Moral Realism Research Articles

Might Moral Epistemologists Be Asking The Wrong Questions?

This paper suggests that moral epistemologists have been focusing on the wrong questions, or at least ignoring some of the right ones. They've been ignoring some of the right questions because they've made a mistake about the semantics and pragmatics of moral discourse. For concreteness, I'll focus on moral skeptics, who argue that none of us have any substantive moral knowledge. Different skeptics offer different arguments. Some appeal to general empiricist strictures on what knowledge requires; others to pervasive moral disagreement; others to the dispensability of moral facts in scientific explanation; others to other considerations.1 Moral skeptics usually focus on their attention on moral realists, who take moral properties to be independent of and more fundamental than our individual evaluative attitudes. Skeptics want to show that we don't know what's permitted or required if moral realism is true. (They tend to be much less interested in showing that moral anti-realism (a la A. J. Ayer (1936), say) has skeptical consequences.2) In discussing arguments for moral skepticism, it thus makes sense to assume that some kind of moral realism is true, to focus on the issues that animate most moral skeptics. If this paper is right, moral skeptics need to address a very new question before they can press their challenge. Moreover, the traditional arguments for moral skepticism do not illuminate the new question, which is about the role that moral judgments play in our social life. So central questions in moral epistemology would look very different if this paper is correct. I myself suspect there is no way for moral skeptics to press their challenge, once we fully internalize the lessons from this paper. Unfortunately, though, there won't be space here to substantiate this suspicion. My goal will rather be to convince you that we need to think about moral epistemology in a very new way. §§2–3 will begin by introducing and defending a claim about the semantics and pragmatics of natural language. §4 shows that claim can have sweeping upshots for moral epistemology. §§5–7 will introduce one particular way of working out these sweeping upshots, and §7 will introduce a complication about those sweeping upshots. §9 closes with a particular illustration of the issues explored: arguments from moral disagreement.

Moral realism versus moral relativism in the postmodern myth

Gibbons (2017) claims that postmodernism is dead. ‘Postmodernism refracted reality into endless language-games… leading to an ensuing disillusionment with the project of neo-liberal postmodernity’....

Meaning, moral realism, and the importance of morality

Many philosophers have suspected that the normative importance of morality depends on moral realism. In this paper, I defend a version of this suspicion: I argue that if teleological forms of moral realism, those that posit an objective purpose to human life, are true, then we gain a distinctive kind of reason to do what is morally required. I argue for this by showing that if these forms of realism are true, then doing what is morally required can provide a life with meaning, which is a widespread human need. I also argue that rival meta-ethical views, like anti-realism or non-naturalist realism, cannot make morality meaning-conferring in this way.

Evolutionary arguments against moral realism: Why the empirical details matter (and which ones do)

The aim of this article is to identify the strongest evolutionary debunking argument (EDA) against moral realism and to assess on which empirical assumptions it relies. In the recent metaethical literature, several authors have de-emphasized the evolutionary component of EDAs against moral realism: presumably, the success or failure of these arguments is largely orthogonal to empirical issues. I argue that this claim is mistaken. First, I point out that Sharon Street’s and Michael Ruse’s EDAs both involve substantive claims about the evolution of our moral judgments. Next, I argue that combining their respective evolutionary claims can help debunkers to make the best empirical case against moral realism. Some realists have argued that the very attempt to explain the contents of our endorsed moral judgments in evolutionary terms is misguided, and have sought to escape EDAs by denying their evolutionary premise. But realists who pursue this reply can still be challenged on empirical grounds: debunkers may argue that the best, scientifically informed historical explanations of our moral endorsements do not involve an appeal to mind-independent truths. I conclude, therefore, that the empirical considerations relevant for the strongest empirically driven argument against moral realism go beyond the strictly evolutionary realm; debunkers are best advised to draw upon other sources of genealogical knowledge as well.

Moral Realism, Speech Act Diversity, and Expressivism

Moral Realism, Speech Act Diversity, and Expressivism

The Dao Admits of No Admixture: Mysticism and Moral Realism in Zhuangzi’s Writings

Recent philosophical scholarship tends to cast Zhuangzi’s philosophy as promoting moral relativism. This is especially true with Chad Hansen’s interpretation of Zhuangzi’s writings. This article seeks to challenge this dominant relativist reading by showing that such a reading does not align with the numerous normative and evaluative remarks that can be found in Zhuangzi’s work. Furthermore, this article aims to show that it is more plausible that Zhuangzi’s metaethical view is that of moral realism instead of moral relativism. This is because a moral realist interpretation of Zhuangzi’s philosophy fits more, not only with the aforesaid evaluative and normative remarks of Zhuangzi’s writings, but also with the mystical elements found in the same writings.

Evolution and Ethics: No Streetian Debunking of Moral Realism

Evolution and Ethics: No Streetian Debunking of Moral Realism

Error and the Limits of Quasi-Realism

If ethical expressivism is true, then moral judgements are motivational desire-like states and do not robustly represent reality. This gives rise to the problem of how to understand moral error. How can we be mistaken if there is no moral reality to be mistaken about? The standard expressivist explanation of moral doubt is couched in terms of our fear that our judgements may not survive improvements to our epistemic situation. There is a debate between Egan (Australas J Philos 85(2):205–219, 2007), Blackburn (Australas J Philos 87(2):201–213, 2009), Köhler (Australas J Philos 93(1):161–165, 2015) and Ridge (J Ethics Soc Philos 9(3):1–21, 2015) on the adequacy of this explanation when it comes to the phenomenon of fundamental moral error. This paper is my contribution to the debate. I argue, contrary to Blackburn and Ridge, that expressivism is committed to some first-order anti-realist sounding claims, and thus quasi-realism fails. If expressivism is true, none of us can coherently believe we might be fundamentally mistaken. However, contrary to Egan and Köhler, I do not think this is bad. Expressivists can still do what motivated the project of quasi-realism in the first place: they can interpret, make sense of, and vindicate ordinary moral discourse. I end by showing it yields some positive results for moral philosophers too – it effectively amounts to a transcendental argument against unhealthy moral scepticism.

Challenges to the Omohundro–Bostrom framework for AI motivations

PurposeThis paper aims to contribute to the futurology of a possible artificial intelligence (AI) breakthrough, by reexamining the Omohundro–Bostrom theory for instrumental vs final AI goals. Does that theory, along with its predictions for what a superintelligent AI would be motivated to do, hold water?Design/methodology/approachThe standard tools of systematic reasoning and analytic philosophy are used to probe possible weaknesses of Omohundro–Bostrom theory from four different directions: self-referential contradictions, Tegmark’s physics challenge, moral realism and the messy case of human motivations.FindingsThe two cornerstones of Omohundro–Bostrom theory – the orthogonality thesis and the instrumental convergence thesis – are both open to various criticisms that question their validity and scope. These criticisms are however far from conclusive: while they do suggest that a reasonable amount of caution and epistemic humility is attached to predictions derived from the theory, further work will be needed to clarify its scope and to put it on more rigorous foundations.Originality/valueThe practical value of being able to predict AI goals and motivations under various circumstances cannot be overstated: the future of humanity may depend on it. Currently, the only framework available for making such predictions is Omohundro–Bostrom theory, and the value of the present paper is to demonstrate its tentative nature and the need for further scrutiny.

Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Meet Evolutionary Science

Evolutionary debunking arguments appeal to selective etiologies of human morality in an attempt to undermine moral realism. But is morality actually the product of evolution by natural selection? Although debunking arguments have attracted considerable attention in recent years, little of it has been devoted to whether the underlying evolutionary assumptions are credible. In this paper, we take a closer look at the evolutionary hypotheses put forward by two leading debunkers, namely Sharon Street and Richard Joyce. We raise a battery of considerations, both empirical and theoretical, that combine to cast doubt on the plausibility of both hypotheses. We also suggest that it is unlikely that there is in the vicinity a plausible alternative hypothesis suitable for the debunker's cause.

Sobre la libre afirmación de nuestro ser

In this article an attempt is made to bring out the presuppositions of the first formulation of ethical realism held by Antonio Millán-Puelles in his recently published work, La libre afirmación de nuestro ser. Una fundamentacíon de la ética realista. These presuppositions show that the central problem in moral philosophy, known as the "Is-Ought" question, is dealt with in a very positive way by pointing out the intrinsic relation that there is between human nature and human freedom.

Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism, and the Asymmetry Claim

Many people accept, at least implicitly, what I call the asymmetry claim: the view that moral realism is more defensible than aesthetic realism. This article challenges the asymmetry claim. I argue that it is surprisingly hard to find points of contrast between the two domains that could justify their very different treatment with respect to realism. I consider five potentially promising ways to do this, and I argue that all of them fail. If I am right, those who accept the asymmetry claim have a significant burden of proof.

Faultless Disagreement, Realism and Moral Objectivity

The argument from faultless disagreement against moral realism is based on the alleged possibility of cognitively faultless moral disagreement, CFD. This possibility contradicts the pre-theoretic intuition that moral truth is knowable, in principle, the so-called epistemic constraint on moral truth, EC. In this paper, I discuss the realist’s two options to cope with this argument. First of all, I point out the realist’s strategies to explain the possibility of cognitively faultless error, which is implied by CFD. Then I discuss one promising option to respond to the argument from faultless disagreement: accepting both CFD and EC but blocking the ensuing contradiction by invoking an equivocation as regards the notion of knowability. After pointing out the drawbacks of this solution I discuss the other promising option: rejecting CFD by drawing on an agnostic stance on the part of cognitively blameless thinkers as regards moral propositions they cannot agree on. Yet this option faces the problem that EC has to be denied. In concluding the paper, I outline the prospects of an attractive objectivist shape of moral antirealism, which is also affected by the argument from faultless disagreement.

Actuar por una razón

What do we mean when we say we act "for a reason"? What is the connection between Reason, as a faculty, and the reasons of our actions? This article maintains that Aristotle and Kant had a similar answer to this question. Moreover: the answer they give can help us to clarify the controversy between moral realism and empiricism regarding the ontological and epistemological status of what we call the reason of an action.

Brutalist Non-naturalism and Hume's Principle

I argue that non-naturalist moral realism does not have a problem with supervenience. The necessities may be explained as flowing from the essence of moral properties. It is still true that non-naturalism embraces necessary connections between distinct things, thus offending against ‘Hume's Principle’ according to which there are no such connections. Therefore, the apparent appeal of Hume's principle needs addressing. Hume's Principle faces a tsunami of counterexamples, of both abstract and non-abstract kinds of things. Furthermore, Hume's Principle lacks any motivation and is highly revisionary of ordinary modal thought. Not only are supervenience objections to non-naturalism that draw on Hume's principle ineffective, but also the modal presuppositions of the supervenience argument are far stranger than anything in non-naturalism.

Some Problems with Scientific Relativism and Moral Realism

In its early development philosophy of science did not allow the possibility of a relativistic approach with regard to explanation of external phenomena. Relativism was seen as justified exclusively with regard to internal phenomena, for example, in the realm of moral and aesthetic judgment. In the realm of moral judgment, external realism functions as a necessary hypothesis, according to which our moral judgment and moral decisions have a real effect in the external world, for which we can be held responsible. A paradigm shift in the theory of science, inaugurated by Th. S. Kuhn, led to the rise of relativism with regard to judgment in the realm of external phenomena and specifically with regard to the validity of scientific theories. Critics of relativism do not take into account that it is not enough to point out the logical inconsistency of relativism. Most arguments for scientific justification of external realism are doomed to failure, because they do not take into account the role of the judgmental subject. In this article I will show that the role of “second nature” is significant not only for the constitution of moral realism, but also for the implementation of scientific naturalism.

L’avenir contextualiste du constructivisme métaéthique : le constructivisme humien amendé

Je défends dans ce texte une version particulière de la position que Sharon Street a appelée le «constructivisme humien». J’esquisserai pourquoi je considère que ce constructivisme est préférable à la fois au réalisme moral et au constructivisme kantien sur le plan de la compréhension du statut ontologique des valeurs. Après avoir accepté de reconnaître le rôle des pressions de l’évolution dans l’émergence de la moralité, le constructivisme humien doit toutefois préciser le rôle de l’intersubjectivité historique dans l’évolution subséquente de la morale. J’expliquerai aussi pourquoi je considère que l’intégration d’un volet cohérentiste au constructivisme permet d’atténuer les craintes concernant le caractère potentiellement non-cognitiviste des théories contextualistes. Enfin, j’esquisserai pourquoi l’idée d’un «espace des raisons morales» indépendant, à certains égards, de l’esprit humain est compatible avec le constructivisme humien.

Fiction, genre exposure, and moral reality.

Fiction, genre exposure, and moral reality.

Moral Realism in Historical Sociological Theory

AbstractSociologists of morality often assume the field can undertake descriptive studies of moral claims (e.g., what are the social origins of moral systems, in what ways do moral systems change over time) but ought not and, indeed cannot, speak to the rightness or wrongness of moral claims in any scientific sense. However, many founders of the field of sociology suggested that moral claims should be viewed as historically, demographically and ecologically situated interdisciplinary attempts at establishing scientific facts about human well‐being. This essay reviews the moral realism of sociology's founders, underscoring important components from each theorist's approach.

Teaching Ethics: A Framework for Thought and Action

Education for ethics is a topic that is appearing frequently in journals and conferences, but there is little or no agreement on a theory of ethics education and action. This paper proposes non-naturalistic moral realism as a theoretical framework that can fit disciplinary and professional ethics. Alternatives to this framework are detailed, but the proposed theoretical stance is deemed both sound and useful. Examples of the application of the framework are included as a means to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposal.