Recovery Fund Research Articles

Ramstad, champion of addiction treatment and recovery, dies at 74

James Ramstad, Republican senator from 1981–1991 and congressman from 1991–2009, died last week at the age of 74 from Parkinson's disease. For his work on the Mental Health and Addiction Treatment Parity Act, which he co‐authored with the late Democrat Minnesota Senator Paul Wellstone, he was named “Legislator of the Year” by the National Association of Alcoholism and Drug Addictions Council in 1998, the National Mental Health Association in 1999 and the National Association of Police Organizations in 1997 and 2000. After retiring from Congress, Ramstad was an advisor to the Hazelden Foundation, the National Association of Drug Court Professionals and the alliantgroup. He was also on the board of the Partnership to End Addiction. He had been sober for 39 years and was active in Alcoholics Anonymous. The celebration of Ramstad's life will be held for family only at Wayzata Community Church and livestreamed to the public on Sunday, Nov. 29. Details of the service will be available at WayzataCommunityChurch.org. Memorials are preferred to the Ramstad Recovery Fund, which is for veterans seeking recovery (RamstadRecoveryFund.org).

Slovakia and V4: European Dimension

After the formation in March 2020 of a new government coalition led by Igor Matovic, the Slovak government has adopted the foreign policy concept analyzing the European agenda. The Slovak Prime Minister participates in several meetings of the EU Council and at the EU summit on July 17-21, 2020. Before his arrival in Brussels, the Slovak politician visited all the countries of the Visegrad Four. Both the meetings of the EU Council and bilateral and multilateral negotiations within the Visegrad Group had a pronounced «pandemic» component: they mainly discussed the EU instruments for overcoming the consequences of COVID-19 (EU budget, Recovery Fund and Next generation EU). The organization of a videoconference between the Prime Ministers of the Central European countries and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel on May 19, 2020, had a very positive effect on the satisfactory results for the Visegrad countries of the EU Summit. As the pandemic subsides, on the agenda of European Council appeared foreign policy issues, especially the Belarus crises.

Europe’s industry seeks green funding

Europe’s leading chemical industry association, Cefic, is calling on the European Commission to allocate a share of the proposed $875 billion green recovery fund to the chemical industry to help it come back from the COVID-19 pandemic and transform itself into a more environmentally sustainable business. Over the next few years, the commission plans to make about $455 billion in recovery funds available in the form of grants and $420 billion in the form of loans. A cash injection would help the region’s chemical sector offset its economic slide due to the COVID-19 outbreak. Europe’s chemical output dropped 5.2% in the first half of the year compared with the same period in 2019, according to a new economic report from Cefic, and the region’s overall manufacturing output dropped 12.9%. The chemical industry also faces rising costs from Europe’s environmental policies, including those resulting from the commission’s proposal to deepen the

2020 Bali's Coral Conservation: from pandemic challenge to Government coral garden project

Bali's coral reef restoration has been the topmost priority by the Indonesian Government and marine activists to save marine habitat in the long run. The action is necessary to halt severe damage that occurs in aquatic habitat over the years. The most apparent threat that has been faced is coral bleaching. Bali's water's tourism activities have sharply dipped between early to mid-2020, yet it did not stop the coral bleaching phenomenon. The phenomenon is occurring due to water temperature rise. The Government's decision to restrict public activity made the conservation task impossible to be done. Albeit challenges in coral conservation became a daunting task in 2020, pleasant news also came from the central Government. Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan revealed the central Government had compiled a National Economic Recovery (PEN) program for Indonesia Coral Reef Garden (ICRG) Bali. The program is coral reef restoration activities centered in Nusa Dua and several other areas such as Sanur, Serangan, Pandawa Beach, and Buleleng. The coral reef garden will be built using the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries National Economic Recovery fund worth IDR 111.2 billion. The fund will be used to build a 50 hectares coral plantation. Meanwhile, the Governor of Bali, I Wayan Koster, expressed his appreciation toward the program. Koster believed the program would significantly impact the community, especially in supporting economic recovery since the national economic recovery activities will involve more than 11,000 workers.

2020 Bali's Coral Conservation: from pandemic challenge to Government coral garden project

Bali's coral reef restoration has been the topmost priority by the Indonesian Government and marine activists to save marine habitat in the long run. The action is necessary to halt severe damage that occurs in aquatic habitat over the years. The most apparent threat that has been faced is coral bleaching. Bali's water's tourism activities have sharply dipped between early to mid-2020, yet it did not stop the coral bleaching phenomenon. The phenomenon is occurring due to water temperature rise. The Government's decision to restrict public activity made the conservation task impossible to be done. Albeit challenges in coral conservation became a daunting task in 2020, pleasant news also came from the central Government. Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan revealed the central Government had compiled a National Economic Recovery (PEN) program for Indonesia Coral Reef Garden (ICRG) Bali. The program is coral reef restoration activities centered in Nusa Dua and several other areas such as Sanur, Serangan, Pandawa Beach, and Buleleng. The coral reef garden will be built using the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries National Economic Recovery fund worth IDR 111.2 billion. The fund will be used to build a 50 hectares coral plantation. Meanwhile, the Governor of Bali, I Wayan Koster, expressed his appreciation toward the program. Koster believed the program would significantly impact the community, especially in supporting economic recovery since the national economic recovery activities will involve more than 11,000 workers.

Action against environmental pollution through a healthy, green and just recovery in Europe

IssueWith the COVID-19 pandemic, the European Union (EU) is faced with an unprecedented crisis with huge effects on every aspect of our society. As European countries start easing lockdowns, discussions on recovery and investment plans pick up the pace, but it will be vital not to repeat mistakes of the past but focus on a healthy, green and just recovery to increase overall health preparedness and resilience in the face of future pandemics.Description of the problemThe recovery from the COVID-19 crisis is the litmus test how serious policy-makers are about the EGD, if they take it as the blueprint for rebuilding or continue investing into yesterday's polluting industries and economies. While at EU level there is a strong commitment for the EGD to be the principle in economic recovery, decisions and bailouts at national level do not necessarily follow suit (yet). One of the actions that are needed is defining conditions for all recovery and investment money being spent.ResultsWith EU Commission President's van der Leyen's proposal for a 750 billion EUR recovery fund was presented end of May (1). The European Green Deal (EGD) proposal (2) shows that European Commission has understood the importance of a healthy planet for healthy people. If successfully implemented, this deal has the potential to achieve major health improvements in the near term while reducing the growing health risks from climate change (3,4), air and chemical pollution.LessonsShifting from a polluting to a green and healthy economy, with the European Green Deal at the core is possible. The EGD already foresees a zero pollution ambition for the EU: preventing all pollution in order to protect health is the much needed goal upon which European and national leaders must base all recovery actions.Key messages A green recovery can give the necessary financial support for upgrading and modernising our cities and sustainable urban planning.Through the imminent recovery decisions, policy-makers need to seize the historic opportunity to reduce the pressure on the planet’s and people’s health.

For a resilient, sustainable and inclusive recovery in Europe: challenges and proposals in response to the pandemic crisis

A corollary of the pandemic crisis and the unprecedented contraction of economic activity in Europe is the inevitable increase in public debt, and the need for active support of the European Central Bank (ECB), centred on the emergency purchase programme of government bonds. There is broad agreement on the general thrust of fiscal and monetary policies, but significant differences exist on the appropriate implementation and efficacy of policy impulses, notably between “Nordic” and “Peripheral” countries. This paper starts by reconsidering the dogma of balanced budgets as a general principle. A different approach is based on the taxonomy of deadweight and (re)productive debt. If government bonds finance capital expenditure (infrastructures broadly defined) with net returns higher than the cost of borrowing, the debt is fundamentally self-financing. More broadly, by reason of the huge warranted public investments (as documented by the European Investment Bank, EIB and the European Commission, EC), it is argued that “good” infrastructure capital accumulation represents a solution not only to the economic consequences of the pandemic crisis, but also to the issue of the savings glut. On the basis of this approach an assessment is offered of the responses to the crisis. Special attention is devoted to the EC proposal of the Recovery Fund. The model proposed here dovetails with the Recovery approach, and suggests a structural scheme to finance European Union (EU) infrastructures (monitored at EU level) through the issue of EU Real Infrastructure Securities (EURIS). The securities would comprise non only debt but also equity and equity-related instruments. The emphasis would be on Public-Private-Partnership initiatives. These real infrastructure securities would form the basis of a new European debt at Union level. The need to ensure rigour in public finances would be satisfied in two concurrent ways: the quality and net returns of the assets financed and a gradual move to a new fiscal pact, whereby national public deficits would be exclusively allowed for the financing of sound public investments, agreed and monitored at European level. Safety clauses would be introduced for exceptional events and to cope with cyclical developments (with full reversal in upturns).

European Council Notes 2020/04-05 - May to July: The MFF and the Recovery Fund

The present paper resumes where the previous paper in this series concluded. At its video conference on 23 April the European Council mandated the Commission to draft a Recovery Plan, and on 21 July, at the end of a fve-day meeting, it signed off on a Recovery Fund and a revised MFF.<br/> The size and economic signifcance of the package are illustrated in the text and tables. It is big money which, because it is targeted primarily at the more vulnerable member states, should have a considerable economic impact, particularly in the South. Talk of a crossing of the Rubicon is nonetheless misplaced. Firstly because, though large, it is still much smaller than member states' Covid-related spending. Secondly, more importantly, because the politics of the agreement, which are analysed at some length in the narrative section of the paper, confrm that the leading players in Europe's Union of sovereign states have little or no appetite for the huge systemic changes which would be required to deliver on the federalists' dream.<br/> Four features of the political narrative are of particular importance.<br/> Firstly, the making of the July agreement was a success story which, in the face of widespread scepticism, confrmed that the EU can deliver. As a result, both the self-confdence of the insiders and the standing of the EU with its citizens have been boosted.<br/> Secondly, the story vindicated the Union's European Council centred system of government. Media focus on the 18 May Statement by Merkel and Macron was misleading. The story begins on 23 April and ends on 21 July with the European Council.<br/> Thirdly, individuals and institutions matter too. In institutional terms, the European Commission, the Council's rotating Presidency as well as the European Council itself have been at the heart of the process. In individual terms, Angela Merkel was once again in a league of her own, von der Leyen and Michel performed well, and the leaders of the F4, reinforced for most of the time by the Finnish prime minister, left their mark in a positive still more than a negative sense. As too did Conte and Sanchez. Macron was also important needless to say, but not as important as the French government and the international media suggested.<br/> Fourthly, the story draws attention to the limits as well as the potential of the system. Two closely related episodes since July are cited by way of illustration. In the frst, the negotiations between the German Council Presidency and the European Parliament about the budget, the parliamentary negotiators over-estimated both the powers and the signifcance of the Parliament in the system. In the second, involving the Council, the Parliament and the Hungarian and Polish governments, the latter have, as often before, challenged the shared values on which the EU system is based. On this occasion however their interlocutors have considerable leverage and, rightly in our view, appear determined to stand frm, even if, as is still possible, this puts the MFF/NGEU package at risk.

Rwanda

As explained in IMF Country Report No. 20/115, COVID-19 has had a severe economic impact on Rwanda through the implementation of strict domestic measures to contain the spread of the virus and related global spillovers. The authorities have responded by deploying health and economic measures totaling USD 311 million (3.3 percent of GDP). They have also set up an economic recovery fund to support firms affected by the pandemic. To help address the urgent balance of payments (BOP) need arising from the pandemic, currently estimated at about USD 433 million, the authorities request an additional disbursement under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) of 50 percent of quota (SDR 80.1 million) under the “exogenous shock” window of the RCF. This follows the Executive Board’s approval on April 2, 2020 of the authorities’ earlier request for the same amount, before the doubling of the annual access limit of emergency financing under the “exogenous shock” window of the RCF to 100 percent of quota on April 9, 2020. This additional request will bring the total disbursement under the RCF to 100 percent of quota.

Executives, Legislatures, and the Semantics of EU Public Law: A Pandemic-Inflected Perspective

This contribution will serve as the epilogue to a forthcoming volume on executive-legislative relations in the European Union (EU). It begins by noting that the EU’s response to the coronavirus pandemic, encouraging though it may be in some respects, has nonetheless reminded us of the constraints placed on a system of supranational governance that lacks a legislative fiscal capacity of its own. Although there is much excitement about the pandemic ‘recovery fund’ built on borrowing against the EU budget (and distributed, at least in part, through grants), the fund will still be ultimately backed by the fiscal capacities of the member states severally rather than by the EU’s own. Autonomous fiscal capacity, however, is arguably the core attribute of a genuinely ‘constitutional’ form of governance, and more specifically of a genuinely constitutional ‘legislature’. The EU’s persistent lack of a fiscal capacity of its own leads this epilogue to pose an admittedly radical question: Semantically speaking, is it right even to speak of the EU possessing ‘legislative’ power at all, at least in the most robust sense of the term, when it otherwise lacks autonomous fiscal capacity? This question might seem bizarre given key features of the EU’s institutional system, notably the existence of an elected assembly—the European Parliament (EP)—as well as that body’s participation in something called the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ (OLP) in order to make rules of general and prospective application to govern European integration. According to the ‘as if’-constitutional framing that dominates most legal analysis of the EU today, the EP and OLP are so-labelled for a simple reason: they are the focal points of ‘legislative’ power in the European system. And yet, might this labelling be misleading? Might both the EP and OLP merely serve to inject an electoral component into a regulatory system that is fundamentally executive-technocratic (ie administrative) in character? Might specifically ‘legislative’ power in the EU—in the sense of the legitimate-compulsory mobilization of fiscal and human resources—still be concentrated entirely at the national level? With these questions in mind, this epilogue examines the many stimulating topics covered by the chapters in this volume: the application of Rodrik’s famous ‘political trilemma of the world economy’ to the EU context; the role of the EP in counter-balancing the powers of the Commission, Council, and European Council; the expansion of national executive power as a consequence of integration—the so-called ‘deparliamentarisation’ phenomenon—which operates to the obvious detriment of national parliaments (NPs); and finally the respective roles of the EP and NPs, as the case may be, in such areas as trade policy, the supranational regulation of national budgets, as well as several former 'second’ and ‘third pillar’ domains (security, defense, foreign policy, justice and home affairs). Based on this discussion, this epilogue concludes by reflecting on whether the last decade of upheaval in the EU—from the Eurozone crisis to the current pandemic emergency—has brought the EU to a ‘critical juncture’, in which some form of supranationalised fiscal capacity is now in the offing and which, if realised, might then allow the EU to transcend the current but misleading ‘as if’ constitutionalism that continues to characterise discussions of EU public law.

Is the European Union going to help us overcome the COVID-19 crisis?

The paper discusses the most noteworthy measures taken or yet to be taken by the EU to combat the coronavirus crisis. Basically, the measures fall into four categories: (i) flexible application of EU rules that could hinder member states in their strenuous efforts to save their national economies; (ii) a financial support package put in place by the EU itself, (iii) monetary action by the ECB and (iv) action by European financial regulators, including the ECB (albeit in its capacity of banking regulator rather than monetary authority). This is followed by some comments on the impact of the coronavirus crisis on (i) the intended completion of the European Banking Union, (ii) the plans for a European Capital Markets Union, (iii) Brexit and (iv) the EU climate plans. The paper concludes that it is clear that the crisis has once again laid bare the divisions between north and south in Europe. These divisions are particularly apparent in relation to the issue of financing the European recovery fund and the power struggle that has now flared up between the German Constitutional Court on the one hand and the CJEU and the ECB on the other. Hard times lie ahead for the EU.

Pacific Coastal Salmon Recovery Fund (DOC)

Federal Grants & ContractsVolume 44, Issue 4 p. 5-5 Grant Alerts Pacific Coastal Salmon Recovery Fund (DOC) First published: 13 January 2020 https://doi.org/10.1002/fgc.30864Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume44, Issue416 January 2020Pages 5-5 RelatedInformation

Europe’s Fractured Metabolic Constitution: From the Eurozone Crisis to the Coronavirus Response

Among the many meanings given to the idea of a European ‘constitution’, perhaps the most widespread relates to the limitation and constraint of power. Missing from this conception, however, is arguably the very essence of genuinely ‘constituted’ authority: the capacity to mobilise fiscal resources—most importantly via taxation—in a legitimate and compulsory fashion, a power the EU obviously lacks on its own. We can call this the ‘metabolic constitution’ of the EU, a term meant to focus our attention on the capacity of a polity to convert resources into work toward public ends. The EU’s metabolic constitution is fractured in several ways, most importantly because of its complete dependence on the taxing power of the Member States severally. This dependence has limited the EU’s autonomous capacities to address a range of challenges over the last decade, from the Eurozone crisis, to the climate emergency, to the coronavirus pandemic response. This article surveys the evolution of the EU’s metabolic constitution over the many crises of the last decade and then considers whether and to what extent the most recent initiative in this regard—the common borrowing in the ‘Next Generation EU’ recovery fund in response to the coronavirus pandemic—can be understood as a critical juncture in the EU’s capacity to mobilise resources on its own, unmediated through the Member States.

Is the European Union Going to Help Us Overcome the COVID-19 Crisis?

The paper discusses the most noteworthy measures taken or yet to be taken by the EU to combat the coronavirus crisis. Basically, the measures fall into four categories: (i) flexible application of EU rules that could hinder member states in their strenuous efforts to save their national economies; (ii) a financial support package put in place by the EU itself, (iii) monetary action by the ECB and (iv) action by European financial regulators, including the ECB (albeit in its capacity of banking regulator rather than monetary authority). This is followed by some comments on the impact of the coronavirus crisis on (i) the intended completion of the European Banking Union, (ii) the plans for a European Capital Markets Union, (iii) Brexit and (iv) the EU climate plans. The paper concludes that it is clear that the crisis has once again laid bare the divisions between north and south in Europe. These divisions are particularly apparent in relation to the issue of financing the European recovery fund and the power struggle that has now flared up between the German Constitutional Court on the one hand and the CJEU and the ECB on the other. Hard times lie ahead for the EU.

Briefly Noted

There is still a huge treatment gap, with millions of Americans needing but not receiving help for a substance use disorder (SUD). What is needed is an Opioid and Substance Use Treatment and Recovery Fund, according to the National Association for Behavioral Healthcare (NABH). Such a fund would be created by Congress and “would allow states to forge public‐private partnerships that deliver SUD treatment for patients when existing public and private payers do not — or cannot — cover that treatment,” according to the NABH proposal, which was distributed on Capitol Hill last spring. Funds from the Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment block grant, as well as the Opioid State Targeted Response (STR) and State Opioid Response (SOR) grants, are critical to the public safety net, but these finances are “limited” and “not always the most effective approach to engage public‐private partnerships,” according to the NABH proposal. The STR funds flowing to states are “not expanding access quickly enough to treatment services,” said the NABH. Meanwhile, private‐sector health systems have empty beds and slots — “untapped capacity,” in the words of NABH, adding, “These systems are poised to provide services immediately.”

FishGen.net: An Online Genetic Repository for Salmon and Steelhead Genetic Baselines

FishGen is a final repository for Pacific salmon Oncorhynchus spp. and steelhead O. mykiss genetic data generated as part of the genetic stock identification and parentage‐based tagging projects in the Columbia River basin and throughout the Pacific Coast of North America. Resource Data, Inc., developed this web‐based, GIS‐interfaced software, which is freely available to the public, with funding from the Pacific Coastal Salmon Recovery Fund and Bonneville Power Administration. FishGen currently houses genetic stock identification baselines for both Chinook Salmon O. tshawytscha and steelhead in the Columbia and Snake river basins, as well as hatchery, parentage‐based, tagging baselines for both species in the Snake River basin. Because it has a user‐friendly interface and protocol for submitting and storing standardized genetic and sample metadata, it is an excellent tool for supporting genetic research and monitoring projects throughout the region.

A Case Study of Bank Accounting Practices on Reserves for Impairment of Credit Deduction

The objectivity of the customers' feasibility is biased with the interest of the targeted credit that they are assigned to achieve. In addition, it remains an obstacle forsmall and medium class banks to be dependant on the long historical credit data of each customer to determine the credit-value loss (CKPN). Â This study uses a method of a qualitative case study with structured stages for determining the formation of credit-value loss (CKPN) with creditrisk+ model. The purpose of this study is to reveal the accounting practice of establishing CKPN with creditrisk+ model. The results show that the ATMR method caused BPR banks to provide a very large recovery fund when compared with CreditRisk+ method. Other findings reveal that the approach of ATMR is not maximized in producing accurate measure of credit risk and in accordance with the actual condition. This study contributes to providing an alternative to the determination of CKPN in addition to using ATMR and roll rate analysis model by the banks. For the regulators and professional organizations of the Indonesian Institute of Accountants, they can use it as sources of information to evaluate the application of PSAK 55, especially in determining the CKPN.Â

대만(臺灣)의 도시광산(都市鑛山) 재자원화산업(再資源化産業)

대만의 도시광산 재자원화산업을 파악, 검토하기 위하여 대만의 도시광산 재자원화산업의 배경과 역사, 자원회수기금관리위원회 제도를 논하고 구리를 위주로하는 비철금속의 재자원화산업, 자동차의 리싸이클링 및 전기로제강분진(EAF Dust) 분야를 중점적으로 조사하였다. 대만은 국토면적과 인구에 비해서 구리를 위시히여 전반적인 금속소비량이 많다. 따라서 도시광산지원이 많고, 도시광산재자원화산업이 활발하다. In order to review the recycling status of urban mine resources in Taiwan, background and history of recycling industries, system of the recovery fund management committee(RFMC), copper recycling with non-ferrous metals, recycling of ELV(end of life vehicles) and recycling of EAF dust were surveyed. Taiwan is a leading country of the world in the metal consumption per capita. Therefore, a lot of waste metals were generated. In other words, urban mine resources are abundant in Taiwan and have some advantages in recycling. There are more than thou-sand recycling plants in Taiwan. Half of them are non-ferrous metal recyclers.

Recovery Fund Grants

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APA, Foundation Invite Donations For Colleagues Hurt by Hurricanes

Back to table of contents Previous article Next article Professional NewsFull AccessAPA, Foundation Invite Donations For Colleagues Hurt by HurricanesTara BurkholderTara BurkholderSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:20 Jan 2006https://doi.org/10.1176/pn.41.2.0002In a collaborative effort, APA, through its philanthropic subsidiary, the American Psychiatric Foundation, has launched the Disaster Recovery Fund for Psychiatrists to assist psychiatrists and psychiatry residents who have been adversely affected by disasters such as hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.The decision to launch the fund was made at the November meeting of the APA Assembly after APA Medical Director James H. Scully Jr., M.D., discussed the effects of Hurricane Katrina on APA members.The fund is being started with $20,000 that APA received from a Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration contract to assist in the coordination of the mental health response to Hurricane Katrina and will rely on additional support from APA members. APA Assembly members have already begun making donations to the fund.“I find it incredibly touching that so many of our members have worked so hard and dedicated their lives to helping others, and now they have lost everything to these disasters,” said Deborah Cross, M.D., Area 2 deputy representative, who spearheaded the initiative. “I think it's so important that we help our colleagues as they rebuild their lives and their practices.”Joseph Rubin, M.D., speaker of the APA Assembly, said, “The Assembly is accustomed to proposing actions or policy statements that often take a lot of time and review to implement. Brought about by tragic events, the Disaster Recovery Fund for Psychiatrists gives us an immediate way to do something concrete for our affected colleagues, in partnership with the foundation. Let's all contribute what we can and make this a real psychiatrist-to-psychiatrist initiative.”Under this program, psychiatrists and psychiatry residents who have been affected by disasters are eligible to apply for a grant of up to $2,500. Grants are intended to help psychiatry residents continue their medical training and help psychiatrists rebuild their practices to serve the mental health needs of the people in their communities.Applications for the recovery grants are now being accepted, and grant decisions will be made on an ongoing basis.“The foundation is pleased to work with APA to facilitate these assistance efforts,” said Altha Stewart, M.D., president of the American Psychiatric Foundation. “Given the scope of the recent disasters, I call on the collective generosity of APA members to support our colleagues in need who have lost their practices and their communities. I hope that all members will contribute to this worthy peer-to-peer effort.”Contributions to the Disaster Recovery Fund for Psychiatrists are tax deductible to the extent allowed by law. Donations may be made online at<www.psychfoundation.org> or by mail to American Psychiatric Foundation, 1000 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 1825, Arlington, VA 22209. Checks should be made payable to the American Psychiatric Foundation; all contributions should be designated for“ disaster recovery.” Contributions may also be made by phone by calling (703) 907-8512.More information about grant applications is available online at<www.psychfoundation.org> or by phone at (703) 907-8517. ▪Tara Burkholder is the marketing communications manager of the American Psychiatric Foundation. ISSUES NewArchived