Realist Explanations Research Articles

Insufficiency of informal alignment: why did Finland choose formal NATO membership?

Abstract In May 2022, less than three months after Russia started its war of aggression against Ukraine, both Finland and Sweden applied for membership in NATO, thereby revoking their longstanding policies of non-alliance. What led to this shift? And what made formal NATO membership more attractive to these countries than their previous relationship with the alliance, which already amounted to informal alignment between them and NATO? To answer these questions, this article reviews the process and debates preceding the Finnish NATO application, which also proved decisive for Sweden's alliance bid. In doing so, the article contributes to the existing literature on Finland's NATO process as well as the broader scholarly debate about alliance formation. It argues that two factors prompted the Finnish NATO application: first, a dramatic shift in Finnish public opinion on NATO membership and, second, the emergence of a broadly shared view among Finland's elites of the insufficiency of Finland's existing security arrangements in view of Russia's increased threat potential, with NATO membership seen as the only viable remedy. The article duly highlights the role of public opinion in shaping a state's alignment preferences. Moreover, it finds strong evidence for realist (threat) and rationalist (efficiency) explanations for alliance formation.

ASEAN, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the politics of pragmatism

Abstract The timid response of member governments of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has puzzled many western observers as it flagrantly violates the most basic norms of international law to which ASEAN expressly subscribes. This article seeks to provide answers to this puzzle. Informed by practice theory, the article transcends conventional realist explanations of how small and medium-sized countries respond to great power politics. Combining material and cognitive arguments, practice theory allows identifying the cultural and ideational roots of these policies and uncovering mismatches between rhetoric and agency. It suggests that, conceptualized as communities of practice, ASEAN member countries' foreign policy elites have developed a path-dependent pragmatism, which guides their response to great power politics and hence the war in Ukraine. Employing a qualitative mixed-methods approach, the empirical part of the article examines how south-east Asia's diplomatic communities of practice define pragmatism and shows that, historically, pragmatism has strongly guided their foreign policies. It traces ASEAN governments' pragmatic responses to the war in Ukraine at three levels: the national, regional and the (global) multilateral level. The article concludes that liberal proselytism does not help the West to win over ASEAN member countries to support its pro-Ukraine course.

The EU's Response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Invoking Norms and Values in Times of Fundamental Rupture

AbstractThe European Union's response to the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has been widely perceived as unprecedented. This article examines how this could be, considering the long track record of disagreement amongst EU member states over foreign policy vis‐à‐vis Russia. It is argued that whilst the Russian invasion had a decisive impact on member states' security threat perceptions, realist explanations of the EU's forceful response encounter limitations: Germany and France, the EU's most influential powers, were not the drivers of the EU's joint actions during the first months following the invasion, as they struggled to redefine their national security interests. Against this background, this article takes a different perspective. It asks in what kind of intersubjective context the EU's initial response became meaningful and rational, allowing for agreement to emerge amongst the member states on a set of unprecedented measures. This article proposes a theoretical approach that takes into account the role of norms, rationalities and speech acts in a changing context and of social interaction therein. It is demonstrated that, given the dramatic rupture following the invasion, the EU's response in 2022 was embedded in, and structured by, a priori understandings and justifications generated by the EU in response to Russia's war against Ukraine starting in 2014, including normative considerations.

An Investigation into the Relationship between Diaspora and Identity with Reference to the Iranian Diaspora

Abstract The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between diaspora and identity with reference to the Iranian diaspora as a case study. Although there has been a recent growth in the study of ideational factors and their effects on sociopolitical issues, identity remains understudied within the mainstream literature on diaspora studies, international relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis (FPA). The aim is to challenge the purely realist and power-based explanations that have dominated the discourse by introducing the notion of identity and exploring it in relation to the Iranian diaspora. The paper’s novel approach lies in its categorisation of Iranian diaspora identity into three main components: nationalist (ancient Iran) tendencies, religious (Islamic-Shiite) tendencies and secular (Western) tendencies. The identity components of Iranians abroad and their interaction with the homeland are relatively comparable to those of their compatriots at home, showing intersecting areas of commonality and difference.

Exploring the Fusion of Magic and Realism in Harris's Chocolat: A Beacon of Hope for Liberation

With an emphasis on the novel's description of magical realism and social reformation, this research paper seeks to study Joanne Harris's Chocolat and its depiction of a society in which the residents strongly regard the so-called Christian orthodoxy. The researcher used a qualitative research method, such as literary analysis, to analyze the novel and explore its themes and motifs. For this, the novel is examined in detail, themes and motifs are identified, and the characters and their interactions are analyzed in detail. The researcher used quotes from the novel to support his claim. The female protagonist, Vianne, challenges this orthodoxy through her chocolate boutique in front of the church and initiates social reformation. The novel explores the negative portrayal of Vianne by the townspeople as a witch, outsider, and atheist, but she overcomes these issues by exposing the hypocrisy of the Christian orthodoxy and advocating for humanity, freedom, and social change through her chocolate shop. The author strikes a balance between magical and realist explanations in her writing. At the same time, the main character possesses a magical ability to intuit her customers' preferences and artfully win their affections. The novel encourages readers to accept the mystical elements of everyday life and scientific rationality. The findings and conclusion of this research is that Harris's Chocolat is a unique blend of magical realism and social reformation, challenging traditional Christian orthodoxy and advocating for a more humane, free, and accepting society.

미국과 중국은 ‘투키디데스 함정’에 빠져 있는가?

This article evaluates the possibility of ‘Thucydides’s Trap’ between the U.S. and China through defensive realism. The possibility of U.S.-China conflict has been mainly discussed in the frame of offensive realism. It argues that if China’s rise continues, it will cause serious military conflict between the two. However, it is unclear whether the crisis will turn into an actual conflict. Defensive realism provides an alternative perspective. However, the interpretation by defensive realism in contrast to offensive realism has not been highlighted. Considering the importance of defensive realism, there is a theoretical gap for the most important global issue. Most realist explanations predict U.S.-China relations as serious conflicts, but defensive realism posits that it does not necessarily have to be pessimistic. This article draws the concepts of a state’s motivation and type, status quo, security dilemma, and grand bargain, reinterprets U.S.-China relations, and presents alternative policies.

UNVEILING REALIST EXPLANATIONS: MEARSHEIMER'S PERSPECTIVE ON WAR IN UKRAINE

The realist explanations surrounding the origins of Russia's war against Ukraine, specifically John Mearsheimer's assertion of western responsibility, have sparked controversy. Realism, including its more specific offensive sub-school, presents a wide range of contrasting interpretations, depending on the actors studied and the characteristics attributed to them. Similar to classical realism, structural realism is based on underlying assumptions about human nature. To elucidate these assumptions regarding the behavior of states and their leaders, the article explores key components of structural theory, such as power differentials, rational interests, and the perception of states as unified actors. It establishes connections between these concepts and fundamental emotions like fear and anger. The article argues that realists should distinguish between the aspirations of states and the individual leaders' pursuit of power and status. Additionally, the consideration of Russian security concerns may reflect the elite's perceived threat of cultural subordination and Putin's personal apprehension about regime stability. Engaging with realist thought is crucial, not only due to its ongoing influence on policy-making, particularly in Russia, but also to prevent the misappropriation of caricatured versions of realist arguments.

Editor's Note

Editor's Note

Offensive ideas: structural realism, classical realism and Putin's war on Ukraine

Abstract Controversy has surrounded realist explanations of the causes of Russia's war against Ukraine, particularly John Mearsheimer's charge of western responsibility. This article seeks to clarify and contextualize his argument, situating it within the broader paradigm. Realism, and even its narrower offensive sub-school, offers a wide range of contrasting interpretations, depending on which major actors are studied and what characteristics they are endowed with. Like its classical predecessor, structural realism is premised on implicit views of human nature. In an effort to explicate some of these assumptions about the behavioural micro-foundations of states and their leaders, the article investigates main components of structural theory—including power differentials, ‘rational’ interests and states as unitary actors—and connects these concepts to base emotions like fear and anger. It argues that realists do well to differentiate between the aspirations of states and individual leaders' quest for power and status. In the same vein, reference to Russian security concerns may be emblematic of elites' perceived challenges of cultural subordination, and Putin's personal fears for the stability of his regime. Engagement with realist thought is essential, in part because of its continuing influence on policy-making (particularly in Russia) and in order to forestall improper co-option of caricaturized versions of realist arguments.

The realist and selectionist explanations for the success of science

According to realists, theories are successful because they are true, but according to selectionists, theories are successful because they have gone through a rigorous selection process. Wray claims that the realist and selectionist explanations are rivals to each other. Lee objects that they are instead complementary to each other. In my view, Lee’s objection presupposes that the realist explanation is true, and thus it begs the question against selectionists. By contrast, the selectionist explanation invokes a scientific theory, and thus it is not clear whether it is a realist explanation or an antirealist explanation. Finally, the six new arguments for scientific realism in the literature truly complement the no-miracles argument.

Culture, Religion and Strategy: The ‘Islamic’ Contours of Iran’s Nuclear Thinking

This article proposes a fresh explanation of Iran’s nuclear programme by using the framework of strategic culture. The core argument of this article is that Iran’s strategic restraint in not overtly weaponising its nuclear programme is primarily driven by its strategic culture despite the continuously deteriorating regional security situation and a deeply hostile neighbourhood. This has incentivised a ‘Shia way’ of looking at and practising a strategy that sees nuclear weapons as fundamentally un-Islamic. Instead of weaponisation, Iran has shown remarkable flexibility to accept restrictions on its nuclear programme under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Security-based realist explanations fail to account for such behaviour and can be better explained using a cultural framework. The strategic culture-based framework also explains the reasons behind Iran’s policy of nuclear hedging and its acceptability by major sections of the political elite in Iran.

The Right Argument from Moral Disagreement

The anti-realist's argument from moral disagreement has prematurely fallen out of favor. The argument has never been stated explicitly in correct form, and its proponents have not appealed to the best examples to support its premises. Realists have responded with a multitude of possible replies without applying them to the most convincing examples of irresolvable disagreements. The argument is a modus ponens from apparent fundamental disagreements to a disjunction of possible explanations, and then a disjunctive argument eliminating all but one alternative. The most convincing example from the point of view of the anti-realist is the disagreement between the collectivist and the individual rights advocate, which occurs on both the levels of principle and individual judgment. Realist explanations for such disagreements include ignorance of nonmoral facts, application of principles in diverse contexts, bias, faulty reasoning, incommensurability or ties, lack of empathy or imagination, inaccessibility of moral facts, or different meanings for moral terms. I argue that none of these realist explanations for the disagreement between the collectivist and the individualist works, leaving only the anti-realist explanation. Other realist moves, for example analogies with other areas of discourse, including disagreement among meta-ethicists, are also shown to fail.

Non-factualism and evaluative supervenience

ABSTRACT Supervenience in metaethics is the notion that there can be no moral difference between two acts, persons or events without some non-moral difference underlying it. If St. Francis is a good man, there could not be a man exactly like St. Francis in non-evaluative respects that is not good. The phenomenon was first systematically discussed by R. M. Hare (1952), who argued that realists about evaluative properties struggle to account for it. As is well established, Hare, and following him, Simon Blackburn, mistakenly took the relevant phenomenon to be weak rather than strong supervenience, and the explanations they offered for it are accordingly outdated. In this paper, I present a non-factualist account of strong supervenience of the evaluative and argue that it fares better than competing realist views in explaining the conceptual nature of the phenomenon, as well as in offering an account of the supervenience of the evaluative in general, rather than more narrowly the moral. While Hare and Blackburn were wrong about the specifics, they were right in that non-factualists can offer a plausible account of the supervenience of the evaluative, that in certain respects is superior to competing realist explanations.

Expressivism, Inferentialism and the Simulation Game

Expressivism, Inferentialism and the Simulation Game

Violations of locality and free choice are equivalent resources in Bell experiments

Bell inequalities rest on three fundamental assumptions: realism, locality, and free choice, which lead to nontrivial constraints on correlations in very simple experiments. If we retain realism, then violation of the inequalities implies that at least one of the remaining two assumptions must fail, which can have profound consequences for the causal explanation of the experiment. We investigate the extent to which a given assumption needs to be relaxed for the other to hold at all costs, based on the observation that a violation need not occur on every experimental trial, even when describing correlations violating Bell inequalities. How often this needs to be the case determines the degree of, respectively, locality or free choice in the observed experimental behavior. Despite their disparate character, we show that both assumptions are equally costly. Namely, the resources required to explain the experimental statistics (measured by the frequency of causal interventions of either sort) are exactly the same. Furthermore, we compute such defined measures of locality and free choice for any nonsignaling statistics in a Bell experiment with binary settings, showing that it is directly related to the amount of violation of the so-called Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequalities. This result is theory independent as it refers directly to the experimental statistics. Additionally, we show how the local fraction results for quantum-mechanical frameworks with infinite number of settings translate into analogous statements for the measure of free choice we introduce. Thus, concerning statistics, causal explanations resorting to either locality or free choice violations are fully interchangeable.

Water and Warfare: The Evolution and Operation of the Water Taboo

Abstract For much of human history, water was a standard weapon of war. In the post–World War II period, however, nation-states in international conflict have made concerted efforts to restrain the weaponization of water. Distinct from realist and rationalist explanations, the historical record reveals that water has come to be governed by a set of intersubjective standards of behavior that denounce water's involvement in conflict as morally taboo. How did this water taboo develop, and how does it matter for nation-states? Focused process-tracing illuminates the taboo's development from the 1950s to the 2010s, and indicates that (1) a moral aversion to using water as a weapon exists; (2) this aversion developed through cumulative mechanisms of taboo evolution over the past seventy years; and (3) the taboo influences states at both an instrumental level of compliance, and, in recent decades, a more internalized level. These findings offer new avenues for research and policy to better understand and uphold this taboo into the future.

Why Didn’t Ukraine Fight for Crimea? Evidence from Declassified National Security and Defense Council Proceedings

ABSTRACT While the Russian decision to annex Crimea has been widely explored and debated, scholarship has largely overlooked the Ukrainian response. Why did the Ukrainian side refrain from escalating? I address this gap, leveraging recently declassified primary-source materials from Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council to provide an original explanation for the Ukrainian decision not to fight for the peninsula. I find evidence in favor of realist explanations, while domestic politics was largely absent in decision-makers’ discussions. Additionally, I find prospect theory to offer a compelling account for the Ukrainian decision. This article therefore explains why decision-makers were risk-averse despite the loss of Ukrainian territory.

A Realist Review of Violence Prevention Education in Healthcare.

Violence from patients and visitors towards healthcare workers is an international concern affecting the safety and health of workers, quality of care, and healthcare system sustainability. Although the predominant intervention has been violence prevention (VP) education for healthcare workers, evaluating its effectiveness is challenging due to underreporting of violence and the inherent complexity of both violence and the health care environment. This review utilized a theory-driven, realist approach to synthesize and analyze a wide range of academic and grey literature to identify explanations of how and why VP education makes a difference in preventing violence and associated physical and psychological injury to workers. The review confirmed the importance of positioning VP education as part of a VP strategy, and consideration of the contexts that influence successful application of VP knowledge and skills. Synthesis and analysis of patterns of evidence across 64 documents resulted in 11 realist explanations of VP education effectiveness. Examples include education specific to clinical settings, unit-level modeling and mentoring support, and support of peers and supervisors during violent incidents. This review informs practical program and policy decisions to enhance VP education effectiveness in healthcare settings.

Why 1914 but Not Before? A Comparative Study of the July Crisis and Its Precursors

Why did the July 1914 crisis—but not crises in 1905, 1908–9, 1911, and 1912–13—escalate to great-power war despite occurring under similar international and domestic conditions? Explanations based on underlying and slowly changing structural, social, or cultural variables cannot answer this question. Examining three Balkan crises of 1912–13 and the July Crisis, we refine realist explanations based on power, alliances, and reputational interests by incorporating the impact of changing power distributions and alliances in the Balkans on the great-power security system. A more complete answer to the why-1914-but-not-before question, however, requires the incorporation of Franz Ferdinand’s assassination, which went beyond a pretext for war. It eliminated the most powerful and effective proponent for peace in Vienna and fundamentally changed the nature of the decision-making process in Austria-Hungary. Counterfactually, we argue that a hypothetical crisis with Franz Ferdinand present would probably have ended differently.

Russia and its Allies in Three Strategic Environments

Why does Russia seem simultaneously powerful and weak? This article finds the answer in a geopolitical analysis of the structural incentives for and impediments to Russian alliance policy that vary across regions in ways that elude realist, liberal and constructivist explanations of Russia’s conduct. We demonstrate that those explanations miss fundamental changes in Russia’s geographical position after the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of new threats and opportunities. We model the three strategic environments in which Russia acts: its immediate post-Soviet neighbourhood; more distant regions of the Eurasian continent, such as the Middle East and East Asia; and the sphere of global security issues. Building on theories of alliance behaviour, we show how the balance of threats in those strategic environments influences Russia’s political and military policies in different regions in ways not captured by dominant theories or the narratives that inform policy debates.