Reciprocal Cooperation Research Articles

Callousness, exploitativeness, and tracking of cooperation incentives in the human default network

Human cognitive capacities that enable flexible cooperation may have evolved in parallel with the expansion of frontoparietal cortical networks, particularly the default network. Conversely, human antisocial behavior and trait antagonism are broadly associated with reduced activity, impaired connectivity, and altered structure of the default network. Yet, behaviors like interpersonal manipulation and exploitation may require intact or even superior social cognition. Using a reinforcement learning model of decision-making on a modified trust game, we examined how individuals adjusted their cooperation rate based on a counterpart's cooperation and social reputation. We observed that learning signals in the default network updated the predicted utility of cooperation or defection and scaled with reciprocal cooperation. These signals were weaker in callous (vs. compassionate) individuals but stronger in those who were more exploitative (vs. honest and humble). Further, they accounted for associations between exploitativeness, callousness, and reciprocal cooperation. Separately, behavioral sensitivity to prior reputation was reduced in callous but not exploitative individuals and selectively scaled with responses of the medial temporal subsystem of the default network. Overall, callousness was characterized by blunted behavioral and default network sensitivity to cooperation incentives. Exploitativeness predicted heightened sensitivity to others' cooperation but not social reputation. We speculate that both compassion and exploitativeness may reflect cognitive adaptations to social living, enabled by expansion of the default network in anthropogenesis.

Unbending strategies shepherd cooperation and suppress extortion in spatial populations

Evolutionary game dynamics on networks typically consider the competition among simple strategies such as cooperation and defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and summarize the effect of population structure as network reciprocity. However, it remains largely unknown regarding the evolutionary dynamics involving multiple powerful strategies typically considered in repeated games, such as the zero-determinant (ZD) strategies that are able to enforce a linear payoff relationship between them and their co-players. Here, we consider the evolutionary dynamics of always cooperate (AllC), extortionate ZD (extortioners), and unbending players in lattice populations based on the commonly used death-birth updating. Out of the class of unbending strategies that can foster reciprocal cooperation and fairness among extortionate players, we consider a particular candidate, pre-optimized through the machine-learning method of particle swarm optimization (PSO), called PSO Gambler. We derive analytical results under weak selection and rare mutations, including pairwise fixation probabilities and long-term frequencies of strategies. In the absence of the third unbending type, extortioners can achieve a half-half split in equilibrium with unconditional cooperators for sufficiently large extortion factors. However, the presence of unbending players fundamentally changes the dynamics and tilts the system to favor unbending cooperation. Most surprisingly, extortioners cannot dominate at all regardless of how large their extortion factor is, and the long-term frequency of unbending players is maintained almost as a constant. Our analytical method is applicable to studying the evolutionary dynamics of multiple strategies in structured populations. Our work provides insights into the interplay between network reciprocity and direct reciprocity, revealing the role of unbending strategies in enforcing fairness and suppressing extortion.

Evolution of reciprocity with limited payoff memory.

Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in repeated social interactions. According to the literature, individuals naturally learn to adopt conditionally cooperative strategies if they have multiple encounters with their partner. Corresponding models have greatly facilitated our understanding of cooperation, yet they often make strong assumptions on how individuals remember and process payoff information. For example, when strategies are updated through social learning, it is commonly assumed that individuals compare their average payoffs. This would require them to compute (or remember) their payoffs against everyone else in the population. To understand how more realistic constraints influence direct reciprocity, we consider the evolution of conditional behaviours when individuals learn based on more recent experiences. Even in the most extreme case that they only take into account their very last interaction, we find that cooperation can still evolve. However, such individuals adopt less generous strategies, and they cooperate less often than in the classical setup with average payoffs. Interestingly, once individuals remember the payoffs of two or three recent interactions, cooperation rates quickly approach the classical limit. These findings contribute to a literature that explores which kind of cognitive capabilities are required for reciprocal cooperation. While our results suggest that some rudimentary form of payoff memory is necessary, it suffices to remember a few interactions.

Reciprocal altruism in Norway rats

AbstractReciprocal altruism has been proposed to generate evolutionarily stable levels of cooperation, but empirical evidence in non‐human animals is contentious. A series of experimental studies on Norway rats revealed that these animals reciprocate received help by using decision rules characterising direct and generalized reciprocity. The direct reciprocity decision rule states that individuals should help someone who previously helped them, whereas the generalized reciprocity decision rule implies that individuals should help anyone after having received help from someone. Here, we present results from meta‐analyses assessing if Norway rats generally help partners according to the direct and generalized reciprocity decision rules by giving more help sooner and matching help received either to previously cooperative partners or to anyone after having received help from a conspecific. We also compared the rats' performance when applying the direct or generalized reciprocity decision rules. Results from these meta‐analyses clearly show that female and male focal rats help partners according to the direct reciprocity decision rule. Rats did not adjust the amount of help they gave by matching the help they received according to both the direct and generalized reciprocity decision rules; however, they may adjust the duration to the first help they gave by matching the help they received according to the direct reciprocity decision rule. Female, but not male, focal rats help partners according to the generalized reciprocity decision rule. There was no apparent difference in the help given by female rats to partners between the direct and generalized reciprocity decision rules. These results (i) demonstrate, across a wide range of studies, the reciprocal cooperation of Norway rats by use of decision rules denoting direct and generalized reciprocity, and (ii) suggest that rats may frequently apply the cognitively less demanding decision rule of generalized reciprocity, unless they need to distinguish between individuals differing in helpfulness.

Direct reciprocity among humans

AbstractDirect reciprocity is the tendency to repay others' cooperation. This tendency can be crucial to maintain cooperation in evolving populations. Once direct reciprocity evolves, individuals have a long‐run interest to cooperate, even if it is costly in the short run. The major theoretical framework to describe reciprocal behavior is the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Over the past decades, this game has been the major workhorse to predict when reciprocal cooperation ought to evolve, and which strategies individuals are supposed to adopt. Herein, we compare these predictions with the empirical evidence from experiments with human subjects. From a theory‐driven perspective, humans represent an ideal test case, because they give researchers the most flexibility to tailor the experimental design to the assumptions of a model. Overall, we find that theoretical models describe well in which situations people cooperate. However, in the important case of “indefinitely repeated games,” they have difficulties to predict which strategies people use.

사회적경제기본법(안)의 사회적경제 및 사회적경제조직의 정의에 관한 연구

The Social Economy Basic Law (draft) has been proposed five times in the 21st National Assembly. The social economy is considered to have the attributes of economic activities that have organizational democracy and autonomy internally and pursue various values and purposes externally. However, according to the legislative bills proposed in the 21st National Assembly, the definition of social economy includes contents such as reciprocal cooperation, reciprocity and solidarity internally, but the main focus is on external activities such as the realization of social values rather than internal activities or organizations. As for the definition of a social economy organization, although it should be an organization with internal autonomous operation and democratic decision-making structure, the lawmakers' bill defines a social economy organization as a business organization that engages in business activities such as purchasing, producing, selling, and consuming goods and services while pursuing social values, and in fact does not mention the requirements for internal autonomy and democratic decision-making structure. As a result, the Social Economy Basic Act proposed by lawmakers has not been able to differentiate itself from the existing Social Enterprise Development Act and has not been enacted. Therefore, it is necessary to insert the contents of internal autonomy and democratic decision-making structure into the definition regulations so that the Basic Social Economy Act (Draft) is in line with the original meaning of social economy and social economy organizations, and to specify the contents of internal autonomy and democratic decision-making structure separately as requirements for social economy organizations in the legislation. It is expected that the original meaning of social economy will be reflected in the bill and the legislation will be smoothly implemented through the supplementation of the definition and the addition of requirements.

A pull versus push framework for reputation.

Reputation is a powerful driver of human behavior. Reputation systems incentivize 'actors' to take reputation-enhancing actions, and 'evaluators' to reward actors with positive reputations by preferentially cooperating with them. This article proposes a reputation framework that centers the perspective of evaluators by suggesting that reputation systems can create two fundamentally different incentives for evaluators to reward positive reputations. Evaluators may be pulled towards 'good' actors to benefit directly from their reciprocal cooperation, or pushed to cooperate with such actors by normative pressure. I discuss how psychology and behavior might diverge under pull versus push mechanisms, and use this framework to deepen our understanding of the empirical reputation literature and suggest ways that we may better leverage reputation for social good.

Punitive justice serves to restore reciprocal cooperation in three small-scale societies

Punitive justice serves to restore reciprocal cooperation in three small-scale societies

Group Formation and the Evolution of Human Social Organization

Humans operate in groups that are oftentimes nested in multilayered collectives such as work units within departments and companies, neighborhoods within cities, and regions within nation states. With psychological science mostly focusing on proximate reasons for individuals to join existing groups and how existing groups function, we still poorly understand why groups form ex nihilo, how groups evolve into complex multilayered social structures, and what explains fission–fusion dynamics. Here we address group formation and the evolution of social organization at both the proximate and ultimate level of analysis. Building on models of fitness interdependence and cooperation, we propose that socioecologies can create positive interdependencies among strangers and pave the way for the formation of stable coalitions and groups through reciprocity and reputation-based partner selection. Such groups are marked by in-group bounded, parochial cooperation together with an array of social institutions for managing the commons, allowing groups to scale in size and complexity while avoiding the breakdown of cooperation. Our analysis reveals how distinct group cultures can endogenously emerge from reciprocal cooperation, shows that social identification and group commitment are likely consequences rather than causes of group cooperation, and explains when intergroup relations gravitate toward peaceful coexistence, integration, or conflict.

Community detection and service discovery on Social Internet of Things

SummaryDue to the increasing growth of objects and problems such as increased traffic, overload, delay in response, and low search volume in the service discovery process in the complex Social Internet of Things (SIoT) environment, we provide an effective mechanism in the service discovery process by grouping objects based on common criteria that help us improve service search performance. In this article, we present a new method for clustering objects so that we can group objects that have common services and can work together. Hence, we create a set of different associations for the type of service and reciprocal cooperation of objects. With its help, instead of a global network search, we can perform service searches locally more efficiently and ensure the accuracy and correctness of searches and their answers. Then, we have provided a new mechanism for the service discovery process. In addition, we categorized communities based on their size to compare our proposed algorithm with other approaches using factors such as modularity in SIoT. Finally, we achieved sufficient efficiency in service discovery (86.81% and 88.28%) and demonstrated better performance of the proposed approach in identifying communities.

The scientometric characteristics of lichen planus in stomatology and dermatology journals: A comparative study

Background/purposeLichen planus (LP) is a representative mucocutaneous disease involving oral mucosa and skin. The aim of this study was to compare the scientometric characteristics of LP publications in stomatology and dermatology journals. Materials and methodsAll the papers on LP were comprehensively searched and then ones published in stomatology and dermatology journals were retrieved. ResultsAmong all the 5633 papers on LP, 1344 (23.9%) and 2528 (44.9%) were published in stomatology and dermatology journals, respectively. Among the most-cited top-100 papers, 58 and 30 were published in stomatology and dermatology journals, respectively. Moreover, citation count (11,908) and citation density (640.2) of the 58 stomatology publications were obviously higher than the 2 numbers (5096, 260.3) of the 30 dermatology publications. Based on the frequency of research keywords, the distinctive keywords such as malignant transformation, precancerous, genetics, genotype, gene expression, saliva, blood, cytokines, smoking, anxiety, and depression were identified in stomatology publications. On the other side, hyperkeratosis, hyperpigmentation, erythema, epiluminescence microscopy, and dermoscopy were identified in dermatology publications. Furthermore, drug research including drug withdrawal, drug safety, and drug dose reduction with a dozen of drugs are frequent keywords in dermatology but not in stomatology publications. ConclusionThe distinctive keywords of LP publications in stomatology and dermatology journals correspond to the research priority in stomatology and dermatology. We hope that the observations of this analysis will aid clinicians and investigators in promoting mutual understanding and more reciprocal cooperation regarding LP in stomatology and dermatology.

Researching football, identity and cohesion in Europe

Multiple crises are endangering the project of European integration, increasingly threatening social cohesion in Europe. Countering these dangers is necessary for the persistence of the European project. While international cooperation continues, it regularly remains in the sphere of political institutions, and interpersonal contact and exchange across Europe is often reserved for socio-economic elites. This conceptual paper argues that football, as a highly Europeanised mass leisure activity with fandom from socially diverse audiences all over Europe, has a strong potential to supplement existing exchange and cooperation, thus strengthening social cohesion in Europe. Based on a secondary analysis of the existing literature, the central concepts of football, (European) identity, and social cohesion are discussed, and their causalities and potential effects are described. A draft research strategy is outlined to analyse concrete football-based European stimuli, European expressions of fandom, and international practices of exchange. We conclude that football leads to the emergence of European identities among fans by exposing them to Europe and strengthens social cohesion through the establishment of international social relations utilised for reciprocal cooperation and action. Football could further be used as a blueprint for similarly Europeanised cultural phenomena, and the outlined research agenda adjusted accordingly to examine them.

The wealth of humans: core, periphery and frontiers of humanomics

ABSTRACT Among the various attempts to re-humanize economics, the ‘humanomics’ proposed by Vernon Smith and Bart Wilson stands out. We contribute to the “humanomics project” by mapping its territory – core, periphery and frontiers – with an eye, also, on future explorations. First, we critically study the core: Smith and Wilson’s interpretation and experimental application of Adam Smith’s ideas on beneficence and injustice. Using the distinction between reciprocal cooperation and reciprocal kindness, we provide a different interpretation of Smith which helps to better understand the difference between exchange and trust, based on mutual advantage, and (reciprocal) beneficence proper. Secondly, we turn to the periphery, going beyond the ‘dichotomous representation of the human personality’ – personal-social/impersonal-economic – and showing other possible worlds: nuances of humans equally worthy of study, such as the personal-economic and the impersonal-social. Thirdly, we argue that the humanomics project should keep its frontiers as open as possible to human diversities and frailties.

Shodagor women cooperate across domains of work and childcare to solve an adaptive problem.

Across human societies, women's economic production and their contributions to childcare are critical in supporting reproductive fitness for themselves, their spouses and children. Yet, the necessity of performing both work and childcare tasks presents women with an adaptive problem in which they must determine how best to allocate their time and energy between these tasks. Women often use cooperative relationships with alloparents to solve this problem, but whether or not women cooperate across different domains (e.g. work and childcare) to access alloparents remains relatively under-explored. Using social network data collected with Shodagor households in Bangladesh, we show that women who need childcare help in order to work draw on cooperative work partners as potential alloparents, and that all women rely heavily on kin, but not reciprocal cooperation for childcare help. These results indicate that Shodagor women strategize to create work and childcare relationships in ways that help solve the adaptive problem they face. We discuss the implications of our results and the example provided by Shodagor women for a broader understanding of women's cooperative relationships, including the importance of socio-ecological circumstances and gendered divisions of labour in shaping women's cooperative strategies. This article is part of the theme issue 'Cooperation among women: evolutionary and cross-cultural perspectives'.

Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations

People tend to have their social interactions with members of their own community. Such group-structured interactions can have a profound impact on the behaviors that evolve. Group structure affects the way people cooperate, and how they reciprocate each other’s cooperative actions. Past work has shown that population structure and reciprocity can both promote the evolution of cooperation. Yet the impact of these mechanisms has been typically studied in isolation. In this work, we study how the two mechanisms interact. Using a game-theoretic model, we explore how people engage in reciprocal cooperation in group-structured populations, compared to well-mixed populations of equal size. In this model, the population is subdivided into groups. Individuals engage in pairwise interactions within groups while they also have chances to imitate strategies outside the groups. To derive analytical results, we focus on two scenarios. In the first scenario, we assume a complete separation of time scales. Mutations are rare compared to between-group comparisons, which themselves are rare compared to within-group comparisons. In the second scenario, there is a partial separation of time scales, where mutations and between-group comparisons occur at a comparable rate. In both scenarios, we find that the effect of population structure depends on the benefit of cooperation. When this benefit is small, group-structured populations are more cooperative. But when the benefit is large, well-mixed populations result in more cooperation. Overall, our results reveal how group structure can sometimes enhance and sometimes suppress the evolution of cooperation.

Global Politico-Economic Dynamics during a Local Conflict: Reciprocal Patterns of Cooperation and Sanctions

Abstract Employing global daily news coverage on interactions between stakeholders in G20 countries, this research offers a near-real-time analysis of changing interaction patterns between Russia and other G20 economies after the onset of open military conflict. Building on an event study over eight months, further analyses of reciprocal response dynamics point to potentially costly short-term consequences of sanctions, such as the breakdown and diversion of international cooperation amongst major economies in a broader sense. Once such a reciprocal cooperation decay has set in, re-establishing international cooperation between major societal actors may take considerable time.

Extortion, intuition, and the dark side of reciprocity

Extortion occurs when one person uses some combination of threats and promises to extract an unfair share of benefits from another. Although extortion is a pervasive feature of human interaction, it has received relatively little attention in psychological research. But, we argue, extortion is structured quite similarly to far better-studied “reciprocal” social behaviors, such as conditional cooperation and retributive punishment. All of these strategies function to elicit some desirable behavior from a social partner and do so by constructing conditional incentives. The main difference is that the desired behavioral response is an unfair or unjust allocation of resources during extortion, whereas it is typically assumed to be a fair or just distribution of resources in studies of reciprocal cooperation and punishment. Thus, we propose that a common set of psychological mechanisms may render these strategies successful. We know from prior work that prosocial forms of reciprocity often work best when implemented inflexibly and intuitively, rather than deliberatively. This both affords long-term commitment to the reciprocal strategy, and also signals this commitment to social partners. We argue that, for the same reasons, extortion is likely to depend largely upon inflexible, intuitive psychological processes. Several existing lines of circumstantial evidence support this conjecture.

An Evolutionary Analysis of Relational Governance in an Innovation Ecosystem

Despite considerable research highlighting the significance of relational governance in inter-organizational relationships, few have involved the connections between relational governance and innovation ecosystems. This study explores this issue to discover the influential mechanisms of relational governance in innovation ecosystem co-evolution. Building an evolutionary game model, we embody trust and reciprocity (two dominance of relational governance) into co-evolutionary relationships of an innovation ecosystem composed of focal firms, research institutes, customers, and governments, and discuss how relational governance affects innovation strategies of actors. Moreover, the impacts of benefit distribution are also examined. We reveal that (1) focal firms and governments prefer cooperative strategies; (2) reciprocity and trust foster cooperation; increasing benefit distribution drives all actors to collaborate except research institutes; (3) governments finitely encourage cooperation through regulation; and (4) the power of relational governance is restricted due to the below-the-average strategies of customers and research institutes and the neutralizing effects of benefits. Our findings offer a complementary and novel framework for relational governance and extend a deeper understanding of innovation ecosystem studies.

Conceptualisation of heritage diplomacy in scholarship

ABSTRACT Heritage diplomacy is a recent concept and a new area of interest in the expanding scope of diplomacy. The concept is explored with various epistemological foci and theoretical frameworks in Western scholarship. It is often used to describe joint international projects or government initiatives abroad for preserving tangible cultural heritage. Several recent studies link heritage diplomacy to attempts to develop reciprocal relations between countries, regions, and/or communities through cultural heritage based on dialogue. This article contributes to interdisciplinary scholarship on heritage diplomacy by clarifying the concept, including its inherent notions of cultural heritage and approaches to power. Our critical close reading of 57 sampled scholarly publications reveals how heritage diplomacy is commonly approached from a conservationist point of view, emphasising the preservation of tangible cultural heritage through knowledge exchange, material aid, and funding. Scholarship lacks studies focusing on the uses of intangible cultural heritage for heritage diplomacy. The study reveals heritage diplomacy scholars’ shared interest in power asymmetry and struggle: the concept can be used to recognise and deconstruct power hierarchies between heritage communities. We do this by understanding cultural heritage as a contact zone of people-to-people connectivity, reciprocal cooperation, mutual trust, and dialogue.

Tools of the trade: the bio-cultural evolution of the human propensity to trade.

Humans are standouts in their propensity to trade. More specially, the kind of trading found in humans—featuring the exchange of many different goods and services with many different others, for the mutual benefit of all the involved parties—far exceeds anything that is found in any other creature. However, a number of important questions about this propensity remain open. First, it is not clear exactly what makes this propensity so different in the human case from that of other animals. Second, it is not clear why other animals did not acquire this propensity to the extent that humans did. Third, it is not clear what explains the fact that the extent to which humans engage in trade is culturally highly variable. The paper argues that at the heart of the human-animal divergence in this propensity is the particular socio-cultural environment in which humans evolved. This has led them to sometimes, but not always, acquire the cognitive technology (writing, algebra, tallying devices, money, etc.) to support a sophisticated disposition and capacity for reciprocal cooperation, and deep and wide concepts of property and exchange value.