Brutalist Non-naturalism and Hume's Principle

Nick Zangwill

doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12235

Abstract

I argue that non-naturalist moral realism does not have a problem with supervenience. The necessities may be explained as flowing from the essence of moral properties. It is still true that non-naturalism embraces necessary connections between distinct things, thus offending against ‘Hume's Principle’ according to which there are no such connections. Therefore, the apparent appeal of Hume's principle needs addressing. Hume's Principle faces a tsunami of counterexamples, of both abstract and non-abstract kinds of things. Furthermore, Hume's Principle lacks any motivation and is highly revisionary of ordinary modal thought. Not only are supervenience objections to non-naturalism that draw on Hume's principle ineffective, but also the modal presuppositions of the supervenience argument are far stranger than anything in non-naturalism.

Highlights

Does moral non-naturalism have a problem with supervenience? That is, are necessary relations between moral and natural properties mysterious if those properties are distinct? Here I try to remove anxiety about the modal comments of moral non-naturalism
Non-naturalism and supervenience In order to orientate the discussion, I begin with some elucidatory comments on these ideas
I shall not worry too much about the definition of ‘moral’ and ‘natural’ properties. It will be enough if there are some clear cases of each kind

Summary

Introduction

Does moral non-naturalism have a problem with supervenience? That is, are necessary relations between moral and natural properties mysterious if those properties are distinct? Here I try to remove anxiety about the modal comments of moral non-naturalism. 3. Hume’s Principle(s) One way to try to reinstate or resuscitate a problem, in the face of Property Brutalism, would be to insist that there is something mysterious about necessary connections between distinct things, and if the non-naturalist says that action at a distance is just built into the essence or nature of non-natural moral properties, that does not make it any less mysterious.

Results

Conclusion