Recall Election Research Articles

Do Recall Elections Undermine Political Support? Insights from the Recall of the Mayor of Frankfurt in 2022

ABSTRACT Concerns about the impact of recall referendums on political support have not been empirically examined so far. For this purpose, we conducted a post-election survey of around 800 respondents in Frankfurt after the mayoral election in March 2023 which followed a successful recall in November 2022. First, there is overwhelming support for recall elections, with 87% of respondents in favour. Even supporters of the recalled candidate rarely dislike the instrument and see little need for electoral reform. Second, only a few respondents are concerned about the impact of recalls on political support, but when they are, it often leads them to disapprove of recalls. Third, political support by the recall electoral losers – as measured by satisfaction with democracy and turnout in the successor election – is at worst only slightly reduced. Taken together, these findings do not suggest that recalls damage people's views of the political system.

Popular Discontent, Recall Elections, and Ranked-Choice Voting

Popular Discontent, Recall Elections, and Ranked-Choice Voting

TV in times of political uncertainty: Evidence from the 2017 elections in Kenya

What is the impact of television during periods of political crisis? This paper examines the nullification of the 2017 presidential election in Kenya, followed by the organization of a repeat ballot, which sparked widespread protests and heightened uncertainty. Leveraging exogenous variations in television signal expansion since 2013, I assess the influence of television reception on voter turnout in both the initial and repeat ballots, as well as on electoral protests. The findings reveal that television did not significantly impact turnout in the first election; however, its effects varied across political camps in the repeat election. Turnout decreased by 3pp in pro-opposition areas but was a 7pp larger in pro-government strongholds. I contend that television played an informative role during a period characterized by high levels of uncertainty. Employing text analysis methods, I document the convergence of news content before the recall election, with a particular emphasis on the ongoing protests. Furthermore, the distinctive tone of coverage by the state-owned TV station may have bolstered the call for participation in the second poll.

López Obrador’s hyper-presidentialism: populism and autocratic legalism defying the Supreme Court and the National Electoral Institute

ABSTRACT This article analyses a growing concern with Mexico’s democracy as regards the idea of separation of powers since the takeover of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador on 1 December 2018. To this end, it explores the tension between the executive’s hyper-presidentialism and independent institutions, specifically the Supreme Court and the National Electoral Institute. Drawing on the ideational approach to populism and autocratic legalism sustaining a new form of hyper-presidentialism in Mexico, the article examines five extraordinary cases revealing how the executive’s ideational aspiration, which seeks to ‘transform’ Mexico, and methods amounting to autocratic legalism fundamentally challenge the integrity and independence of said institutions: a) the so-called Zaldívar Law (named after the former Chief Justice, a last-minute amendment aiming to extend his term); b) the failed energy reform; c) the public consultation on the prosecution of former presidents; d) the recall vote; and, e) the electoral reform. The article concludes the recent election of a new Chief Justice could be seen as a revindication of the Supreme Court’s autonomy, whereas the institutional integrity of the National Electoral Institute remains contested in the unsettled electoral reform.

Separation of Powers in Distress: AMLO’s Charismatic Populism and Mexico’s Return to Hyper-presidentialism

Abstract This article inquires the charismatic populism of López Obrador (AMLO) and Mexico’s return to hyper-presidentialism. Drawing on the literature on populism and hyper-presidentialism it explores the tension between charismatic populist leadership and independent institutions, especially the Supreme Court and the National Electoral Institute serving as a counterbalance to the president’s agenda, which aims for institutional ‘transformation’. The main argument, that AMLO is defying the integrity and independence of these institutions, is sustained by analyzing a) the Zaldívar Law named after the former Supreme Court President, a last-minute amendment that would extend his term; b) the public consultation on the prosecution of former presidents; c) the recall vote, and d) the electoral reform. The article concludes that AMLO’s charismatic populism, his transgression of constitutional constraints to the executive power and use of meta-constitutional powers means a return to hyper-presidentialism, which also raises concerns about Mexico’s struggling democracy.

Parteimitgliedschaften im Jahre 2022

Following allegations that he had accepted undue advantages in his position, a referendum was held on 6 November 2022 to recall the mayor of Frankfurt, Peter Feldmann . The article first presents the legal framework of the recall election in Hesse and critically examines in particular the level of the required quorum . It is argued that the quorum has undesirable consequences for political competition and political culture . For example, the quorum changes the logic of the electoral campaign by encouraging a one-sided mobilization of the incumbent’s opponents . Based on official election data, it can be shown that participation in the referendum was indeed lower in districts where Peter Feldmann had done particularly well in the 2018 mayoral election . Finally, various proposals for a possible reform of the Hessian municipal code (Hessische Gemeindeordnung) are discussed . First of all, reforms that focus on the quorum are conceivable, such as reducing or even abolishing the quorum . But more far-reaching reforms, such as the complete abolition of the recall vote, are also being discussed .

Incentive Effects of Recall Elections: Evidence from Criminal Sentencing in California Courts

Incentive Effects of Recall Elections: Evidence from Criminal Sentencing in California Courts

Don’t Go Chasing Windfalls: California’s 2021-2022 Budget

Amidst a global pandemic, a gubernatorial recall election, and a shaky economy, California had one of its best budget years in recent memory. Flush with cash, the state was able to make unprecedented investments in education, health, and social welfare programs, provide direct stimulus payments to many California residents, and still set aside money in its rainy-day fund. Governor Newsom handily defeated the recall effort, and the budget outlook for 2022 looks bright. 2021 was a tumultuous year, but California is proving that it’s once again the “Golden State”.

Accountability, Political Capture, and Selection Into Politics: Evidence from Peruvian Municipalities

Abstract We estimate the effects of political accountability on the selection of politicians when accountability mechanisms are prone to political capture. We compare the characteristics of candidates running in municipalities where the previous incumbent was ousted from office through a recall referendum with those who run where the recall referendum failed by a small margin. Having a recalled incumbent in the previous term causes a negative selection of candidates in terms of their education and previous experience. They are also less representative of indigenous groups. The results are driven by localities where the accountability institution is likely used for political purposes.

When do voters boycott elections with participation quorums?

With participation quorums present in elections and referendums, supporters of the status quo have to decide whether to vote against the proposition or boycott it by abstaining altogether to achieve the same result. This paper examines why one strategy or the other is implemented, using data from recall elections in 376 Peruvian municipalities mandating a 50% participation quorum to validate the removal of the mayor. While instrumental rationality under situations of strategic uncertainty in competitive settings goes far in explaining the incidence of boycotts, a bounded rationality approach whereby actors rely on inferential heuristics through spatial diffusion and past experience produces similarly consistent results. Boycotts are also more likely when voter coordination is easier. Personal traits of the status quo elites, on the other hand, are irrelevant. The paper contributes to the understanding of the quorum paradox warning that measures to increase voter participation, such as the introduction of a participation quorum, may actually depress it.

Recall Elections: A Tool of Accountability? Evidence from Peru

I examine the role of recall elections in Peruvian municipalities to evaluate whether they are used as a tool to increase political accountability. I test the theoretical assumptions of elite mobil...

A Constitutional Policy Study on the Improvement of Public Recall Vote System

A Constitutional Policy Study on the Improvement of Public Recall Vote System

When Is It Democratic to Postpone an Election? Elections During Natural Disasters, COVID-19, and Emergency Situations

Holding regular elections is an essential feature of democratic practices. The case for postponing elections is often made during emergency situations, however. Despite the critical nature of the i...

A Silent Corrupting Force? Criminal Sentencing and the Threat of Recall

39 U.S. states authorize recall elections, but the incentives they create are not well understood. We examine how changes in the perceived threat of recall alter the behavior of one set of officials: judges. In 2016, outrage over the sentence imposed on a Stanford athlete following his sexual assault conviction sparked an ultimately successful drive to recall the presiding judge. Using data on over 22,000 sentences from six California counties and matched arrest records for a subset of more than 12,000, we examine whether critical events in the recall campaign were accompanied by corresponding changes in other judges' sentences. We find a large, discontinuous increase in punitiveness associated with the campaign's announcement, but not the recall itself -- suggesting the announcement shifted judges' beliefs about their political environment. The increase may have indirectly produced a disproportionate burden for minority defendants. Our findings are the first to document incentive effects of recall, and suggest that targeted political campaigns may have far-reaching, unintended consequences.

EL DERECHO A DECIDIR Y LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA CIUDAD DE MÉXICO

The article deals with the consultation of the people as one of the rights of sovereignty (to elect representatives, control and dismiss them), whose purpose is the decision making by the citizens and the orientation of the action of the State. Issues such as scope, object, typology and conveners are addressed. Specifically, it deals with the adoption of these rights in the first Political Constitution of Mexico City, contrasted with the regulation of the consultation in article 35 of the National Political Constitution. Addresses the definitions and rules of exercise of the consultations, specifically plebiscite, referendum and the recall referendum of elected officials and applications of the popular legislative initiative.

Understanding the use of recall referendums: Evidence from Ecuador

The recall referendum – a referendum triggered by citizens seeking to remove elected officials by means of a binding vote – used to be a rare institution, but since the 1990s has spread in different areas of the world. The frequency of its activation has been explained by three sets of sometimes interconnected variables: growing citizen dissatisfaction, institutional design (i.e. ease of activation), and the activity of political parties using the mechanism against their opponents, specially in contexts of low party-system institutionalization. This article proposes an additional variable: the role of electoral management bodies (EMBs) in allowing or preventing recall attempts. The empirical analysis focuses on the Ecuadorian experience, where legal provisions governing recall were introduced in 1998, modified in 2008, and amended in 2011, with a dramatic variation in the frequency of recall activations after each change.

‘Never just a local war’: explaining the failure of a mayor’s recall referendum

ABSTRACTThe November 2017 referendum for the recall of Dorin Chirtoacă, Mayor of Chișinău (Moldova), largely failed because of the citizens’ low turnout. Why do recall referendums fail and, in particular, why was this boycott strategy successful? My assumption is that the referendum was perceived not only as a tool to eliminate a major political competitor and thus weaken the anti-presidential opposition, but also as a wider attempt to gain extensive political control. I will use secondary data and data obtained from a focus-group research in order to show that the following factors determined the outcome of the boycott: the popular mistrust of institutions and parties, the perceived decisive importance of the Capital’s control nationwide, the citizens’ will to prevent the concentration of power, and the perception of the broader geopolitical stakes of the recall.

Lessons from the Left in Lima: Susana Villarán and the Fleeting Return of Progressive Politics to City Hall

Amid a rightward shift in Latin America, how can the left gain ground in cities characterized by entrenched neoliberalism? The case of Susana Villarán, the progressive mayor who led Lima, Peru, from 2011 to 2014, illustrates the uphill battle facing the left. Villarán’s surprise election put a leftist in City Hall for the first time in 25 years. She confronted unrelenting opposition but defied expectations and beat back a recall election only to face a punishing defeat in her reelection bid. Weak policy-making capacity and a lack of party machinery forced her to expend all her political capital on the recall battle, leaving her with nothing to secure reelection. Her trajectory suggests an important lesson for progressives in cities where the left is weak: a headline-grabbing win by an individual leftist is no substitute for a robust left base. Absent the latter, simply electing a progressive mayor is likely to prove a fleeting victory.En medio de un movimiento hacia la derecha en América Latina, ¿cómo puede la izquierda ganar terreno en ciudades caracterizadas por un neoliberalismo atrincherado? El caso de Susana Villarán, la alcaldesa progresista que gobernó Lima, Perú, de 2011 a 2014, ilustra la batalla cuesta arriba que enfrenta la izquierda. La sorprendente victoria electoral de Villarán logró colocar a alguien de la izquierda en la alcaldía por primera vez en 25 años. Ella se enfrentó a una oposición implacable, pero desafió las expectativas y ganó una revocatoria solo para enfrentar una derrota contundente en su intento por la reelección. Dado la poca capacidad para crear políticas públicas y la ausencia de una maquinaria electoral partidista, se vio forzada a gastar todo su capital político en la batalla por la revocatoria, lo cual la dejó sin recursos para conseguir la reelección. Su trayectoria presenta una lección importante para los progresistas en ciudades donde la izquierda es débil: una victoria llamativa por parte de un individuo de la izquierda no funge como substituto para una base robusta de la izquierda. Lo anterior sugiere que cuando esta base se encuentra ausente, es probable que el simple acto de elegir un alcalde progresista sea una victoria efímera.

Participation in Contentious Politics: Rethinking the Roles of News, Social Media, and Conversation Amid Divisiveness

ABSTRACTWhen political disputes devolve into heated partisan conflicts, do the factors known to trigger electoral political engagement continue to operate, or do they change? We consider this question during a divisive electoral context—a gubernatorial recall—focusing on how media consumption, conversations, and interactions with social media feed into the decision to participate in politics. To do so, we employ high-quality survey data collected in the weeks before the 2012 Wisconsin recall election. Results indicate that during times of contentious politics, political communication does not operate as observed in less polarized settings, calling into question widely held assumptions about what spurs and suppresses electoral participation. Most notably, we find that broadcast news consumption negatively predicts participation, whereas political conversation with coworkers and use of political social media positively predict participation. The implications for electoral behavior research in contentious political environments are discussed.

Playing by the rules of the game: partisan use of recall referendums in Colombia

ABSTRACTAs a bottom-up mechanism of direct democracy, recall can be triggered by citizens to remove elected officials through a vote, which is expected to increase accountability. Contradicting this hope, previous research has suggested that intensive use of recall referendums became an instrument of party competition. However, empirical evidence is scant. Thus, focusing on the 107 attempts of activating recall in Colombia during the first half of 2017 this article seeks to understand if recall activations are more likely to reinforce democratic governance (by giving an institutional solution to exceptional problems of legitimacy) or are more likely to erode it (by becoming a weapon to escalate the partisan competition beyond regular elections). We created a dataset to identify who started the recall – partisan, mixed or civil society actors – and for what reasons. Then, we examined to what extent the effective number of parties in the council, the majority reached in the previous election, or the size of the municipality have an effect on the likelihood of recall attempts. The study finds that in Colombia, political leaders (and not specific parties) are the main actors promoting recall.