Realist Response Research Articles

Standpoint theory, realism and the search for objectivity in the sociology of education

This paper evaluates the contribution of ‘social realism’ in resolving questions of knowledge and curriculum in the sociology of education. Social realists argue that, in the interests of educational equality, all pupils should have access to ‘powerful’ knowledge produced by specialist intellectual communities. Social realism relies upon a critique of standpoint theory, taking it to be irrealist, relativist and ignorant of the post-empiricist revolution in the philosophy of science. This paper argues however, that social realists fail to appreciate the critical realist response to the post-empiricist revolution and thereby end up critiquing a caricatured version of standpoint theory. The paper concludes that if we are concerned with restoring objectivity, in a manner that avoids both relativism and cultural elitism in school curricula, a turn away from standpoint theory in the sociology of education is not warranted and may be obstructive.

Squaring the Exceptional and the Normative? A Realist Response to Kahn’s Political Theology

Squaring the Exceptional and the Normative? A Realist Response to Kahn’s Political Theology

Instantiation is not partial identity

In order to avoid the problems faced by standard realist analyses of the “relation” of instantiation, Baxter and, following him, Armstrong each analyze the instantiation of a universal by a particular in terms of their partial identity. I introduce two related conceptions of partial identity, one mereological and one non-mereological, both of which require at least one of the relata of the partial identity “relation” to be complex. I then introduce a second non-mereological conception of partial identity, which allows for both relata to be simple. I take these three conceptions to exhaust the plausible ways of construing two entities as being partially identical. I then argue that there is no analysis (including those offered by Baxter and Armstrong) of a universal and a particular as being partially identical consistent with any of these three conceptions that (i) is coherent, (ii) is consistently realist, (iii) does not lead to absurd consequences, and (iv) offers a “solution” to the problem of instantiation that avoids the problems with the other standard realist responses. In so arguing, I offer a criticism of the analysis of instantiation as partial identity that is independent of the standard criticism that it entails the necessity of predication.

Epistemic Equivalence and Epistemic Incapacitation

AbstractOne typical realist response to the argument from underdetermination of theories by evidence is an appeal to epistemic criteria besides the empirical evidence to argue that, while scientifi...

The metaphysics of rule-following

This paper proposes a causal–dispositional account of rule-following as it occurs in reasoning and intentional agency. It defends this view against Kripke’s (Wittgenstein on rules and private language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982) objection to dispositional accounts of rule-following, and it proposes a solution to the problem of deviant causal chains. In the first part, I will outline the causal–dispositional approach. In the second part, I will follow Martin and Heil’s (Philos Perspect 12:283–312, 1998) realist response to Kripke’s challenge. I will propose an account that distinguishes between two kinds of rule-conformity and two kinds of rule-following, and I will defend the realist approach against two challenges that have recently been raised by Handfield and Bird (Philos Stud 140:285–298, 2008). In the third part, I will turn to the problem of deviant causal chains, and I will propose a new solution that is partly based on the realist account of rule-following.

Constructivism, Expressivism and Ethical Knowledge

In the contemporary metaethical debate, expressivist (Blackburn, Gibbard) and constructivist (Korsgaard, Street) views can be viewed as inspired by irrealist ideas from Hume and Kant respectively. One realist response to these contemporary irrealist views is to argue that they are inconsistent with obvious surface‐level appearances of ordinary ethical thought and discourse, especially the fact that we talk and act as if there is ethical knowledge. In this paper, I explore some constructivist and expressivist options for responding to this objection. My conclusion is that, although both constructivists and expressivists can capture other surface‐level features of ethical thought and discourse, the possibility of ethical knowledge causes special problems for these versions of irrealism. I end with some comments about where I think irrealists should begin to look for a response to these special problems, which points, somewhat surprisingly, towards an alternative inferentialist form of irrealism about epistemic and ethical thought and discourse, which is inspired by Sellars.

A curious disagreement: response to Hoyningen-Huene and Oberheim

In this response, doubts are expressed relating to the treatment by Hoyningen-Huene and Oberheim of the relation between incommensurability and content comparison. A realist response is presented to their treatment of ontological replacement. Further questions are raised about the coherence of the neo-Kantian idea of the world-in-itself as well as the phenomenal worlds hypothesis. The notion of common sense is clarified. Meta-incommensurability is dismissed as a rhetorical device which obstructs productive discussion.

Scientific realism and the inevitability of science

This paper examines the question of whether scientific realism is committed to the inevitability of science or is consistent with claims of the contingency of science. In order to address this question, a general characterization of the position of scientific realism is presented. It is then argued that scientific realism has no evident implications with regard to the inevitability of science. A historical case study is presented in which contingency plays a significant role, and the appropriate realist response to this case study is indicated. Finally, it is argued that, when conjoined with a reliabilist theory of method, realism does have implications for the inevitability of science.

South Korea and Sino-Japanese rivalry: a middle power's options within the East Asian core triangle

South Korea is a middle power in a region where its scope of action can rise and fall quickly and diplomatic flexibility is needed. Neither realist responses to threats nor idealist trust in integration meet its needs for adjusting triangular ties with China and Japan, as their relations become the principal great power divide in Northeast Asia. Its optimal choice is as a facilitator biding its time when tensions over both security and national identity clashes are intense, while preparing for opportunities. Four conditions would give it a favorable environment: forward-looking foreign leadership; security challenges brought under some control; subsiding preoccupation with national identities; and its own strategic planning with care not to overreach. Multiple possibilities emerge if it can rebuild ties with Japan as part of a triangle with China as well as one with the United States and also synchronize ties with China to other ties. Even amidst recurrent tensions, the core East Asian triangle offers Seoul a chance to take advantage of changing dynamics in the world's most ascendant region.

Exceeding our grasp: science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives

1. Realism, Pessimism, and Underdetermination 1.1 Scientific Realism: What's at Stake? 1.2 Problems for Pessimism and Underdetermination 1.3 Recurrent, Transient Underdetermination, and a New Induction over the History of Science 2. Chasing Duhem: The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives 2.1 Duhem's Worry: Eliminative Inferences and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives 2.2 Confirmation: Holism, Eliminative Induction, and Bayesianism 2.3 Pessimism Revisited 3. Darwin and Pangenesis: The Search for the Material Basis of Generation and Heredity 3.1 Preliminary Worries 3.2 Pangenesis: Darwin's Mad Dream and Beloved Child 3.3 Darwin's Failure to Grasp Galton's Common Cause Mechanism for Inheritance 4. Galton and the Strip Theory 4.1 The Transfusion Experiments: A Dreadful Disappointment to Them Both 4.2 Galton's Strip Theory and Its Maturational, Invariant Conception of Inheritance 4.3 Galton's Understanding of Correlation and Variable Influences in Development 5. August Weismann's Theory of the Germ-Plasm 5.1 German Biology at the End of the Nineteenth Century and Weismann's Theory of the Germ-Plasm 5.2 Germinal Specificity, the Search for a Mechanism of Cellular Differentiation and the Reservation of the Germ-Plasm 5.4 Productive and Expendable Germinal Resources 5.5 Conclusion: Lessons from History 6. History Revisited: Pyrrhic Victories for Scientific Realism 6.1 Realist Responses to the Historical Record 6.2 Once More into the Breach: The Pessimistic Induction 6.3 Reference without Descriptive Accuracy 6.4 Diluting Approximate Truth 7. Selective Confirmation and the Historical Record: Another Such Victory over the Romans? 7.1 Realism, Selective Confirmation, and Retrospective Judgments of Idleness 7.2 Theoretical Posits: They Work Hard for the Money 7.3 Trust and Betrayal 7.4 Structural Realism and Retention 7.5 Selective Confirmation: No Refuge for Realism 8. Science without Realism? References Index

‘The analytic–synthetic distinction and conceptual analyses of basic health concepts’

Within philosophy of medicine it has been a widespread view that there are important theoretical and practical reasons for clarifying the nature of basic health concepts like disease, illness and sickness. Many theorists have attempted to give definitions that can function as general standards, but as more and more definitions have been rejected as inadequate, pessimism about the possibility of formulating plausible definitions has become increasingly widespread. However, the belief that no definitions will succeed since no definitions have succeeded is an inductive objection, open to realist responses. The article argues that an influential argument from philosophy of language constitutes a more fundamental objection. I use disease as an example and show that this argument implies that if a common understanding of disease can be analysed into a definition, then this is a non-trivial definition. But any non-trivial analysis must be viciously circular: the analysis must presuppose that disease can be defined, but this is what the analysis is supposed to yield as a result. This means, the article concludes, that disease and other controversial health concepts do not have analyses grounded in a common language. Stipulative and contextual definitions can have local significance, but the normative roles of such definitions are at the same time limited.

A Naturalist–Phenomenal Realist Response to Block's Harder Problem

A Naturalist–Phenomenal Realist Response to Block's Harder Problem

Realism, Regularity and Social Explanation

Stephen Kemp and John Holmwood, Realism, Regularity and Social Explanation, pp. 165–187. This article explores the difficulties raised for social scientific investigation by the absence of experiment, critically reviewing realist responses to the problem such as those offered by Bhaskar, Collier and Sayer. It suggests that realist arguments for a shift from prediction to explanation, the use of abstraction, and reliance upon interpretive forms of investigation fail to demonstrate that these approaches compensate for the lack of experimental control. Instead, it is argued that the search for regularities, when suitably conceived, provides the best alternative to experiment for the social sciences.

The Realist Response to Idealism in England and Lonergan's Critical Realism

The Realist Response to Idealism in England and Lonergan's Critical Realism

The Problem of Meaning and Borgmann's Realist Response

The Problem of Meaning and Borgmann's Realist Response

Realism and constructivism in strategy research: a critical realist response to Mir and Watson

AbstractMir and Watson (2000) advocate that constructivism has the potential to inform strategy research. In their discussions, they compare constructivism with realism, and highlight certain alleged strengths of the former over the latter. Although their paper provides some insights, their version of constructivism is problematic and their understanding of realism is inaccurate. In this note we clarify some key issues concerning constructivism and realism. Moreover, we argue that Mir and Watson's insights can be accommodated within a critical realist framework. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The language of science: meaning variance and theory comparison

The paper gives an overview of key themes of twentieth-century philosophical treatment of the language of science, with special emphasis on the meaning variance of scientific terms and the comparison of alternative theories. These themes are dealt with via discussion of the topics of: (a) the logical positivist principle of verifiability and the problem of the meaning of theoretical terms, (b) the post-positivist thesis of semantic incommensurability; and (c) the scientific realist response to incommensurability based on the causal theory of reference.

The Social Construction of Nature: Relativist Accusations, Pragmatist and Critical Realist Responses

Social constructivists argue that what we call “nature” isfar less universal and extrahuman than generally assumed. Yet this argument has been vigorously attacked by some natural scientists and other scholars due to what they perceive as its dangerous flirtation with relativism. I introduce this debate by reference to a recent controversy over the concept of wilderness, an important icon of nature in North America. I then define several forms of relativism, and compare two contemporary bodies of thought that are in broad agreement with social constructivism, yet do not promote strong forms of relativism: critical realism and pragmatism. For its part, critical realism is marked by a qualified, though vigorous, rejection of strong forms of relativism in understanding nature, whereas pragmatism involves more of an agnostic response, a sense that the so-called problem of relativism is not as serious as critics of the social-construction-of-nature argument would believe. Taken together, the two approaches offer more than either one alone, as they both suggest important truths about nature, albeit generally at different scales. Ultimately, pragmatists and critical realists alike admit that allknowledges are partial and a certain degree of relativism is thus unavoidable; yet they both, in a sort of tense complementarity, point to ways that geographers and others whose business and concern it is to represent nature can indeed have something to say.

A Realist Response to the Appeal for Pacifism

A Realist Response to the Appeal for Pacifism