Realist Interpretation Of Quantum Mechanics Research Articles

On the Significance of the Bell Inequalities for the Locality Problem in Different Realistic Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics

AbstractThe relation between the Bell inequalities, locality and the existence of joint probability distributions is discussed in different realist interpretations of quantum mechanics. We distinguish four realist interpretations, viz., the objectivistic one, the contextualistic one, the strictly nonobjectivistic and the quasi‐objectivistic interpretation. Conclusions are differing largely in different interpretations. We also distinguish between two kinds of locality, viz, macrolocality and Einstein/Bell locality. From a classical model of stochastic measuring processes a definition of Einstein/Bell locality is derived that differs from the Bell/Clauser/Horne/Shimony factorizability condition. It is demonstrated that only in the quasi‐objectivistic interpretation the Einstein/Bell locality condition plays a role in the derivation of a Bell inequality for quantities that are experimentally relevant. It is argued that even in this interpretation it is not possible to arrive at the conclusions that the Bell inequalities stem from the locality condition because of the tacit assumption of an additional property, namely the existence of probability distributions conditionalized on the dispersionfree states of the hidden variables. Consideration of a phase space representation of the Schrödinger equation demonstrates that this latter assumption is at odds with the statistics of quantum systems.

Logic, Quantum Logic and Empiricism

This paper treats some of the issues raised by Putnam's discussion of, and claims for, quantum logic, specifically: that its proposal is a response to experimental difficulties; that it is a reasonable replacement for classical logic because its connectives retain their classical meanings, and because it can be derived as a logic of tests. We argue that the first claim is wrong (1), and that while conjunction and disjunction can be considered to retain their classical meanings, negation crucially does not. The argument is conducted via a thorough analysis of how the meet, join and complementation operations are defined in the relevant logical structures, respectively Boolean- and ortholattices (3). Since Putnam wishes to reinstate a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, we ask how quantum logic can be a logic of realism. We show that it certainly cannot be a logic of bivalence realism (i.e., of truth and falsity), although it is consistent with some form of ontological realism (4). Finally, we show that while a reasonable explication of the idealized notion of test yields interesting mathematical structure, it by no means yields the rich ortholattice structure which Putnam (following Finkelstein) seeks.

The possibility of a more realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics

The old-fashioned concept of state is shown to be inadequate and misleading. Replacing it by a concept of information and taking advantage of the invariance of the mechanical description under time reversal puts the problems of the interpretation of quantum mechanics in a new light. A more realistic interpretation appears to be possible. Moreover, a new explanation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox is presented, too.