Rawlsian Principles Research Articles

Affirmative Action and Equality of Opportunity in College Admissions

This essay critically examines the efficacy of race-based affirmative action in U.S. college admissions, arguing that it fails to adequately address the root causes of racial inequality and often does not benefit the most marginalized individuals within minority groups. By exploring affirmative action through the lens of political philosophy, particularly John Rawls' conception of social justice, the essay contends that a focus on socioeconomic status rather than race would more effectively promote equality of opportunity and align with Rawlsian principles. The analysis draws on various studies and theoretical perspectives to highlight the limitations of race-based affirmative action, including its tendency to benefit economically advantaged members of minority groups and its inadequacy in addressing the diverse and complex backgrounds of individuals within these groups. The essay proposes socioeconomic affirmative action as a more equitable alternative, supported by empirical evidence suggesting that such an approach could increase both socioeconomic and racial diversity in higher education institutions. The conclusion underscores the need for systemic reforms beyond admissions policies to truly achieve a just and equitable society.

Corporate Ethos and Justice as Fairness

This paper explores the integration of John Rawls’s (1921–2002) theory of “justice as fairness” into corporate social responsibility (CSR). It accentuates the shift from solely focusing on profit maximization to a model that prioritizes ethical governance and sustainable development. The paper reinterprets Rawls’s theory for corporate ethics and governance, asserting that businesses have a moral obligation to uphold fairness and equity beyond mere compliance or public perception. It acknowledges the role of the government in this integration. It recognizes the challenges in aligning Rawlsian principles with corporate objectives while balancing economic and societal obligations. The fusion of CSR with Rawlsian ideas can potentially bring transformative impacts to businesses, paving the way for a more equitable form of capitalism that combines economic goals with a strong commitment to social justice and ethical practices.

Educational Justice and School Boosting

School boosters are tax-exempt organizations that engage in fundraising efforts to provide public schools with supplementary resources. This paper argues that prevailing forms of school boosting are defeasibly unjust. Section 1 shows that inequalities in public education funding in the United States violate John Rawls’s two principles of domestic justice. Section 2 argues that prevailing forms of school boosting exacerbate and plausibly perpetuate these injustices. Section 3 then contends that boosting thereby defeasibly violates Rawlsian principles of nonideal theory for rectifying injustice. Thus, boosting should be presumptively either made illegal or substantially reformed. Finally, Section 4 responds to potential objections.

A general approach for computing a consensus in group decision making that integrates multiple ethical principles

We tackle the problem of computing a consensus according to multiple ethical principles – which can include, for example, the principle of maximum freedom associated with the Benthamite doctrine and the principle of maximum fairness associated with the Rawlsian principles – among the preferences of different individuals in the context of Group Decision-Making (GDM). More formally, we put forward a novel formalisation of the above-mentioned problem based on a multi-ℓp-norm approximation problem that aims at minimising multiple p-metric distance functions, where each parameter p represents a given ethical principle. Our contribution incurs obvious benefits from a social-choice perspective. Firstly, our approach significantly generalises state-of-the-art approaches that were limited to only two ethical principles (p=1, for maximum freedom, and p=∞, for maximum fairness). Secondly, our experimental results considering an established test case demonstrate that our approach is capable, thanks to a novel re-weighting scheme, to compute a multi-norm consensus that takes into account each ethical principle in a balanced way, in contrast with state-of-the-art approaches that were heavily biased towards the p=1 ethical principle.

MinMax fairness: from Rawlsian Theory of Justice to solution for algorithmic bias

This paper presents an intuitive explanation about why and how Rawlsian Theory of Justice (Rawls in A theory of justice, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1971) provides the foundations to a solution for algorithmic bias. The contribution of the paper is to discuss and show why Rawlsian ideas in their original form (e.g. the veil of ignorance, original position, and allowing inequalities that serve the worst-off) are relevant to operationalize fairness for algorithmic decision making. The paper also explains how this leads to a specific MinMaxfairness solution, which addresses the basic challenges of algorithmic justice. We combine substantive elements of Rawlsian perspective with an intuitive explanation in order to provide accessible and practical insights. The goal is to propose and motivate why and how the MinMaxfairness solution derived from Rawlsian principles overcomes some of the current challenges for algorithmic bias and highlight the benefits provided when compared to other approaches. The paper presents and discusses the solution by building a bridge between the qualitative theoretical aspects and the quantitative technical approach.

SIGNIFICANTS OF RAWLSIAN PRINCIPLES ASSOCIATED WITH VARIATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

Considering economic inequality as a vulnerability, both in economic and social terms, the paper discusses, with the help of the two Rawlsian principles of difference (negative case - increase in economic inequality, positive case - decrease in economic inequality), nuances of the acceptability or unacceptability of any changes in it. The paper is structured in two sections, the context section, which presents the basic concepts and details of the difference principle in managing the growth of economic inequality, and a discussion section, which examines two aspects: a critical evaluation of the originary difference principle and a new (related) difference principle that can manage, from a social justice perspective, the decline of economic inequality in society. The last part of the paper includes results, conclusions and some future research directions.

Self-Respect and the Justification of Rawlsian Principles of Justice

ABSTRACT In this article I examine the importance of self-respect in the justification of Rawls’s theory of justice. First, I present two elements that are part of the contemporary debate on self-respect as a form of self-worth—namely, moral status and merit. Second, I specify the bases that support self-respect within A Theory of Justice. Finally, I discuss at length the function of self-respect in justifying the principles of justice. This inquiry implies an analysis of the relationship between self-respect and the component parts of the two principles of justice: basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle. I also explore the connection between self-respect and the sense of justice in light of the stability argument, and how the relationship between the two is important for achieving social stability.

Justice and Ecocide

According to an environmental application of Rawlsian principles of justice, the well-ordered society cannot tolerate the perpetration of certain environmental harms. This paper gives an account of those harms committed in the form of ecocide. The concept of ecocide is developed, as well as the ideal of eco-relational pluralism, as conceptual tools for defending citizens’ environmental interests. This paper aims to identify persuasive and reasonably acceptable justice claims for compelling states to curtail environmentally destructive activities through recourse to principles firmly established in the liberal tradition, while simultaneously exploring the limitations of such an approach.

‘Ai Theory of Justice’: Using Rawlsian Approaches to Legislate Better on Machine Learning in Government

Policymaking is increasingly being informed by ‘big data’ technologies of analytics, machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI). John Rawls used particular principles of reasoning in his 1971 book, A Theory of Justice, which might help explore known problems of data bias, unfairness, accountability and privacy, in relation to applications of machine learning and AI in government. This paper will investigate how the current assortment of UK governmental policy and regulatory developments around AI in the public sector could be said to meet, or not meet, these Rawlsian principles, and what we might do better by incorporating them when we respond legislatively to this ongoing challenge. This paper uses a case study of data analytics and machine-learning regulation as the central means of this exploration of Rawlsian thinking in relation to the redevelopment of algorithmic governance.

Allergies and Asthma: Employing principles of social justice as a guide in public health policy development

The growing epidemic of allergy and allergy-induced asthma poses a significant challenge to population health. This article, written for a target audience of policy-makers in public health, aims to contribute to the development of policies to counter allergy morbidities by demonstrating how principles of social justice can guide public health initiatives in reducing allergy and asthma triggers. Following a discussion of why theories of social justice have utility in analyzing allergy, a step-wise policy assessment protocol formulated on Rawlsian principles of social justice is presented. This protocol can serve as a tool to aid in prioritizing public health initiatives and identifying ethically problematic policies that necessitate reform. Criteria for policy assessment include: 1) whether a tentative public health intervention would provide equal health benefit to a range of allergy and asthma sufferers, 2) whether targeting initiatives towards particular societal groups is merited based on the notion of ‘worst-off status’ of certain population segments, and 3) whether targeted policies have the potential for stigmatization. The article concludes by analyzing three examples of policies used in reducing allergy and asthma triggers in order to convey the general thought process underlying the use of the assessment protocol, which public health officials could replicate as a guide in actual, region-specific policy development.

Bhandary on Liberal Care Provision

According to Asha Bhandary, there is a liberal (Rawlsian) justification for including “the receipt of dependency care among the benefits of social cooperation” (“Liberal Dependency Care,” 43). The novelty is to claim that such care is among the Rawlsian circumstances of justice. I argue that liberalism does not support this extremely strong claim. Dependency care is indeed among the goods generated by social cooperation, broadly speaking—but so are virtually all goods, such as pizza provision, scarcely any of which are among the circumstances of justice. Most of us have ample inclination toward caring for dependents—but neither is this extended to everyone else’s dependents, nor is it mostly a legal duty, as indeed having children at all is not. Nor should it be on liberal principles. Neither of the two Rawlsian Principles support general dependency care. And, Bhandary’s “strong proceduralism,” calling for the training of all persons in care-giving skills, would edge up toward totalitarianism—hardly a welcome outcome of liberalism.

Flood vulnerability, risk, and social disadvantage: current and future patterns in the UK

Present day and future social vulnerability, flood risk, and disadvantage across the UK are explored using the UK Future Flood Explorer. In doing so, new indices of neighbourhood flood vulnerability and social flood risk are introduced and used to provide a quantitative comparison of the flood risks faced by more and less socially vulnerable neighbourhoods. The results show the concentrated nature of geographic flood disadvantage. For example, ten local authorities account for 50% of the most socially vulnerable people that live in flood prone areas. The results also highlight the systematic nature of flood disadvantage. For example, flood risks are higher in socially vulnerable communities than elsewhere; this is shown to be particularly the case in coastal areas, economically struggling cities, and dispersed rural communities. Results from a re-analysis of the Environment Agency’s Long-Term Investment Scenarios (for England) suggest a long-term economic case for improving the protection afforded to the most socially vulnerable communities; a finding that reinforces the need to develop a better understanding of flood risk in socially vulnerable communities if flood risk management efforts are to deliver fair outcomes. In response to these findings, the paper advocates an approach to flood risk management that emphasises Rawlsian principles of preferentially targeting risk reduction for the most socially vulnerable and avoids a process of prioritisation based upon strict utilitarian or purely egalitarian principles.

Fact-Sensitivity and the ‘Defining-Down’ Objection

This paper aims to clarify what it means for a normative theory to be fact-sensitive, and what might be wrong with such sensitivity, by examining the ways in which ‘justice as fairness’ depends upon facts. While much of the fact-sensitivity of Rawls’s principles consists of innocent limitations of generality, Rawls’s appeal to stability raises a legitimate worry about defining justice down in order to make ‘justice’ stable. If it should turn out that the correct principles of justice are inconsistent with human nature, it might be important for us to recognize that as a feature of human psychology we regret, rather than revising our principles for the sake of stability in a way that obscures the fact that there is anything to regret. Whether or not Rawlsian principles are in fact watered down depends on how one interprets the role of reciprocity in the theory. Reciprocity can be seen as a fact about human psychology that limits the extent to which justice can be realized where assurance of compliance on the part of others is lacking. Or it can be seen as a fact about justice, to wit, that its point is to create a relationship of mutual recognition and respect, making strictly unilateral compliance pointless.

Unemployment in a Just Economy

This paper is based on the ideas of political philosopher John Rawls who suggested that a just society is one which would be created behind a “veil of ignorance”, that is to say, without knowing where one would end up in the society’s distribution of talent and other attributes valued in the labor market. Today’s labor market does not meet this criterion inasmuch as risk averse people would not be willing to enter it at random, being too concerned about ending up among the excluded, i.e., those without full time jobs which today in the U.S. is still 10% of the labor force or some 15 million people (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). This is substantial but it does not even include about 5 million additional people who have dropped out of the labor force altogether or the 2.3 million convicts in jail. Thus, a just labor market would strive for full employment beyond the implications of NAIRU. The latter concept is actually misleading, because most economists and commentators in the media equate it with “full employment”. As a consequence, endemic and large scale un- and underemployment is accepted as an inevitable attribute of the labor market. This is insidious inasmuch as the concept assumes that the institutional structure of the labor market is held constant. According to Rawlsian principles the aim should be to bring unemployment down to the minimum feasible rate which in the U.S. is most likely around 1.2%, -- the rate which prevailed in 1944 and which probably represents an attainable lower bound. Instead of the prevailing system, the right to work needs to be recognized as a natural right, because the right to life depends upon it. Several ways are proposed to create an inclusive labor market that distributes the available work in a more equitable fashion than the current system and envisions a just economy on Rawlsian principles that risk-averse people would be willing to enter at random.

What Do Liberal Democratic States Owe the Victims of Disasters? A Rawlsian Account

AbstractIs there a principled way to understand what liberal democratic states owe, as a matter of justice, to the victims (survivors) of disasters? This article shows what is normatively special and distinctive about disasters and argues for the view that there are substantial duties of justice for liberal democratic states. The article rejects both a libertarian and a utilitarian approach to this question and, based on broadly Rawlsian principles, argues for a ‘political definition’ of disasters that is concerned with the restoration of citizens' dignity and their capacities for effective citizenship.

Robotic Nudges: The Ethics of Engineering a More Socially Just Human Being.

Robots are becoming an increasingly pervasive feature of our personal lives. As a result, there is growing importance placed on examining what constitutes appropriate behavior when they interact with human beings. In this paper, we discuss whether companion robots should be permitted to "nudge" their human users in the direction of being "more ethical". More specifically, we use Rawlsian principles of justice to illustrate how robots might nurture "socially just" tendencies in their human counterparts. Designing technological artifacts in such a way to influence human behavior is already well-established but merely because the practice is commonplace does not necessarily resolve the ethical issues associated with its implementation.

Historical Injustice, Rawlsian Egalitarianism, and Political Contestation

Jeremy Waldron has plausibly argued that historical injustices can be superseded by serious efforts to achieve justice in the present and future. This essay considers what it might mean to arrange things justly in the relevant way, focusing on the work of John Rawls as our best existing template for conceptualizing justice of this kind. The essay outlines ways in which a Rawlsian system of social justice seems unable to meet its own normative aspirations and unable to provide a model for overcoming historically constituted disadvantage. As the essay argues, the society described by Rawls is likely to remain divided by inherited class structures, given the motivational requirements of markets and the psychological effects of the division of labor, so that inheritors of historical injustice would remain disadvantaged even if Rawlsian principles were put into practice. The essay considers some speculative methods for overcoming these inequalities, and argues that the most promising approach in circumstances as we know them will draw on already-existing programs of compensation for historical expropriation. The essay also argues that Rawlsians should take seriously the application of the difference principle to the distribution of political authority alongside material resources, suggesting that we should give careful thought to how political structures can protect the interests of the least advantaged. The paper argues that, once again, existing mechanisms for Aboriginal self-governance are more appropriate as a system of forward-looking justice than they may otherwise appear. The essay argues in closing that political philosophy should give increased attention to the ethics of political action and to conflict among the disadvantaged in imperfect circumstances.

Civic phronēsis

Eric Nelson has recently argued that John Rawls’ interpretation of the maxim to respect persons as ends in themselves which grants priority to our least-advantaged citizens violates the liberal commitment to neutrality towards each person’s capability to choose her or his conception of the good. This violation is revealed by the sectarian character of Martha Nussbaum’s list of capabilities, her Aristotelian extension of Rawls’ distributive ethics. I argue that Nelson advances an elitist interpretation of the non-violability of persons, in which the capabilities of oneself are set in opposition to those of an other. He thus overlooks for his purposes the anti-sacrificial telos of the Rawlsian principles of justice which articulates the capabilities of oneself as another. Nelson’s elitism may itself be traced to Nussbaum’s rejection of Rawls’ distributive figuration of capability, the Aristotelian heritage of which is developed by Paul Ricoeur and which underwrites civic phronēsis on societal norms of reciprocity.

Are intellectual property rights compatible with Rawlsian principles of justice?

This paper argues that intellectual property rights are incompatible with Rawls's principles of justice. This conclusion is based upon an analysis of the social stratification that emerges as a result of the patent mechanism which defines a marginalized group and ensure that its members remain alienated from the rights, benefits, and freedoms afforded by the patent product. This stratification is further complicated, so I argue, by the copyright mechanism that restricts and redistributes those rights already distributed by means of the patent mechanism. I argue that the positions of privilege established through both the patent and the copyright mechanisms are positions that do not "allow the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all." They do not "benefit the least advantaged." Nor are they "open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." In making this argument I critically assess the utilitarian defense of intellectual property rights and find it insufficient to respond to the injustices manifest in our current arrangement for the protection of intellectual property rights.

Decision Criteria in Ethical Dilemma Situations: Empirical Examples from Austrian Managers

This article is the result of an empirical research project analyzing the decision behaviour of Austrian managers in ethical dilemma situations. While neoclassical economic theory would suggest a pure economic rational basis for management decisions, the empirical study conducted by the authors put other concepts to a test, thereby analyzing their importance for managerial decision making: specific notions of fairness, reciprocal altruism, and commitment. After reviewing some of the theoretical literature dealing with such notions, the article shows the results of an online survey working with scenarios depicting ethical dilemma situations. By judging such scenarios the respondents showed their preference for the named concepts, though with different degrees of confirmation. The results (with all limitations of an online survey in mind) support the theoretical work on the named concepts: Fairness elements (including Rawlsian principles of justice and an understanding of fairness as conceived by a reference transaction) play a major part in management decisions in ethical dilemma situations. Also, commitment as a behaviour that sticks to rules even if personal welfare is negatively touched, and reciprocal altruism as a cooperative behaviour that expects a reciprocal beneficial action from other persons have been concepts used by Austrian managers when analyzing ethical dilemmas. The article also tries to put the results into a comparative perspective by taking into account other studies on ethical decision factors conducted with, e.g. medical doctors or journalists, and by discussing intercultural implications of business ethics.