recycler to describe the informal recycler’s recycling channel advantage and the formal recycler’s environmental responsibility and to depict the possible recycling market structures. Under different market structures, how informal recycler’s recycling channel advantage and the formal recycler’s environmental responsibility shape their optimal decisions, economic and environmental performances are explored. In addition, whether the two members should cooperate through a wholesale-pricing contract and the threshold conditions of cooperation if should are investigated from perspectives of recycling, economic and environmental performances. The results show that under the market structure with no competition, when environmental responsibility cost is small enough, cooperation can achieve a “triple-win” outcome of the two members’ profits and environmental performance. Under the market structure with partial competition, whether cooperation can achieve a “triple-win” situation additionally depends on the unit environmental impact of the informal recycler’s recycling. Higher unit environmental impact of the informal recycler’s recycling and lower formal recycler’s environmental responsibility cost can bring “triple-win” prospect. This paper can enrich the theory of dual-channel recycling management and guide formal recyclers to better cooperate with informal recyclers to achieve economic and environmental synergy improvement.

How can the recycling of power batteries for EVs be promoted in China? A multiparty cooperative game analysis

While electric vehicles (EVs) are developing at a high speed in China, the power battery market is facing a decommissioning peak. The problem is that the recycling situation of domestic power batteries is not ideal, partly due to neglect by consumers. By considering the recycling system, mode, and policy of China’s EV power batteries, we construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, consumers and EV manufacturers; analyse the stable strategy adjustment mechanisms of tripartite participation in this recycling cooperation game; and simulate the tripartite evolutionary game. The results show that when the initial willingness of the government, consumers and EV manufacturers to recycle power batteries is not strong, the government takes the lead, driving EV manufacturers and consumers to participate in power battery recycling. When the government, consumers and EV manufacturers have medium or high levels of initial willingness, the government evolves and chooses a nonregulation strategy. In addition, by simulating the impact of changes in consumer-related influencing factors on this tripartite evolutionary game, we find that subsidies for recycling power batteries are a key factor affecting consumers’ strategy choices and that boosting recycling compensation for consumers can improve their enthusiasm to participate in such recycling. Therefore, to improve the recycling of power batteries for EVs, in terms of both efficiency and percentage of deployment, the Chinese government should strengthen public education on power battery recycling, further integrate informal recycling channels, and balance the distribution of profits among consumers for recycling compensation.

Recycling channel strategy in the presence of free-riding in the carbon neutrality era

Recycling has become a critical response to the goals of reaching a carbon peak and achieving carbon neutrality. This study explores the effects of consumer free-riding behavior, the quality of recycling services, and the costs of channel transfers on the profitability of manufacturers and retailers in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), focusing on the importance of recycling practices for carbon neutrality. Using consumer utility theory and a Stackelberg game model, we analyze the dynamics among these factors. Our results show that: (i) Consumer free-riding behavior slightly increases market demand and recycling volumes, enhancing profitability for both manufacturers and retailers in the dual-channel CLSC. (ii) The quality of recycling services and the transfer costs associated with retailer free-riding behavior jointly influence the profits of manufacturers and retailers. (iii) The effect of free-riding behavior on recycling services affects both forward sales and reverse recycling channels equally. This study provides valuable insights for decision-making in sustainable development practices in the recycling sector, significantly contributing to the goal of achieving carbon neutrality.

Analysis of Factors Influencing EV Power Battery Recycling Channel Selection: A Study Based on TPB and Multi Class Logistic Regression

New energy electric vehicle (EV) have become the mainstream worldwide, and the power battery recycling industry is facing new opportunities and challenges. This article compares and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of existing power battery recycling channels. Through a questionnaire survey, a multi class logistic regression model is used to study the impact and correlation of users' gender, age, occupational category, and education level on their choice of recycling channels. The results indicate that there is a positive correlation between education level and understanding of power battery channels. The higher the education level, the more concerned the group is about environmental protection compared to convenience. Finally, based on the TPB, the impact of seven factors on users' choice of recycling channels and corresponding measures were summarized to help the enterprises understand users' inner thoughts, facilitate the establishment of a more comprehensive recycling mechanism, and improve the revenue of power battery recycling.

Financing and online recycling channel decisions in a closed-loop supply chain

In the context of “Internet + recycling”, remanufacturing enterprises seek cooperation with recycling platforms to develop online recycling channels. Given that many manufacturers have capital constraints in the recycling and production process, we consider bank and recycling platform to provide financial assistance to the manufacturer. This paper constructs a Stackelberg game model under bank financing and recycling platform financing based on two forms of online recycling cooperation: entrusted recycling and direct recycling. Through the comparison of equilibrium profits, the participants’ financing and recycling channel preferences are explored. The results show that the recycling platform is willing to provide financing service for the manufacturer with a larger capital gap, but there are feasibility conditions for the setting of its loan interest rate. The manufacturer with less initial capital tends to choose the financing scheme with a relatively low interest rate, while the reduction of capital gap increases the propensity for bank financing. The lower platform commission prompts the manufacturer to implement direct recycling, and the increase in cost saving rate of remanufacturing and platform interest rate makes the superiority of direct recycling even more significant. However, entrusted recycling is always more profitable for the recycling platform regardless of the financing scheme. Furthermore, differentiated product sales and portfolio financing can have a certain impact on the manufacturer’s financing and recycling decisions.

Enhancing the stability of deep blue OLED via multiple exciton recycling channels provided by low-concentration doped TTF-HLCT combinational molecule

Enhancing the stability of deep blue OLED via multiple exciton recycling channels provided by low-concentration doped TTF-HLCT combinational molecule

Reverse supply chain decisions with online and offline dual recycling channels considering consumer fairness concerns and channel preference

Online recycling is becoming more prevalent as a result of the quick development of innovative technologies to enhance the recycling system. Based on consumer fairness concerns and channel preferences, we establish an online and offline dual-recycling channel reverse supply chain model in which a processor dominates and a recycler follows according to Stackelberg game theory and investigates the impact of two consumer’s behavioral preferences upon supply chain decisions. The results show that: (1) for the game leader, the impact of consumer fairness concerns is greater than that of channel preference; (2) for the game follower, the impact of channel preference is greater than that of consumer fairness concerns; (3) entrusting the recycler to collect can help the leader reduce profit losses caused by consumer fairness concerns.

Power Battery Cascade Utilization Reverse Supply Chain Literature Review

In the 21st century, the development prospects of new energy vehicles are broad, and the next few years are expected to continue to maintain rapid growth. However, with the continuous expansion of the new energy vehicle market, the recycling problem of power batteries has gradually become prominent. The power battery contains precious metals and harmful substances that may cause environmental pollution, which will lead to waste of resources and environmental pollution if the recycling is not properly handled. Therefore, taking the right recycling measures is essential to protect the environment and save resources. This paper mainly studies the reverse supply chain recycling of power batteries, including the following aspects: supply chain recycling channels, government participation in recycling, research on cascade utilization of power batteries, and puts forward prospects for future research on cascade utilization of power batteries.

A Dual-Channel Cooperative Strategy between Recyclers and E-Tailers for the Offline and Online Recycling of Waste Electronics

A Stackelberg game model was formulated for dual recycling channels for a supply chain with a recycler and an e-tailer, who recycle and resell waste electronics. A reverse solution was adopted to find the optimal recycling prices, the optimal selling prices, and the supply chain’s overall profits for cooperative and non-cooperative models. The profits gained in the cooperative model were greater. We proposed a revenue-sharing contract to investigate the profit distribution. Finally, we validated the effectiveness of the cooperative recycling model through numerical simulations, calculated the revenue-sharing factors, and analyzed the effects of these factors on the decisions of the recycler and the e-tailer. By comparing the dual-channel non-cooperative recycling model based on online and offline recycling by the recycler to the dual-channel cooperative recycling model based on offline recycling by the recycler and online recycling by the e-tailer, as well as examining the results in relation to the contracts, we found that the recycler and the e-tailer should cooperate in recycling electronics to maximize the supply chain’s overall profits. However, the e-tailer will see reduced profits and may be less willing to cooperate, so it is necessary to formulate a revenue-sharing contract. The revenue-sharing factors in the contract must be set within a reasonable range; otherwise, either party could see reduced profits and renounce cooperation, even if the supply chain’s overall profit is maximized. The recycler is the more critical party for achieving cooperation. In this paper, we research the cooperative strategy between recyclers and e-tailers that is conducive for expanding the market scale of waste electronics recycling and improving the profits of both parties, while promoting the sustainable development of the supply chain.

Promoting consumer returns in closed-loop supply chains under cap-and-trade regulation: A cooperative recycling advertising perspective

Under carbon cap-and-trade regulation, to control carbon emissions and improve the recycling efficiency of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) from the traditional offline recycling channel, more enterprises attempt to simultaneously combine the online recycling platform with the digital transformation of the supply chain. Based on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with dual recycling channels and considering recycling advertising invested both in offline and online recycling channels, this paper attempts to explore the optimal recycling advertising mode which can both achieve economic and environmental performance under cap-and-trade regulation. Therefore, game models including a manufacturer and above either recycler are established, which are respectively correspond to four recycling advertising modes: manufacturer cooperates with neither recycler (MO mode), manufacturer only cooperates with the offline retailer (MR mode), manufacturer only cooperates with the online recycling platform (MT mode), and manufacturer cooperates with either recycler (MRT mode). Consequently, this paper solves the optimal decisions of the tripartite and focuses on the analysis of the impact of cooperative (competitive) recycling advertising under cap-and-trade regulation. By comparing the profits and total carbon emissions of the whole CLSC under four recycling advertising modes, the results indicate that: cooperative advertising between the manufacturer and two recyclers can achieve economic and environmental performance for the whole CLSC if the free-riding phenomenon occurs in recycling advertising. Otherwise, influenced by competitive recycling advertising, the above mode turns to the suboptimal one for the profits of two recyclers and the total carbon emissions of the CLSC. Moreover, driven by economic benefits, cooperative advertising will eventually become a consensus, but the total carbon emissions may not always be the least.

Research on pricing and financing strategy of dual-channel closed-loop supply chain considering recycling channel competition

This paper investigates the pricing and financing strategies of a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain consisting of a financially constrained manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party recycler that competes with the manufacturer for recycling, considering the various financing options available to the manufacturer. The profit functions of the supply chain members with no capital constraint, no capital constraint, equity financing, bank financing and retailer equity financing are constructed respectively. The optimal decision of the closed-loop supply chain under different scenarios and the capital boundary of the manufacturer’s debt financing are determined based on the Stackelberg game method and the Kuhn-Tucker conditional approach. The results show that: (1) increased competition for recycling has a negative impact on all supply chain members, and an increase in the manufacturer’s own funds when the manufacturer is financially constrained reduces channel pricing, increases recycling rates and increases member profits; (2) an increase in the retailer’s share of the dividend leads to a reduction in the manufacturer’s direct sales price and recycling price and an increase in the wholesale price, but the retailer is still profitable and reduces retail prices and increases recycling rates. (3) A high or low equity dividend ratio will lead the manufacturer to choose bank financing when the manufacturer has little initial capital, and to choose no financing when the manufacturer has more initial capital. (4) An increase in own funds reduces the threshold and range of equity dividends for retailer entry financing, and an increase in the recycling competition factor has the opposite effect. (5) As consumers’ online channel preferences increase, retailers are willing to enter into financing partnerships with manufacturers within a range of dividends, regardless of the manufacturer’s initial capital level.

Recycling Channel Selection for a Manufacturer Involving Consumers' Green-Return Behavior

Recycling Channel Selection for a Manufacturer Involving Consumers' Green-Return Behavior

Recycling Pricing and Government Subsidy Strategy for End-of-Life Vehicles in a Reverse Supply Chain under Consumer Recycling Channel Preferences

In the existing recycling system for end-of-life vehicles (ELVs), online recycling based on the Internet platform is a useful supplement. In this paper, a Stackelberg game pricing model, which is dominated by ELV part remanufacturers and composed of remanufacturers, recyclers, and consumers, is constructed considering consumer preferences for recycling channels. The influence of different subsidy strategies on the optimal pricing, profit, and recycling volume of the reverse supply chain (RSC) of ELVs is discussed, and the effects of factors such as subsidy amount and consumer preferences on the RSC of ELVs are analyzed using numerical simulation. The results show that the increase in consumers’ online recycling preferences has a positive effect on the recycling volume and profit of the RSC of ELVs. Considering the recycling volume of the RSC, when fewer subsidies are given, more recycling volume can be generated by subsidizing remanufacturers, and, on the contrary, recycling volume will be generated by subsidizing consumers. Considering the profit of the RSC, when subsidies are given at the lower-middle level, higher profits can be earned by subsidizing remanufacturers, and, on the contrary, higher profits can be earned by subsidizing consumers.

A recycling model based on blockchain and reverse logistics for remanufacturing

ABSTRACT This paper addresses the challenge of integrating discarded products as pivotal raw materials in the remanufacturing process. The pervasive lack of transparency in the origin of discarded products and the prevalent issues of diminished recycling value in existing market recycling models underscore the need for a transformative solution. In response, this study introduces a novel remanufacturing-centric recycling framework that harnesses blockchain (BC) technology and reverse logistics (RL). This framework orchestrates transactions within the recycling market by systematically tracking the quality attributes of products. The proposed model innovates by deploying dynamic game theory to devise recycling pricing strategies tailored for recycling entities. Additionally, the incorporation of an appraisal mechanism for recycled product quality enhances the capability of recycling entities to acquire high-value items. The model’s viability and pioneering attributes are corroborated through a case study involving a retailer’s engine recycling strategy. The empirical findings validate the model’s potential in creating a standardized market for recycling high-value products, thereby empowering remanufacturers to access superior-quality discarded materials through optimized recycling channels.

Manufacturer's online recycling channel intrusion strategies considering digital technology enabling and government subsidies

AbstractWe constructed closed‐loop supply chain decision‐making models for digital technology empowerment considering government subsidies and analyzed the interaction between subsidy strategies and digital technology empowerment decisions. We found that when manufacturer does not (does) implement online recycling channel intrusion, government subsidies have (have not) a transmission effect. However, when the government subsidizes manufacturer (recycling platform), channel intrusion will increase (decrease) the digital technology empowerment level of recycling platform. Meanwhile, excessive subsidies for recycling platform are not conducive to remanufacturing. In addition, when consumers' digital sensitivity is weak, government subsidies to manufacturer is more conducive to increasing social welfare.

Product pricing and recycling mode considering competition under used product error classification

Sorting used products is an effective way for enterprises to improve resource utilization and increase profits, but the effects of sorting quality standards and classification errors on the sorting process requires attention. In light of the fact that in addition to recycling used products by themselves, enterprises may choose to outsource or compete with third parties for recycling, by constructing the game-theoretic model of manufacturer sorting, third-party recycler sorting and competitive sorting, this paper studies the impact of quality sorting standards and two types of classification errors on the decision-making and performance of supply chains under different modes. The results show that although a higher the quality sorting standard indicates a higher the acquisition price, and a lower the sales price of the product, for enterprises, a higher the quality sorting standard is not the better. Classification errors have opposite impacts on the profits of different recycling channels. Enterprises can optimize their performance by controlling error proportions in combination with their own sorting modes. Moreover, although the manufacturer sorting mode is superior to the third-party sorting mode, a third-party recycler participating in the recycling competition will not harm the manufacturer’s profits, and it can also make the recycler stricter in the sorting process, reduce the classification error proportions, and optimize the manufacturer’s profits and supply chain performance. These findings provide corresponding insights for enterprises in determining quality sorting standards and selecting sorting modes.

Recycling channel design and coordination in a reverse supply chain with customer green preference

This study investigates the selection of recycling mode and the coordination mechanism in a reverse supply chain (RSC) that consists of one remanufacturer, one traditional recycler, and one smart recycler. We characterize the collection cost differences between traditional recycling and smart recycling, and the scrap rate of used products by smart recycling. We consider three recycling modes with recycling pricing competition, conditional on whether the remanufacturer collaborates with the traditional recycler, with the smart recycler, or with both recyclers. We show that the optimal recycling channel strategy for the remanufacturer is to enroll both the traditional recycler and the smart recycler, and the competition between these two recyclers exerts some non-trial implications on the firms’ equilibrium pricing strategy and profitability. By comparing the equilibrium outcomes with a centralized system, we further develop two coordination contracts: a two-part tariff contract and a transfer price combined with a profit-sharing contract, both of which can effectively mitigate double marginalization and improve the supply chain’s overall performance. Our findings provide useful guidance for the design of recycling channels, and for the coordination of RSC members to achieve Pareto improvement.