In April 2005, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) of the United Nations received one of its final deathblows from the secretary-general. In his 2005 report, In Larger Freedom, Kofi Annan stated that politicization and selectivity had undermined the commission and that its declining credibility had tarnished the reputation of the UN. Instead of piecemeal reforms, the secretary-general suggested a fresh start with a new UN Human Rights Council. The September 2005 UN World Summit decided to endorse the proposal and to create the new council with a mandate to address country situations, including gross and systematic human rights violations. All the details of the new council have been left to the General Assembly to debate, negotiate, and clarify. How can the new UN Human Rights Council be credible, powerful, and legitimate in a world of power politics? How can the UN Human Rights Council avoid the flaws and failures of the CHR? If the chief problems of the CHR have been politicization and selectivity, are these not endemic to the current international political system? Is international human rights scrutiny a question of structure or willpower? The initial purpose of the CHR was standard setting. Its first task was the preparation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The commission continued in its standard-setting function in the early years of its existence, creating several new treaties on specific human rights issues such as racial discrimination; civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; torture; and women's and children's rights. The second phase of the organization's work has been to oversee the implementation of these standards. Through debates, discussions, and resolutions it has instituted mechanisms, such as working groups and special rapporteurs, to assist in monitoring the implementation of the standards. Yet, despite all of these efforts, the CHR suffered from a steady decline in its credibility and faced serious challenges in the effectiveness of its work. The Commission on Human Rights has had several significant problems that have prevented it from effectively addressing human rights concerns. It came to resemble a club where friendships easily overlooked wrongdoing. A record of selectivity and double standards tarnished its reputation, and its membership has often included notorious political regimes that were themselves major perpetrators of human rights abuses. Procedural problems, such as the no-action motion, have also existed. This is a technical procedure of the CHR that states have misused to prevent discussion of a resolution. It has suppressed the effectiveness of the commission and has promoted selectivity--for example, by preventing discussion of the human rights situations in China and Sudan. Another problem has been the lack of meeting time. The commission holds only one annual session for a six-week period. All the agenda items, debates, resolutions, and decisions are condensed into this compact period. As a result, the commission is not able to deal effectively with crisis situations and cannot give due time and attention to prevention strategies. The malfunctioning of the CHR has meant that human rights concerns have been treated ineffectively and in a biased manner. The commission has regularly debated many reform ideas. Yet none of the piecemeal reforms have yielded effective change. The secretary-general therefore took a bold step in suggesting that the UN human rights structure be completely overhauled and that the CHR be replaced by a new Human Rights Council. The main purpose of the reform plan was to upgrade the status of the commission to that of a council, putting human rights on a par with security and development issues. The council would be a standing body, able to meet on a regular basis rather than restricted to a six-week annual meeting. It would have a chamber of peer review where every member state would periodically come under scrutiny, with equal attention to be given to all areas of rights. …