Reasonable Account Research Articles

Application of Electromagnetic Induction Technique to Measure the Void Fraction in Oil/Gas Two Phase Flow

In this work, electromagnetic induction technique of measuring void fraction in liquid/gas fuel flow was utilized. In order to improve the electric properties of liquid fuel, an iron oxide Fe3O4 nanoparticles at 3% was blended to enhance the liquid fuel magnetization. Experiments have been conducted for a wide range of liquid and gas superficial velocities. From the experimental results, it was realized that there is an existing linear relationship between the void fraction and the measured electromotive force, when induction coils were connected in series for excitation coils, regardless of increase or decrease CNG bubbles distribution in liquid fuel flow. Therefore, it was revealed that the utilized method yielded quite reasonable account for measuring the void fraction, showing good agreement with the other available measurement techniques in the two-phase flow, and also with the published literature of the bubbly flow pattern. From the results of the present investigation, it has been proven that the electromagnetic induction is a feasible technique for the actual measurement of void fraction in a Diesel/CNG fuel flow.

Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons

In this paper, I defend an account of the reasons for which we act, believe, and so on for any Ф such that there can be reasons for which we Ф. Such reasons are standardly called motivating reasons. I argue that three dominant views of motivating reasons (psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism) all fail to capture the ordinary concept of a motivating reason. I show this by drawing out three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and demonstrating how each view fails to satisfy at least one of these constraints. I then propose and defend my own account of motivating reasons, which I call the Guise of Normative Reasons Account. On the account I defend, motivating reasons are propositions. A proposition is the reason for which someone Ф‐s when (a) she represents that proposition as a normative reason to Ф, and (b) her representation explains, in the right way, her Ф‐ing. As I argue, the Guise of Normative Reasons Account satisfies all three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and weathers several objections that might be leveled against propositionalist views.

Γιατί οι ηθικές βελτιώσεις χαρακτήρα είναι καταδικασμένες να αποτύχουν; Η κριτική των φιλοσοφιών της αρετής

All kinds of enhancements, cognitive, physical, psychological, moral etc. are at the center of moral debates nowadays. In particular the moral enhancements of character by virtue of pharmacological and biotechnological means are widely discussed, as they raise a number of questions regarding human autonomy and freedom. In the present article, we argue that if we study carefully the way in which the moral enhancements are applied according to the bioethicists Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson, we will realize that they are logically impossible. That is, if we analyze the logical procedure of enhancing characters morally, as this is presented in Aristotle’s and Kant’s moral account, then we will understand that the kind of moral enhancement of character by virtue of biotechnological means which the two philosophers put forward is doomed to fail. Furthermore, we will also understand that the two philosophers offer an impoverished conception of morality, since reason, the basic element of the moral process, plays no role in the account of moral reasoning they propound.

Ethical Dilemmas in Protecting Susceptible Subpopulations From Environmental Health Risks: Liberty, Utility, Fairness, and Accountability for Reasonableness

Various U.S. laws, such as the Clean Air Act and the Food Quality Protection Act, require additional protections for susceptible subpopulations who face greater environmental health risks. The main ethical rationale for providing these protections is to ensure that environmental health risks are distributed fairly. In this article, we (1) consider how several influential theories of justice deal with issues related to the distribution of environmental health risks; (2) show that these theories often fail to provide specific guidance concerning policy choices; and (3) argue that an approach to public decision making known as accountability for reasonableness can complement theories of justice in establishing acceptable environmental health risks for the general population and susceptible subpopulations. Since accountability for reasonableness focuses on the fairness of the decision-making process, not the outcome, it does not guarantee that susceptible subpopulations will receive a maximum level of protection, regardless of costs or other morally relevant considerations.

Evaluating healthcare priority setting at the meso level: A thematic review of empirical literature.

Background:Decentralization of health systems has made sub-national/regional healthcare systems the backbone of healthcare delivery. These regions are tasked with the difficult responsibility of determining healthcare priorities and resource allocation amidst scarce resources. We aimed to review empirical literature that evaluated priority setting practice at the meso level of health systems. Methods:We systematically searched PubMed, ScienceDirect and Google scholar databases and supplemented these with manual searching for relevant studies, based on the reference list of selected papers. We only included empirical studies that described and evaluated, or those that only evaluated priority setting practice at the meso-level. A total of 16 papers were identified from LMICs and HICs. We analyzed data from the selected papers by thematic review. Results:Few studies used systematic priority setting processes, and all but one were from HICs. Both formal and informal criteria are used in priority-setting, however, informal criteria appear to be more perverse in LMICs compared to HICs. The priority setting process at the meso-level is a top-down approach with minimal involvement of the community. Accountability for reasonableness was the most common evaluative framework as it was used in 12 of the 16 studies. Efficiency, reallocation of resources and options for service delivery redesign were the most common outcome measures used to evaluate priority setting. Limitations:Our study was limited by the fact that there are very few empirical studies that have evaluated priority setting at the meso-level and there is likelihood that we did not capture all the studies. Conclusions: Improving priority setting practices at the meso level is crucial to strengthening health systems. This can be achieved through incorporating and adapting systematic priority setting processes and frameworks to the context where used, and making considerations of both process and outcome measures during priority setting and resource allocation.

Reasonableness as Normality

A classic debate concerns whether reasonableness should be understood statistically (e.g., reasonableness is what is common) or prescriptively (e.g., reasonableness is what is good). This Article elaborates and defends a third possibility. Reasonableness is a partly statistical and partly prescriptive “hybrid,” reflecting both statistical and prescriptive considerations. Experiments reveal that people apply reasonableness as a hybrid concept, and the Article argues that a hybrid account offers the best general theory of reasonableness. First, the Article investigates how ordinary people judge what is reasonable. Reasonableness sits at the core of countless legal standards, yet little work has investigated how ordinary people (i.e., potential jurors) actually make reasonableness judgments. Experiments reveal that judgments of reasonableness are systematically intermediate between judgments of the relevant average and ideal across numerous legal domains. For example, participants’ mean judgment of the legally reasonable number of weeks’ delay before a criminal trial (ten weeks) falls between the judged average (seventeen weeks) and ideal (seven weeks). So too for the reasonable num- ber of days to accept a contract offer, the reasonable rate of attorneys’ fees, the reasonable loan interest rate, and the reasonable annual number of loud events on a football field in a residential neighborhood. Judgment of reasonableness is better predicted by both statistical and prescriptive factors than by either factor alone. This Article uses this experimental discovery to develop a normative view of reasonableness. It elaborates an account of reasonableness as a hybrid standard, arguing that this view offers the best general theory of reasonableness, one that applies correctly across multiple legal domains. Moreover, this hybrid feature is the historical essence of legal reasonableness: the original use of the “reasonable person” and the “man on the Clapham omnibus” aimed to reflect both statistical and prescriptive considerations. Empirically, reasonableness is a hybrid judgment. And normatively, reasonableness should be applied as a hybrid standard.

Nietzsche, intention, action

AbstractNietzsche sometimes writes as if we are not in control—at least not in conscious control—of our actions. He seems to suggest that what we actually do is independent of our intentions. It turns out, though, that his understanding of both intention and action differs radically from most contemporary treatments of the issue. In particular, he denies that our actions are caused by their intentions, whose role is hermeneutical in a sense that this essay develops. How then is responsibility to be assigned, since its moral variety, at least, depends, on several views, on the intention with which an action is performed? Nietzsche, of course, is not interested in making attributions of moral responsibility. Still, his views on the relationship between an individual action, its intention, other actions by its agent, and the agent's character, as this essay presents them, provide a reasonable account of action generally and a different, broader account of responsibility for oneself.

Following the law because it’s the law: obedience, bootstrapping, and practical reason

Voluntarists in the early modern period speak of an agent’s following the law because she was ordered to do so or because it’s the law. Contemporary philosophers tend either to ignore or to dismiss the possibility of justified obedience of this sort – that is, they ignore or dismiss the possibility that something’s being the law could in itself constitute a good reason to act. In this paper, I suggest that this view isn’t taken seriously because of certain widespread beliefs about practical reason – in particular, it’s due to the belief that it’s impossible for reasons to be “bootstrapped” into existence. I argue, though, that a plausible account of practical reasoning should allow that reasons can be bootstrapped into existence, and so there’s no reason to be suspicious about the possibility of a person’s being justified in following the law because it’s the law. I end by suggesting that this conclusion opens up important new avenues of inquiry for philosophers working on topics related to legal obedience.

Evaluating healthcare priority setting at the meso level: A thematic review of empirical literature

Background: Decentralization of health systems has made sub-national/regional healthcare systems the backbone of healthcare delivery. These regions are tasked with the difficult responsibility of determining healthcare priorities and resource allocation amidst scarce resources. We aimed to review empirical literature that evaluated priority setting practice at the meso level of health systems. Methods: We systematically searched PubMed, ScienceDirect and Google scholar databases and supplemented these with manual searching for relevant studies, based on the reference list of selected papers. We only included empirical studies that described and evaluated, or those that only evaluated priority setting practice at the meso-level. A total of 16 papers were identified from LMICs and HICs. We analyzed data from the selected papers by thematic review. Results: Few studies used systematic priority setting processes, and all but one were from HICs. Both formal and informal criteria are used in priority-setting, however, informal criteria appear to be more perverse in LMICs compared to HICs. The priority setting process at the meso-level is a top-down approach with minimal involvement of the community. Accountability for reasonableness was the most common evaluative framework as it was used in 12 of the 16 studies. Efficiency, reallocation of resources and options for service delivery redesign were the most common outcome measures used to evaluate priority setting. Limitations: Our study was limited by the fact that there are very few empirical studies that have evaluated priority setting at the meso-level and there is likelihood that we did not capture all the studies. Conclusions: Improving priority setting practices at the meso level is crucial to strengthening health systems. This can be achieved through incorporating and adapting systematic priority setting processes and frameworks to the context where used, and making considerations of both process and outcome measures during priority setting and resource allocation.

PP149 Features Of Accountable And Reasonable Processes For Coverage Decision-Making

Introduction:The Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R) framework addresses the legitimacy of coverage decision processes by defining four conditions for accountable and reasonable processes: Relevance, Publicity, Appeals, Implementation. Cost-per-quality-adjusted life year (QALY) and multicriteria-centered processes may have distinct implications for meeting A4R conditions. The aim of this study was to reflect on how the diverse features of decision-making processes can be aligned with A4R conditions to guide legitimized decision-making. Rare disease and regenerative therapies (RDRTs) pose special decision-making challenges and offer a useful case study.Methods:To support reflection on how different approaches address the A4R conditions, thirty-four features operationalizing each condition were defined and organized into a matrix. Seven experts from six countries explored and discussed these features during a panel (Chatham House Rule) and provided general and RDRT-specific recommendations for each feature. Responses were analyzed to identify converging and diverging recommendations.Results:Regarding Relevance, panelists highlighted the importance of supporting deliberation, stakeholder participation and grounding coverage decision criteria in the legal framework, goals of sustainable healthcare and population values. Among seventeen criteria, thirteen were recommended by more than half of panelists. Although the cost-effectiveness ratio was deemed sometimes useful, the validity of universal thresholds to inform allocative efficiency was challenged. Regarding Publicity, panelists recommended communicating the values underlying a decision in reference to broader societal objectives, and being transparent about value judgements in selecting evidence. For Appeals, recommendations included clear definition of new evidence and revision rules. For Implementation, one recommendation was to perform external quality reviews of decisions. While RDRTs raise issues that may warrant special consideration, rarity should be considered in interaction with other aspects (e.g. disease severity, age, budget impact).Conclusions:Improving coverage decision-making towards accountability and reasonableness involves supporting participation and deliberation, enhancing transparency, and more explicit consideration of multiple decision criteria that reflect normative and societal objectives.

Artificial Dasein: Solving the Frame Problem with Incremental Contextualization

In this paper, we give an account of a rationally behaving agent—an artificial Dasein—which can perceive the world in terms of relevance to its own goals. The way we achieve this is through a process of incremental contextualization of goals and constraints that range from the purely conceptual and abstract to the well-defined and physical. The model described in this paper combines a conceptual hierarchy with a schema structure, and leads to an account of practical reasoning which relies on two novel ideas: the recursive selection of increasingly contextualized subgoals, and the tractable determination of behavioral consequences through simulation. The present account seeks to provide an outline for developing an agent which does not suffer from the frame problem due to the way in which it incrementally contextualizes its goals until they can be achieved unreflectively by matching them to pre-learned schemas. We believe that this account can lead to a form of artificial intelligence more powerful than traditional attempts based on formal logic.

Suboptimal choice, reward-predictive signals, and temporal information.

Suboptimal choice refers to preference for an alternative offering a low probability of food (suboptimal alternative) over an alternative offering a higher probability of food (optimal alternative). Numerous studies have found that stimuli signaling probabilistic food play a critical role in the development and maintenance of suboptimal choice. However, there is still much debate about how to characterize how these stimuli influence suboptimal choice. There is substantial evidence that the temporal information conveyed by a food-predictive signal governs its function as both a Pavlovian conditioned stimulus and as an instrumental conditioned reinforcer. Thus, we explore the possibility that food-predictive signals influence suboptimal choice via the temporal information they convey. Application of this temporal information-theoretic approach to suboptimal choice provides a formal, quantitative framework that describes how food-predictive signals influence suboptimal choice in a manner consistent with related phenomena in Pavlovian conditioning and conditioned reinforcement. Our reanalysis of previous data on suboptimal choice suggests that, generally speaking, preference in the suboptimal choice procedure tracks relative temporal information conveyed by food-predictive signals for the suboptimal and optimal alternatives. The model suggests that suboptimal choice develops when the food-predictive signal for the suboptimal alternative conveys more temporal information than that for the optimal alternative. Finally, incorporating a role for competition between temporal information provided by food-predictive signals and relative primary reinforcement rate provides a reasonable account of existing data on suboptimal choice. (PsycINFO Database Record

Rawls on agreeing to disagree: How democracies differ from non-democracies in justifying war

ABSTRACTWe use Rawls’s account of public reason and the Law of Peoples to test two hypotheses: democracies are more likely to invoke self-defense in justifications than non-democracies, and democracies are more likely to invoke human rights in justifications than non-democracies. Through an analysis of war justifications since 1875, we find that although democracies and non-democracies are similarly likely to use self-defense as a justification, democracies are more likely to justify war through human rights. Institutions and values centering on rights that promote domestic public justification also promote justifications compatible with those values and institutions at the international level.

New trends in the system regulating the market of bank services

The severity of the last financial crisis for the European financial markets, the economy, and society makes the scientists and financial analysts start to seek answers with great openness not only to the question of how to reduce its negative effects in the future, but also of how the system regulating financial institutions will look like in the future. The article discusses three options of the positions on the future regulatory tendencies: theoretical alternative, option presented in reports and expert studies, and the version arising from observations of the current practices of functioning of the European banks. The aim of the article is to confront the views on the future trends in the regulation of the banking sector from theoretical, consulting point of view, and the view formulated on the basis of evalua-tion of banking practices.

Advancing methods for health priority setting practice through the contribution of systems theory: Lessons from a case study in Ethiopia

Setting priorities for health services is a complex and value laden process. Over the past twenty years, there has been considerable scholarly attention paid to strengthening fairness and legitimacy using the prominent ethical framework, Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R). A variety of case studies applying A4R have advanced our conceptual understanding of procedural fairness, and have highlighted the significance of context through its application. There is a paucity of research, however, that rigorously examines how and to what extent context influences health priority setting processes and the establishment of procedural fairness. We argue here that to study context rigorously requires taking a holistic view of the system by examining the dynamics and interrelationships within it. Using the Transformative Systems Change Framework (TSCF), this investigation sought to examine the influence of system factors on priority setting practice and procedural fairness. A qualitative case study of Ethiopian district health planning was undertaken in 2010 and 2011. Methods included 58 qualitative interviews with decision makers, participant observation, and document analysis. Data analysis followed in three phases: i) an inductive analysis of district health priority setting to highlight experiences across each of the three districts selected, ii) deductive analysis applying A4R and the TSCF independently; and iii) a synthesis of concepts of priority setting practice and procedural fairness within a broader, theoretical understanding of the system. Through the application of the TSCF, a nuanced understanding of priority setting practice is revealed that situates this process within a system of interdependent components that include: norms, operations, regulations, and resources. This paper offers a practical guide attuned to system features influencing the design, implementation, and sustainability of greater fairness in health priority setting practice.

FROM ECLIPSE OF REASON TO THE AGE OF REASONS? HISTORICIZING HABERMAS AND THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL

Two new works historicize the human faculty of reason. The first, a biography of Jürgen Habermas, traces the evolution of his postmetaphysical theory of reason from its origins to its most recent iterations. The second offers a far broader genealogy of the concept of reason in modern thought, especially in Kant, Hegel, Marx, and the Frankfurt school. Both depict Habermas as one of the most important protagonists in contemporary philosophy, but offer differing accounts of his place in the history of the “Frankfurt school.” The two also contextualize Habermas very differently. While Müller-Doohm locates Habermas firmly within a postwar German, European, and to a lesser extent transatlantic frame, Jay opts for the longue durée of German Idealist thought and its critics from Kant to the first generation of the Frankfurt school. Both help us assess the merits of the procedural rationality that Habermas considers the only valid conception of reason available to us as moderns—Müller-Doohm by sketching its many facets and spheres of application, Jay by scrutinizing the arguments for and against Habermas's account of reason. As Jay puts it, it is fair to say that a paradigm shift has occurred in our appreciation of the stakes involved in defending reason as a ground of critique against those who have reduced it to a tool in the service of some deeper purpose . . . put in a nutshell, it might be said—or at least plausibly hoped—that both the Enlightenment's Age of Reason and the Counter-Enlightenment's Age of Reason's Other have been left behind, and in their place is dawning a new Age of Reasons” (148, original emphasis).

The Dual Account of Reason and the Spirit of Philosophy in Hume's Treatise

The purpose of this essay is to contribute to the understanding of Hume’s account of the faculty of reason and to examine some implications for interpreting the broader arc of his philosophy. I argue that Hume develops his thinking about reason dialectically in Book I of the Treatise by creating a reflective dynamic between two different concepts of reason. The first concept of reason (reason1) is a narrow faculty that operates on ideas via intuition and demonstration. The second concept (reason2) is a broader imagination-dependent faculty that augments reason1 with the activity of probable reasoning. The dialectic between reason1 and reason2 leads to Hume skepticism, which is compounded by the fact that reason2 self-subverts if not constrained. Hume resolves these matters in the conclusion to Book 1 by conditionally committing to apply reason2 to matters of common life and social interest in a diffidently skeptical manner.

Can Objectivists Account for Subjective Reasons?

Abstract here.

Binocular combination of luminance profiles.

We develop and test a new two-dimensional model for binocular combination of the two eyes' luminance profiles. For first-order stimuli, the model assumes that one eye's luminance profile first goes through a luminance compressor, receives gain-control and gain-enhancement from the other eye, and then linearly combines the other eye's output profile. For second-order stimuli, rectification is added in the signal path of the model before the binocular combination site. Both the total contrast and luminance energies, weighted sums over both the space and spatial-frequency domains, were used in the interocular gain-control, while only the total contrast energy was used in the interocular gain-enhancement. To challenge the model, we performed a binocular brightness matching experiment over a large range of background and target luminances. The target stimulus was a dichoptic disc with a sharp edge that has an increment or decrement luminance from its background. The disk's interocular luminance ratio varied from trial to trial. To refine the model we tested three luminance compressors, five nested binocular combination models (including the Ding–Sperling and the DSKL models), and examined the presence or absence of total luminance energy in the model. We found that (1) installing a luminance compressor, either a logarithmic luminance function or luminance gain-control, (2) including both contrast and luminance energies, and (3) adding interocular gain-enhancement (the DSKL model) to a combined model significantly improved its performance. The combined model provides a systematic account of binocular luminance summation over a large range of luminance input levels. It gives a unified explanation of Fechner's paradox observed on a dark background, and a winner-take-all phenomenon observed on a light background. To further test the model, we conducted two additional experiments: luminance summation of discs with asymmetric contour information (Experiment 2), similar to Levelt (1965) and binocular combination of second-order contrast-modulated gratings (Experiment 3). We used the model obtained in Experiment 1 to predict the results of Experiments 2 and 3 and the results of our previous studies. Model simulations further refined the contrast space weight and contrast sensitivity functions that are installed in the model, and provide a reasonable account for rebalancing of imbalanced binocular vision by reducing the mean luminance in the dominant eye.

Byzantinism and Rationality: Julien Benda and Constantine Tsatsos

This article examines the concept of Byzantinism that Julien Benda employed in his book La France Byzantine. In the fin-de-siècle European sensibility, Byzantinism was transferred from political to literary level, but Benda created an epistemological break when he asserted in his book that Byzantinism is literature in its normal function. Furthermore, of Byzantinist character is especially the modern literature (e.g. Valéry or Mallarmé). Thus, labeling modern literati as Byzantinist writers served as a critical tool for Benda, who condemned the degradation of modern intellectuals into clerks. This transformation of literary normality affected also pure thought as is manifested in the ambiguous manner of expressing their ideas by modern thinkers (this being a mixture of idealism and apocryphal thinking, which renders ideas rather abstractions than instruments of rationality). An example of such a Byzantinist use can be found in the manner Emmanuel Levinas exploited Husserl’s phenomenology. Finally, Benda engaged in a discussion with Paulhan’s view that literary philosophy is a form of critical terror. The position of Benda is that of a rationalist, whereas Paulhan is a thinker who focuses on the use of language. For Constantine Tsatsos (1899–1987), on the other hand, a Greek philosopher and author of a philosophical novel entitled Dialogues in a Monastery (1974), the Byzantine moment is a part of great continuity of Greek culture, which is characterized by various structures in its period of long duration. One of these is the synthesis of Hellenism and Christianity that can be seen in Byzantium, where the transposition of the philosophical (Platonic) Eros to the mystical one plays a major role. This development is of paramount importance not only for the whole European culture but also for all questions of beauty and morality. The present paper concludes with a brief discussion of Richard Rorty’s account of pragmatic reason, which makes it possible to show how contemporary philosophy can be placed in the context of the debate about Byzantinism.