Rational Requirements Research Articles

Narrow-scoping for wide-scopers

Many philosophers think that requirements of rationality are “wide-scope”. That is to say: they are requirements to make true some material conditional, such that one counts as satisfying the requirement iff one either makes the conditional’s antecedent false or makes its consequent true. These contrast with narrow-scope requirements, where the ‘requires’ operator takes scope only over the consequent of the conditional. Many of the philosophers who have preferred wide-scope requirements to narrow-scope requirements have also endorsed a corresponding semantic claim, namely that ordinary talk about rationality, despite appearances to the contrary, expresses wide-scope claims. In doing so, they seek to avoid attributing massive error to ordinary speakers. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that the wide-scope semantics inadequately captures the meaning of ordinary talk about rationality. It seems, then, that we are left with a dilemma: either give up the view that requirements of rationality are wide-scope, or accept an implausible semantics for ordinary talk about rationality, or attribute massive error to speakers. In this paper, I argue that this dilemma is only apparent, since we can appeal to a standard kind of contextualist semantics for modals to explain why narrow-scope talk comes out true in virtue of the wide-scope requirements. My view, then, combines wide-scoping about the explanatorily fundamental requirements of rationality with a contextualist variant of a narrow-scope semantics. I argue that this view gives us the best of both worlds, as well as solving related puzzles and challenges for the extant views in the literature.

Magnetic Compass in Modern Maritime Navigation

This article looks into the role of magnetic compass in providing the navigational safety of the ship. Existing requirements for the magnetic compass at the presence of satellite navigation are not economically justified. Therefore, a new rational requirement is proposed for the accuracy and frequency of deviation compensation work assuring the safety of navigation and cost-effectiveness. The proposed method has been verified by a lab experiment.

On the use of inclusion structure in fuzzy clustering algorithm in case of Gaussian membership functions

This article addresses the problem of incorporating an inclusion structure in the general class of fuzzy c-means algorithms. Conventionally, all the classes of fuzzy clustering algorithms involve a distance structure as the main tool to compute the interaction between the expected class prototypes and all the patterns. However, as the inclusion violates the basic metric assumptions, thereby it cannot be directly substituted for regular distance structure. The approach, advocated in this paper, consists of supporting the distance structure by a semi definite matrix A, which preserves the inclusion constraint globally for each class. Particularly, a graded inclusion index is put forward that takes into account the rational requirements underlying the definition of the inclusion of two Gaussian membership functions. Behaviour and algebraic properties of the proposed methodology are investigated. The proposed approach is then incorporated into the general fuzzy c-mean scheme, where the corresponding optimization problem is solved. Using both synthetic and real datasets, some illustrations are carried out in order to highlight the performances of the constructed algorithm and their evaluations, which are also compared to standard fuzzy c-means algorithm.

Preference‐Conditioned Necessities: Detachment and Practical Reasoning

AbstractThis article is about conditionalized modal statements whose antecedents concern a preferential attitude of an agent. The focus is on anankastic conditionals or, as they are known in the philosophical literature, hypothetical imperatives. We present a linguistically‐motivated analysis of anankastic and related conditionals and use it to address challenges for semantic theories of natural language conditionals motivated by certain philosophical concerns about practical reasoning and the requirements of rationality.

When Reasons Obligate

This paper explores isomorphism between two relationships. The first is that between reasons and requirements. Reasons for action (or for belief - but focus here is action) differ from requirements, in that reasons are typically merely advisory while requirements are mandatory. We are rationally required to do that which there is most reason for us to do (and of course if we have most reason to do nothing, that is what reason requires). This way of understanding relationship between reasons for action and what reasons require of an actor has been called maximizing conception. The second relationship is that between moral reasons (a subset of reasons generally, but not necessarily a proper subset) and moral requirements. It is natural to assume that moral reasons ripen into moral requirements in same manner that reasons generally ripen into rational requirements: we are morally required to do what we have most reason, morally, to do. This transposition of maximizing view from realm of reasons generally to moral realm can be traced to Moore. The paper defends a version of Moore's view, despite its perhaps drastic consequences. Part of this defense consists of taking into account putative incomparability between certain types of moral reasons. The paper argues that incomparability, far from undermining maximizing view, helps it accommodate possibility of moral options, and to that extent to avoid what has become commonly known as the strenuousness objection, typically directed against consequentialistic species of maximizing conception. But larger part of this defense consists of criticism of alternative accounts of relationship between moral reasons and moral requirements. Historically, a number of ideas have been invoked to close gap between reasons and requirements, or (as gap could also be described) between goodness and obligation. Sanction theories, voluntaristic theories, and rationalistic or universalization theories are examined and found wanting. The paper concludes that maximizing conception can be reconciled with whatever is defensible in each of these alternatives: a unary account of morality and rationality is available once moral reasoning is represented as an operation of maximization performed upon a filtered or supplemented set of reasons bearing upon actor.

On the problem of computing the conglomerable natural extension

Embedding conglomerability as a rationality requirement in probability was among the aims of Walley's behavioural theory of coherent lower previsions. However, recent work has shown that this attempt has only been partly successful. If we focus in particular on the extension of given assessments to a rational and conglomerable model (in the least-committal way), we have that the procedure used in Walley's theory, the natural extension, provides only an approximation to the model that is actually sought for: the so-called conglomerable natural extension. In this paper we consider probabilistic assessments in the form of a coherent lower prevision P̲, which is another name for a lower expectation functional, and make an in-depth mathematical study of the problem of computing the conglomerable natural extension for this case: that is, where it is defined as the smallest coherent lower prevision F̲≥P̲ that is conglomerable, in case it exists. Past work has shown that F̲ can be approximated by an increasing sequence (E̲n)n∈N of coherent lower previsions. We solve an open problem by showing that this sequence can consist of infinitely many distinct elements. Moreover, we give sufficient conditions, of quite broad applicability, to make sure that the point-wise limit of the sequence is F̲ in case P̲ is the lower envelope of finitely many linear previsions. In addition, we study the question of the existence of F̲ and its relationship with the notion of marginal extension.

RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND REASONING

This critical note concerns John Broome's book Rationality through Reasoning (2013). Broome claims that rationality amounts to satisfying rational requirements as opposed to responding correctly to reasons. My critique focuses on two issues. First, I try to show that Broome's account of rational requirements, in particular his answer to the so-called ‘symmetry-problem’, presupposes that responding correctly to reasons is part of rationality. Secondly, in discussing Broome's account of reasoning I criticize his claim that first-order reasoning involves no appeal to reasons and, hence, no normative thoughts on behalf of the reasoner.

Begging the Question: A Qualified Defense

This discussion examines two of the central notions at work in Sterba’s From Rationality to Equality: question-beggingness, and the notion of a rational requirement. I point out that, against certain unreasonable positions, begging the question is a perfectly reasonable option. I also argue that if we use the sense of “rational requirement” that philosophers ought (and tend) to have in mind when defending the idea that morality is rationally required, then Sterba has not succeed in defending this idea. Rather, he has at most demonstrated the rational preferability of morality over two other positions: an extreme egoism, and a very particular form of altruism. But another position exists: one that holds altruistic reasons to exist, and to be capable of justifying sacrifices, but that also holds that they do not require us to sacrifice our interests in the way that morality sometimes does require.

Sacredness of the Constitutional Text and Interpretative Heresy: The Brazilian Supreme Court Decision on Same-Sex Civil Unions

The paper provides a close lecture of the arguments and methods of legal construction, employed in the extensive individual opinions written by the Justices of the Brazilian Supreme Court in the case which authorized the same sex civil union. After tracing an outline of the legal problem and his possible solutions, we analyze the individual opinions, showing their methodological syncretism, the use of legal methods and arguments in a contradictory way as well the deficiencies in the reasoning. The Justices use legal arguments, but do not meet the requirements of rationality in the decision-making. We have a rhetorical attempt that aims to satisfy the public opinion than to offer a comprehensive and coherent solution according the normative elements of the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988.

Minimalism about Intention: A Modest Defense

Intentions have recently played a starring role in theories of practical rationality. Michael Bratman’s Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) brought to everyone’s attention the importance of plans, general intentions, etc. in the life of a rational agent and argued for various requirements governing intentions, especially future-directed intentions. At the same time, there has been a general tendency to formulate more traditional principles of practical rationality in terms of intentions. Intentions, but not actions, seem to be under the rational control of the agent.In ‘Minimalism about Intention’, I first explain and motivate a general deflationist view of intention I call ‘minimalism’ about intentions. Minimalism contrasts with more robust views of intention, and in particular views that imply the existence of intention specific rational requirements; that is, rational requirements governing intentions that are not simple consequences of rational requirements on actions. I then distinguish four different types of putative rational requirements that are incompatible with minimalism. I argue that three of these requirement are supposed to be based on what I call ‘internal’ grounds. I then argue that these grounds are incapable of justifying any kind of rational requirement that is incompatible with minimalism. Detailed examination of the fourth type of putative requirement is left for another occasion, as it is supposed to be based on an entire different kind of justification (what I call ‘external’ grounds); however, I briefly sketch some reasons to be skeptical that this kind of justification would succeed. In sum, this paper tries to show that minimalism about intention turns out to be a rather plausible and compelling view.

How to derive a narrow-scope requirement from wide-scope requirements

I argue that given standard deontic logic, wide-scope rational requirements entail narrow-scope rational requirements. In particular, the widely-embraced Enkratic Principle entails that if a particular combination of attitudes is rationally forbidden, it is also rationally forbidden to believe that that combination of attitudes is required.

Is Evaluative Compositionality a Requirement of Rationality?

This paper presents a new solution to the problems for orthodox decision theory posed by the Pasadena game and its relatives. I argue that a key question raised by consideration of these gambles is whether evaluative compositionality (as I term it) is a requirement of rationality: is the value that an ideally rational agent places on a gamble determined by the values that she places on its possible outcomes, together with their mode of composition into the gamble (i.e. the probabilities assigned to them)? The paper first outlines a certain simple response to the Pasadena game and identifies two problems with this response, the second of which is that it leads to a wholesale violation of evaluative compositionality. I then argue that rationality does not require decision makers to factor in outcomes of arbitrarily low probability. A method for making decisions which flows from this basic idea is then developed, and it is shown that this decision method (Truncation) leads to a limited — as opposed to wholesale — violation of evaluative compositionality. The paper then argues that the truncation method yields solutions to the problems posed by the Pasadena game and its relatives that are both attractive in themselves and superior to those yielded by alternative proposals in the literature.

Diachronic Incontinence is a Problem in Moral Philosophy

Is there a rational requirement enjoining continence over time in the intentions one has formed, such that anyone going in for a certain form of agency has standing reason to conform to such a requirement? This paper suggests that there is not. I argue that Michael Bratman’s defense of such a requirement (‘Time, Rationality, and Self-Governance’. Philosophical Issues 22 [2012]: 73–88) succeeds in showing that many agents have a reason favoring default intention continence much of the time, but does not establish that all planning agents have such a reason in every case of intending. I then defend an account on which such a reason is grounded in the need to maintain the capacity to commit oneself to a practical option. But although I think this applies more widely than Bratman’s account, it is also not a reason that any planning agent has in every case. I tentatively conclude that although we have many good reasons to stick with our intentions once we have formed them, it is not required by rationality.

A Constitutive Account of ‘Rationality Requires’

The requirements of rationality are fundamental in practical and theoretical philosophy. Nonetheless, there exists no correct account of what constitutes rational requirements. This paper attempts to provide a correct constitutive account of ‘rationality requires’. I argue that rational requirements are grounded in ‘necessary explanations of subjective incoherence’, as I shall put it. Rationality requires of you to X if and only if your rational capacities, in conjunction with the fact that you not-X, explain necessarily why you have a non-maximal degree of subjective coherence.

Rational Choice versus Lawful Choice

The legal and the economic perspective on a policy proposal are likely to differ far more fundamentally than is commonly appreciated. Economists will impose certain minimal requirements of rationality on the evaluation process, which lawyers routinely violate. Economists will expect the evaluation process to be coherent in the sense of not exhibiting any intransitivity, not violating the Pareto principle, and not being susceptible to framing effects. Lawyers will routinely run afoul all of these. This paper shows what is at the root of these seeming irrationalities and why they are not so irrational after all.

On the Normativity of Intentions

Suppose you intend now to φ at some future time t. However, when t has come you do not φ. Something has gone wrong. This failing is not just a causal but also a normative failing. This raises the question how to characterize this failing. I discuss three alternative views. On the first view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy only if the balance of reasons pointed to φ-ing. The fact that you intended to φ does not add to the reasons for φ-ing at t. On the second view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy because you violate a requirement of rationality. Both these views have in common that they deny that intending to φ at t creates a reason to φ at t. The third alternative, the one I defend, claims that you often create reasons to φ by intending to φ.

The Normative Requirement of Means-End Rationality and Modest Bootstrapping

“Myth theorists” have recently called the normative requirement of means-end rationality into question. I show that we can accept certain lessons from the Myth Theorists and also salvage our intuition that there is a normative requirement of means-end rationality. I argue that any appeal to a requirement to make our attitudes coherent as such is superfluous and unnecessary in order to vindicate the requirement of means-end rationality and also avoid the problematic conclusion that persons ought to take the means to whatever ends they happen to intend.

II—Ralph Wedgwood: Doxastic Correctness

If beliefs are subject to a basic norm of correctness—roughly, to the principle that a belief is correct only if the proposition believed is true—how can this norm guide believers in forming their beliefs? Answer: this norm guides believers indirectly: believers are directly guided by requirements of rationality—which are themselves explained by this norm of correctness. The fundamental connection between rationality and correctness is probabilistic . Incorrectness comes in degrees; for beliefs, these degrees of incorrectness are measured by quadratic scoring rules, such as the so-called Brier score. This account is defended against objections; and its implications for suspension of judgement are explored.

Reasons Consequentialism

Douglas Portmore’s recent book, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Rationality Meets Morality, is an ambitious, painstaking effort to render the moral requirements of consequentialism consistent both with our intuitions and with the requirements of rationality. Portmore argues for a version of consequentialism that requires one to act in accordance with one’s reasons for preference or reasons for desire. I raise doubts here as to whether such reasons can explain moral requirements and whether, if they do, it would be of any practical use to know that they do.

Hidden symmetries and focal points

This paper provides a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure of the game. The set of alternative symmetry structures has itself a clear structure (a lattice). Focal points are strategy profiles which respect the symmetry structure and are chosen according to some meta-norm, which is not particular to the framed game at hand. We also clarify the difference between different concepts of symmetry used in the literature. The main aim of this paper is to provide a general framework for the analysis of focal points in the tradition of Schelling (1960). Our analysis also enables us to clarify the meaning of the concept of a framed game, which is extensively used in various forms in the literature. We remark right away that the framework we develop is not limited to pure coordination games (as most papers on focal points and framed games), but encompasses arbitrary normal-form games. Games, in this paper, are truly one-shot. That is, they are not played recurrently, such as the game of which side of the road to drive on, for which conventions have been established through recurrent interaction. Rather, we assume that players are unfamiliar with the particular game at hand (and have no expectation of ever playing it again either). The game might be of a form that is recognized, but the game itself is new to the players. 1 The game, in this paper, can also come with a frame 2 (context, setting). The frame can be familiar to players or it can be unfamiliar as well. We will argue that a formal definition of a focal point of a framed game has to come in two parts. First, a careful study of the symmetry structures present in the game and its frame is required. Much of this paper is devoted to the analysis of these symmetry structures. On the basis of the induced symmetry structure of a framed game, a subset of strategy profiles is identified which is consistent (in a well-specified sense) with this symmetry structure and meets certain rationality requirements. We shall call these rational symmetric recommendations. A multiplicity problem is unavoidable, and indeed will be exacerbated the more symmetries are broken by increasingly detailed frames. Hence, the second