ABSTRACT We live in an institutional world, where our identity is significantly shaped by our membership in institutional groups (from sports clubs and condo boards to state and international organisations). As such, then, understanding what those groups are and how they affect our reality through their actions is imperative. To that end, some philosophers have taken on the task of elucidating ‘institutional agency' (the capacity of institutional groups to act). Most recently, for example, Michael Bratman has introduced a theory of institutional agency, according to which an institutional group can act if the relevant participants act on an institutional intention (viz., a decision output that satisfies certain rationality constraints). Crucially, he develops this approach on the assumption that ‘planning agency' is the core capacity involved across various forms of human practical organization: individual, social, and institutional. However, this paper shows that while true that planning agency may be a basic element of individual and shared intentionality, it is not so relevant for institutional intentionality. In fact, contra Bratman’s intuitions, it argues that institutional agency is constructed out-of-group attitudes and actions, for which group agency, but not planning agency, is the core capacity.
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