Reciprocal Preference Research Articles

Negative reciprocity: The coevolution of memes and genes

A preference for negative reciprocity is an important part of the human emotional repertoire. We model its role in sustaining cooperative behavior but highlight an intrinsic free-rider problem: the fitness benefits of negative reciprocity are dispersed throughout the entire group, while the fitness costs are borne personally. Evolutionary forces tend to unravel people's willingness to bear the personal cost of punishing culprits. In our model, the countervailing force that sustains negative reciprocity is a meme consisting of a group norm together with low-powered (and low-cost) group enforcement of the norm. The main result is that such memes coevolve with personal tastes and capacities so as to produce the optimal level of negative reciprocity.

Negative Reciprocity: The Coevolution of Memes and Genes

A preference for negative reciprocity is an important part of the human emotional repertoire. We model its role in sustaining cooperative behavior but highlight an intrinsic free-rider problem: the fitness benefits of negative reciprocity are dispersed throughout the entire group, but the fitness costs are borne personally. Evolutionary forces tend to unravel people's willingness to bear the personal cost of punishing culprits. In our model, the countervailing force that sustains negative reciprocity is a meme consisting of a group norm together with low-powered (and low-cost) group enforcement of the norm. The main result is that such memes coevolve with personal tastes and capacities so as to produce the optimal level of negative reciprocity.

Repeated Interaction and the Evolution of Preferences for Reciprocity

This paper models self-enforcing agreements and the evolution of preferences for reciprocity when all agents are rational, Bayesian optimisers. In this ‘indirect’ evolutionary model, player types are defined not by their strategies, but by their preferences. The paper studies the evolution of a community consisting of ‘opportunists’, who maximise material payoffs, and ‘reciprocators’, who prefer joint co-operation to exploiting their opponents. Players are randomly matched to play a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. In the unique evolutionary equilibrium, the reciprocators co-operate throughout their careers, and the opportunists co-operate up to, but not including, the last stage of their careers.

Factors affecting binary sex evolution with respect to avoidance of vertical transmission of deleterious intracellular parasites

In sexual reproductive systems, the number of sexes is generally binary, viz. male and female. Several theoretical studies have shown that the evolution of this system is possibly related to cytoplasmic DNA, including deleterious cytoplasmic symbionts. When organisms are infected by a symbiont that is transmitted vertically to offspring via gametes, the exclusion or degeneration of the latter may evolve as a characteristic of those organisms. If this necessarily results in the elimination of organelle DNA in gametes, a reciprocal preference between individuals, one transmitting organelles and the other not, may be favored. In this theoretical study, factors affecting such an evolutionary process, in which the symbiont is considered as a parasite infecting vertically, horizontally and naturally, are considered. In addition, host individuals are assumed to recover from the infection to some degree. According to the analysis, a binary sex system can evolve only when uninfected and infected host individuals co-exist in a single host population. This condition can be satisfied only if natural infection occurs. Although recovery from infection has both positive and negative effects on binary sex evolution, the latter is promoted only when natural infection exists. Accordingly, if natural infection does not exist, the evolution of binary sex system is unlikely with respect to deleterious cytoplasmic symbionts, in absent of heterozogotic advantage in vertical transmission.

Reciprocal Fairness and Gift Exchange Practices in the Labor Contract: Econometric Analysis on a French Firms Survey

We aim at investigating to what extent reciprocal considerations, exhibited by employers and employees, should lead to stable gift exchange practices in the labor contract, giving rise to non-compensating wage differentials among industries. We use the concept of Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium developed by Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (1998) to incorporate players' preferences for reciprocity in their utility function. We model the labor relation through a one shot sequential gift giving game between an employer who proposes a wage given the employee's profitability level as exogenous and an employee who chooses his level of effort. We show that successful gift exchange practices may arise if both players are actually motivated by reciprocity. Even though intentions act as a catalyst of opportunistic behaviors, the respect of the equity norm makes mutual cooperation more likely. We propose a direct evaluation of the determinants of gift exchange practices between French employers and employees, estimating the probabilities to observe productivity increases following upon the settlement of rent-sharing agreements in the firm. Whether we estimate the probability for the employer to propose a rent-sharing agreement or the probability for the employees to raise their effort, we show that there exists an endogeneity bias related to the variable chosen as proxy to express the agents' perception of their opponent's fairness. This result gives support to the hypothesis that French employers and employees' decisions are directly influenced by reciprocity concerns. Our results give support to the Akerlof & Yellen's fair wage effort hypothesis as an explanation of the persistence of non-compensating wage differentials.

Carrot or Stick? Group Selection and the Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences

This paper studies the evolution and co-evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity - the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior. Firstly, both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can survive in evolution provided individuals interact within separate groups. This holds even with randomly formed groups and even when individual preferences are unobservable, provided players adjust their play to the environment in their group. Secondly, preferences for rewarding survive only in coexistence with self-interested preferences, but preferences for punishing either vanish or dominate the population entirely. Thirdly, the evolution of preferences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing influence each other decisively. Rewarders can invade a population of self-interested players. The existence of rewarders enhances the evolutionary success of punishers, who then crowd out all other preference types.

General transitivity conditions for fuzzy reciprocal preference matrices

A reciprocal fuzzy matrix (relation) is a non-negative matrix Q={ q ij } such that q ij + q ji =1 for all i, j∈{1,2,…, n}. We define general transitivity conditions (named FG-transitivities) for fuzzy reciprocal preference relations and show that they generalize some well-known transitivities. We also study relationships of these conditions with two models of rational preferences (the so-called “utility” model and the ”multidimensional” model).

The EU's Free-trade Agreements with Developing Countries: A Case of Wishful Thinking?

Since the middle of the1990s the EU has vigorously pursued a policy of replacing non– reciprocal preferences for the developing countries in the Mediterranean, Latin America and with South Africa, with bilateral free–trade agreements. This article examines the content of these agreements and the empirical evidence on their likely effects and concludes that they are ‘broad’ but ‘shallow’ agreements. The static effect are likely to be very small or negative while the potential dynamic gains are problematic, especially regarding the concept of a ‘lock in’ to trade liberalisation, unless there are greater commitments to trade related issues by both sides and especially by the EU.

Competition among cooperators: Altruism and reciprocity

Levine argues that neither self-interest nor altruism explains experimental results in bargaining and public goods games. Subjects' preferences appear also to be sensitive to their opponents' perceived altruism. Sethi and Somanathan provide a general account of reciprocal preferences that survive under evolutionary pressure. Although a wide variety of reciprocal strategies pass this evolutionary test, Sethi and Somanthan conjecture that fewer are likely to survive when reciprocal strategies compete with each other. This paper develops evolutionary agent-based models to test their conjecture in cases where reciprocal preferences can differ in a variety of games. We confirm that reciprocity is necessary but not sufficient for optimal cooperation. We explore the theme of competition among reciprocal cooperators and display three interesting emergent organizations: racing to the "moral high ground," unstable cycles of preference change, and, when we implement reciprocal mechanisms, hierarchies resulting from exploiting fellow cooperators. If reciprocity is a basic mechanism facilitating cooperation, we can expect interaction that evolves around it to be complex, non-optimal, and resistant to change.

Justice Perception and Allocation Rule Preferences: Does Social Disadvantage Matter?

The present study compares disadvantaged group (DG) and non-disadvantaged group (NDG) subjects from rural India, with respect to their justice perception and alloca tion rule preferences. Overall, the differences between the two groups in their concep tualisation of justice, the extent of perceived justice in society, perceived injustice under violation of certain allocation rules and allocation rule preferences were found to be non-significant. Contrary to expectations, the recipient's caste and group mem bership per se were not found to be significant determinants in allocation rule prefer ence. Modifying earlier findings on rule preferences among Indians, the present study showed need, merit (effort), equality, and reciprocity preference in response to specific resource and situational variables. Perceived injustice under violations of certain allo cation rules deviated from the expected pattern of allocation rule preferences. The absence of the expected DG/NDG variations was explained on the basis of possible social desirability and the lack of felt disadvantage in the present sample. It was con cluded that social disadvantage probably matters in justice perception only when it is made salient and practically meaningful.

Preference Evolution and Reciprocity

This paper provides an evolutionary theory of reciprocity as an aspect of preference interdependence. It is shown that reciprocal preferences, which place negative weight on the payoffs of materialists and positive weight on the payoffs of sufficiently altruistic individuals can invade a population of materialists in a class of aggregative games under both assortative and nonassortative matching. In comparison with simpler specifications of preference interdependence (such as pure altruism or spite), the survival of such preferences is therefore less sensitive to details of the evolutionary selection process. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D62.

Appropriating the Commons - a Theoretical Explanation

In this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. When communication or informal sanctions are available, however, appropriation behaviour is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences.

On the evolutionary stability of preferences for reciprocity

Recent theoretical work has incorporated assumptions that agents have preferences for reciprocity, leading them to behave non-opportunistically in social interactions. There is extensive experimental evidence for the existence of such preferences. This paper explains the emergence of preferences for reciprocity in a population consisting of two types: “reciprocators” and “opportunists”. Unlike conventional evolutionary models, both types maximize their expected payoffs, given their preferences. The population proportions of these two types evolve from one generation to the next, according to their expected payoffs. It is shown that, under a variety of conditions, preferences for reciprocity can survive in the population.

Rationality of fuzzy reciprocal preference relations

We study relationships between different transitivity and acyclicity conditions for fuzzy reciprocal relations. Such conditions may be treated as rationality conditions for preferences described by such kind of relations.

The Evolutionary Roots of Morality in Theological Perspective

Theological ethics can interpret the relation between evolution and morality in at least three ways. The reductionist approach holds that morality emerges because it is adaptive. The independent approach maintains that morality develops without registering the influence of evolution. Finally, the interdependence position holds that morality reflects the influence of evolution to the extent that the latter shapes human emotional capacities and predispositions, for example, those regarding reciprocity and kin preference. The third approach is more suitable for theological ethics, which attends to ways in which natural desires can be ordered to serve morality, for example, to be habituated to virtue, and to ways in which we must strive to curb or minimize their disruptive effects on human communities.

ACP–EU trade cooperation after 2000: an assessment of reciprocal trade preferences

The establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 reflected and reinforced significant shifts in global orthodoxies in favour of the liberalisation of world trade, and posed problems for trading arrangements such as the Lome Conventions between the European Union (EU) and the 70 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, which had initially been established in the very different setting of the mid-1970s. Integral to the Lome Conventions has been the principle of non-reciprocity, under which the EU offered preferential conditions for access to its markets by products originating in the ACP states, without any requirement for reciprocal concessions (other than most-favoured-nation status) by the ACP. These preferences are due to expire with the 4th Lome Convention in February 2000. Because they are non-reciprocal, these preferences cannot qualify under Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947. Being available only to a particular group of developing countries, they are discriminatory and cannot be regarded as being covered by Part IV of the GATT, or the Enabling Clause of 1979, since these measures only sanction special, differential and preferential treatment for all developing countries. As a result of the changed climate of opinion in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), emphasising the obligation of members to bring their trade measures into conformity with WTO disciplines, the EU sought and obtained a waiver from Article I (principle of non-discrimination) for the remaining duration of the Convention, leaving open the arrangements to be put into effect after 2000.In the public discussions and consultations on a successor arrangement to Lome, the European Commission has emphasised the need for such an arrangement to be compatible with WTO requirements, so as to ensure the legal security of preferences. It is therefore envisaged that Lome preferences will be available only to the least developed countries (LLDCs), but will be generalised to all of the least developed countries, including for example Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Lao D.R., Maldives, Nepal and Yemen, and not just to members of the ACP Group. The Commission has proposed that the non-LLDC ACP countries should be offered a series of regional and sub-regional free trade agreements. Not only would such arrangements seek to be WTO compatible, but the Commission also sees reciprocal regional agreements as stepping stones to fully liberalised trade and the integration of the developing countries into the world economy – an important development cooperation objective of the Maastricht Treaty.This article examines the Commission's proposals, and analyses the likely static and dynamic effects of a free trade agreement on the African ACP countries. It concludes by questioning whether the Commission's proposals would assist, rather than hinder, the regional integration and greater participation of these countries in the world economy.

Emergency Decisions, Cultural-Selection Mechanics, and Group Selection [and Comments and Reply

Emergency behaviors of nonliterate groups are taken as a useful starting point for demonstrating that decisions can be integrated more directly into cultural analysis and that the explanatory pay-offs can be far-reaching. The methodological feasibility of studying group decisions directly is explored through three exceptional tribal ethnographies with a focus on emergency adaptive problem solving and its implications for both cultural- and gene-selection theory. Urgently discussed decision alternatives become apprehensible to fieldworkers through open group debate, while the reproductive effects of decisions are readily assessed whenever groups act in unison. Implications for the development of a more effective theory of cultural microselection and a truly processual definition of culture in its guided phase are suggested. With respect to long-term genetic evolution, the implications of emergency decision making are extended to foragers, exploring special possibilities that enable genetic group selection to become robust when groups are egalitarian and engage in consensual problem solving. Prehistorically, the verdict is that group-selection effects were amplified at the same time that individual effects were suppressed. On this basis it is hypothesized that the genetic evolution of human cooperative and altruistic tendencies can be explained in part by selection at the level of groups rather than inclusive fitness

FUZZY APPROACHES TO MODELLING OF CONSENSUS IN GROUP DECISION SUPPORT

In this paper we introduce some models and Systems we developed in the field of group decision support in fuzzy environments. The basic framework within which we operate is the following ore. We have a set of individuals who present their opinions concerning an issue in question, and a moderator, who is supposed to be responsible for the session with the individuals. The individuals present their testimonies which may initially differ to a large extent, i.e. the group may be far from consensus (unanimous agreement, as a traditionally meant). Then the moderator -via some exchange of information, rational argument, bargaining, etc.- tries to persuade the individuals to change their opinions. If the individuals are rationally committed to consensus, such a change usually occurs, and the group gets closer to consensus. This is repeated until the group gets sufficiently close to consensus, according to a fixed metric, or until some time limit meant to the process is reached. The individual testimonies are assumed to be expressed as reciprocal fuzzy preference relations and the measure of consensus depends on a function estimated for each expert according to her/his aversion to opinion changing. In order to capture the fuzzy uncertainties of human intuition we introduce a vocabulary of linguistic terms whose values are represented by fuzzy numbers. At the end of the paper an application in the field of environmental impact assessment is described

Functional and immunochemical comparison of hepatic UDP-glucuronosyltransferases in a piscine and a mammalian species

1. 1. The aglycone specificity of hepatic microsomal glucuronidation was compared under uniform conditions in a fish, Pleuronectes platessa and a mammal, Rattus norvegicys, representative of the most primitive and advanced vertebrate classes. 2. 2. Both species exhibited comparable UDP-glucuronosyltransferase (UDPGT) activity towards planar phenolic substrates (1-napthol, 4-nitrophenol); however, plaice activity towards bulky non-planar substrates such as (−)-morphine was either 200-fold lower, or for arylacetic acid ( RS-2-phenylpropionic acid) and an aryloxyacetic acid (clofibric acid) non-detectable. 3. 3. Conjugation of the endogenous substrates, bilirubin and steroids were 4- to 40-fold lower in the plaice than in the rat. Whilst both species formed diglucuronides of the asymmetrical bilirubin IXα, they displayed a reciprocal preference for the initial esterification, conjugation of the C-8 side chain predominating in the rat and of C-12 in the fish. 4. 4. Immunoblot analysis using two polyclonal antisera preparations raised against rat UDPGTs demonstrated the presence of multiple weakly cross-reacting polypeptides in fish microsomes indicative of multiple isoforms and conservation of common structural motifs over more than 350 million years since evolutionary divergence of the mammals.

Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning

Abstract : If organization theory finds it useful to draw upon some of the ideas that have emerged in cognitive psychology, it will be advantageous to borrow also the terminology used in discussing these ideas. Without working toward a higher level of consistency in terminology than prevails in organization theory today, it will be difficult or impossible to cumulate and assemble into a coherent structure the knowledge we are gaining from individual case studies and experiments. We will be continually reinventing wheels. That is a luxury we cannot afford. The happy band of researchers on organization theory is sufficiently small to be kept fully occupied discovering and verifying the theory just once. (Author) (kr)