Rawlsian Theory Research Articles

Storytelling for Social Justice: Reconceptualizing Invisibility, Legitimacy, and Self-Censorship via Stories of Failure

ABSTRACT Building upon scholarship on stories – including oral-history and oral-tradition – this article considers often-silenced narratives in the form of stories of failures. Comparison between empirical research and qualitative methodologies highlight value of fictional storytelling, which has been mobilized by researchers to protect the anonymity of vulnerable groups and the intersectionally marginalized in research. While hierarchies in power lead to self-censorship and self-delegitimization as observed by bell hooks and Paulo Freire, stories of failure may resist social pressures to present successes – which in themselves have led to widely disseminated cases of academic fraud. Additionally, stories of failures may help acknowledge Kemmis and Mezirow’s considerations of negative emotions as valid, toward resolution, resistance, and social change. Stories may help elucidate the hidden curriculum, which confounds efforts toward social justice under Rawlsian theories. Lastly, these stories may elucidate the impacts of interest convergence under critical race theory, towards the promotion of social justice intersectionally.

Rawlsian Anti-Capitalist Environmental Justice

In this paper, I examine John Rawls’ claim in the first edition of A Theory of Justice that Justice as Fairness cannot include considerations about the environment and non-human animals. The paper aims to resolve the tension in this statement, as the idea of a Rawlsian well-ordered society without concern for the rest of nature presents as a contradiction. Through a more charitable reading of Rawlsian theory that borrows from anti-capitalist and environmental justice frameworks, we can see how Rawlsian justice connects tightly to these issues. I conclude that the Rawlsian well-ordered society must be committed to anti-capitalist environmental justice.

RIGHTOF PEOPLE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN JOHN RAWLS PHILOSOPHY:PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN AFRICA

Is there something like a social function of justice, organizing, alongside politics, our relationship to reality and constituting a minimum standard of action in society?John Rawls answered this question with his theory of justice where principles are presented as necessary substrates for well-ordered societies. This can be formulated the question of the relationship between justice presented as the first virtue of social institutions and the idea of the inviolability of the human person. (J. Rawls, 1997, p. 29).To the question of what link can be established between the law of nations and the notion of human rights, we hypothesize that the opening of the principles of justice to relations between societies allows an indiscriminate implementation of fundamental human rights beyond the borders of democratic societies.This is why the objective of this contribution is to analyse the possibility of a rule of law in Africa from the Rawlsian theory of the law of nations in the perspective of an institutional patriotism.

Participation, prediction, and publicity: avoiding the pitfalls of applying Rawlsian ethics to AI

AbstractGiven the popularity of John Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness as an ethical framework in the artificial intelligence (AI) field, this article examines how the theory fits with three different conceptual applications of AI technology. First, the article discusses a proposition by Ashrafian to let an AI agent perform the deliberation that produces a Rawlsian social contract governing humans. The discussion demonstrates the inviability of such an application as it contradicts foundational aspects of Rawls’ theories. An exploration of more viable applications of Rawlsian theory in the AI context follows, introducing the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic theoretical adherence, i.e., the difference between approaches integrating Rawlsian theory in the system design and those situating AI systems in Rawls-consistent policy/legislative frameworks. The article uses emerging AI legislation in the EU and the U.S. as well as Gabriel’s argument for adopting Rawls’ publicity criterion in the AI field as examples of extrinsic adherence to Rawlsian theory. A discussion of the epistemological challenges of predictive AI systems then illustrates some implications of intrinsic adherence to Rawlsian theory. While AI systems can make short-term predictions about human behavior with intrinsic adherence to Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, long-term, large-scale predictions results do not adhere to the theory, but instead constitute the type of utilitarianism Rawls vehemently opposed. The article concludes with an overview of the implications of these arguments for policymakers and regulators.

What can urban policies and planning really learn from John Rawls? A multi-strata view of institutional action and a canvas conception of the just city

One of the most influential theories of justice in planning theory and practice has been, without doubt, that of John Rawls. The very idea of the just city is indebted to Rawls’s view. However, the way in which Rawlsian theory of justice has been imported into planning often seems debatable. This article aims to discuss this aspect critically. The objective is not merely to discuss certain planning approaches inspired by Rawls; it is also to investigate, in more general terms, what meaning and role (any theory of) justice could and should have for planning and urban policies. In revisiting John Rawls’s view, the article is structured around two points: first, a critical discussion on how Rawls’s theory of justice has been generally applied to urban policies and planning; second, an exploration of an alternative way to interpret and apply certain Rawlsian insights (often undervalued) in this field. The article is not intended to defend and recommend Rawls’s normative theory as a whole (i.e. in its entirety), but to evidence certain Rawlsian contributions of a general nature that are particularly important. Nor is it the aim of this article to contribute directly to the development of a specific substantive idea of the just city; instead, it is to highlight fundamental methodological and analytical caveats that are crucial in this regard. Rather than a “theory of the just city”, this article develops a “meta-theory of the just city”: that is, an approach specifying precautions and conditions for any coherent and convincing just city theory.

Rawls’ Theory of International Justice: A Brief Reconstruction and Critical Commentary

The aim of this paper is to offer a concise and faithful account of Rawls’ theory of international justice, in an effort, first, to elucidate the structure of the argument that is advanced in that theory and, second, to present a critical assessment of it. The critical assessment section attempts, on the one side, to cope with crucial methodological issues, which have a more general bearing upon Rawls’ overall political philosophical position, including the constructivist perspective of theory making and the division between a political conception and a comprehensive doctrine; on the other side, to weigh up a set of substantive claims made in the Rawlsian theory of international justice, including the recognition of peoples as the fundamental subjects of international law, the toleration of the so-called decent peoples and the considerably thin construal of human rights encompassed in The Law of Peoples. The paper attempts to provide a series of reasons that could be well-suited to explicate its author’s doubts about the soundness of the Rawlsian theoretical perspective with regard to both its formal methodological features and its more content-oriented convictions.

Rawls' Theory of International Justice: A Brief Reconstruction and Critical Commentary

The aim of this paper is to offer a concise and faithful account of Rawls’ theory of international justice, in an effort, first, to elucidate the structure of the argument that is advanced in that theory and, second, to present a critical assessment of it. The critical assessment section attempts, on the one side, to cope with crucial methodological issues, which have a more general bearing upon Rawls’ overall political philosophical position, including the constructivist perspective of theory making and the division between a political conception and a comprehensive doctrine; on the other side, to weigh up a set of substantive claims made in the Rawlsian theory of international justice, including the recognition of peoples as the fundamental subjects of international law, the toleration of the so-called decent peoples and the considerably thin construal of human rights encompassed in The Law of Peoples. The paper attempts to provide a series of reasons that could be well-suited to explicate its author’s doubts about the soundness of the Rawlsian theoretical perspective with regard to both its formal methodological features and its more content-oriented convictions.

MinMax fairness: from Rawlsian Theory of Justice to solution for algorithmic bias

This paper presents an intuitive explanation about why and how Rawlsian Theory of Justice (Rawls in A theory of justice, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1971) provides the foundations to a solution for algorithmic bias. The contribution of the paper is to discuss and show why Rawlsian ideas in their original form (e.g. the veil of ignorance, original position, and allowing inequalities that serve the worst-off) are relevant to operationalize fairness for algorithmic decision making. The paper also explains how this leads to a specific MinMaxfairness solution, which addresses the basic challenges of algorithmic justice. We combine substantive elements of Rawlsian perspective with an intuitive explanation in order to provide accessible and practical insights. The goal is to propose and motivate why and how the MinMaxfairness solution derived from Rawlsian principles overcomes some of the current challenges for algorithmic bias and highlight the benefits provided when compared to other approaches. The paper presents and discusses the solution by building a bridge between the qualitative theoretical aspects and the quantitative technical approach.

Humanization of outgroups promotes justice in carbon allocation

Understanding the underpinnings of climate justice, especially justice in carbon allocation, is paramount for international cooperation in coping with climate change. Previous work has attempted to promote carbon allocation justice based on a utilitarian theory of justice, but it has backfired. Adopting the per capita approach in defining justice suggested by a Rawlsian theory of justice, the current research addresses the psychosocial processes underlying justice in carbon allocation. Inspired by the social identity approach, we propose that whether people choose to behave justly in carbon allocation originates, in part, from their perceptions about whether an outgroup shares similar humanness with the ingroup. We conducted four studies (N = 1326) to test this assumption. The results indicated that humanization increased the allocation of carbon credits to an outgroup (Study 1), increased the amount of carbon credits contributed and decreased free-riding behavior (Studies 2 & 3), and reduced carbon emissions and over-emitting behavior (Study 4) in carbon allocation; the effects were mediated by an expanded scope of justice (Studies 1–4). By identifying the roles of humanization and the scope of justice in carbon allocation justice, this research provides a psychosocial framework for understanding climate justice, which has implications for guiding the priorities of policymakers.

Justice as fairness: a Rawlsian perspective in compensating regulatory land takings

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to articulate the inherent unfairness in compensation outcomes between landowners whose land is physically taken versus those whose land is regulated. Using Rawlsian theory as the normative standard of “fairness as justice”, the paper argues that both physical and regulatory takings should be compensated.Design/methodology/approachMost jurisdictions invariably provide market price compensation when land is physically acquired. When land is not physically taken but merely subject to regulation, however, there is no corresponding need to compensate, even where the economic loss suffered by the landowner is the same. Adopting Rawlsian theory, this paper explains why justice and fairness in land use planning require both physical takings and regulatory takings to be equally compensable.FindingsApplying Rawlsian theory to compare compensable compulsory purchase with non-compensable regulatory takings of land show that the latter is not compatible with an ethical planning praxis.Originality/valueWhile Rawlsian theory has been applied in urban planning research before, this would be its first application in highlighting the apparent justice paradox which now distinguishes a physical and regulatory taking of land.

A Comparative Study between the ‎Mainstream, Critical, and Islamic ‎Approaches to Sustainable ‎Development

There are never-ending debates revolving around the concept of sustainable development as different groups of people have a different understanding of it. However, in a broader sense, it consists of three essential elements: conservation of the environment, intragenerational, and intergenerational justice. Currently, there are three broad groups of approaches to sustainable development: mainstream, critical, and Islamic approaches. It is best to assume that those three essential elements are inherent within each approach. The study aims to explain how those three approaches differ in establishing and maintaining the three elements of sustainable development by using a comparative analysis framework. Each element of sustainable development in each approach will be assessed based on the ability to produce relative decoupling, Rawlsian theory of justice, and whether they can help future generations meet their needs according to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. The study shows that each approach has it's good and bad, looking at their practices. It can be said that the practices of the Islamic approach to sustainable development can fulfil the three elements the best and more easily among the three approaches compared. It is just that it does not have a clear set of specific guidance on how the Islamic view on the environment can be applied.

The path to “a theory of justice”: works by John Rawls of the 40s — early 50s

Over the many years that have passed since John Rawls published “A Theory of Justice” (1971), researchers have considered Rawls’s theory to be a new stage in the development of the liberal tradition of Locke and Kant. However, after Rawls’s papers were opened at the Harvard University Archive, it became clear that this established idea is not entirely accurate. Studying Rawls’s early works, most of which are still unpublished, allowed to see more comprehensively both the stages and the features of the formation of his theory and, in general, to look at the history of the development of political philosophy in the twentieth century in a new way. The focus of this paper is on the works of Rawls, written in the 40s and the first half of the 50s. They are still poorly studied. Moreover, since we are talking about works written before Rawls’s trip to Oxford, when his “Wittgensteinian turn” (P. Mackenzie Bock) was completed, we can consider them a separate stage in the development of his thought. They are undoubtedly of interest to researchers. An analysis of early works by Rawls makes it possible to see that he was beginning to form the basic concepts of the Rawlsian theory of justice even before his trip to Oxford. In these works, Rawls has not yet studied the topic of justice itself; nevertheless, they lay the foundations for the concepts of a “well-ordered society” and the “original position”, the interpretation of the circumstances of justice that we find in “A Theory of Justice”. And, although after the war Rawls renounces religion, resulting in his search for basic ethical principles of fair cooperation that can be rationally justified, he nevertheless retains in his further works a general orientation towards the social ideal, which he formed in the 40s within the tradition of neo-orthodox Protestant theology.

4. What would be a fair intellectual property? A dynamic inquiry through the Rawlsian theory of justice

En droit comme en économie, la propriété intellectuelle a toujours été un sujet hautement controversé. En effet, les discussions passées et présentes ne portent pas tant sur le fonctionnement de cette propriété que sur son existence même. Récemment, certaines contributions ont sollicité le cadre théorique des deux principes de justice de John Rawls pour justifier et concevoir les droits de propriété intellectuelle. Cependant, ces contributions arrivent à des conclusions contraires. Notre travail vise à clarifier ce débat de deux façons : d’abord, en introduisant une distinction conceptuelle entre le volet patrimonial et le volet extrapatrimonial de cette propriété, ensuite, en incluant dans l’analyse les résultats récents fournis par la littérature en économie de l’innovation. Classification JEL : A13; K11; O34; O38

Beyond Ideal Theory: Foundations for a Critical Rawlsian Theory of Climate Justice

ABSTRACT Rawls’s contractualist approach to justice is well known for its adoption of ideal theory. This approach starts by setting out the political goal or ideal and leaves it to non-ideal or partial compliance theory to map out how to get there. However, Rawls’s use of ideal theory has been criticized by Sen from the right and by Mouffe from the left. We critically address these concerns in the context of developing a Rawlsian approach to climate justice. While the importance of non-ideal theory for climate justice is increasingly being understood, its strategic and institutional importance for a Rawlsian approach needs further elaboration. We focus on the role of the Kantian conception of the reasonable and rational powers of persons in Rawls’s work and show how this helps us to develop a partial compliance theory that focuses on the importance of institutions and strategic political action for achieving climate justice.

Global justice theory as alternative to the Rawlsian theory of justice in contexts of multiple domination

No contexto multifacetado atual, há atores que se beneficiam do design estrutural mundial ao mesmo passo em que a diversos outros são impostas barreiras que dificultam o acesso às riquezas - as quais, defende-se, em havendo uma arquitetura distribucional global voltada à equidade, poderiam ser melhor alocadas, de maneira a beneficiar um maior número de indivíduos. Nesse passo, o presente artigo, utilizando-se, principalmente, de método de pesquisa bibliográfico, possui o objetivo de demonstrar que a visão rawlsiana, ainda que cabível em sociedades herméticas, é inadequada para um mundo submerso em desigualdades econômicas altamente maculadas pela forma de acumulação histórica, predatória e usurpadora, imposta pelos países mais desenvolvidos economicamente em relação aos pobres globais. Assim, busca demonstrar, por uma análise de conjunto e com referência na teoria de justiça global consoante avançada por Thomas Pogge, a maneira pela qual a estruturação global ainda hoje prejudica, seletivamente - i.e., principalmente por meio dos privilégios internacionais sobre recursos e sobre empréstimos -, países, mantendo-os - ou, mais frequentemente, suas populações - em condição de pobreza.

John Rawls: a razoabilidade como demarcação de objetividade

In the late Rawlsian theory objectivity is evaluated by the reasonability parameter. However, to arrive at such a finding, Rawls has come a long way. From A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism many writings favored their theoretical development, where the reasonable tends to take priority over the rational, although both are complementary. This aspect is seen primarily in the Original Position, guaranteeing the autonomy of the parties in a political sense. It should be noted here that reasonableness is not related to a theory of truth, but only to a sense of justice, in a concrete situation, in which the notions of person and society are shared and present in a public culture.

The Specificity of the Theory of Justice and the Problem of Its Implementation in Russia

The theory of justice by John Rawls belongs to the set of “local” theories in ethics. These theories constitute a middle ground between strong ethical theories and the so-called “anti-theories”. The local theories do not possess many specific features of the grand theories, but also are lacking many of the drawbacks, for which they are attacked by the “anti-theorists”. These theories are closely related to the social choice theories and tackle the problems of social development in liberal societies. Recently the local theories gained significant impetus in the liberal states for tackling concrete ethical problems. At the same time, these theories have certain limitations. These theories are of limited universalizability. The theory of Rawls is applicable only to liberal society and only for free and equal agents, capable of cooperative strategy. These theories should be regarded as further development and continuation of social choice theories. The social choice theories are striving for ethics the same as ethics is striving for social choice theory. It is due to this reason in particular that the theory of Rawls is inapplicable to Russia. Russia, according to Rawlsian classification, is a hierarchical society, and because of that, it cannot draw from Rawlsian theory of justice. The problem, which theory better suits Russian development, remains open. Presumably, it must be some kind of strong theory.

Amartia Sen, leitor de Rawls: uma crítica à teoria da justiça enquanto prioridade da liberdade formal (por um novo fundamento da dignidade humana, da autonomia e da justiça)

The object of this essay is to examine Amartia Sen’s approach to the justification of substantive rights pointed out in the third chapter of ‘Development as Freedom’ and his critique of the priority of formal freedoms in rawlsian theory. He points out a conflict between liberties (formal freedoms) and freedoms (material freedoms). This opposition will be confronted with Herbert Hart’s polemic in the third part of ‘Essays in Jurisprudence and philosophy’, where he points out a problem of Rawls’ formulation in not reconciling the admission of private property as a basic freedom with the principle of maximum equal freedom. The problem is whether the Sen model better addresses this issue. Our positive hypothesis. By establishing a small number of basic freedoms, Rawls treated the right as a mere formal guarantee. Consequently, the right to private ownership of large portions of land and the extensive control by private individuals over the financial system and over major industrial, commercial, and service goods, in the absence of any greater or consistent justification, end up envisioned by something equivalent to a self-justified natural right. As Marx said, it is not scientifically possible to conceal the original fact of the conquest of private property by covering it up under the diaphanous cloak of natural law, inasmuch as, to oppose the ‘natural right of a few’ it would be enough for the previously dispossessed majority to gather sufficient strength to impose a ‘natural right’ of the reconquest of usurpation. As for the method, it is an exclusively bibliographical research, which can be based, in a merely incidental way, on empirical data.

Rawlsian Institutionalism and Business Ethics: Does It Matter Whether Corporations Are Part of the Basic Structure of Society?

ABSTRACTIn this article, I aim to clarify some key issues in the ongoing debate about the relationship between Rawlsian political philosophy and business ethics. First, I discuss precisely what we ought to be asking when we consider whether corporations are part of the “basic structure of society.” I suggest that the relevant questions have been mischaracterized in much of the existing debate, and that some key distinctions have been overlooked. I then argue that although Rawlsian theory’s potential implications for business ethics are more extensive than some have suggested, the nature of the concern that we ought to have about the effects of corporate behavior on individuals’ economic and social conditions should lead us to reject the view that corporations are bound by principles of justice only if, and insofar as, they are part of the basic structure.

John Rawls' Theory of Justice Applied to Sustainable Development

Sustainable development is a systemic concept, which aims at global development together with the concern with the preservation of nature. This study aims to apply the Rawlsian Theory into sustainable development. Considerations seems to allow that, with the collaboration of society in an egalitarian and cooperative way, it is possible to mitigate or overcome existing environmental challenges. The present study it presents a new aspect capable of helping in the solution and management of environmental issues currently faced globally. Keywords: Sustainable development; John Rawls; Global challenges.