Rawlsian View Research Articles

Führerprinzip or 'I Was Following Orders' in Jus in Bello Era

In June of 1945, the International Military Tribunal (ITM) formed in London, faced the problem of a non-yet existing legal armor for the Nazi crimes. Two new rules were widely accepted there. First, a new category of war crimes, the “crimes against humanity” was legally defined. Second, the ex-ante rejection of the defense line “I was following orders” or Führerprinzip (the principle of the duty to obey every order given by the military leader). In the first part of this paper, I will present in brief, the historical and legal context of the rejection of Führerprinzip as a defense line of the Nazi defendants in Nuremberg trials as also in Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, where the same legal context was enacted. Next, I will expose a short history of conscientious objection in war ethics and the International Law on Human Rights that supports it. This exposition reveals that objection to criminal orders has the status not only of a right, but also of a duty for the soldiers on either side of the war. In the third part, the Rawlsian view on conscientious objector will be exposed as the meeting point of a broadly Kantian conception of war ethics and the existing International Law frame. In the final part I will present some philosophical aspects of jus in bello theory, as also the critique of its importance, and its contribution to the reification of the moral importance of conscientious objection in wartime and the rejection of Führerprinzip.

Pricing the Pharmaceuticals when the Ability to Pay Differs

A non-trivial fraction of people cannot afford to buy pharmaceutical products at unregulated market prices. This paper analyses the public insurance of a patent-protected pharmaceutical product in terms of price controls and socially optimal third-degree price discrimination. First, the paper characterizes the Ramsey pricing rule in the case where the producer price has to cover the R&D costs of the firm and patients’ pharmaceutical expenditures are not covered by health insurance. Subsequently, conditions for a welfare increasing departure from the Ramsey pricing rule are stated in terms of price regulation and health insurance coverage. Unlike the earlier views expressed, the increased consumption of the pharmaceutical is shown to be welfare increasing. In the spirit of the Rawlsian view, a criterion for vertical equity is examined as an optimal means-tested health insurance. In this scheme, the regulator chooses a higher insurance coverage for individuals whose income is below an endogenously determined income threshold. The means-tested insurance scheme improves
 social welfare but also yields very equal market outcomes.

The Symposium on “Setting Health-Care Priorities” by Torbjörn Tännsjö

The present paper constitutes an introduction to a special issue of Diametros devoted to Setting Health-Care Priorities. What Ethical Theories Tell Us by Torbjörn Tännsjö. The book in question states that there are three moral theories which have valid implications in the field of the distribution of medical resources in a healthcare system: utilitarianism (possibly conjoined with prioritarianism), the maximin/leximin view, and egalitarianism. A number of authors have contributed to this special issue with papers which challenge this thesis. Robert E. Goodin argues that, besides general moral theories, some local principles of justice might be valid. Quinn Hiroshi Gibson states that Tännsjö should have considered the Rawlsian view on justice in its contractualist reading. Jay A. Zameska argues that his “revised lexical sufficientarianism” constitutes a more reliable moral view than prioritarianism. Finally, Lasse Nielsen points out that there is more to say about distributive justice than consequentialist theories can grasp. Moreover, he puts forward an argument in defense of prioritarianism. The final article in this issue constitutes Tännsjö’s replies to his critics.

Global justice theory as alternative to the Rawlsian theory of justice in contexts of multiple domination

No contexto multifacetado atual, há atores que se beneficiam do design estrutural mundial ao mesmo passo em que a diversos outros são impostas barreiras que dificultam o acesso às riquezas - as quais, defende-se, em havendo uma arquitetura distribucional global voltada à equidade, poderiam ser melhor alocadas, de maneira a beneficiar um maior número de indivíduos. Nesse passo, o presente artigo, utilizando-se, principalmente, de método de pesquisa bibliográfico, possui o objetivo de demonstrar que a visão rawlsiana, ainda que cabível em sociedades herméticas, é inadequada para um mundo submerso em desigualdades econômicas altamente maculadas pela forma de acumulação histórica, predatória e usurpadora, imposta pelos países mais desenvolvidos economicamente em relação aos pobres globais. Assim, busca demonstrar, por uma análise de conjunto e com referência na teoria de justiça global consoante avançada por Thomas Pogge, a maneira pela qual a estruturação global ainda hoje prejudica, seletivamente - i.e., principalmente por meio dos privilégios internacionais sobre recursos e sobre empréstimos -, países, mantendo-os - ou, mais frequentemente, suas populações - em condição de pobreza.

The view of the coronavirus pandemic response through the lens of political philosophy: Utilitarianism and the Rawlsian approach

The paper discusses the moral justification of the adoption of the restriction measures during the coronavirus pandemic, and attempts to connect it with the notion of human rights and freedom. The popular Western response falls in the line of the work of John Rawls and his perception of justice and fairness. The premise of Rawlsian approach is that the state has a duty to protect everyone as they themselves would wish to be protected. However, as the time has progressed, the outcomes of the lockdown has begun to become visible, hence challenging the initial Rawlsian view of the issue at stake. Under the new circumstances, the political theory of utilitarianism seems to be gaining ground, but in its most brutal form. Dismissing the roots of the utilitarian theory, the utilitarian calculus has been used as a sophism by politicians for the introduction of the notion of “sacrifice” for the greater good. By the presentation and application of the two approaches, in the face of a future reemergence of similar problem, this paper argues for the adoption of a combining approach that covers the concerns of both and answers the moral dilemmas that have emerged from this period of quarantine.

Pricing the Pharmaceuticals When the Ability to Pay Differs: Taking Vertical Equity Seriously

A non-trivial fraction of people cannot afford to buy pharmaceutical products at unregulated market prices. Therefore, the paper analyzes the public insurance of the pharmaceutical products in terms of price controls and the socially optimal third-degree price discrimination. It characterizes first the Ramsey pricing rule in the absence of insurance and in the case where the producer price has to cover the R&D sunk cost of the firm. Subsequently, conditions for a welfare increasing departure from Ramsey pricing are stated in terms of price regulation and insurance coverage. The resulting outcome is second best. Unlike the earlier views expressed, increased consumption of pharmaceutical products is shown to be welfare increasing in the second best world. As the optimal means-tested insurance, two alternative criteria for vertical equity are examined in the spirit of the Rawlsian view. In the first scheme, the regulator chooses a higher insurance coverage for individuals with their income below a threshold. In the second scheme, the society imputes a social value to low-income patients in terms of the value-added they produce after the treatment. Under both schemes, the threshold is determined endogenously.

Rawlsian Objectivity

AbstractIn a 1981 letter to H .L. A. Hart, John Rawls sketches a view of moral objectivity that substantially differs from that of contemporary constructivists. The view he describes does not rely on constitutive features of agency as Korsgaard's does, and it does not bottom out in a form of realism as Scanlon's moral theory does. Instead, Rawls's view grounds objectivity on the fundamental conceptions that could be shared in wide reflective equilibrium. Constructivism grounds objectivity in a kind of intersubjectivity, and Rawls finds the relevant kind of intersubjectivity in the alignment between fundamental convictions. This article develops this Rawlsian view of objectivity and highlights its strengths.

Ratzinger, Habermas, and Pera on Public Reason and Religion

Ratzinger, Habermas, and Pera on Public Reason and Religion Peter J. Colosi (bio) Introduction:1 Among contemporary scholar atheists and agnostics, there are these two distinct types: (1) Those who think religion is the cause of all evil in the world and who assert that it ought to be eradicated so as to bring about their version of utopia, and (2) those who perceive that the world is going terribly off track and wonder whether religion after all does have something to offer with respect to how we structure our common life together.2 This article explores a conversation between that second type of atheist or agnostic and people of faith, in particular on the question of public policy and the common good. Before becoming pope, Joseph Ratzinger/Pope Benedict XVI collaborated on book projects with Jürgen Habermas,3 an atheist, and Marcello Pera,4 an agnostic,5 on questions pertaining to the foundations of morality and the common good. Habermas, who once held a Rawlsian view with respect to religious voices in the public square, has changed his position,6 stating that, “The liberal state has an interest of its own in unleashing religious voices in the public sphere, for it cannot know whether secular society would not [End Page 148] otherwise cut itself off from key resources for the creation of meaning and identity.”7 Marcello Pera has expressed a similar position, to be discussed below. While both men are calling for religious voices in the public sphere, they differ in that Habermas speaks of religion in general,8 while Pera refers specifically to the Christian roots of Europe. This new openness of some high profile atheists and agnostics to religious voices in the public sphere combined with the West’s rejection of its moral heritage and historical roots has led Joseph Ratzinger to the following suggestion, In the age of the Enlightenment, the attempt was made to understand and define the essential norms of morality by saying that these would be valid etsi Deus non daretur, even if God did not exist. … We must … reverse the axiom of the Enlightenment and say: Even one who does not succeed in finding the path to accepting the existence of God ought nevertheless to try to live and to direct his life veluti si Deus daretur, as if God did indeed exist.9 Axiom 1: Its Meaning and Consequences Axiom 1 represents the Enlightenment view that the norms of traditional morality remain true even if God did not exist, “etsi Deus non daretur.” It can be explained as follows. Immanuel Kant, in his time, was deeply concerned about the loss of morality that would ensue from his position on the unknowability of: God’s existence; free will; and the immortality of the soul. Thus, Kant decided to accept these as postulates of practical reason (i.e., ethics). He did this in order that morality would not fall apart, which he thought would inevitably happen if people actually rejected God, free will, and immortality when building their ethical views.10 Marcello Pera expresses this by saying that Kant, and also Galileo, were trying to keep what “is and as such can be verified scientifically” together with what “ought to be and which is based on sources that are not scientific or rational [End Page 149] (customs, beliefs, faith).”11 Kant and Galileo wanted to promote traditional morality even if God could not be known or proven to exist. Another way to put the point would be: Since God, freedom, and immortality are not scientifically or empirically verifiable, Kant and Galileo excluded them from the realm of the knowable, yet at the same time they wanted to retain the moral vision that depends on God, freedom, and immortality. Pera then notes, “The solution thought out by Kant did not succeed … because once it had taken hold the logic of separation [of scientific knowledge from faith/morality] was more powerful than the logic of unification.”12 I concur with the view of Ratzinger and Pera that Kant’s goal was not the destruction of traditional morality, but rather its rescue. Granted, morality needed to be rescued from Kant’s very own...

A Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (III): Conformism, Equilibrium Refinement and Selection

This is the third part of a comprehensive essay on the Rawlsian view of corporate social responsibility (CSR), seen as an extended model of corporate governance, and the corresponding firm’s objective function.1 In the first part of this essay (Sacconi, 2010a), I provided the following definition of CSR as a multi-stakeholder governance model (see also Sacconi 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2009): CSR is a model of extended corporate governance whereby those who run a firm (entrepreneurs, directors, managers) have responsibilities that range from fulfillment of fiduciary duties toward the owners to fulfillment of analogous — even if not identical — fiduciary duties toward all the firm’s stakeholders. This definition has been articulated and defended as an institutional model of corporate governance implementable through explicitly expressed norms of self-regulation based on company/stakeholders social dialog — which means that CSR is neither a matter of managerial discretion nor one of external regulation enforced though statutory laws. The basic idea is that such a model of self-regulation, provided it is not obstructed by statutory company law, which imposes a single-stakeholder fiduciary model and objective function on companies, is self sustaining. Hence the relevant perspective from which to understand the normative nature of CSR is that of an institution in Aoki’s sense (see Aoki 2001, Aoki 2007a, Aoki 2007b and Sacconi 2010a).

Henry Sidgwick’s Moral Epistemology

In this essay I defend the view that Henry Sidgwick’s moral epistemology is a form of intuitionist foundationalism that grants common-sense morality no evidentiary role. In §1, I outline both the problematic of The Methods of Ethics and the main elements of its argument for utilitarianism. In §§2-4 I provide my interpretation of Sidgwick’s moral epistemology. In §§5-8 I refute rival interpretations, including the Rawlsian view that Sidgwick endorses some version of reflective equilibrium and the view that he is committed to some kind of pluralistic epistemology. In§9 I contend with some remaining objections to my view.

A Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part II): Fairness and Equilibrium

This is the second part of an comprehensive essay of the Rawlsian view of corporate social responsibility (CSR thereafter) understood as an extended model of corporate governance and objective function, based on the extension of fiduciary duties owed to the sole owner of the firm to all the company stakeholder (for this definition see part I, Sacconi, 2010a, infra). As in the first part, CSR is also understood as a self-sustaining institution - i.e. as a self-sustaining system of descriptive and normative beliefs consistent with the equilibrium behaviors performed repeatedly by agents in the domain of action of corporate governance (firms and their stakeholders). But equilibria are multiple in the game representing the strategic interaction among the firm and its stakeholders - modeled as a repeated trust game or some similar ‘social dilemma game’ (Ostrom, 1990). Thus asserting that CSR satisfies the Nash equilibrium condition as an institution is not enough. There is also an equilibrium selection problem. This the place where the Rawlsian social contract (Rawls, 1971, 1993) enters again the picture by performing its main role as normative equilibrium selection device from the ex ante perspective: that is, the ex ante impartial selection of a unique equilibrium amongst the many possible in the repeated trust game involving the firms and its stakeholders. Note that this was its second role previously suggested (see section 5 part I, and left to this part where it is treated at length), as distinguished from the role of shaping the players’ expectations so that in the ex post perspective they are able to predict the agreed solution as the result of a cognitive process of beliefs convergence to the equilibrium, which is focused on in part III, (see Sacconi, 2011 and Sacconi 2008).

A Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part I): The Multistakeholder Model of Corporate Governance

A Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part I): The Multistakeholder Model of Corporate Governance

Immanuel Kant (International Library of Essays in the History of Social and Political Thought). Edited by Arthur Ripstein

Immanuel Kant (International Library of Essays in the History of Social and Political Thought). Edited by Arthur Ripstein

La production de modernités urbaines « glocales » : explorant les failles dans le miroir

Les villes sont — et ont toujours ete — des lieux fortement differencies, qui expriment une heterogeneite, des activites diverses, de la joie et du plaisir. Ceux sont des arenes pour la poursuite d’activites et de desire in-oppresse, mais aussi des espaces remplis de pouvoir systematique, de danger, d’oppression, de domination et d’exclusion. Pouvoir jongler entre ces tensions paradoxales, l’emancipation et la perte de pouvoir, a ete bien sur le quotidien des urbanistes, designer, ingenieurs sociaux, architectes et d’une vaste liste de visionnaires depuis les debuts des temps d’urbanisation. Cependant, les villes — et en particulier, les villes modernes — ne rendent pas l’apprivoisement facile. Dans les dernieres decennies, les parametres de la vie urbaine se sont orientes dans de nouvelles directions et se sont deplaces rapidement hors des contraintes dans lesquels les conceptions modernes et les pratiques gestionnaires urbaines avaient essaye de les retenir. Cette contribution soutient, premierement, que ce nouvel etat urbain presente une reaffirmation dramatique des forces modernes plutot que l’annonce d’une image, radicale, d’une nouvelle ville « post-moderne ». Dans une seconde partie, l’attention se tournera vers les nouvelles conditions et les failles qui infusent l’urbanisation contemporaine. La differentiation et la fragmentation a tous les niveaux sont devenues le resultat naturel de l’internationalisation, de la mondialisation et de l’imposition croissante d’une culture total(isante) de biens. En dernier lieu, cet article s’orientera vers des questions de justice sociale et urbaine dans cette nouvelle image de la ville. Alors que les plans urbains et d’urbanisation, durant la periode d’apres-guerre, se sont enveloppes dans une idee Rawlsienne d’une « Justice Equitable » autour de grands termes de redistribution, le mirage d’une ville et d’une region juste, a distribution equitable, a ete pulverise par la geopolitique d’accumulation de capitaux, prenant une nouvelle route importante apres les transformations cataclysmiques des deux dernieres decennies. Nous en concluons donc que les dynamiques contradictoires d’urbanisation hypermodernes actuelles ouvrent toute sorte de failles et de fissures. L’image d’une ville refletant la modernite est brisee, tel un kaleidoscope et tout sauf coherent. Ce sont justement dans ces « Third Spaces » (troisiemes espaces) interstitielles que resident les possibilites pour une intervention creative et pour toute autre experimentation innovatrice urbaine. Ce sont aussi dans ces endroits ou se negocie et se promulgue les questions et les pratiques d’une justice differente, du droit a la ville, et d’une vie urbaine emancipatrice. En effet, a l’interieur de ces interstices d’une logique commerciale d’urbanisation « glocale », se cache avec tout son potentiel energetique, la possibilite d’une forme et d’une vie urbaine, veritablement humaine.

What we Owe to the Global Poor: Political Philosophy Meets Development Economics

John Rawls's Law of Peoples has come in for a good deal of critical discussion recently, and most political philosophers seem to find it wanting for one reason or another. This study argues that Rawls's is a plausible view of what developed countries owe developing countries. Rawls formulates a stringent duty (putting the status quo to shame) in a philosophically sound manner that has a genuine chance of persuading policy-makers, while integrating normative argumentation and empirical claims in a way that does justice to both in a domain in which claims about facts and claims about values are intricately intertwined. Rawls gives us, in his words, a realistic utopia. To make my case, I use two argumentative devices. First, I develop the Rawlsian view through an assessment of the Rawls-Pogge debate. Thomas Pogge's account of the duty to developing societies differs from Rawls's in major points and contains forceful objections that must be rebutted for Rawls's view to have any plausibility. Second, I consult answers to an empirical question discussed by growth economists, to whit, why are some societies poor and volatile, and others wealthy and stable? The most promising answer (highlighting domestic institutions) supports Rawls. Unless that answer prevails, Rawls's account is implausible.