Terrorist Recruitment Research Articles

Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia

Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia

Anti-American Sentiment and America's Perceived Intent to Dominate: An 11-Nation Study

Perceptions of America as a powerful but malevolent nation decrease its security. On the basis of measures derived from the stereotype content model (SCM) and image theory (IT), 5,000 college students in 11 nations indicated their perceptions of the personality traits of, intentions of, and emotional reactions to the United States as well as their reactions to relevant world events (e.g., 9/11). The United States was generally perceived as competent but cold and arrogant. Although participants distinguished between the United States' government and its citizens, differences were small. Consistent with the SCM and IT, viewing the United States as intent on domination predicted perceptions of lack of warmth and of arrogance but not of competence and status. The discussion addresses implications for terrorist recruitment and ally support.

Optimizing counter-terror operations: Should one fight fire with “fire” or “water”?

This paper deals dynamically with the question of how recruitment to terror organizations is influenced by counter-terror operations. This is done within an optimal control model, where the key state is the (relative) number of terrorists and the key controls are two types of counter-terror tactics, one (“water”) that does not and one (“fire”) that does provoke recruitment of new terrorists. The model is nonlinear and does not admit analytical solutions, but an efficient numerical implementation of Pontryagin's minimum principle allows for solution with base case parameters and considerable sensitivity analysis. Generally, this model yields two different steady states, one where the terror organization is nearly eradicated and one with a high number of terrorists. Whereas water strategies are used at almost any time, it can be optimal not to use fire strategies if the number of terrorists is below a certain threshold.

Preference modification vs. incentive manipulation as tools of terrorist recruitment: The role of culture

Terrorism is a tactic much more likely to be used when combatants have asym- metric numerical strength and weaponry. Only if one side is comparatively very weak will it use terror tactics. This weakness requires a means of controlling strong incentives for free-riding or defection from the weaker side. There are two (nonexclusive) answers: (1) Atttract or inculcate recruits with an innate preference for cooperation, even if it results in the recruit's own death (2) Create a set of incentives that reward loyalty, by giving access to excludable near-public ("club") goods. Culture is the key to achieving either of these solutions. Culture is defined here as the set of "inherited" beliefs, attitudes, and moral strictures that a people use to distinguish outsiders, to understand themselves and to communicate with each other. The primary question is whether culture creates a pref- erence for cooperation as a primitive, or accommodates incentives such as excludable club goods that can only be obtained by cooperation. The difference between the two accounts matters greatly for determining the correct strategy to fight terrorism. If terror- ists are selected for having unusual (cooperative, from the perspective of the terror group) preferences, then recruitment must be disrupted somehow. If, on the other hand, terrorists allow themselves to be recruited to gain access to club goods, then the intervention strat- egy must be the disruption of social networks that credibly guarantee access to those club goods.

Al Qaida Recruitment Trends in Kenya and Tanzania

At first glance, Kenya and Tanzania, the scene of some of Al Qaida's most impressive attacks, would appear to be fertile ground for recruiting militants into the global Islamist jihad. Substantial Muslim populations, widespread poverty, poor policing, inadequate border control, and systemic political and economic corruption would seem to make these East African countries potentially rich environments in which to attract new Al Qaida members. However, other factors essential to the terrorist recruitment process are largely absent. Despite claims that the traditionally tolerant Muslim populations of Kenya and Tanzania re being radicalized, the evidence suggests that Islamist radicals have in fact made little headway. Although individuals may have forged links with Al Qaida, Osama bin Laden and his network have few followers. Of course, this is subject to change. But in the near term, absent an environment of radicalism, as in a major recruitment ground like Pakistan, it is difficult to see how Al Qaida can expect to attract more than a handful of new members. That said, the United States could do far more in the region to prevent the emergence of violent Islamist extremism.

Too Much of a Good Thing?

In a two-player proactive response game the level of proactive activity and the choice of terrorist target is endogenized. The targeted government first chooses its measures to weaken the terrorists, and the terrorists then choose the type of event—normal or spectacular. Unlike previous analyses, proactive policy has a downside by increasing grievances and, consequently, terrorist recruitment. If the government responds too harshly, its actions can empower the terrorists by providing a larger constituency. Aggressive antiterrorist actions, encouraged by a high perceived loss from terrorism and low marginal proactive costs, may result in spectacular events with dire consequences. If spectaculars are transferred abroad to soft targets, then proactive operations may be excessive from a global viewpoint as external costs are ignored. The analysis explains why some target nations engage in a modest level of offense but a prime target chooses a large level.

Soft Power and American Foreign Policy

Anti-Americanism has increased in past few years. Thomas Pickering, a seasoned diplomat, considered 2003 high a zenith of anti Americanism as we've seen for a long time.1 Polls show that our soft power losses can be traced largely to our foreign policy. widespread and fashion able view is that United States is a classically imperialist power. ... That mood has been expressed in different ways by different people, from hockey fans in Montreal who boo American national anthem to high school students in Switzerland who do not want to go to United States as exchange students.2 An Australian observer concluded that the lesson of Iraq is that US's soft power is in decline. Bush went to war having failed to win a broader military coalition or UN authorization. This had two direct conse quences: a rise in anti-American sentiment, lifting terrorist recruitment; and a higher cost to US for war and reconstruction effort.3 A Gallup Interna tional poll showed that pluralities in fifteen out of twenty-four countries around world said that American foreign policies had a negative effect on their attitudes toward United States. A Eurobarometer poll found that a majority of Europeans believe that United States tends to play a negative role in fighting global poverty, protecting environment, and maintaining peace in world.4 When asked in a Pew

Institutional responses to terrorism: The Italian case

This study analyzes the main trends in the Italian response to terrorism for the effectiveness of specific policies and their impact on civil liberties. Four periods are highlighted. The first (1970–74) is characterized as ‘immobilist'; while left‐wing terrorism was not recognized as a threat, right‐wing terrorism, which was much more serious at that time, was protected by the Italian secret service. The second period (1974–76) is characterized by a decline in right‐wing terrorism and a more serious attack on left‐wing terrorism within a wider repression of organized and violent crime. The third period (1977–82), called the Emergency period, is characterized by a new wave of left‐wing terrorism and increased repression that ultimately promoted terrorist recruitment. The fourth period (1982–89) represents the defeat of left‐wing terrorism through new anti‐terrorism policies, such as amnesty and repentance laws. The conclusion draws three lessons for Europe: the possible implication of secret services in right‐wing terrorism; the inefficacy of emergency legislation that treats terrorism like organized crime; and the importance of reintegrating former terrorists into society.