Rawls Claims Research Articles

Runaway Climate Change: A Justice‐Based Case for Precautions

Runaway Climate Change: A Justice‐Based Case for Precautions

Rawls on the practicability of utilitarianism

John Rawls's claim to have demonstrated the superiority of his own two principles of justice to the principle of utility has generated fairly extensive critical discussion. However, this discussion has almost completely disregarded those of Rawls's arguments that are concerned with practicability, despite the significance accorded to them by Rawls himself. This article addresses the three most important of Rawls's objections against the practicability of utilitarianism: (1) that utilitarianism would generate too much disagreement to be politically workable, (2) that a utilitarian society would be vulnerable to social instability, and (3) that publicly adopting the principle of utility as the ultimate criterion of right and wrong would undermine the self-respect of some citizens. It is argued that Rawls's objections are either exaggerated or mistaken, and that this may have an impact on the assessment of `justice as fairness' as well as the utilitarian doctrine.

Religious Democracy and the Liberal Principle of Legitimacy

John Rawls's liberal principle of legitimacy states that the essentials of a constitution must be reasonably acceptable to all citizens.1 This principle in effect precludes the possibility of a fully legitimate religious constitutional order, at least in normal circumstances in religiously pluralistic societies. Members of religious minorities cannot be reasonably expected to endorse constitutional essentials that embody controversial elements of a religion they do not accept. Rawls claims that the liberal principle would be selected in the original position, and that the argument for its selection is in essence the same as the argument for the two principles of justice as fairness.2 1 argue against this claim. My thesis is that the parties in the original position have no compelling reason to select the liberal principle in addition to a democratic principle of legitimacy. This democratic principle states that political power must be exercised within a constitutional order that respects the equal status of all citizens and that effectively guarantees each citizen the basic liberal rights and entitlements necessary to participate in political processes on equal terms. The liberal principle incorporates the democratic principle since reasonable citizens would not find a basic political inequality acceptable. But the democratic principle does not imply the liberal

Rawls on Kant

This article will investigate Rawls's claim that his theory is Kantian in origin. In drawing on the Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, I will show that Rawls's claim to be Kantian cannot be conclusively explained and assessed without the Lectures. An investigation of the Lectures shows that Rawls forces onto Kant's theory a Rawlsian interpretation which crucially alters Kant's theory. So far the secondary literature has neglected to subject Rawls's Lectures to detailed philosophical scrutiny. This article aims to fill this gap in the literature on Rawls's Kantianism. I will identify three points in Rawls's interpretation of Kant (need for CI-procedure, willing condition, true human needs) which are questionable. I argue that the similarities of Rawls's theory to Kant are due to these (mis)interpretations, which makes Rawls's claim to be Kantian ultimately not legitimate.

Noncomparabilities & Nonstandard Logics

Many normative theories set forth in the welfare economics, distributive justice and cognate literatures posit noncomparabilities or incommensurabilities between magnitudes of various kinds. In some cases these gaps are predicated on metaphysical claims, in others upon epistemic claims, and in still others upon political-moral claims. I show that in all such cases they are best given formal expression in nonstandard logics that reject bivalence, excluded middle, or both. I do so by reference to an illustrative case study: a contradiction known to beset John Rawls's selection and characterization of primary goods as the proper distribuendum in any distributively just society. The contradiction is avoided only by reformulating Rawls's claims in a nonstandard form, which form happens also to cohere quite attractively with Rawls's intuitive argumentation on behalf of his claims.

Civic respect, political liberalism, and non-liberal societies

One prominent criticism of John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples is that it treats certain non-liberal societies, what Rawls calls ‘decent hierarchical societies’, as equal participants in a just international system. Rawls claims that these non-liberal societies should be respected as equals by liberal democratic societies, even though they do not grant their citizens the basic rights of democratic citizenship. This is presented by Rawls as a consequence of liberalism’s commitment to the principle of toleration. A number of critics have claimed that Rawls’s treatment of these non-liberal societies is symptomatic of a more general problem with political liberalism, namely, its reliance on toleration as its ‘fundamental principle’. Against this view, I argue that the principle of toleration should not be understood as political liberalism’s ‘fundamental principle’. This is revealed through a consideration of the normative basis of what Rawls calls the ‘Liberal Principle of Legitimacy’. A correct understanding of political liberalism’s ‘fundamental principle’, which I claim is a principle of equal ‘civic respect’ for citizens, shows that Rawls’s toleration of non-liberal societies is in fact a misapplication of political liberalism to the global domain. Moreover, I explain that political liberalism must assert that the principle of equal civic respect for citizens is the correct principle to govern the public political relations of citizens in all pluralist societies, and that most ‘decent hierarchical societies’ are pluralist in nature. Identifying political liberalism’s fundamental principle as that of equal civic respect for citizens helps to render political liberalism, in both the domestic and international domains, a more coherent and compelling approach to thinking about fundamental political issues.

Human Embryos in the Original Position?

Two different discussions in John Rawls' A Theory of Justice lead naturally to a rather conservative position on the moral status of the human embryo. When discussing paternalism, he claims that the parties in the original position would seek to protect themselves in case they end up as incapacitated or undeveloped human beings when the veil of ignorance is lifted. Since human embryos are examples of such beings, the parties in the original position would seek to protect themselves from their embryonic stages onward. When discussing the basis of equality, Rawls claims that the parties in the original position would guarantee basic rights for all those with the capacity to take part in this original position. To guarantee the basic rights of infants and young children, he goes on to interpret this capacity as a "potentiality that is ordinarily realized in due course." Since human embryos have this potentiality, they too should have basic rights.

Rawls on Global Distributive Justice: A Defence

Critical response to John Rawls's The Law of Peopleshas been surprisingly harsh) Most of the complaints centre on Rawls's claim that there are no obligations of distributive justice among nations. Many of Rawls's critics evidently had been hoping for a global application of the difference principle, so that wealthier nations would be bound to assign lexical priority to the development of the poorest nations, or perhaps the primary goods endowment of the poorest citizens of any nation. Their subsequent disappointment reveals that, while the reception of Rawls's political philosophy has been very broad, it has not been especially deep. Rawls has very good reason for denying that there are obligations of distributive justice in an international context.

Universalization or Threat Advantage? The Difficult Dialogue between Discourse Ethics and the Theory of Rational Choice

InA Theory of Justice, Rawls claims that “to each according to his threat advantage is not a conception of justice.” Although it may indeed seem intuitively plausible that a principle based on “threat advantage” cannot count as a principle of justice, it is an altogether different matter to explain why this is so. The question is especially pressing if one bears in mind that such a principle of bargaining in fact underlies many institutionally regulated interactions. Moreover, to the extent that morality is thought of as a mechanism for guaranteeing mutual advantage in the resolution of conflicts, it may indeed seem necessary that it reflect the bargaining power of the parties (in order to make sure that it is indeed advantageous for all of them). In fact, there is a prominent tradition of social-contract theories (from Hobbes to Gauthier) that work under this assumption and claim to provide an answer to what justice requires as much as Rawls's theory does. So seen, the burden of proof seems to fall rather on the shoulders of those committed to claim both that morality is a mechanism that works to the advantage of all and that it nevertheless requires neutralizing all differences in bargaining power.

¿Puede el utilitarismo ser deontológico? Una respuesta a Kymlicka

En Teoría de la justicia, Rawls sostiene que los defectos normativos que contienen algunas concepciones de justicia, como el utilitarismo y el perfeccionismo, se deben a que, por su carácter teleológico, no otorgan prioridad a lo correcto en relación con lo bueno. Kymlicka ha cuestionado esta afirmación siguiendo la estrategia de brindar una interpretación del utilitarismo que respete la prioridad de lo correcto. Esto mostraría que los defectos normativos que Rawls atribuye al utilitarismo no podrían explicarse por su carácter teleológico. La clasificación de las doctrinas en deontológicas o teleológicas carecería de la relevancia que Rawls le adjudica. El presente artículo tiene por objeto mostrar que el argumento de Kymlicka para señalar la trivialidad de la clasificación no se sostiene, pues fracasa en su intento de brindar una interpretación deontológica del utilitarismo.

Reviewing Public Reason: A Critique of Rawls’ Political Liberalism and the Idea of Public Reason

This article provides a critical review of Rawls’ effort in Political Liberalism to construct a political theory of justice compatible with the fact of reasonable pluralism. Particular attention is given to the ‘idea of public reason’ and political liberalism’s liberal neutrality. It is argued that because of its liberal neutrality, political liberalism would preclude people from endorsing at least some reasonable comprehensive views and, therefore, as a theory it lacks the necessary stability required to be as successful as Rawls claims.

Without Regret: The Comprehensive Nature of Non-Domination

In this article I examine Rawls's claim that there is no fundamental opposition between political liberalism and republicanism. I contend that Rawls's position is untenable in light of the necessary values and virtues that must accompany republican liberty as non-domination. Furthermore, I examine the ‘regret’ Rawls has toward some of the ‘political virtues’ of his approach and argue that if republicans were to have the same attitude, republican liberty as non-domination would be undermined. I conclude that republicanism is likely to be accompanied by values and virtues that affect the whole of an individual's life and therefore can be said to be a comprehensive doctrine.

POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND TRUTH

Every theory of justice requires a first-order theory specifying principles of justice, and a second-order view explaining why those principles constitute the correct principles of justice. According to John Rawls, political liberalism is committed to the two principles of justice specified in its first-order theory, “justice as fairness.” Justice as fairness, according to Rawls, in turn presupposes the second-order view that justice is a political conception. A political conception of justice treats the principles derived from the fundamental ideas in the public political culture as the correct principles of justice. Political liberalism, however, nowhere offers a defense of the view that justice is a political conception. Indeed, it even strives to avoid the admission that it presupposes that justice is a political conception by stating only that it uses a political conception of justice, while allowing that justice might not actually be a political conception. As to the truth of its second-order presupposition, political liberalism chooses to remain agnostic. Rawls claims that political liberalism has no choice at all. To do otherwise, he argues, would lead to an internal contradiction.

Critical remarks on Rawls's burdens of judgement

I examine the role of the burdens of judgement argument in Rawls's defence of the claim that liberalism cannot be based on a comprehensive doctrine. According to Rawls, the burdens of judgement make it very unlikely that most individuals can agree on anything more than a purely political morality. I argue that the argument does not succeed. I concentrate on the last three burdens which are specifically about problems of reaching normative agreement. Firstly, I argue that Rawls's claim that modern society inevitably gives rise to a diversity of values is not convincing since for every claim of divergence a counterclaim of convergence can be provided. Secondly, I provide examples of plausible agreement on partial comprehensive doctrines. Thirdly, I argue that liberalism must rely on at least one partial comprehensive doctrine, namely, the value of autonomous choice. I conclude that the burdens of judgement argument does not demonstrate that liberalism cannot be based on comprehensive moral foundations.

Persons, Selves, and Utilitarianism

A common objection to utilitarianism is that maximizing the total or the average net happiness fails to take sufficient account of the separateness of persons.' In one guise, this is of course the Rawlsian complaint against utilitarianism. Rawls claims that the utilitarian approach extends to society as a whole the principle of rational prudence for one person.2 This approach can best be characterized as that of an impartial, sympathetic spectator who imaginatively identifies with each and every member of society, thus conflating all their desires within one experience, which in turn makes it possible to treat the internal ordering of the community as though it were much the same problem as that of maximizing an individual's desire satisfaction. Thus, it allow's a society to balance the satisfactions and dissatisfactions, the gains and losses, of different individuals as if they together formed one individual seeking the greatest balance of satisfaction. The problem, naturally, is that a society is not like a person. Adopting this approach amounts to treating the different identities of persons as if they were of no more importance, for the ordering of society, than the different stages of an individual's life are for its prudent ordering. But a society is composed of distinct persons, each with a life to lead, a point of view, and so on. As distinct systems of ends, persons cannot simply be cashed out asjust so many containers for valuable experiences, since the boundaries between individuals are of more than merely derivative importance and indeed define the very object of moral concern. Derek Parfit has long been identified with a somewhat unusualand admittedly speculative-response to such objections to utilitarianism. His suggestion is that the utilitarian approach derive, not from the conflation of persons, but from their (partial) disintegration. It may rest upon the view that a person's life is less deeply integrated than we mostly think. Utilitarians may be treating benefits and burdens, not as if they

“Moral Theory” Versus Political Philosophy: Two Approaches to Justice

John Rawls's book A Theory of Justice1 has been widely looked to not only as a substantive account of the meaning of justice, but also as a model of the procedure by which the requirements of justice may be determined. Rawls terms his mode of approach to justice “moral theory,” and apparently subsumes the traditional discipline of political philosophy under this more inclusive science. At the same time, he claims that his approach is Socratic in nature, and that it “goes back in its essentials to Aristotle's procedure in the Nicomachean Ethics” (pp. 49, 51). “Moral theory,” from this point of view, is simply a new name for the enterprise pursued by the great political philosophers from Socrates onwards. But, surprisingly, despite the number of outstanding thinkers who devoted themselves to this enterprise, little progress was ever made in it, for the theories with which we have been left, according to Rawls, remain “primitive and have grave defects” (p. 52). It is Rawls's claim to have developed a “theory of justice” that is superior to any of those devised by previous philosophers, in that it conforms better to the dictates of men's “sense of justice” (p. 52).

Fair Contracts and Beautiful Intuitions

John Rawls, the twentieth century political liberal and arch-foe of utilitarianism, has resurrected the moral methodology of contractualism on the battleground of normative ethics. Rawls’ theory illuminates both the power and the weaknesses of all theories of contractualism in normative ethics.In this paper, I examine what Rawls believes contractualism can accomplish in ethics. Then I examine one crucial aspect of Rawls’ contractualism — the notion of fairness. Next, I argue that Rawls begs the question of the choice of principles against utilitarianism. One way in which question-begging occurs is by forsaking any real conception of bargaining agents, substituting instead many abstract instantiations of one non-envious, mildly self-interested, impartial agent. Rawls claims that it is of “great importance” (141-142) that agents in the social contract achieve unanimity. In reality, the contractstipulatesunamimity among its agents, instead of the opposite, where unanimity follows from consensus over fair principles. The veil of ignorance does not guarantee impartiality, but instead, it precludes choosing utilitarian principles. Finally, I test the adequacy of Rawlsian contractualism by applying it to an important problem in modern medicine involving justice,viz.,the just allocation of scarce medical resources.

Philosophers' Contracts and the Law

The notion of an original social contract has been generally criticized since the time of Kant. Critics have dismissed it as a fiction of Enlightenment political philosophy: empirically unsupported, based on a model of detached rationality, blind the forces of psychology, sociology, and history, and finally lacking teeth morally and politically. In A Theory ofJustice, John Rawls resurrects this Enlightenment fiction, particularly in its Kantian form, and gives it new flesh: methodological clarity, plausible empirical assumptions, an elaborate socioeconomic model of rationality, historical relevance, and moral determinateness. Rawls claims only to generalize and carry a higher order of abstraction the traditional theory of the social contract as represented by Locke, Rousseau, and but clearly he is too modest in disclaim[ing] any originality (TJ, p. viii).' In this paper, I want examine in some detail one aspect of Rawls's originality: his elaboration of the original social contract in terms of the concept of rational choice drawn from contemporary economic theory. In so doing, I shall question Rawls's theory at two points. First, with respect the starting point of his analysis, I shall question his version of the original social contract as an instrumental process of reasoning for the construction of constitutive principles of a just society. Here I shall contrast the employment of the social contract by Rawls with its employment by Kant, whose heritage Rawls principally claims. Second, with respect the product of Rawls's analysis, I shall question his account of legal institutions for the articulation and maintenance of principles of justice in the community. I shall argue that