Recipient Nations Research Articles

Changing Fashions in Medical Education

The magnitude of the value and quantity of transfers of arms and military technology, the internationalization and commercialization of armaments industry (through vastly increased direct investments, through co-production, licensing and sub-contracting arrangements), the supply of training and technical services as adjuncts of arms supply, the blurring of the dividing line between military and civilian technology - all have made control measures infinitely more complicated and difficult. What compounds the difficulty is the fact that, since an overwhelmingly preponderant portion of arms transfers is made up of government-to-government transactions, control measures must emanate from supplying and/or receiving governments. But even if by some miracle these measures were forthcoming and proved effective, they will have touched only a small part of the problem of disarmament, because the share of international transfers of arms and military technology amounts to only 5–6% of the total world military expenditure. The other, far larger and more intractable, part relates to the staggering stockpiles of both conventional and nuclear weapon systems, almost wholly concentrated in the hands of the two superpowers. Both transfers and stockpiles of armaments are inextricably enmeshed in the existing international structure, epitomized in a dominance-dependency relationship. The paper examines the measures that the supplier nations and recipient nations can take unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally to curb arms transfers, and comes to the conclusion that unilateral initiatives, especially on the part of receiving nations, are more feasible. Not to take such initiatives on the ground that they cannot succeed unless taken in concert is only an excuse for doing nothing.

Consequences of Sharp Military Assistance Increases for International Conflict and Cooperation

Effects of sharp increases in military assistance on international conflict and cooperation on the part of recipient nations are investigated. Since traditional bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques are often conceptually inapplicable to this subject matter, a quasi-experimental design is used which relies on autoregressive moving average models and exponential smoothing forecasting mechanisms. Twenty-five annual observations, from 1946 through 1970, of 15 Asian nations serve as the data base. Key findings are: (1) sharp increases in military assistance tend to change decidedly the recipient nation's international conflict and cooperative behavior; (2) in a substantial majority of cases examined, the direction of that behavior change is toward increased conflict and decreased cooperation; and (3) a two-year lag between military assistance and behavior change of recipient nations is statistically supported. The effects of increased capabilities as well as bureaucratic politics, habit, expectation, and prior deals are offered as possible reasons for these results. The findings seem to refute the argument that giving military aid to a nation not involved in a war will help strengthen that nation and thereby avoid future conflict.

Professional absorption in Israel of nurse-immigrants from the USSR

CITIZENS of today’s world are becoming increasingly mobile. Nurses, because of the universal character of their profession, are able to move about fairly easily. Some countries, such as the Philippines and Korea serve as donor countries, while the United States, Canada, Britain and Germany are among the recipient nations. Migration is accompanied by both blessings and problems. Studies of the scope, nature and implications of the movement of health workers have been undertaken by the World Health Organization, the American Nurses’ Association and others. Israel is a land of immigration. Absorption of the newcomers has high priority for three reasons: humanitarian-the real concern for people as individuals; economic-the need for utilization of manpower; and national-ingathering of the people is a major life motif of the State. Since the establishment of the State in 1948, 1,375,OOO persons from over 80 lands have settled in Israel. Immigration from some countries has continued as a small but steady stream over the years, and from others has come in short-term waves as a result of change in the local or international scene. The most recent large contingent is from the USSR. Negligible until 1970, Jews from Russia become the largest immigrant group in 1971 and 1972. Nurses were among the newcomers, and by the end of 1971 their presence was felt in the services as a considerable source of manpower. Because of major differences in the nursing education system and philosophy in the USSR and Israel, reports of problems soon surfaced. In order to learn how to prevent further difficulties, a study was undertaken by four concerned nurses, later joined by two research assistants. Finances were requested and received from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Absorption and Tel-Aviv University. Objectives of the study were : 1. Describe selected demographic and professional variables of the nurse immigrants from the USSR;

Cafeteria Programming: The Dilemma of Development Assistance

Development assistance has progressed little, in spite of a “generation” of effort and the expenditures of vast sums. The relationship between donor and recipient nations is still perceived largely within political terms and both parties give preference to non-controversial projects such as roads and irrigation works.Development cannot be construed within such a narrow design. It is a joint venture between the donor and the recipient who both reap satisfactory rewards. Obstacles inhibiting the establishment of a satisfactory working relationship are identified and explained. On the present scene there appears little promise that more constructive development assistance programs will emerge, since the principal parties insist on playing the game of development assistance within the technique of safety.

A Political Theory of Foreign Aid

Of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid. The very assumption that foreign aid is an instrument of foreign policy is a subject of controversy. For, on the one hand, the opinion is widely held that foreign aid is an end in itself, carrying its own justification, both transcending, and independent of, foreign policy. In this view, foreign aid is the fulfillment of an obligation of the few rich nations toward the many poor ones. On the other hand, many see no justification for a policy of foreign aid at all. They look at it as a gigantic boon-doggle, a wasteful and indefensible operation which serves neither the interests of the United States nor those of the recipient nations.

Lyman S. Moore as Consultant in Thailand

EXPERIENCE with United States foreign aid programs has increasingly emphasized the importance of strengthening the administrative institutions of those recipient nations whose traditions in self-government and in conducting extensive public services are relatively short. The assistance extended to such nations necessarily flows through local official channels, and its immediate and long-run usefulness is heavily influenced by the soundness of the administrative organization, the civil service, and the established ways of transacting governmental business. The administration of foreign aid programs naturally has made United States representatives fairly familiar with local administrative problems and resources. In some countries, notably Greece, United States aid groups have been staffed to provide technical assistance in governmental management. In many, however, American knowledge of local administrative problems has been a loose collection of impressions gained in securing customs clearances, in organizing a demonstration program in the field of agricultural extension services, in equipping a hospital, or in accomplishing any other of the diverse objectives embraced within the mutual aid programs. Such contacts, however, do not serve to sort out the basic problems from the peripheral; and while they have acquainted Americans with local officials whose dedication to their duties is profound and whose talents are of the highest order, they have also revealed that these same officials have neither the time nor, in many cases, the perspective to identify the causes of poor administration or to formulate remedies and the order in which they should be applied. Along with the recognition of the paramount importance of administrative improvement in realizing the optimum value from economic and military aid, and of the appropriateness of United States grants of technical assistance in furthering such improvement, t ere has come a growing realization of the need for an orderly approach to this objective. In some cases it has been sought by the addition of a public administration adviser to the aid mission's staff; in others, the initial phase of developing a program for improving public administration in the recipient nation has been entrusted to one man, to a team, or to an institution like Public Administration Service as a short-term undertaking, and the later phases have been carried on by the regular mission staff.