Collective Action, Opacity, and the "Problem of Irrationality":Anarchism and the First of May, 1890-1892 Davide Turcato, Independent Scholar Introduction The history of anarchism is often approached as a simple and odd business. Anarchist collective action tends to be depicted as a succession of unconnected and hopeless initiatives: futile insurrectionary attempts by isolated and ill-equipped bands, such as the 1877 Benevento expedition led by Errico Malatesta and Carlo Cafiero, or spontaneous outbursts of rage by exasperated mobs in backward areas, such as was allegedly typical of Andalusian anarchism. In all cases, available historical evidence seems to leave little doubt about the anarchists' lack of preparation and organization, in stark contrast with their high-sounding proclaimed ends. Ultimately, the patent inconsistency and unsustainability of anarchist tactics support charges of irrationalism, as epitomized by E. J. Hobsbawm's influential depiction of anarchism as millenarian.1 There has been no lack of attempts to rescue anarchism from such dismissive accounts in the last three decades. Some of these have involuntarily reinforced stereotypes. For example, Peter Marshall, in his justified effort to dispel the [End Page 1] customary association of anarchism with terrorism and violence, remarks that "at its most violent the [anarchists'] action has typically not gone much beyond throwing up barricades or entering a village armed with rudimentary weapons," just as the millenarian stereotype would have it.2 Still, the advent of the "new social history" has spurred new research on anarchism, which persuasively argues for the effectiveness and relevance of anarchism. To mention only a few examples, this literature includes the books of Bruce Nelson on the Haymarket affair, of Richard Sonn and Alexander Varias on French anarchism, of John Lear on Mexico, of Kirwin Shaffer on Cuba, and of Matthew Thomas on Great Britain.3 Most of these works leave aside the mode of operation of anarchist direct action and insurrectionary tactics—and the related stereotypes about them—to focus on anarchist culture and its ability to influence society. Yet in focusing on the effectiveness of anarchism such works have failed in their own way to do justice to its rationality, in the standard sense of coherence among desires, beliefs, and behavior. In emphasizing the realism of anarchism and its ability to grapple with issues in the here and now, the adaptability and effectiveness of anarchist means are not gauged by the anarchists' goals, which tend to be regarded as a dead letter at best, or a dead weight at worst, but in contrast to them. Thus, Nelson's and Lear's emphasis on workers' traditions implies that anarchism had an instrumental value for workers who embraced it without fully sharing its objectives; likewise, anarchist goals were ultimately a liability for the countercultures studied by Thomas; and for Sonn and Varias, anarchist diversity, which enabled anarchists to be in tune with the culture of their times, was also the very reason that precluded them from successfully pursuing their anarchist ends. From the perspective of rationality, those who share Hobsbawm's judgment of "monumental ineffectiveness," and those who seek to rescue anarchism from that charge, are two sides of the same irrationalist coin. Either way, anarchism is made sense of by introducing an element of irrationality, whether in the form of impossible aims, futile means, or absurd beliefs. In contrast, the present article focuses on rationality, rather than on effectiveness. The two issues are distinct, as is commonly recognized in social sciences. An example is the debate on magical thought since Durkheim and Weber, with its rejection of Lévy-Bruhl's theory of "primitive mentality." As Raymond Boudon puts it, "the case of magic is paradigmatic, since magical [End Page 2] beliefs are by definition false beliefs," and therefore magic is ineffective; yet, "although their beliefs are without objective foundation, magicians have good reasons for believing what they believe," and therefore they are rationa1.4 This distinction is not equally familiar to historians; thus, the anarchists' failure to carry through a successful revolution tends to be taken as evidence against their rationality. Moreover, the focus of the present article is precisely on the organizational background of anarchist insurrectionary tactics. With few notable exceptions, such as Jerome Mintz's...
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Nov 27, 2014
Nathalie Bulle + 1
Open Access