Governance In Recipient Countries Research Articles

Budget Support and Governance in Foreign Aid: Evidence from a Panel Granger Causality Test

Purpose: This paper investigates the causal direction between budget support and good governance in foreign aid. In other words, does good governance attract budget support, or does budget support foster good governance? Originality: While the existing literature approaches the relationship between budget support and governance from the perspectives of aid selectivity and aid effectiveness, this study focuses on the causal direction between budget support and governance, bridging the two bodies of scholarship. Methodology: Using the Panel Granger causality test proposed by Dumitrescu and Hurlin, the study analyzes budget support and governance data from 2000 to 2019 from a panel of 57 recipient countries. Result: The study finds evidence of bidirectional causality between budget support and governance in general, with governance functioning as both a condition for receiving budget support and an outcome of budget support. The study also finds that the presence of Granger causality varies across different income groups and governance dimensions. Conclusions and Implication: The noteworthy analysis from these findings is that governance dimensions that are found to attract budget support are closely entangled with political dynamics. These findings highlight the intricate interplay between governance and political factors in shaping the outcomes of budget support programs. Our study also hints at the potential of budget support programs to contribute to improving governance in recipient countries.

The European Union's migration management aid: Developing democracies or supporting authoritarianism?

AbstractThe European Union and its member states have invested billions of euros in migration management programs that purport to promote “good migration governance” around the world. But what is the impact of migration management aid on governance outside of the EU? In this article, we theorise the impact of migration management aid on governance in recipient countries by analysing the key policy areas of intervention. To do so, we focus on the effects of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and draw on data collected from policy and government documents, in addition to secondary literature, to understand how migration management aid negatively impacts institutions of governance in recipient countries. While migration management aid may build the capacity of states to monitor borders and prevent irregular migration, we argue that this fails to account for negative externalities including human rights abuses and increased surveillance for migrants and citizens alike.

Does China-Pakistan Economic Corridor improve connectivity in Pakistan? A protocol assessing the planned transport network infrastructure

China invested vastly in overseas infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims at improving international connectivity through collaboration with partner countries. For these countries, capturing the developments from BRI's massive transport infrastructure investments becomes a crucial economic multiplier. But there are few methods available in the existing literature. In this paper, we developed an analytical protocol that evaluates the changes in transport network connectivity before and after the BRI transport infrastructure construction, using open-source data and tools, and tested it on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship project of BRI. Results show that China's transport infrastructure investment may improve connectivity and the potential for economic agglomeration in certain key cities and some regions in Pakistan but would widen the development inequality in the country. Our protocol benefits are threefold. First, it provides a quantitative estimation of the change in economic geography, accessibility and agglomeration-forming potentials, resulting from China's transport infrastructure investment. Second, it can be replicated to different scales and locations with easy-access open data. Last, its usage of open-source platforms and open data enables wide adoption by the public, especially agents with limited resources. Potential beneficiaries such as the governments of recipient countries, academics, funding providers, and private sectors can follow our protocol to assess the likely regional accessibility patterns and potential spatial economy from BRI-related transport infrastructure developments.

Learning in migration management? Persistent side effects of the EUTF

AbstractThis study contributes to the existing literature on the unintended effects of migration management programmes beyond migration. By combining a structured literature review with fifteen in‐depth interviews with diplomats, consultants, and researchers – all involved with the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), the largest migration management programme since 2015 – this study examines why policymakers do not always learn from unintended effects. The paper identifies four unintended effects: increased border guard violence; increased organized crime of smugglers and undermined livelihoods; exacerbation of poor governance in recipient countries; and legitimation of governments with limited legitimacy. While officials involved in the EUTF recognize the occurrence of these unintended effects, the EUTF insufficiently addresses these effects. This study analyses the technical, institutional, and ideological limits to learning that prevent migration management instruments such as the EUTF from effectively mitigating unintended effects.

Health Aid, Governance and Infant Mortality

AbstractWe investigate the impact of health aid on infant mortality conditional on the quality of governance. Our analysis applies instrumental variable estimation with health aid instrumented by donor government fractionalization interacted with the probability of allocating health aid to a recipient country. Using panel data for 96 recipient countries for the 2002–2015 period, we find that the effectiveness of health aid in reducing infant mortality is conditional on good governance. The results are robust in a variety of ways. Our findings reaffirm the importance of improving the quality of governance in recipient countries.

The Digital Silk Road and the evolving role of Chinese technology companies

Concerns about China’s ambitions to return to the global centre stage as a great power have recently begun to focus on the Digital Silk Road (DSR), an umbrella term for various activities – commercial and diplomatic – of interest to the Chinese government in the cyber realm. Part of (or a spin-off from) the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, by 2020 the DSR had become a focal point of China’s foreign policy. But the DSR remains ill-defined and poorly understood. At the heart of such concerns is not that Chinese technology companies are becoming globally competitive, but rather that Beijing could use them to ‘rewire’ the global digital architecture, from physical cables to code. Dominance by Chinese technology could shift global norms from a free cyber commons to competing systems of cyber sovereignty or cyber freedom. This Adelphi book brings together eight experts to examine the development of the DSR; explore its impact on economics, security and governance in recipient countries; and assess its broader impact on patterns of economic and technological dependence, on the emerging rules and norms of tech globalisation, and on global geopolitics and great-power relations. Beijing has grasped the opportunity to leverage the entrepreneurial strengths of its private tech sector to gain prominence in the world’s digital ecosystem. But the more interventionist Beijing becomes, the more Chinese firms will be seen as instruments of the state, and the greater the pushback against Chinese technology and the DSR may be. To achieve great-power status and global centrality, Beijing might ultimately need to change tack. How it innovates in further rolling out Chinese tech across the world, and what the DSR will then look like, will have far-reaching impacts on global economics, politics and security.

The Digital Silk Road and China’s grand strategic ambition

Concerns about China’s ambitions to return to the global centre stage as a great power have recently begun to focus on the Digital Silk Road (DSR), an umbrella term for various activities – commercial and diplomatic – of interest to the Chinese government in the cyber realm. Part of (or a spin-off from) the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, by 2020 the DSR had become a focal point of China’s foreign policy. But the DSR remains ill-defined and poorly understood. At the heart of such concerns is not that Chinese technology companies are becoming globally competitive, but rather that Beijing could use them to ‘rewire’ the global digital architecture, from physical cables to code. Dominance by Chinese technology could shift global norms from a free cyber commons to competing systems of cyber sovereignty or cyber freedom. This Adelphi book brings together eight experts to examine the development of the DSR; explore its impact on economics, security and governance in recipient countries; and assess its broader impact on patterns of economic and technological dependence, on the emerging rules and norms of tech globalisation, and on global geopolitics and great-power relations. Beijing has grasped the opportunity to leverage the entrepreneurial strengths of its private tech sector to gain prominence in the world’s digital ecosystem. But the more interventionist Beijing becomes, the more Chinese firms will be seen as instruments of the state, and the greater the pushback against Chinese technology and the DSR may be. To achieve great-power status and global centrality, Beijing might ultimately need to change tack. How it innovates in further rolling out Chinese tech across the world, and what the DSR will then look like, will have far-reaching impacts on global economics, politics and security.

Introduction

Concerns about China’s ambitions to return to the global centre stage as a great power have recently begun to focus on the Digital Silk Road (DSR), an umbrella term for various activities – commercial and diplomatic – of interest to the Chinese government in the cyber realm. Part of (or a spin-off from) the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, by 2020 the DSR had become a focal point of China’s foreign policy. But the DSR remains ill-defined and poorly understood. At the heart of such concerns is not that Chinese technology companies are becoming globally competitive, but rather that Beijing could use them to ‘rewire’ the global digital architecture, from physical cables to code. Dominance by Chinese technology could shift global norms from a free cyber commons to competing systems of cyber sovereignty or cyber freedom. This Adelphi book brings together eight experts to examine the development of the DSR; explore its impact on economics, security and governance in recipient countries; and assess its broader impact on patterns of economic and technological dependence, on the emerging rules and norms of tech globalisation, and on global geopolitics and great-power relations. Beijing has grasped the opportunity to leverage the entrepreneurial strengths of its private tech sector to gain prominence in the world’s digital ecosystem. But the more interventionist Beijing becomes, the more Chinese firms will be seen as instruments of the state, and the greater the pushback against Chinese technology and the DSR may be. To achieve great-power status and global centrality, Beijing might ultimately need to change tack. How it innovates in further rolling out Chinese tech across the world, and what the DSR will then look like, will have far-reaching impacts on global economics, politics and security.

Locating the Digital Silk Road in the Belt and Road Initiative

Concerns about China’s ambitions to return to the global centre stage as a great power have recently begun to focus on the Digital Silk Road (DSR), an umbrella term for various activities – commercial and diplomatic – of interest to the Chinese government in the cyber realm. Part of (or a spin-off from) the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, by 2020 the DSR had become a focal point of China’s foreign policy. But the DSR remains ill-defined and poorly understood. At the heart of such concerns is not that Chinese technology companies are becoming globally competitive, but rather that Beijing could use them to ‘rewire’ the global digital architecture, from physical cables to code. Dominance by Chinese technology could shift global norms from a free cyber commons to competing systems of cyber sovereignty or cyber freedom. This Adelphi book brings together eight experts to examine the development of the DSR; explore its impact on economics, security and governance in recipient countries; and assess its broader impact on patterns of economic and technological dependence, on the emerging rules and norms of tech globalisation, and on global geopolitics and great-power relations. Beijing has grasped the opportunity to leverage the entrepreneurial strengths of its private tech sector to gain prominence in the world’s digital ecosystem. But the more interventionist Beijing becomes, the more Chinese firms will be seen as instruments of the state, and the greater the pushback against Chinese technology and the DSR may be. To achieve great-power status and global centrality, Beijing might ultimately need to change tack. How it innovates in further rolling out Chinese tech across the world, and what the DSR will then look like, will have far-reaching impacts on global economics, politics and security.

Conclusion

Concerns about China’s ambitions to return to the global centre stage as a great power have recently begun to focus on the Digital Silk Road (DSR), an umbrella term for various activities – commercial and diplomatic – of interest to the Chinese government in the cyber realm. Part of (or a spin-off from) the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, by 2020 the DSR had become a focal point of China’s foreign policy. But the DSR remains ill-defined and poorly understood. At the heart of such concerns is not that Chinese technology companies are becoming globally competitive, but rather that Beijing could use them to ‘rewire’ the global digital architecture, from physical cables to code. Dominance by Chinese technology could shift global norms from a free cyber commons to competing systems of cyber sovereignty or cyber freedom. This Adelphi book brings together eight experts to examine the development of the DSR; explore its impact on economics, security and governance in recipient countries; and assess its broader impact on patterns of economic and technological dependence, on the emerging rules and norms of tech globalisation, and on global geopolitics and great-power relations. Beijing has grasped the opportunity to leverage the entrepreneurial strengths of its private tech sector to gain prominence in the world’s digital ecosystem. But the more interventionist Beijing becomes, the more Chinese firms will be seen as instruments of the state, and the greater the pushback against Chinese technology and the DSR may be. To achieve great-power status and global centrality, Beijing might ultimately need to change tack. How it innovates in further rolling out Chinese tech across the world, and what the DSR will then look like, will have far-reaching impacts on global economics, politics and security.

Identifying the Digital Silk Road

Concerns about China’s ambitions to return to the global centre stage as a great power have recently begun to focus on the Digital Silk Road (DSR), an umbrella term for various activities – commercial and diplomatic – of interest to the Chinese government in the cyber realm. Part of (or a spin-off from) the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, by 2020 the DSR had become a focal point of China’s foreign policy. But the DSR remains ill-defined and poorly understood. At the heart of such concerns is not that Chinese technology companies are becoming globally competitive, but rather that Beijing could use them to ‘rewire’ the global digital architecture, from physical cables to code. Dominance by Chinese technology could shift global norms from a free cyber commons to competing systems of cyber sovereignty or cyber freedom. This Adelphi book brings together eight experts to examine the development of the DSR; explore its impact on economics, security and governance in recipient countries; and assess its broader impact on patterns of economic and technological dependence, on the emerging rules and norms of tech globalisation, and on global geopolitics and great-power relations. Beijing has grasped the opportunity to leverage the entrepreneurial strengths of its private tech sector to gain prominence in the world’s digital ecosystem. But the more interventionist Beijing becomes, the more Chinese firms will be seen as instruments of the state, and the greater the pushback against Chinese technology and the DSR may be. To achieve great-power status and global centrality, Beijing might ultimately need to change tack. How it innovates in further rolling out Chinese tech across the world, and what the DSR will then look like, will have far-reaching impacts on global economics, politics and security.

The Digital Silk Road and normative values

Concerns about China’s ambitions to return to the global centre stage as a great power have recently begun to focus on the Digital Silk Road (DSR), an umbrella term for various activities – commercial and diplomatic – of interest to the Chinese government in the cyber realm. Part of (or a spin-off from) the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, by 2020 the DSR had become a focal point of China’s foreign policy. But the DSR remains ill-defined and poorly understood. At the heart of such concerns is not that Chinese technology companies are becoming globally competitive, but rather that Beijing could use them to ‘rewire’ the global digital architecture, from physical cables to code. Dominance by Chinese technology could shift global norms from a free cyber commons to competing systems of cyber sovereignty or cyber freedom. This Adelphi book brings together eight experts to examine the development of the DSR; explore its impact on economics, security and governance in recipient countries; and assess its broader impact on patterns of economic and technological dependence, on the emerging rules and norms of tech globalisation, and on global geopolitics and great-power relations. Beijing has grasped the opportunity to leverage the entrepreneurial strengths of its private tech sector to gain prominence in the world’s digital ecosystem. But the more interventionist Beijing becomes, the more Chinese firms will be seen as instruments of the state, and the greater the pushback against Chinese technology and the DSR may be. To achieve great-power status and global centrality, Beijing might ultimately need to change tack. How it innovates in further rolling out Chinese tech across the world, and what the DSR will then look like, will have far-reaching impacts on global economics, politics and security.

Balancing prosperity and security along the Digital Silk Road

Concerns about China’s ambitions to return to the global centre stage as a great power have recently begun to focus on the Digital Silk Road (DSR), an umbrella term for various activities – commercial and diplomatic – of interest to the Chinese government in the cyber realm. Part of (or a spin-off from) the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, by 2020 the DSR had become a focal point of China’s foreign policy. But the DSR remains ill-defined and poorly understood. At the heart of such concerns is not that Chinese technology companies are becoming globally competitive, but rather that Beijing could use them to ‘rewire’ the global digital architecture, from physical cables to code. Dominance by Chinese technology could shift global norms from a free cyber commons to competing systems of cyber sovereignty or cyber freedom. This Adelphi book brings together eight experts to examine the development of the DSR; explore its impact on economics, security and governance in recipient countries; and assess its broader impact on patterns of economic and technological dependence, on the emerging rules and norms of tech globalisation, and on global geopolitics and great-power relations. Beijing has grasped the opportunity to leverage the entrepreneurial strengths of its private tech sector to gain prominence in the world’s digital ecosystem. But the more interventionist Beijing becomes, the more Chinese firms will be seen as instruments of the state, and the greater the pushback against Chinese technology and the DSR may be. To achieve great-power status and global centrality, Beijing might ultimately need to change tack. How it innovates in further rolling out Chinese tech across the world, and what the DSR will then look like, will have far-reaching impacts on global economics, politics and security.

China’s investment in digital technologies and the Digital Great Game

Concerns about China’s ambitions to return to the global centre stage as a great power have recently begun to focus on the Digital Silk Road (DSR), an umbrella term for various activities – commercial and diplomatic – of interest to the Chinese government in the cyber realm. Part of (or a spin-off from) the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, by 2020 the DSR had become a focal point of China’s foreign policy. But the DSR remains ill-defined and poorly understood. At the heart of such concerns is not that Chinese technology companies are becoming globally competitive, but rather that Beijing could use them to ‘rewire’ the global digital architecture, from physical cables to code. Dominance by Chinese technology could shift global norms from a free cyber commons to competing systems of cyber sovereignty or cyber freedom. This Adelphi book brings together eight experts to examine the development of the DSR; explore its impact on economics, security and governance in recipient countries; and assess its broader impact on patterns of economic and technological dependence, on the emerging rules and norms of tech globalisation, and on global geopolitics and great-power relations. Beijing has grasped the opportunity to leverage the entrepreneurial strengths of its private tech sector to gain prominence in the world’s digital ecosystem. But the more interventionist Beijing becomes, the more Chinese firms will be seen as instruments of the state, and the greater the pushback against Chinese technology and the DSR may be. To achieve great-power status and global centrality, Beijing might ultimately need to change tack. How it innovates in further rolling out Chinese tech across the world, and what the DSR will then look like, will have far-reaching impacts on global economics, politics and security.

Financial Development Thresholds and the Remittances-Growth Nexus

This study provides new evidence on the relationship between remittances and economic growth using system GMM on dynamic panel and panel threshold regression (PTR) model proposed by Hansen (J Econ 93:334–368, 1999) that authorized multiple thresholds. The sample consists of 60 developing countries from 1985 to 2015. The empirical results indicate that there is a threshold effects of financial development in the remittances-growth relationship. Beyond a given threshold of financial development, there is a positive relationship between remittances and economic growth, while, this relationship is insignificant under the threshold. Specifically, remittances will be more likely to contribute to economic in recipient countries with relatively well-functioning financial sectors. Since financial development seems to matter in the manner in which remittances are used, the best way for recipient country governments to ensure that remittances contribute to positive economic growth is to foster financial sectors, thus ensuring that a greater proportion of remittances are channeled in a more effective way to have a positive impact on growth.

Effect of Aid for Trade Policy and Regulations on Tariff Policy Volatility: Does Institutional and Governance Quality Matter?

This article investigates empirically the effect of aid for trade policies and regulations on the volatility of tariffs in the recipient countries. The analysis has used an unbalanced panel dataset of 107 countries over the period from 2002 to 2015. The empirical results, based on the two-step system Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) approach, show that aid for trade policies and regulations influences negatively and significantly tariff policy volatility in recipient countries. Additionally, the findings indicate that the better the institutional and governance quality in recipient countries, the higher is the reducing effect of aid for trade policies and regulations on tariff policy volatility. These results, therefore, suggest that a scale up of aid for trade policies and regulations to, inter alia, build the capacity of policymakers in recipient countries to contribute to reducing tariffs volatility in these countries, which would, in turn, likely benefit donor countries. Furthermore, improving domestic institutions and governance in recipient countries would further enhance the reducing impact of this aid on tariff volatility, which, once again, benefits both the recipient countries and donor countries.

Aid and good governance: Examining aggregate unintended effects of aid

Although donors generally aim to improve governance in recipient countries by various means, critics claim that the aggregate effect of large aid flows is the deterioration of governance. Aid is said to weaken domestic accountability, sustain authoritarian regimes, increase political instability, weaken government capacities, and increase corruption. Conducting a systematic search in Web of Science, this paper reviews the empirical evidence for these unintended aggregate effects of aid on the political, administrative, and judicial dimensions of good governance. It finds that the negative effects of aid on governance are much exaggerated. The aggregate effect of aid on democracy has become more positive after the Cold War, and the effect of aid on government capacity and on reducing corruption has also improved over time. Furthermore, most studies show a positive effect of aid on political stability. These findings imply that donor intentions matter: donors that are serious about their intended effects on governance are able to mitigate the possible negative unintended effects of their aid.

Foreign Aid, Governance and Economic Growth in Sub‐Saharan Africa: Does One Cap Fit All?

AbstractSub‐Saharan Africa (SSA) has been receiving foreign aid for many decades; nonetheless, it ranked among the poorest regions in the world. This study revisits the aid effectiveness debate quantitatively by investigating the relationship among foreign aid, governance and economic growth in SSA using more recent data from 1996 to 2012 and testing for heterogeneity in aid recipient countries. Fundamental questions raised in this study are: does aid work the same way in all regions and group of countries in SSA? Do governance and size of aid matter? Employing the system generalized methods of moments (system GMM) technique, results show that foreign aid has an insignificant negative relationship with economic growth in aggregate SSA. However, one cap does not fit all in SSA as heterogeneity across aid recipients has implications for aid effectiveness. Moreover, governance and size of aid complement each other to improve growth in SSA. This study has been able to show quantitatively that a general policy for countries in SSA is not good enough for aid effectiveness; donors should increase the size of aid, and governance in recipient countries must improve. In conclusion, heterogeneity, governance and size of aid matter for aid effectiveness in SSA.

AIIB Development: Forecast and Implications

Update: On June 24-26, 2016, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) held a board of directors meeting and its first annual meeting in Beijing, China. USD 509 million worth of loans will finance four projects approved by the AIIB The projects can be defined by the following characteristics: 1) infrastructure investment in countries situated on the path connecting the Belt and Road Initiative, 2) proposals by recipient country governments, 3) co-financing with other MDBs, and 4) small loans. Short-term Forecast: The AIIB's projects are predicted to involve joint collaboration via co-financing with other MDBs. As for joint ventures, other MDBs and recipient governments will propose AIIB participation in existing projects, and the AIIB will do due diligence before making a final investment decision. The reason behind this operational structure is that the AIIB is yet a newly-formed MDB and has a staff of only around 40 people in the working group. Consequently, it lacks the internal capacity to pursue a large-scale, stand-alone venture. Also, by setting its initial projects as collaborations with other MDBs, the AIIB can expect lower risk, seek to acquire business operation know-how, and build international public confidence. Above all, the AIIB will seek collaboration with international financial organizations including other MDBs, and strive to settle itself in the international financial system (in a bid to alleviate concerns that China will have undue influence on AIIB projects, or that it will challenge the existing international financial order).Mid to Long-term Forecast: The AIIB will possibly lead a greater share of stand-alone projects and support the Belt and Road Initiative financially, on the back of accumulated experience and better project financing capabilities. Projects related to the Belt and Road Initiative are expected to dominate, and economic corridor implementation projects that strengthen linkage among regions and countries will likely be considered a priority. There is also the possibility of collaboration with other new financial organizations founded under Chinese leadership (the BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB), the Silk Road Fund, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)). These China-led organizations will provide funds for the Belt and Road Initiative's implementation and pursue the internationalization of the renminbi, which will help increase China's financial influence globally. Implications: In the case of co-financing projects, strong contenders are likely to be infrastructure projects related to the Belt and Road Initiative that have been developed and screened by other MDBs. Therefore, Korean companies will stand to gain by seeking participation in such ventures. Meanwhile, for stand-alone projects the AIIB will assess the feasibility of infrastructure projects proposed by member governments and companies. This would call for a proactive approach, identifying in advance the infrastructure demands of recipient countries and then cooperating with local institutions. Financial institutions should also respond appropriately to the AIIB's initial moves to pursue extensive cooperation with other MDBs, state-run financial institutions and global financial companies.

Control of corruption, democratic accountability, and effectiveness of HIV/AIDS official development assistance

BackgroundDespite continued global efforts, HIV/AIDS outcomes in developing countries have not made much progress. Poor governance in recipient countries is often seen as one of the reasons for ineffectiveness of aid efforts to achieve stated objectives and desired outcomes.ObjectiveThis study examines the impact of two important dimensions of governance – control of corruption and democratic accountability – on the effectiveness of HIV/AIDS official development assistance.DesignAn empirical analysis using dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moments estimation was conducted on 2001–2010 datasets.ResultsControl of corruption and democratic accountability revealed an independent effect and interaction with the amount of HIV/AIDS aid on incidence of HIV/AIDS, respectively, while none of the two governance variables had a significant effect on HIV/AIDS prevalence. Specifically, in countries with accountability level below −2.269, aid has a detrimental effect on incidence of HIV/AIDS.ConclusionThe study findings suggest that aid programs need to be preceded or at least accompanied by serious efforts to improve governance in recipient countries and that democratic accountability ought to receive more critical attention.