Real Activities Manipulation Research Articles

Influence of Foreign Investors on Corporate Real Activities Manipulation in Emerging Markets: Evidence from China

ABSTRACT Whether foreign investors can play a prominent monitoring role as shareholders in emerging markets is a controversial issue. This study investigates the effect of foreign ownership on corporate real activities manipulation in China. We find that, even after correcting for the potential endogeneity issues, foreign investors help to decrease corporate real earnings management, and this effect is explained by the disciplinary and monitoring roles of foreign investors. We also find that foreign institutional investors have greater influence on real earnings management than domestic institutional investors do. Further evidence shows that foreign ownership affects firm value via real earnings management.

AUDIT QUALITY AND REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM TUNISIAN BANKS

The beginning of the 21st century was marked by a multitude of financial scandals, notably the Enron affair in 2001 and the fall of the auditing firm Arthur Andersen (2002). Such scandals have called into question of the financial reporting quality. The main cause of these scandals was the failure of the external audit quality which is considered crucial to ensure the reliability and relevance of accounting information. Moreover, following the promulgation of the SOX law (2002), managers tend rather towards the real activities manipulation to avoid the detection of the accounting earnings management. In fact, managers can resort to certain adjustments whose opportunistic or optimal nature is difficult to discern by auditors, in particular the reduction in selling prices, the granting of more lenient credit terms, overproduction and the reduction or postponement of research and development (R&D) and advertising expenditure. This study therefore aims to show the role that external audit quality can play in limiting real activities manipulation and therefore in the quality of accounting information. For this, we conducted an empirical study with a sample of the main. Tunisian commercial banks observed over a period from 2006 to 2019, using the panel data method. The results indicate that the presence of a reputable auditor limits real earnings management. However, the results show that the tenure of auditors increases these discretionary practices.

Substitution between Accrual- Based Earnings Management and Real Activities Manipulation – A Commentary and Guidance for Future Research

Substitution between Accrual- Based Earnings Management and Real Activities Manipulation – A Commentary and Guidance for Future Research

The Effect of Board Characteristics on Real Activities Manipulation in Tunisian Banks

The succession of financial scandals and resounding bank failures that characterized the economic environment over the past three decades have given more weight to governance mechanisms. As such, considered to be one of the most important internal governance mechanisms, the board of directors has shown its strengths in controlling earnings manipulation, in particular those linked to real activities. The aim of this paper is to examine the effect of board characteristics on real earnings management. Using panel data econometrics, on all Tunisian commercial banks over the period 2008-2019, we show that board gender diversity has a disciplinary role in real earnings management as measured by discretionary revenue on equity securities. However, we show that board independence increases the real earnings management. As for board size, board duality, as well as the number of meetings carried out per year by the board of directors, we prove that they have no significant effect on real earnings management.

Executive equity incentives and opportunistic manager behavior: new evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

This study provides plausible causal evidence on the effect of executive equity incentives on opportunistic manager behavior. I exploit a unique setting created by the introduction of Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R in 2005, which led to an exogenous increase in the cost of option pay, causing a substantial decline in option pay for some firms while leaving others largely unaffected. Using difference-in-differences analyses with a treatment group of firms that show a decline in option pay and two control groups, I find that the likelihood of a treatment firm meeting or beating analyst forecasts decreases by 14–20%. The results show that the relatively high levels of meet-or-beat before FAS 123R were largely driven by real activities manipulation such as abnormal asset sales and sales manipulation to beat analysts’ benchmarks, while accrual manipulation and analyst management were less relevant. Together, the results suggest that equity incentives encourage opportunistic actions to meet or beat earnings expectations, and a decline in option pay results in a decline in earnings management to meet earnings expectations.

Firm diversification and earnings management strategies: European evidence

This paper investigates whether corporate diversification, both international and industrial, provides a favourable environment for earnings management. We find that international diversification is associated with greater manipulation of accruals and sales but with lower manipulation of production costs. Industrial diversification is associated with lower levels of all three earnings management strategies. We find strong evidence that the combination of industrial and international diversification increases real activity manipulation but has no effect on accrual manipulation. Moreover, we find that in the presence of firm complexity linked to higher levels of earnings management, the recommendations of financial analysts are more likely to be on the sell side and vice versa. Our results provide useful insights to investors by highlighting the impact of corporate diversification on earnings management and, thus, the accurate estimation of firm value.

Countering a Future Crisis of Accountants with Decreasing Credibility: the Influence of Ethical Education and Religiosity on Ethical Perceptions of Accrual, Real Activity and Tunneling Manipulation

Purpose: This study is intended to: First, examine the effectiveness of ethics education to instill core ethical values in students; Second, test the differences between students’ ethical perceptions in religious and public universities; Third, examine the effects of individual’s ethical ideology on ethical perceptions.Method: Questionnaire was used to collect data and SEM PLS was used to test the hypotheses. A total of 215 undergraduate students from public and private university have taken part in this study.Findings: The study show that business ethics education does not influence ethical perceptions. However, there is a significant difference in students’ ethical perceptions between the public university and religious-based universities. Furthermore, result shows that individuals’ ethical ideology has an impact on ethical perceptions.Novelty: This study differs from previous research because most of the previous studies focused on the ethical judgments of the accruals and real activity manipulation methods but have limited ethical considerations regarding tunneling. Meanwhile, the business group structure and low legal enforcement have led to many cases of tunneling in Indonesia.

Intelligent Supervision and Earnings Management Choice：A Natural Experiment Based on Golden Tax-III

This paper studies the impact of intelligent tax supervision on the decision of corporate earnings management. Companies determine earnings management strategies by weighing the marginal benefits and costs of accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management. Existing literature finds that managers prefer real earnings management than accrual-based earnings management because of regulatory pressure. This paper takes tax costs into consideration and adopts that tax will affect the substitution relationship between different earnings management methods.Accrual-based earnings management is realized by accounting methods. But real earnings management has a direct cash flow effect. Compared with accrual-based earnings management, real earnings management is subject to a higher level of book-tax conformity. Real activity manipulation is more costly due to tax incentives. Intelligent tax supervision represented by Golden Tax-III can effectively realize information integration and reduce information asymmetry between taxpayers and tax authorities. It can help to identify companies whose tax burdens deviate from the industry average. So Golden Tax-III can strengthen tax supervision and significantly increase the tax costs of real earnings management. Then, it can affect earnings management strategies. The higher the degree of tax non-compliance, the greater the impact of the implementation of Golden Tax-III.We use the implementation of Golden Tax-III as an exogenous event to construct a DID test. The results show that: Tax-noncompliant companies have a higher level of accrual-based earnings management after Golden Tax-III; tax-noncompliant companies have a lower level of real earnings management after Golden Tax-III; the substitution relationship between the two earnings management strategies in tax-noncompliant companies is mainly reflected after Golden Tax-III.The main contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) It directly examines the impact of tax costs on earnings management strategies, and finds that companies prefer accrual-based earnings management to real earnings management under strong tax supervision. It also expands the previous earnings management model. The research enriches and supplements the literature on earnings management. (2) It constructs a DID test to examine the impact of tax regulation on earnings management based on the implementation of Golden Tax-III. It can help to solve the problem of self-selection and endogeneity and supplement the relevant literature on tax and earnings management. (3) It finds that the intelligent supervision represented by Golden Tax-III can effectively distinguish tax-noncompliant companies and achieve precise supervision. The results help to understand and evaluate the economic consequences of Golden Tax-III, and also provide enlightenment for the development of intelligent tax supervision and taxation regulatory policy.

Ordeal by Innocence? Mandatory Data Breach Revelation and Strategic Manipulation of Real Business Activities

In this paper, we demonstrate that the mandatory disclosure of data breaches may have an unintended consequence: the distortion of firms’ real business activities. We employ the staggered adoption of data breach disclosure laws across various U.S. states to show that such mandatory disclosure exacerbates firms’ real earnings manipulation multidimensional through twisting production costs, discretionary expenses, and cash flow from operations. The main effect is more pronounced for firms of which the outbreak of data breaches is more of a concern and under stronger short-term market pressures. Furthermore, the adoption of such laws is associated with higher stock price crash risk and fewer patenting activities. Overall, our findings reveal possible unintended real effects of certain laws oriented at protecting customers through mitigating information opacity.

Abnormal real activities, meeting earnings targets and firms' future operating performance: evidence from an emerging economy

PurposeThis paper aims to examine the extent to which real earnings management (REM) is used in Jordan to meet zero or previous year's earnings, and how this impacts the subsequent operating performance of Jordanian firms.Design/methodology/approachThe study used a sample of 98 Jordanian listed firms over the 2010–2018 period. To test the research hypotheses, which are formulated in accordance with both, agency theory and signalling theory, multivariate regression is performed using a pooled OLS estimation. Additionally, a two-step dynamic generalised method of moment (GMM) model has been estimated to address any concerns regarding the potential occurrence of endogeneity issues.FindingsThe results show that Jordanian firms that meet zero or last year's earnings tend to exhibit evidence of real activities manipulations. More specifically, suspect firms show unusually low abnormal discretionary expenses and unusually high abnormal production costs. Further, consistent with the signalling earnings management argument, the authors find that abnormal real-based activities intended to meet zero earnings or previous year's earnings potentially improve the subsequent operating performance of Jordanian firms. This implies that REM is not totally opportunistic, but it can be used to enhance the subsequent operating performance of Jordanian firms. Our findings are robust to alternative proxies and endogeneity concerns.Practical implicationsThe findings have several implications for policymakers, regulators, audit professionals and investors in their attempts to constrain REM practices to enhance financial reporting quality in Jordan. Managing earnings by reducing discretionary expenses appeared to be the most convenient way to manipulate earnings in Jordan. It provides flexibility in terms of time and the amount of spending. The empirical evidence, therefore, reiterates the crucial necessity to refocus the efforts of internal and external auditors on limiting this type of manipulation to reduce the occurrence of REM activities and enhance the subsequent operating performance of listed firms in Jordan. Drawing on Al-Haddad and Whittington (2019), the evidence also urges regulators and standards setters to develop a more effective enforcement mechanism for corporate governance provisions in Jordan to minimise the likelihood of REM incidence.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the body of the accounting literature by providing the first empirical evidence in the Middle East region overall on the use of REM to meet zero or previous year earnings by Jordanian firms. Moreover, the study is the first to empirically examine the relationship between REM and Jordanian firms' future operating performance.

Hometown Ties and the Quality of Government Monitoring: Evidence from Rotation of Chinese Auditors

Audits are a standard mechanism for reducing corruption in government investments. The quality of audits themselves, however, may be affected by relationships between auditor and target. We study whether provincial chief auditors in China show greater leniency in evaluating prefecture governments in their hometowns. In city-fixed-effect specifications—in which the role of shared background is identified from auditor turnover—we show that hometown auditors find 38 percent less in questionable monies. This hometown effect is similar throughout the auditor’s tenure and is diminished for audits ordered by the provincial Organization Department as a result of the departure of top city officials. We argue that our findings are most readily explained by leniency toward local officials rather than an endogenous response to concerns of better enforcement by hometown auditors. We complement these city-level findings with firm-level analyses of earnings manipulation by state-owned enterprises (SOE) via real activity manipulation (a standard measure from the accounting literature), which we show is higher under hometown auditors. (JEL D73, H54, H83, L32, M42, O18, P25)

Leverage, Tata Kelola Perusahaan, dan Manajemen Laba Riil

Earnings management is conducted by key internal personels within a firm through the utility of accounting policy judgements which then mislead financial reports. The level of leverage and corporate governance have the ability to influence the degree of earnings management implementation. This research has an objective to examine the leverage and corporate governance mechanisms influence on real earnings management. This research population is included in 50 companies with the best corporate governance implementation in Indonesia for the period of 2012-2018. By using the purposive sampling method, 126 observations fit the sample criteria. This research uses a quantitative approach and secondary data with a random effects’ regression model. This research shows leverage and corporate governance mechanisms, when combined, affect real earnings management. This research's supplementary results show that leverage cannot limit real earnings management practice and consecutively on corporate governance mechanism. Independent board of commissioner negatively and significantly exert influence on real earnings management, followed by the audit committee, reducing real earnings management practice. Meanwhile, institutional and managerial ownership do not present a significant merit on real earnings management. This research implicates the policy maker in justifying good corporate governance and practioners to look upon the possibility of real activities manipulation.

Real earnings manipulation surrounding mergers and acquisitions: the targets’ perspective

Purpose This paper aims to investigate whether UK public targets manage their earnings using real activities manipulation in the period prior to the announcement of a mergers and acquisition (M&A). It also examines whether the payment method in M&As affects the degree to which takeover targets manipulate earnings. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 131 UK listed targets acquired over the period 1995–2013, this paper examines real earnings management (REM) by employing OLS regression models. The data related to deals have been mainly collected from Thomson One Banker and Thomson Reuters Eikon databases. REM is examined by investigating abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal production costs. This analysis was supplemented by conducting additional robustness checks. Findings The results show that UK takeover targets manage earnings upwards through cutting discretionary expenses in the year prior to the acquisition, while they do not do so by manipulating sales or production costs. Moreover, targets of cash-only or mixed-payment deals do not have the same strong motivation to manage their earnings as stock-financed deal target counterparts do. Our results continue to hold after using alternative accrual earnings management (EM) measures, controlling for unobservable firm heterogeneity using the fixed-effect model and controlling for endogeneity using the two-stage Heckman (1979) model. Practical implications The main findings of this study could be beneficial for various parties involved M&As, such as standard setters and regulators. A need arises to improve disclosure rules and enhance overall financial reporting quality in the capital markets with the aim of reducing information asymmetry and agency conflicts. Originality/value As far as the literature on EM around M&As is concerned, only EM by acquirers has been examined, and not much attention has been paid to targets’ EM.

An Empirical Assessment of Real Activities Manipulation Measures

ABSTRACTI empirically assess the extent to which real earnings management metrics capture opportunistic behavior versus firms' fundamental factors such as performance. For the traditional proxies proposed by Roychowdhury (2006), I find (1) the economic magnitude of the proxies to be high relative to two relevant benchmarks; (2) they exhibit persistence; and (3) they vary predictably with performance. These findings suggest that the traditional proxies likely not only capture opportunistic behavior, but also likely reflect fundamental factors. I also examine several adjusted proxies based on refinements proposed by subsequent studies. I find that those proposed by Vorst (2016) and those based on Kothari, Mizik, and Roychowdhury (2016) seem to be the most effective at attenuating correlation with underlying fundamentals. Additional simulation tests on bias and power reveal that, between the two adjusted proxies, those based on Kothari et al.'s (2016) are generally more preferable.JEL Classifications: M41; M1.

Option informativeness before earnings announcements and under real activity manipulation

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate whether single-name options trading prior to earnings announcements is more informative when there exist real activity manipulations.Design/methodology/approachUsing 5,419 earnings announcements during 2004–2018 made by 208 public US companies with relatively high options volumes ranked by the CBOE, the authors uncover two regularities using predictive regressions for stock return.FindingsFirst, the total options volume up to twenty days pre-announcement is significantly higher than that in other periods only for earnings management firms; moreover, after detailing options characteristics, the authors find these intensive pre-announcement trading to be concentrated in transactions of in-the-money call and long-term maturity put options. Second, an increase in the single-name call minus put options volume can positively predict the underlying stock’s next-day excess return much better in real earnings management firms, with a larger magnitude of effect in periods right before regular earnings announcement dates.Originality/valueThis paper makes a marginal and novel contribution by showing that real earnings management can serve as a proxy for the potential profit from informed trading in options as the return predictability of options volume becomes stronger for firms that have the manipulation motive and indeed perform manipulative actions.

Earnings management and the role of MOSAL in co-ops

• Consumer co-ops drive their annual earnings toward zero earnings based on their prior expectations of the level of pre-managed earnings. • Co-ops manipulate sales up, increase COGS, and reduce SG&A discretionary expenses when observed pre-managed earnings fall below zero earnings. • If pre-managed earnings exceed zero and attract regulators’ attention, co-ops reduce sales and COGS, and increase SG&A discretionary expenses. • Co-ops with small losses engage in real activities manipulation to avoid reporting losses and to make small profits. • Real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management have decreased following the passage of the 2013 MOSAL regulation. This study provides evidence that consumer co-operative societies (co-ops) drive reported earnings toward zero profit by adjusting sales, discretionary expenses, and costs of goods sold. Evidence also indicates that co-ops with small losses manage earnings up to avoid reporting losses and make small profits. Furthermore, earnings management tends to decrease after the 2013 MOSAL (Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor) regulation. This paper examines a highly significant and currently unresearched segment of the economy using a unique and comprehensive dataset of annual information on Kuwaiti co-ops. It also provides new insights on the role of government regulations in curbing the accounting practices co-ops managers use to misreport financial statements.

SHORT-TERM DEBT AND FIRMS' EARNINGS MANAGEMENT CHOICES: THE CASE OF VIETNAM

The primary purpose of this research is to explore the link between short-term debt and firms' earnings management choices. It focuses on understanding how and when short-term debt will improve or reduce the earnings management activity of companies. Our proxy for real earnings management is based on the measure developed by (Roychowdhury, 2006). Using a sample of listed firms in the period of 2009-2018 in Vietnam, the study determines an important positive correlation between short-term debt and real activities manipulation. Our results further show that firms having lower levels of short-term debt tend to use real earnings management activities, but those that have higher levels of short-term debt are prone to use accrual-based earnings management method rather than altering real activities, inducing an inverted U-shaped relationship between short-term debt and real earnings management.

Detecting Real Activities Manipulation: Beyond Performance Matching

The use of real activities manipulation (RAM) to mislead stakeholders has garnered the focus of earnings management research. A prominent feature of RAM research is its use of estimation models in conjunction with performance matching. The veracity of this research dependents on performance matching to mitigate estimation bias. This paper provides comprehensive tests of the RAM models and their performance‐matched counterparts and puts forth a set of model modifications to directly address weaknesses in the models’ specifications. In comparative tests, the performance‐matched models leave residual bias, while the modified models remove it. Similarly, in test of power, with simulated RAM, the performance‐matched models fail to detect high levels of simulation, for example, 5% of assets, while the modified models demonstrate power. These results, combined with the examination of actual and counterfactual RAM settings, call into question the use of the performance‐matched RAM models. On the other hand, the additional tests provide further evidence of the modified models’ accuracy and ability to detect RAM.

Insider Trading, Competition, and Real Activities Manipulation

We consider a setting where managers manipulate the firms’ real activities in anticipation of insider trading opportunities. Managers choose strictly higher production quantities than the quantities chosen absent insider trading, implying lower firm profit but higher consumer surplus. Through comparative statics, we show the overproduction is mitigated by the degree of competition in the industry, the manager’s current equity stake in the firm, and the precision of cost information. We also analyze the effects of insider trading in several extensions including asymmetric ownership structure, potential horizontal merger, and common market maker. This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.

Product market competition and real activities manipulation: Theory and implications

We investigate how a firm manipulates its real activities in production to meet the earnings target in product market competition against its product-market rivals. We show that the equilibratory way to reach the earnings target is to set a higher first-period output level, reaching a higher short-term profit level. However, once the expected level of demand uncertainty is high, a firm will exploit this effect on its output choice by taking a mixed strategy and raising its short-term output level. This result suggests that one should consider longer-horizon paths of variables to detect opportunistic real activities manipulation.