Realism In Political Theory Research Articles

Two forms of realism in political theory

This paper explores contemporary debates about the meaning and value of realism in political theory. I seek to move beyond the widespread observation that realism encompasses a diverse set of critiques and commitments, by urging that we recognize two key strands in recent realist thought. Detachment realists claim that political theory is excessively abstract and infeasible and thereby fails adequately to inform actual political decision-making. Displacement critics, on the other hand, suggest that political theory threatens or disrespects real politics. Not only are these visions of realism very different, there are also important tensions between them. I focus, in particular, on clarifying and evaluating the more complex charge that political theory displaces politics.

David Hume and Contemporary Realism in Political Theory

Proponents of the recent movement of realism in political theory have expressed dissatisfaction with the typically Kantian and ideal theoretical assumptions that guide much political and normative theorizing. In this paper it is proposed that these realist theorists could find support for their critique of the Kantian legacy, as well as building blocks for a realist alternative, by drawing on the moral and political thought of David Hume. The paper constitutes a reading of Hume’s writings with the contemporary realist critique in mind. The result highlights four themes in Hume’s thought: (1) The empirically informed approach to normative reasoning. (2) An emphasis on that political theorizing must be conducted on the basis of a realistic political psychology. (3) The critique of social contract doctrines, a critique that is directed at idealistic and rationalistic versions of liberalism. (4) Hume’s account of human sociality and the origins of political authority. Lastly, it is suggested that the fact that Hume combines realism with liberalism makes him of additional interest to the many realists who are seeking to correct rather than reject liberal political theory and who are thus wary of finding themselves too close to Machiavelli and Hobbes, the usual realist predecessors.

Bernard Williams and the possibility of a realist political theory

This article explores the prospects for developing a realist political theory via an analysis of the work of Bernard Williams. It begins by setting out Williams’s theory of political realism and placing it in the wider context of a realist challenge in the literature that rightly identifies several deficiencies in the liberal view of politics and legitimacy. The central argument of the article is, however, that Williams’s political realism shares common features with liberal theory, including familiar normative concerns and a consensus view of the political and political legitimacy, which results in it replicating rather than overcoming the weaknesses that other realists have recognized in liberalism, thereby making it vulnerable to the same criticisms. Though these are taken to be significant problems for Williams’s theory, the purpose of making this argument is not to undermine the prospects for a realist political theory but to indicate obstacles and difficulties that any compelling account will need to address.

Realism, liberal moralism and a political theory of modus vivendi

This article sets out some of the key features of a realist critique of liberal moralism, identifying descriptive inadequacy and normative irrelevance as the two fundamental lines of criticism. It then sketches an outline of a political theory of modus vivendi as an alternative, realist approach to political theory. On this account a modus vivendi should be understood as any political settlement that involves the preservation of peace and security and is generally acceptable to those who are party to it. In conclusion, some problems with this conception of modus vivendi and with a realist political theory more generally are discussed. In particular, the question is raised of whether a realist political theory should be understood as an alternative to liberal moralism or only a better way of doing basically the same kind of thing.

What is to be done? Political theory and political realism

This article argues for greater realism in political theory with respect to judgements about what politicians ought to do and how they ought to act. It shows that there are major problems in deducing what a given politician should do from the value commitments that are common to liberalism and it makes a case for recognizing the major role played by the context of action and particular agent involved. It distinguishes political virtue from moral virtues and argues that the ‘decisionist’ features of political agency render evaluation a partly post hoc process. The article advocates a version of political realism that is rooted in an understanding of the distinctive character of political rule and that provides the basis for a contextualist but non-relativist account of ‘what is to be done’.

Realism in political theory

In recent decades, a ‘realist’ alternative to ideal theories of politics has slowly taken shape. Bringing together philosophers, political theorists, and political scientists, this countermovement seeks to reframe inquiry into politics and political norms. Among the hallmarks of this endeavor are a moral psychology that includes the passions and emotions; a robust conception of political possibility and rejection of utopian thinking; the belief that political conflict — of values as well as interests — is both fundamental and ineradicable; a focus on institutions as the arenas within which conflict is mediated and contained; and a conception of politics as a sphere of activity that is distinct, autonomous, and subject to norms that cannot be derived from individual morality. For political realists, a ‘well-ordered society’ is rarely attainable; a modus vivendi without agreement on first principles is often the only practical possibility. Not only will ‘full compliance’ never be achieved, but also it is an assumption that yields misleading accounts of political norms. While realists offer a number of compelling criticisms of ideal theory, there are some lacunae in their stance. It is not yet clear whether realism constitutes a coherent affirmative alternative to idealism. Nor have realists clarified the extent of conflict that is consistent with political order as such. And because both sides accept ‘ought implies can’ as a constraint on the validity of political norms, much of the debate between realists and idealists revolves around deep empirical disagreements that are yet to be clarified.

George F. Kennan's Strategic Thought: The Making of an American Political Realist

Foreword by Kenneth W. Thompson Preface Political Realism and American Foreign Policy A Realist's Political Theory: On Man, Power, Morality, and Politics American National Interest and the World Balance of Power The Domestic Struggle for Power The Forgotten American Art of Diplomacy Force and War as Foreign Policy Instruments Major Power Rivalry: The American-Soviet Security Dilemma Kennan's Realism as a Theory of American Foreign Policy Selected Bibliography Index

Realizing Theory: The Philosophy of Science Revisited

Contemporary issues in the philosophy of science, and the recent turn to scientific realism in political theory, prompt both a reconsideration of the nature of theory in social scientific inquiry and an examination of current attempts to appropriate philosophical arguments in support of images of theory and the relationship between social science and political practice. Metatheoretical claims about the explanation of social phenomena and about the possibilities of a critical social science are not a substitute for a substantive theory of social reality and a confrontation with the practical issue of the relationship between political theory and politics.

Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma Model

Realist political theory finds that states are positional in character. Thus, states prefer that relative achievements of jointly produced gains not advantage partners, and their concerns about relative gains may constrain their willingness to cooperate. Conventional presentations of the game of Prisoner's Dilemma do not depict Realism's specification of the relative gains element of the structure of state preferences or Realism's analysis of the capacity of state concerns about relative gains to impede cooperation. However, by distinguishing between game payoffs and state utility, an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma model can depict both the relative-gains element of state preferences and the relative-gains problem for cooperation. This Amended Prisoner's Dilemma facilitates analysis of an important systemic constraint on international cooperation identified by Realist political theory, contributes to our understanding of international institutions, and draws our attention to a number of potentially interestin...