Reagan Doctrine Research Articles

Deciding to intervene: the Reagan Doctrine and American foreign policy

Journal Article Deciding to intervene: the Reagan Doctrine and American foreign policy Get access Deciding to intervene: the Reagan Doctrine and American foreign policy. By James M. Scott. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 1996. 333pp. Index. £47.95; ISBN 0 8223 1780 x. Pb.: £17.95; ISBN 0 8223 1789 3. Nigel Ashford Nigel Ashford 1Staffordshire University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 73, Issue 3, July 1997, Page 812, https://doi.org/10.2307/2624346 Published: 01 July 1997

Civil Society, Liberalism and the Corporatist Alternative in the Middle East

Democracy has returned to the center stage of American political science. Before World War I, political science assumed the universality of democracy in America. Its educational mission was to inform American citizens of this, its research mission to identify the imperfections of this democracy in order to reform it and to provide academic expertise to strengthen the American state administratively in its democratic mission.’ Post-behavioral political scientists in the 1990s also assume the universality of democracy, now on an international and cross-cultural basis. They also wish to inform the American public of this, and when they uncover it they also wish to reform it through their writings and through the support of indigenous intellectuals and scholars. The incentives, coercion and pressure of the US government assist them in their efforts. They are also engaged in the strengthening of the capabilities of the American state in spreading the democratic message abroad. This collaboration of government and scholar from the 1986 announcement of the Reagan Doctrine and the founding of the National Endowment for Democracy until today has been termed “Operation Democracy.”

Interbranch Rivalry and the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua

Journal Article Interbranch Rivalry and the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua Get access James M. Scott James M. Scott JAMES M. SCOTT is an assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Nebraska at Kearney. He is the author of Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy and a number of articles on U.S. foreign policy making. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 112, Issue 2, Summer 1997, Pages 237–260, https://doi.org/10.2307/2657940 Published: 15 June 1997

Book Review: Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, 604 pp. $30.00 hbk.). James Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham, North Carolina, and London: Duke University Press, 1996, 333 pp., no price given)

Book Review: Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, 604 pp. $30.00 hbk.). James Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham, North Carolina, and London: Duke University Press, 1996, 333 pp., no price given)

Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy. By James M. Scott. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996. 333p. $49.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy. By James M. Scott. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996. 333p. $49.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Deciding to intervene: the Reagan doctrine and American foreign policy

Deciding to intervene: the Reagan doctrine and American foreign policy

Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy

Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy

Changing conceptions of security in the Third World

information, drawn mainly from the post-World War Two period, although special attention was paid to recent times. Analysis of interpretations of the Central American Crisis (the name often used to describe the period of prolonged tension in the region beginning in 1979 and continuing into the early 1980s) suggested weakness in the predominant position of security as a concept within International Relations. Before the crisis, Central America had not attracted much attention and its apparent geopolitical irrelevance saw it characterised as an unimportant region of 'banana republics' (a term first used by US humorist 0 Henry) ruled by dictators. Analysis rarely reached beyond such stereotypes. However, the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979, and the gathering strength of revolutionary groups in El Salvador, soon stimulated intense academic interest and debate about the nature of the crisis. Two broad types of interpretation of the Central American Crisis emerged, with some overlap. First, those which blamed predominantly external factors and analysed the situation in an international context. Second, explanations which concentrated on the internal dynamics of the crisis as a domestic political problem. The former category used a predominantly traditional security-strategic studies approach to analyse the region's problems. Central America was seen in an East-West context, as an arena of superpower conflict. This view is particularly associated with the Reagan administration. In the campaign leading to Reagan's first presidency 'the insurgency in El Salvador was portrayed as resulting primarily from Cuban and Soviet subversion rather than domestic social and political conditions'.2 That the region's conflicts had indigenous roots was denied or subsumed in the much more immediate and crucial problems of managing the delicate Cold War balance or implementing the so-called Reagan Doctrine of 'rolling back' communism.

The Reagan Doctrine: Sources of American Conduct in the Cold War's Last Chapter, by Mark P. Lagon

The Reagan Doctrine: Sources of American Conduct in the Cold War's Last Chapter, <i>by Mark P. Lagon</i>

Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State.

George Schulz was Secretary of State in Reagan's cabinet from 1982 to 1989. This book gives his account of Reagan's foreign policy with an insider's view of important diplomatic manoeuvres and portrayals of major players during his term in office, from Mikhail Gorbachev to Margaret Thatcher.

The Reagan Doctrine: Sources of American Conduct in the Cold War's Last Chapter

The Reagan Doctrine: Sources of American Conduct in the Cold War's Last Chapter

The Nicaraguan-Contra Negotiations of 1988: A Test of The Reagan Doctrine

AbstractThe 1988 peace negotiations between the Nicaraguan government and the contras were noteworty as a reaction to the implementation by the United States government of the Reagan Doctrine and the theory of Low Intensity Conflict against the Sandinista state. That government confronted the Doctrine by reversing its long-held position of refusing to talk with the contras, as well as by agreeing to hold elections at an earlier date than originally planned. A detailed examination of the 1988 negotiations indicates that the government made important concessions to the contras in order to weaken the military impact of LIC; but this strategy could not overcome the economic warfare aspect of LIC. This conclusion indicates that LIC may be a more effective economic than military strategy even though the Sandinistas have not been totally defeated. The military aspect of LIC, furthermore, depends heavily on the strength of local rightist forces.

Western state terrorism

International - image and reality, Noam Chomsky terrorism as ideology and cultural industry, Edward S.Herman and Gerry O'Sullivan the discipline of terrorology, Alexander George the terrorist foundations of recent US foreign policy, Richard Falk American doctrine and counter-insurgent terror, Michael McClintock containment and its failure - the British State and the control of conflict in Northern Ireland, Bill Rolston Indonesia - mass extermination and the consolidation of authoritarian power, Carmel Budiardjo the Reagan doctrine and the destabilization of Southern Africa, Sean Gervasi and Sybil Wong.

The International System and the Reagan Doctrine: Can Realism Explain Aid to ‘Freedom Fighters’?

Doctrines have been a prevalent form of foreign policy in American history. What explains their origins? This study addresses this question by examining the Reagan Doctrine, a declared policy which pledged aid to anti-communist guerrillas in the Third World. This case study examines the utility of the ‘structural realist’ theory, focusing on the international level of analysis.Structural realism stresses the international balance of power, international conditions, limits on the government's freedom to make policy and the national interest. Sources of the Reagan Doctrine are found both in the international environment as a whole and in the individual countries where the Reagan Administration openly aided insurgents: Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola and Cambodia.The findings indicate that the structural realist perspective is necessary to explain the Reagan Doctrine, but not sufficient. In particular, it fails to account for the role of political elites and their beliefs in foreign-policy making.

Inside the National Security Council: the True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan's Foreign Policy. By Constantine C. Menges. New York: Simon &amp; Schuster, 1988. 418p. $19.95.

Inside the National Security Council: the True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan's Foreign Policy. By Constantine C. Menges. New York: Simon &amp; Schuster, 1988. 418p. $19.95. - Volume 84 Issue 4

The Reagan Strategy of Containment

Ronald Reagan came into the Oval Office on a platform that rejected the previous three administrations' basic foreign policies. His criticisms of Jimmy Carter were unsurprising. Every president distances himself from his predecessor, especially one from the opposite party. But Reagan condemned just as unequivocally the detente policies that had been fashioned by his fellow Republicans, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. This wholesale rejectionism led to speculation that President Reagan would move outside the evolved framework of postwar American foreign policy and adopt a radically different strategy of containment than had his predecessors. Some suggested that he might abandon containment altogether and move closer to James Burnham's prescription to rollback the Soviet Union. 1 Verdicts at the end of the Reagan years were mixed; some commentators felt vindicated in their fears of confrontation, while others saw Reagan's foreign policy as radical only in its rhetoric.2

The Reagan doctrine in its strategic and moral context

(1990). The Reagan doctrine in its strategic and moral context. Small Wars & Insurgencies: Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 22-38.

The Reagan Doctrine: Problems and prospects

(1990). The Reagan Doctrine: Problems and prospects. Small Wars & Insurgencies: Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 9-14.

The Central American Resource Center

With the success of the Sandinista Revolution in 1979 and the ensuing Reagan Doctrine of the 1980's, Central America has become an area of much debate in the United States. Despite its renewed visibility in the media, a comprehensive understanding of the region and of the serious issues faced by its people is still lacking. The need for timely and accurate information on Central America is made clear by such indicators as:

The Reagan Doctrine in Perspective

(1990). The Reagan Doctrine in Perspective. Perspectives on Political Science: Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 43-49.